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•ABSTRACT 
The thesis is a comprehensive examination of the Nigerian
Enterprises Promotion Decrees of 1972 and 1977, and more broadly
of the process of indigenisation in Nigeria.
A brief introduction to the historical background of indigenisation
before 1970 is followed by an account of the timing of the Decrees
in the context of the oil boom in the country's economy. An
examination of the problems encountered in implementing the Decrees
and their effects, and an analysis of the distribution of benefits,
is informed by empirical research including interviews, carried out
by the author in Nigeria between 1982 and 1985.
The record shows that indigenisation has led to the consolidation
of an economy which accommodates the interests of ex-State personnel,
the State as an institution, private indigenous businessmen and
foreign capital, in an order which is far from certain to bring about
the national economic independence which, in official terms, is the
chief objective.
Nigeria's commitment to capitalism and the promotion of
Indigenous private enterprise, on the basis of resources generated
initially by the agricultural economy, between the 1940s and 1960s,
and then much more spectacularly and more significantly by oil
revenues in the 1970s, provides an instructive example of the limits
to what a post-colonial society in black Africa can achieve by trying
to indigenise the ownership structure of its economy.
1$
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INTRODUCTION
Nigerian Enterprises Promotion Decrees and Indigenisation in Nigeria
The immediate post-colonial economic scene in Africa was
characterised by technological limitations, capital shortages, lack
of expertise and a paucity of skilled manpower. It was against this
background that indigenisation of the economies of newly independent
African countries began in the late 1960s and early 1970s. Not
surprisingly, the indigenisation efforts have been constrained in
various ways. The severity of the constraints has varied from
country to country; but the officially stated objectives of indigenisation
are, at first sight, virtually the same in nearly all the post-colonial
states. Even in Tanzania, a country that practises a variant of
socialism sometimes dubbed ' ,African Socialise, the officially
expressed view is that although ideological differences between
countries may affect the method adopted, they do not necessarily
change the general objective of securing greater national economic
control. 1
Hence the emphasis seems everywhere to be on wrenching control
of the economy from foreign hands, and in Tanzania's case, socialisation
of the economy as well. But although the basic aim of economic
independence is the same to all socialist and non-socialist post-
colonial states, there are variations in approach and in the scope
and depth of attempted indigenisation. Apart from important considerations
of ideology, these variations are due to differences in: financial
position, manpower availability, indigenous private sector capabilities
to take over foreign enterprises, the volume of internal and external
pressures for and against indigenisation, and the responsiveness of
the government.
Some of the methods adopted for increasing the opportunities
for the indigenous private sector rely heavily on restrictive
legislation for aliens — for example, work permits, licensing,
Decrees Acts, or a combination of these. In Kenya for example,
the Trade Licensing Act (1967) and the Transport Licensing Board
serve the purpose of controlling foreign investment in commerce
and service industries whilst at the same time expanding the
Indigenous business sector.
Nigeria's experience of indigenisation is unique. This is because
of the country's relatively superior financial position compared
with that of many other African countries, especially in the period
after 1973. The choice of Nigeria in this study, as a model of an
indigenising economy, is premised on the belief that Nigeria has been
better placed than many countries in Africa to undertake the task of
indigenisation, by virtue of the financial resources generated by
the 19700 oil boom.
Moreover, indigenisation also provides a strong key to our
understanding of the genesis of modern indigenous industrial capitalism.
No comprehensive study of Nigeria's political economy could be
complete without an adequate examination of indigenisation and the
working of the Nigerian Enterprises Promotion Decrees (NEPD8). The
prominence of indigenisation is reflected both in numerous official
statements and in references in the literature on Nigerian politics
and economy, as well as statements which originate in the country's
business sector. This study is an attempt to demonstrate further,
that indigenisation policy has been pivotal in Nigeria's efforts to
create indigenous capitalism.
From an historical perspective, African businessmen have been
retarded by many factors even after the end of 	 colonial rule.
In contrast to Nigeria, state policies in some other African countries
such as Ghana during the time of its first leader after independence,
Dr. Nkrumah, were not officially supposed to nurture private indigenous
capitalists. At the same time in Nigeria, the government of Prime
Minister Tafawa Balewa was trying to foster and encourage Nigerian
businessmen. Even further back, in the colonial period, governments
In Nigeria subscribed to a policy of "passivity". This meant that
major areas of the economy should be left entirely to private
enterprise. However, it was foreign investors who took chief
advantage of the policy and invested in manufacturing, commodity
processing and mineral extraction, and in consequence they became
dominant in the Nigerian economy. As foreign investment increased
in Nigeria, there was a corresponding and steady increase in nationalist
economic militancy, in particular after 1960. Official records
before and after the Civil War (1967-1970) indicate a rising trend
in government thinking about the possibility of indigenisation.
Foreign investors were, of course, aware of the government's
growing intentions, and they also knew roughly the particular types
of enterprise which were most likely to be targeted, and the extent
to which they as individuals would be affected. Nevertheless when
the government launched the first indigenisation Decree in 1972,
foreign investors were relieved to see that it shied away from
outright nationalisation. The huge volume of businesses to be taken
over did, however, necessitate that the country's state governments
and their agencies acquire shares, as will be shown later. The private
indigenous sector simply could not have coped single.handed with the
volume of equity shares.
By and large, foreign investors who had a long history of
association with the Nigerian economy could not withdraw suddenly,
P
and had no wish to terminate what would still be a viable business
connection. After all, the requirements of the NEPD were not all
that extreme. Therefore they adopted a wait-and-see attitude, and
played along with the first NEPD after it was finally launched, in
1972, and the second Decree in 1977. The prospects for some foreign
investors remained attractive. For example in 1982 British Leyland
was quite eager to invest the minimal sum of L4.8 million for its
permitted 40% equity shares in a project of £60 million, particularly
in view of the fact that in return for that stake, the company forecast
it would be able to sell 02 million in kits from the United Kingdom
in 1980, and even more after thatt 2
The contrast in features between Nigeria and some other African
countries servecto justify the choice of Nigeria as a model for studying
indigenisation and its impact on the development of capitalism in
Africa under the most favourable conditions. First we shall look at
the contrast between Nigeria and Ghana.
In 1968 Ghana faced falling prospects for cocoa, its main
source of income, and adopted an indigenisation policy, "more for
economic survival than by any calculated move either to achieve
economic independence or to assume command of the economy." 3 Hence
this case, unlike that of Nigeria, cannot provide an adequate model
or a suitable example of a country ideally placed to achieve the
indigenisation of its economy. If Nigeria cannot achieve the development
of a viable and more self-reliant economy within the framework of an
indigenous capitalism, then it seems unlikely that many other black
African countries pursuing the same path. , would be more successful.
In Nigeria, the state's oil revenues provided the greatest spur
to indigenisation, whereas in Ghana the financial cost of indigenisation
had to be met largely out of private savings. 4 In the Ivory Coast,
where indigenisation has been a tore modest policy, financial institutions
have been effective in mobilising local savings as well as foreign
loans for indigenous investment: "Between 1960 and 1970 an average
of some 80% of gross domestic investment was financed from national
savings, and 15 to 20 percent from foreign aid."5
The extent and importance of private saving mobilisation in
Nigeria is in comparison much lower because of the amount of state
capital involved. For instance, of the N122 million spent under the
1972 NEPD, private savings and funds from private savings institutions
accounted for only N14 million (see chapter 5).
Nonetheless in spite of the involvement of the state, successive
Ni gerian governments consistently rejected large scale nationalisation,
and pursued a gradualist approach, partly because of the damage which
it is feared might be caused to the economy by adopting radical
measures, and partly because of the overriding capitalistic inclinations
of Nigeria's social, economic and political elites. The same can
equally well be said of post-Nkrumah governments in Ghana; and there
have been some similarities in machinery and in implementation of
indigenisation in the two countries.
Nigeria also contrasts with the socialist economies such as
Guinea under President Sekou Toure, Algeria, Egypt and even Tanzania,
where the role of public sector is far larger. In Tanzania, President
Nyerere has claimed that: "Under existing conditions 'periphery
capitalism' simply cannot result in an indigenised, self-reliant
economy: only Tanzanians are sufficiently interested to develop
6Tanzania in the interest of Tanzanians • • •11 Nyerere of course,
holds strong egalitarian sentiments, and finds central aspects of
capitalist development anathema.
One emphasis in the official Tanzanian approach is that
"development of a country is brought about by people, not by money." 7
However in Nigeria, indigenisation has rested precisely on the country's
and the government's newly acquired financial resources, and has in
practice directly touched only a small fraction of the population,
chiefly its ruling military/bureaucracy and the business groups.
There have been no serious attempts to involve the great majority of
the population, who are largely peasant farmers, or to relate indigenisation
to the economic and political development of the country as a whole.
Thus Nigeria's indigenisation has in part effected a transfer of
wealth and business opportunities from alien investors to an indigenous
elite, and yet in part also served to continue a close alliance
between domestic and foreign capital, with the aim being to further
develop indigenous capitalism. This method of pursuing "economic
independence" may of course prove in the long term to be self-defeating,
in spite of the country's transient ability to buy foreign-owned
businesses, and need not lead to the creation of a self-reliant
economy. These reservations will be taken up later.
A further contrast in indigenisation can be found between
Nigeria and Kenya. Both are Anglophone countries and both can be
identified as modele of developing African capitalism. Kenya's
indigenisation initially started with the acquisition of part of the
fertile farmland which had been possessed by white settlers.
Indigenisation of land became an essential priority in independent
Kenya. But again an important difference between Kenya and Nigeria
in the indigenisation of their economies has been finance. Kenya
depended for a substantial part of its financing of indigenisation
on foreign borrowing. Furthermore, the objective of Kenyan indigenisation
was not to wholly replace foreign investors, as has certainly been
ultimately the case in Nigeria in the service sector at least, but
instead simply to increase the participation of Kenyans in the economy.
The reason for this is the foreign exchange constraint which applied
in Kenya and which, for a time, Nigeria escaped.
The Industrial and Commercial Development Corporation set up in
Kenya in 1965, roughly equivalent to the Enterprises Promotion Board
set up in Nigeria in 1972 1
 was empowered to raise loans from outside
Kenya and lend to indigenous businessmen on a long term basis. It also
undertakes feasibility studies, evaluations and market studies for
the benefit of the private indigenous sector. The NEPE l s operational
scope is in contrast, more limited as will be shown in chapter 4 below.
In conclusion to this brief and selective overview of indigenisation
in black:Africa, the most obvious contrast lies between most Franco-phone
and the Anglo-phone countries. The former have tended to promote the
competitiveness of the indigenous private sector without restricting
a
foreign capital. This has been true of such countries as the Ivory
Coast and Senegal, where external sources have been allowed, indeed
invited, to provide technical and supervisory assistance for the
development of African businesses (State development institutions
there are prone to criticism for an apparent bias in favour of foreign
investors).
Turning now to the study which follows, the subject is limited
to indigenisation and the promotion of indigenous capital by the state
in Nigeria. The centrepiece is the Indigenisation Decrees of 1972
and 1977. The first Nigerian Enterprises Promotion Decree (attached
in full in Appendix A) was the most comprehensive government policy
statement on indigenisation which Nigeria had witnessed up to 1972.
It was launched on the 23rd February and defined areas where foreign
capital was henceforth not to be allowed to operate in the economy.
Fifty-five types of enterprises operating in Nigeria were classified
into two groups. Commercial enterprises such as retail business and
many other service operations were classified as Schedule one enterprises
and required 100% indigenous ownership, to the complete exclusion of
foreign capital. An exception was granted where equity capital was
not less than N400,000,8
 For instance, departmental superstores, by
virtue of their size and the volume of capital involved, were exempted.
Schedule two enterprises, which were required to have 40% indigenous
equity ownership, comprised mainly joint ventures. Most of the
enterprises which were allotted to this group are intermediate or
small-scale manufacturing firms (see the list of enterprises in
Appendix A).
Initially the government allowed a two-year transitional period
within which all enterprises affected by the NEPD were to comply with
its requirements.
In 1977, following a change in the leadership of the military
government which took place in July 1975, a second Enterprises Promotion
Decree was issued, updating the 1972 Decree (see Appendix B). This
time all enterprises in Nigeria were classified into three schedules.
Schedules one and two in the 1977 Decree had already been included
in the 1972 Decree, but a new list of enterprises was now added,
forming Schedule three, which required at least 40% indigenous equity
capital. The numbers of Schedule one and two enterprises were increased.
All enterprises in Schedule one remained exclusively for indigenous
participation, but Schedule two enterprises were, as of 1977, required
to have 60% indigenous capital rather than the 40% stipulated in the
first Decree (1972 )• All enterprises affected by the 1977 Decree were
supposed to comply with the government's requirement by 1979. However
the implementation periods subsequently had to be extended, as will
be shown in chapter four (Sectton iv) below.
These two Decrees and indigenisation are worth studying, first
because they marked the beginning of a bold step in the aspiration to
create-7a strong and prosperous indigenous capitalist economy. In
this sense the Decrees constituted a "watershed" in the history of
Nigeria. Secondly, Nigeria's experience provides an eminent lesson
in Africa and other parts of the third world as a whole, of a state in
a large developing country attempting to use very substantial, newly-
found wealth for the purpose of promoting indigenous capitalism. For
at the same time as it increased its assistance to indigenous capital,
the state also undertook to harness the benefits of foreign capital
investment, while trying to dispense with some of its costs. The
Nigerian Enterprises Promotion Decrees clearly identified areas in
the economy that indigenous businessmen were capable of owning and
running relatively easily. However by the same token they also
identified other areas of the economy that would still require foreign
capital and joint ownershipwith foreign capital. The potential
scope for effective indigenisation and the role of the state in
capital accumulation and industrialisation in general, in other
non-socialist third world countries can, then, be illuminated by our
examination of the particular case of Nigeria.
The official case for indigenisation in Nigeria was a strong
desire to facilitate the development of an economy that would
eventually come under the control of Nigerians. The ability of
foreign capital in the past to transfer abroad large sums of profit
and dividends earned in Nigeria had especially givenrise to local
resentment. However, the crucial questions of whether the promotion
of private indigenous capital could ever lead to stable capitalist
development in Nigeria, and whether the practice of giving state aid
and assistance to private Nigerian enterprises can consolidate
indigenous capitalism do not seem to have been addressed at the time
by the chief policy-makers and decision-takers. This was a failing;
and there are several major issues of development which should have
been given greater deliberation. These include the role of the state
in industrialisation, the harmonisation of foreign and domestic capital,
the relative weakness of private domestic capital in industrial ventures,
and the development of domestic entrepreneurs, all revolving around
the central theme of promoting private indigenous capital by the state.
Needless to say, no sooner was the First Decree launched in 1972,
than debates began in Nigeria about the nature of the Decree and its
impact on society and economy. Informed observers, officials and
commentators of various political persuasions came to contribute to
these debates, each identifying specific problems with the formulation
of the Decrees and their implementation. These problems of indigenisation,
as well as the substance of the Nigerian Enterprises Promotion Decrees,
will be examined in the chapters that follow.
There has always been a consensus amongst most officials over at
least the official aims of the policy of indigenisation, which reduce
to the achievement of national "economic independence". However,
economic independence is a rather vague aspiration, and the belief
that it has been the only significant motivating force behind Nigeria's
indigenisation is somewhat naive. A close look at the Decrees and
their implementation suggests that "economic independence" can be a
means for achieving further, and rather different ends. Moreover in
any case even the official interpretation of the concept appears to
be consistent with the promotion of the private interests of businessmen
and state officials. In order to promote the interests of these groups,
such catch-phrases as "economic independence", "economic freedom" and
"self-determination" were used to generate a broad based support for
the policy. In reality, the formal espousal of official views has
barely concealed the priority given to unofficial interests and
informal concerns. The words of a New Nigerian editorial (27/7/83)
captioned "Ugly Nigerians" reveal some of the barely hidden truth, by
quoting Mr. Minso Gadzama, the Chairman of NEPB:
"Many Nigerians participate in tearing apart the
fabric and have hastened the collapse of our economy.
Regrettably, they are the ones that shout the loudest
about our so-called lack of leadership in the
management of the economy. Yet they are the same people
in the lead in contravening the laws designed to
bring about prosperity and progress of the people
of this country."
The editorial pessimistically concluded:
"there is no running away from the Ugly Nigerians.
How painfult"
Clearly there is a prima facie case of violation of the rules
governing the Decrees by individuals in high places, in the quest
for shares.
The indigenisation policy was designed to promote the business
interests in such a way as to allow state officials to also take a
part. In addition, the military regimes of General Gowan (in 1972)
and General 0. Obasanjo (in 1977) attempted by means of the NEPDs
which they instituted to create a network of patrons and clients.
Such a network would consolidate their own power as well as help
win some popular support. The NEPDs may not have led to an improvement
in the standard of living of the majority of Nigerian citizens, but
the strengthening of the indigenous business community j which was
occasioned by the entry of retired members from the military/bureaucracy,
has served to increase the pressure on the state to further promote
the private business sector. Whatever the other merits and demerits
of the NEPDs, the results of the implementation exercise, in particular
the first phase (1972-74), have been to concentrate equity share holdings
in a few hands. Such a concentration has been seen by some people,
for example, Professor B. Akinyemi, 9
 the ex-director of the Nigerian
Institute of International Affairs, and Peter Ejiofar, 10 to be the
best way of going about indigenising the economy. They argue that in
order to ensure effective decision-making, it is imperative that a
few powerful shareholders with very large blocks of shares be present
in indigenised firms, so as to be in a position to take important
decisions swiftly. Apologists of the Decrees also emphasise the
accompanying retention of business profits in the country, regardless
of who in the country benefits. Other observers are more cautious and
even condemn such concentrations, on political and ideological grounds.
Whichever viewpoint is adopted, none would dispute that modern
indigenisation in Nigeria is largely a phenomenon of the privileged
urban ruling groups in the military/bureaucracy and among politicians
and big businessmen.
There are good reasons for commencing an examination of indigenisation
in Nigeria with an account of the historical origins of the modern
policy which culminated in the 1972 and 1977 Decrees. For these Decrees
extended a pattern of active state participation in the economy in
combination with direct state encouragement of private indigenous
enterprise which can, with hindsight, be seen to be a continuation
of colonial trends. Thus chapter one, after briefly documenting
pre-colonial resistance to the penetration and establishment of foreign
firms, concentrates on the colonial period and agitations for equal
opportunities for educated Africans in the civil service in particular,
for this ultimately led up to demands for comprehensive Nigerianisation
or Africanisation. Attention is drawn to the significance of the
Nigerian Marketing Boards' funds in the formation and development
of indigenous businesses. This historical background to the first
indigenisation Decree (1972) contributes to an understanding of the
modern phase of indigenisation because the colonial period provided
the pretext and the conditions which led Africans to demand not only
political power, but economic gains as well.
Chapter two details the emerging structure of Nigeria's post-civil
war oil economy, for this is what provided a suitable financial
climate for the Decree. The post-colonial forms of state assistance
to private indigenous businessmen up to 1970 were severely limited
due to the paucity of large-scale finance capital. In the 1950s, the
Marketing Boards's surplus funds had been applied to direct financing
of regional industrialisation, but it was the rise of new wealth
from the oil economy in the early 1970s which gave the green light for
state assistance to indigenous capital and for industrialisation. To
understand the timing of the Decree and the sense of urgency of the
aims it sought to achieve, it is necessary to first understand the
oil economy which provided the state with the wherewithal to launch
the Decrees. At the same time it can be shown that the extensive
state acquisitions of shares in the oil industry, which began prior
to 1972, and in banking (1973 and 1976) were not ideologically
motivated even though they were acts of nationalisation. Instead,
those particular instances of government involvement should be
considered as forerunners of indigenisation, or at most as a way of
facilitating the indigenisation which was to follow.
Chapter three sets out in detail the aims and objectives of the
Decrees. The Decrees were conceived and executed by three different
government leaderships largely between 1972 and 1979, and of course
the flavour was different under each of these regimes. However, the
major purposes of the policy were common to all three. Even if the
style and approach of the Obaeanjo regime was different, in some
respects, there was no radical policy shift, only an increase in
the scope and the momentum of the indigenisation exercise. In 1977
there had hardly been sufficient time to carry out extensive detailed
studies to take account of the effects of the 1972 Decree, when the
second Decree was drawn up and then introduced. The surprising speed
with which the second, more stringent Decree emerged, can be explained
in at least two ways. Firstly, the military leadership was'in general
seeking to push through a foreign policy which, for Nigeria, was quite
radical. It felt that it could mobilise domestic support for this by
implementing the second Decree. Secondly, the new ruling group now
in power sought to create private opportunities for its own members,
so as to make up for the missed opportunities of the 1972 Decree.
Chapter four deals with central themes in the implementations
of the NEPDs. The account given will be based on evidence drawn in
particular from Borno State, as well as illustrative material from
Kano, Lagos, Niger and Sokoto States. However, we should remember
that generalisation from particular cases is, at the best of times,
a delicate matter. Hence it should be borne in mind that the
experience of one State, or the accounts given by one State Committee
official may not be wholly comparable with the experience and the
perceptions of officers from other States.
Chapter five enumerates how State officials and businessmen have
resorted to several different means to acquire shares, and it underlines
the role of the foreign investors in determining who are to become
the major shareholders. The difficulties of exercising management
and production control, and the issue of citizenship are also examined.
A conclusion is drawn to the effect that it is hardly possible for
the law to be effectively applied to violaters of the Decrees. For
although the law has stipulated penalties for such practices as non-
compliance and so called "fronting", the limits imposed on the powers
of the Board and its inspectors have made it impossible to identify
all non-complying cases, or to ensure taking effective remedial steps.
Also, in some cases, powerfully placed and politically influential
Nigerians have themselves become active collaborators in violating
the law.
In chapter six we focus on the labour force and the role it
has played in indigenisation. This section owes to the inclusion
in the 1977 Decree of a clause setting aside a specific proportion
(10%) of the equity in indigenised enterprises to the employees -
managerial and non-managerial, including manual. A small amount of
the material in this chapter refers to the colonial as well as the
Immediate post-colonial period, and is included there for analytic
convenience. The chapter concludes with some tentative suggestions
about how to make the recommendation of 10% worker participation in
indigenised firms more effective than it has so far been in practice.
Chapter seven is concerned with the after—effects of the
implementations of the Decrees, and with developments in the pattern
of continuing agitation for further indigenisation. A significant
development in the 1980s has been an increase in the active role of
sectional interests and interest groups, particularly professional
bodies, who since 1979 have lobbied for further indigenisation simply
in order to prevent their professions from being dominated by foreign
capital. This seems to be a departure from the previous pattern in
which the dominant force was the official impetus given to indigenisation
by governments, ostensibly in the name of economic independence and
other national goals. However, in spite of this it should be noted
that both the overt and the covert pursuit of sectional interest in the
process of indigenisation go back as far as the early years of the
century. Right from the start of agitation for equal opportunities
for Africans, it is clear that a section of the population — the more
articulate and privileged — realised that formally equal opportunities
meant in effect a real opportunity for them alone. This perception,
and a very ready willingness to act in the cause of self—interest run
throughout the history of indigenisation up to the present day.
The experience of the last decade has shown that the race for
equity share acquisition in the manufacturing sector of the economy)
which emerged after initial success in acquiring shares in the
commercial sector, has given rise to yet further demands. The efforts
by professional bodies and other groups to create, protect and preserve
opportunities for themselves, have proceeded without due regard to
the likely effects on the performance and efficiency of the country's
economy as a whole.
Chapter eight attempts to relate the whole of the preceding
discussion to important theoretical issues concerning the State and
industrialisation in peripheral non-socialist economies, and most
notably the system of alliances developed between the State, foreign
capital and local capital, for industrial development. Studies of
post-colonial Kenya and dependent development in Brazil will be
referred to briefly in so far as they help to depict the situation
that Nigeria is in and the path that the country has set out to tread.
The conclusion that is arrived at, contends that no amount of State
financial assistance or the enforced transfer of equity in modern
business establishments to Nigerians, through the NEPDs, can of
themselves resolve the main problems besetting viable independent
capitalist industrialisation. This chapter thus assesses some
important consequences of indigenisation which are predictable but
which have never been admitted officially.
Increases in the proportion of domestic private ownership of
industrial investment may not necessarily lead to independent industrial
capitalist development, let alone industrial self-sufficiency. The
conclusion of this study is based upon the belief that the State's
indigenisation policy has wrongly placed excessive emphasis on the
acquisition of share capital by private individuals and organised
associations of businessmen. There has not been a corresponding concern
for the consequences lin terms of industrial performance, and the
necessary conditions of success, most notably an adequate technological
and scientific base and a plentiful supply of skilled manpower including,
especially)
 managerial personnel. Because of this relative lack of
concern the State is unlikely to be successful in bringing about the
"economic independence" which officials have long professed is their
goal. Hence the concluding chapter presents some general suggestions
as to what could be done to improve the existing policy of Nigerian
enterprises promotion, with a view to making control of the economy
by Nigerians a more realisable aim.
Sources of Data for the Study and the Survey of Opinion in Nigeria
Data on 1,888 companies out of a total of 3,112 companies filed
for indigenisation at the NEPB'have been obtained from the NEPB and
examined for the purpose of this study. Of the total, 46 companies
are classified as dormant, 29 do not present any information, 57
have been liquidated, 16 wound up, 10 declared defaulters, I sealed
up and 23 are exempted. The latter are exempted because they are
largely non-profit making organisations, for example religious
establishments, and liaison offices such as British Airways and
Shipowners' representatives, or are naturalised Nigerians, and have
no paid-up capital or are registered outside Nigeria, or state-owned
companies. There are also 4 companies exempted without explanation
(2 Indian, 1 British and I US). Thus the number of companies about
which information is gleaned from data is 1,705, and the total equity
capital N1,667,950,000. The information extracted includes volume of
capital, indigenous and foreign ownership, nationality of capital, types
of schedule and partnership.
A more specific and detailed set of information was also obtained
on 145 companies (9 are liql,(ated and 2 are dormant) under the Kano
zonal office, of which 16 companies are wholly indigenised and 7 owned
by Organisation of African Unity (0AU).citizens. Fifty-seven companies
are in manufacturing, of which six combine two activities - manufacturing/
distribution or processing/manufacturing. Most of the companies
manufacture such goods as furniture, perfumes, cosmetics, candles,
soap, textiles, rubber mats and tiles, bottles, kettles, paper and
envelopes, sweets, drinks, nuts and bolts and batteries and matches.
Another sixty companies are in the service sector. These include
building and civil engineering, consultancy firms, metallurgical
analysts, construction companies, wholesale and retail firms, catering
and restaurants, fuel depot construction, dyers, technical consultants,
road haulage, travel agencies, import/export firms, distributive
agencies, land reclamation and irrigation, irrigation consultants,
borehole digging firms and leather tanning. Ten companies are involved
in extracting and processing oil from nuts and seeds '. Another ten
companies are in tin mining (all are in the tin mining area of
Plateau State).
About twelve companies are in schedule I of the Indigenisation
Decree (1972), and six companies are in schedule III. These are
publicly quoted companies such as Union Carbide and Steyr Nigeria with
substantial investment (5 in Kano, 1 in Kaduna). Another 37 are in
schedule II. The rest are not classified by the reports. However
reference to the 1977 scheduled enterprises suggests that 11 of the
enterprises which have no information on their classification belong
to schedule I, and the rest are schedule II. This observation is
based on description of the nature of activities undertaken by the
companies. On the whole, half of the total enterprises examined are
In commerce and service sectors, while the rest are in small-scale
manufacturing and processing.
The information acquired about all of these companies relates
to ownership; pattern of distribution of shares between foreign and
Nigerian citizens; volume of capital; method of payment for shares;
expatriate quota allocations; fulfilment/non-fulfilment of the
requirement of 10% equity shares for employees; nationalities of foreign
shareholders; distribution of shares among ex-state officials,
foreigners and traditional Nigerian businessmen; number of individuals
acquiring shares in more than one company; distribution of companies
among the Northern states; figures on cross-Regional and state
participation; extent of state and Federal government participation;
•
defaulters and those recommended for the certificate of compliance
with the indigenisation Decrees. The number of firms from other
countries in the Organisation of Africa Unity (OAU) and the volume
of capital involved, the number of Lebanese who have obtained OAU
citizenship and the volume of capital retained through this method,
are also examined.
Not all the reports contain all the information sought under the
above headings, but in each case information will be quoted against
the background of the actual number of reports that have included
the information in question. Thus 114 enterprises out-of the total
of 145 enterprises have given their authorised, issued and paid-up
capital i.e. 114 companies hold N119,410,403. The largest capital
held by a firm is N21 million - Steyr Nigeria Ltd., a vehicle and
track assembly plant with over 901% of the authorised capital owned
by the Federal and 3 Northern state governments and a private
indigenous company. The smallest is a tin mining consultancy firm -
Alfred Knight Ltd. 11 with an authorised capital of N200. A majority
of the companies have on average an authorised capital of between
N200,000 and N600,000.
At the time of the visit made by the author to the Nigerian
Enterprises Promotion Committee (Kano) office, about 490 companies
with Lebanese, Indian, OAU, Nigerian and joint proprietorships, were
represented in the files. These companies are spread across the
Northern states (except Kwara state which comes under Ibadan zonal
office) with Kano state accounting for nearly three quarters. Of the
145 companies examined, 76 are in Kano, 25 in Kaduna, 17 in Jos, 14
in Maiduguri, 3 in Sokoto, 2 in Zaria, 2 in Katsina, 1 in Bauchi, 2
in Lagos (Head Office) and 1 in Ilorin (Head Office). The analysis
is limited to these 145 companies. Only 177 companies had undergone
both pre- and post-compliance inspections at the time of inquiry
(most of the post-compliance inspections were carried out between
1979 and 1985). These companies are therefore in an ideal position
to give a clearer picture of the post-compliance structure of the
companies and the extent of actual indigenous participation and its
a
effects. Not all 177 reports were available, but the absence of 32
of them is unlikely to seriously affect our findings. A note of
caution is, however, in order here. Although the results of the
analysis may be valid with respect to the implementation in the
Northern states, it should be treated only as indicative of the
prominent trends in the implementation of the 1977 NEPD and not as
a definitive general statement which would require an even more
extensive and exhaustive investigation.
Additional data on 48 publicly quoted companies has been extracted
from their annual reports - volume of authorised capital, ownership,
type of directors and their shareholdings and valuation of their per
share units. With respect to this group of companies, where the
authorised capital is not shown in the annual report, information
has been supplemented by data from The Nigerian Stock Exchange Handbook
(Volume 2, 1984), and "Who makes what in Nigeria - Buyers Guide to Made
in Nigeria products ,' (a publication of the Manufacturers Association
of Nigeria, 1984). Except for 3 oil companies, all the other 45
companies are in manufacturing, construction and commerce. They are
all in schedule II and III categories.
Peferences are also made to the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN)
quarterly statistical and other reports. However relevant detailed
technical information is scanty even in these source materials.
Officials of the CBN itself claim that they often experience difficulties
in meeting requests for information even from other government departments.
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This is indicative of a general problem which the author had to
continually face. Nevertheless, in spite of these difficulties,
CBN sources proved to be helpful.
The geographical concentration of industrial and commercial
establishments looked at is in Lagos and Kano, but there is also an
intention to provide a contrast in the shape of Borno State as an
example of one of the relatively less industrialised states of Nigeria.
Background knowledge of that state was also an influential factor in
the choice, because fairly good private access to officials and to
government papers is, in Nigeria perhaps more than in many other
countries, a critical variable. The study therefore looks at the
impact and the pattern of implementation of the NEPD with specific
reference to enterprises covered by the Northern zonal office. Two
files of the Nigerian Enterprises Promotion Committee of Borno State,
containing correspondence, official minutes, reports and other matters
relating to the NEPD, and committee activities in the state, were
examined.
To obtain first hand accounts of the experience of implementations
of Nigerian Enterprises Promotion Decrees personal interviews were
conducted in August 1982 and April 1985 with officials of Bomb State
Ministry of State of Trade, Industry and Cooperatives and with members
of the State's Enterprise Promotion Committee, with staff of the NEPC
(Kano zonal office), and with officers of the NEPB (Lagos), and some
ex-inspectors. Also interviewed were, officials of the Manufacturers
Association of Nigeria (MAN), the Nigerian Labour Congress (NLC), and
members of the Chambers of Commerce and Industry in Kaduna State. The
questions for these elite interviews were selected from Questionnaire
(I) (in Appendix C below), which was also designed to obtain information
from ex-state officials who are now involved in private sector business.
The questionnaire aimed to find out, amongst other things, the origin
of the idea of indigenisation and its momentum, and sought to confirm
the extent of participation by ex-members of military/bureaucratic
groups. Throughout, the questionnaire was used only as a general
guide, and the position of the interviewee and individual responses
dictated the course of the interviews.
Questionnaire II (see Appendix D) was directed at employees,
both managerial and manual, in indigenised firms. The 1977 Decree
included a special provision for employees to benefit from the transfer
of enterprises that were to be indigenised; and so questions were
directed at such employees as accountants, clerks and cashiers who
might be thought to have a reasonable knowledge of how to apply for
the loans which could assist them in the purchase of shares, and who
might possess a general awareness of the main provisions of the
indigenisation Decrees. Some manual employees who were also supposed
to benefit from the Decree (by acquiring 5% of the shares to be sold),
were also interviewed.
In the cases of all the groups of people so far mentioned, most
of the interviews were conducted during working hours. Many difficulties
which were experienced in successfully conducting interviews, in
particular the irregular time-keeping and occasional failures of
potential contacts to turn up jmeant that an original intention to
interview suitable members of the Nigerian intelligentsia regrettably
had to be abandoned. Similarly a questionnaire originally designed
for members of the Lebanese business community in order to assess the
impact of indigenisation on them had to be abandoned because of the
poor response from this notably very secretive community.
Any study of indigenisation in Nigeria - the present study being
no exception - must refer to official documents and acts and the
speeches and behaviour of leading members of the government and the
business community. However, additional and sometimes more revealing
sources of information were also tapped. These include lectures by
heads of private and public organisations, papers presented by
professional bodies and media reports.
One interesting source of information is the media. Nigeria
has by and large, enjoyed a vigorous and well-informed press.
References in this study are thus made from time to time to national
dailies, weekly magazines and other periodic magazines and journals
which comment on Nigerian politics and economy. The indigenisation
Decrees have been one of the most prolonged and widely discussed of
national issues in Nigeria since independence in 1960. The editor of
the Daily Times, claimed in March 1974 that since the launching of
the Nigerian Enterprises Promotion Decree in 1972, there were no
"less than twenty million words . poured through the newspapers,
television and radio in support of, or in criticism of the 1972 NEPD." 12
The issue still seems to be as fresh today as when it was introduced
in 1972.
The two most widely circulated National Dailies, the New Nigerian
and the Daily Times were selected so as to assess coverage of the
indigenisation exercise. However, pre-indigenisation editorials on
"economic independence" and related reports are also considered as a
contribution to the climate in which early agitation for indigenisation
increased. The most relevant period for our purpose here is 1970-1983,
most notably from the months immediately prior to the 1972 indigenisation
Decree through to those immediately after the 1977 Decree. The two
Decrees continue to give rise to plenty of comment. Between 1971
and 1983 the two papers carried about 94 editorial comments and 160
front page coverage on the indigenisation Decrees or closely related
issues. These figures do not include inside page stories and leader
articles, letters, labour pages and company reports which also touch
on issues of indigenisation.
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The majority of the editorial comments and front page news are
statements and interviews. Government officials, prominent businessmen,
academics, union leaders, representatives of business organisations and
diplomats use the medium to advise, warn or explain the essence of
the Decrees. The most notable and authoritative voice in the private
sector which was widely reported was that of Chief Henry Fajemirokun,
.t.
the President of Nigerian Association of 'Chambers of Commerce, Industry,
Mines and Agriculture (NACCIMA). In the government sector, the statements
of the officials of the Federal Ministry of Industry and Internal
Affairs are the most reported of all. The views of the head of state,
state military governors, state commissioners of trade and industry
and other top civil servants are also reported.
Although we cannot quantify the extent to which the policy-makers
in government have been influenced in their policy deliberations by
exposure to media reports, it is obvious that the newspapers have at
least aired and conveyed prevailing opinions amongst the informed
members of the public. In this way, the media has supplemented other
sources of information to government such as the reports of official
committees of inquiry, views gathered through periodic government
meetings with business Associations, closed door consultations with
representatives of foreign investors and diplomats, and the reports
of fact-finding missions by government officials who have looked at
similar exercises in other countries (e.g. Guinea and Ghana), and
inter-ministerial meetings.
a.
The newspapers' treatment ofxsubject often give definition to
an issue, and they may attempt to form public opinion in ways which
cannot be ignored by the official policy-makers. In view of this, it
is relevant to take account of what the media have said and continue
to say with regard to indigenisation in Nigeria. Policy outputs, and
even more so outcomes may not always correspond to editorial views.
But in the case of several specific instances of government decisions
on various aspects of indigenisation, the policies are observed to
comport with the known editorial views of the two named papers.
Conversely, on occasions editorial comments have agreed with and
endorsed government actions, in such matters as the reclassification
of certain enterprises under the NEPDs and immigration restrictions,
and thereby not only publicised such moves but also, perhaps, lent
greater legitimacy to them.
A note on terminology: 
Such terms as "indigenous bourgeoisie" and "aspiring bourgeoisie"
as used in this study do not denote a unified "national bourgeoisie".
They merely refer to groups of individual Nigerians who have substantial
ownership stakes in the manufacturing, service or commercial sectors,
and the extremely wealthy property owning Nigerians who overlap with
the political and military/bureaucratic ruling groups. The terms:
"indigenous bourgeoisie", "aspiring bourgeoisie", "aspiring industrialists"
are in most cases used interchangeably. Similarly the terms: "foreign
capital", "Transnational Corporation", "Multinational subsidiaries"
and "Metropolitan capital" are used interchangeably.
It should also be noted that between 1979 and 1983 (i.e. a period
of civilian rule) the word "Decree" was replaced by the word "Act".
Under the civilian regime of President Shagari, the Nigerian Enterprises
Promotions Decree was reworded as the Nigerian Enterprises Promotion
Act, 1979. The one therefore can be regarded as the other. Both
titles refer to the same documents. Since the Military came back to
power again in December 1983, by the coup led by Major General Buhari,
the word "Act" has been replaced by the original word "Decree".
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CHAPTER 
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
The history of indigenisation in Nigeria comprises two main
themes. The first is a history of conflict between private
Nigerian and foreign business interests. The second is a conscious
government policy to promote a strong, indigenous capitalism
able to enter into partnership with foreign investors in the
drive for industrialisation. Any discussion of these two
themes must take account of three significant periods in the
history of Nigeria. The colonial period, (1900 to 1960), the first
republic, (1960 to 1966) and the period of military rule between
1966 and 1969. It is pertinent however to first mention briefly
the pre-colonial period in order to grasp the present develop-
mental trends which encompass an alliance between foreign
and domestic capital. Knowledge of the pre-colonial period will
also provide a further understanding of subsequent colonial and
post-colonial policies.
The history of indigenous antagonism to foreign business
interests dates back long before the establishment of colonial
rule in the territories that are now the parts of modern Nigeria.
The articulation of that antagonism by way of overt opposition,
- backed up by forceful economic arguments and a determination
to resist foreign "economic exploitation", is however a more
recent phenomenon, which dates from the 1940s.
Poreign private capital of European origin penetrated
Nigeria as far back as 1850 in the form of trade between
European commercial traders and the indigenous population of the
coastal areas. In the later years of the Cl9th traditional
rulers on the Southern coasts attempted on several occasions
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to prevent Europeans from gaining the upper hand in the economy
of their kingdoms. The dethroning of Jaja of Opobo by the
British in 1887 was directly related to the King's attempts to
make European middlemen redundant in the lucrative palm oil bus-
iness in his Kingdom. At one time Jaja himself was a slave,
and was exposed to the realities of European mercantilism in
Africa. Upon establishing a Kingdom, his knowledge of trade
led him to the idea of controlling economic activities in his
domain for his own benefit. Jaja started to sell oil directly
to Europe, thereby side stepping European middlemen based at
the coast. To make sure that he was in absolute control of
trade, he denied European merchants access to the interior of
his Kingdom, and meted out severe punishment to those tribes
who ignored his laws and dealt directly with the Europeans. 1
In 1883 the British Consul, Hewett brought to the attention
of the British government Jaja's exclusion of European merchants
in his Kingdom, and urged the removal of the King from the
throne and banishment from his Kingdom. At that time the
British government did nothing more than warn the King. Four
years later however, Jaja was dethroned by agents of the British
government and exiled to the West Indies, thereby clearing the
way for European merchants to gain access to the interior.
Like Jaja of Opobo, the Oba of Benin, Oba Ovaramwen was
also removed from his throne in 1897 because he constituted a
challenge to British commercial interests. The Oba had wanted
a royal monopoly on the products of his Kingdom and he had the
royal authority to exclude European middlemen. At times he
placed impediments in the way of trade.
Indigenous resistance as illustrated above was quite common
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in Southern Nigeria before ' formal rule was established by the
British, but it was generally too weak to hold out for long
against the foreign powers. African merchants were poorly organ-
ised and unable to match the resistance against foreign
competition by the Kings.
The establishment of a legitimate trade in the second half
of the Cl9th attracted many Africans to commerce and trade.
Generally the role of the indigenous traders was confined almost
entirely to the buying of local products from the interior and
transporting them to the coast where the Europeans would
then buy them. The Africans in turn bought manufactured goods
from European firms for distribution to the interior. The
European firms handled the wholesale trade of imported goods
and bought local produce in bulk for export. Most Africans,
on the other hand concentrated On the retail trade and operated
as middlemen or agents for purchasing local produce for export.
They operated with only small amounts of capital, and their
turnover and stocks were also relatively small. Nevertheless
they were able "to provide the essential link in the commercial
progress of the Country."
2
 Indigenous antagonism to foreign
companies owed not so much to the latter's predominant position
in the wholesale trading sector . as to the companies' involve-
ment in the retail trade. For that invariably meant competition
with indigenous retail traders. Many indigenous businessman were
aware of the danger of falling behind in the commercial compet-
ition, as long ago as the 1890s.
Historically Nigerian businessmen have been neither passive
nor compliant. They have always objected to their position
within the economy which seemed to be that of a third class,
behind both the Europeans, mainly British, and other assorted
immigrants such as the Lebanese and Syrians 3
 who have
gravitated to many areas of West Africa and whose ability to
corner commercial opportunities has outweighed the relatively
small number of people involved. Nigerian businessmen have
constantly struggled for an equal or better position vis-
a-vis foreign capital, but essentially the modern policy of
indigenisation was the outcome of political developments which
have occurred since Nigeria came into existence in 1900.
Although the issue of political sovereignty was what was
stressed most of all by the early nationalists, a corresponding
commitment to economic improvement was also present at least
in the background of their demands.
(i) The period of Colonial Rule 1900-1960 
By 1900 the traditional rulers of the South finally succumbed
to British Naval pressure, and British Imperial rule was finally
proclaimed over most of Nigeria. The course of development was
henceforth effectively determined by external forces, by way of
colonial rule. A colonial economy started to replace, although
it never completely supplanted, the previous mode of product-
ion. The pre-colonial mode of production characterised by
subsistence and collective ownership in many parts of Nigeria
was to co-exist alongside an emerging and increasingly dominant
new economic system. The change was accomplished by rapid
capital formation brought about by direct private foreign
investment, the introduction of banking facilities, the establish-
ment of physical infra-structures such as roads, railways and
ports, and by socio-cultural change oriented towards the adoption
of a Western lifestyle among the Western educated native elites.
All of these set a new course of modern capitalist development.
In sum the establishment of British authority in Nigeria
opened the way for foreign private capital and shaped a course
of development which was in line with Britain's own economic
as well as political interests. The present stage of capitalist
development which Nigeria has reached in the 1980s has to be
seen as resting upon sixty years of British colonial rule.
That rule facilitated private non-indigenous capital formation;
and later, the post-colonial state shifted to a position of
indigenous business promotion. Having said that, it is
necessary to point out that part of the colonial and post-
colonial development experience was the emergence of Nigerian
entrepreneurs enjoying limited commercial opportunities. In the
period between the 1920s and 1940s, a mixed bag of businessmen
and a few educated people combined to form a nationalist movement.
They agitated for better commercial opportunities and for
access to jobi and equal opportunities for Africans in the colonial
administration.
Between 1900 and 1914, the British were mainly pre-occupied
with the creation and consolidation of Nigeria as one colony.
The establishment of law and order and of formal British
authority were of paramount importance for the safety of
European commercial firms. This was because even after the
removal of most of the hostile Kings of the coast, the coastal
tribes, particularly the natives of the Delta areas who opposed
European penetration of the interior, continued to be appreh-
ensive about powerful amalgamated European firms. They
attacked and ransacked trading stores and created a climate
which was not conducive to peaceful commerce. At the very least
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the native people of the territory "hampered" commercial
activities. 4
In 1914 the Southern and Northern parts of Nigeria were
amalgamated and Nigeria formally became a single socio-
economic and political entity forming a part of the British
Empire.
At about the time of the first world war indigenous
businessmen began to be increasingly concerned about the problems
of their business and their relations with non-indigenous firms.
This was necessitated partly by the closure of several indigenous
businesses in 1914 due to falling profit margins and the lack of
a sufficiently widespread network of trade. The unwillingness
of the colonial government to bring about a structural change
in the economyin such a way as to improve the condition of
indigenous enterprises was, according to Hopkins, compounded
by concern about the detrimental effects of such action on
Britain's exports of manufactured goods. 5
 In any case, a policy
of granting special privileges to indigenous business would not
be consistent with the professed commitment to a free market
economy and a policy of non-interference by the State. Never-
theless nationalist programmes calling for "equal treatment for
native traders and producers" became common from the 1920s
onwards.
By the time concern started t6 be voiced by the indigenous
businessmen, it was obvious that foreign firms were already
well established and dominant in significant sectors of the
country's economy.
6
 It is this historical fact which provides
the background to modern indigenisation which seeks to redress
the imbalance between foreign and domestic business interests
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in the post-colonial economy.
The origin of modern nationalist economic discontent can
be traced to the 1920s and 1930s when most industrialised
economies of the world experienced stagnation and depression.
This took its toll on the Nigerian peasant ' producers. It was
then that "economic nationalism became the creed of the day." 7
The plight of agricultural producers in particular provided the
nationalists in Nigeria with a platform which enabled the latter
to pose as the natural mouthpiece and champion of the peasant's
course.
The National Congress of British West Africa (NCBWA),
consisting of African nationalists from the British Western
African Colonies, of which Nigeria was a member, consistently
agitated for both political and economic freedom. When the
Congress met in March 1920, at Accra in Ghana, the economic
grievances of. the British West African territories were
strongly emphasised. The Congress voiced its discontent about
the prevailing economic position of the dependencies vis-a-vis
the imperial British interest - with an insistence "that the
natural resources of the British West African Dependences
should not be for the exploitation of the concessionaires under
State control." 8
 A demand was also made at the conference to
the effect that the economic activities of non-indigenes, and
particularly of the Lebanese and Syrian traders, be curtailed,
as they were a "menace" to the interest of the indigenous
businessmen.
It is not surprising that MaCaulay's Nigerian National
Democratic Party (NNDP) endorsed most of the views expressed by
NCBWA at this conference. Whereas during the period of
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colonial expansion, from 1900 to 1914, there had been no clear
nationalist economic policies, in the inter-war period the
international economic depression enabled political organisation
like the NNDP to capitalise on the difficulties of indigenous
businessmen and farmers. They started to draw up economic
policies of their own. This created a movement aimed
specifically at increasing the power base of the political
agitators, by harnessing the discontent of farmers and
businessmen alike. Policies were contained within a broad
programme which in the first instance aimed at the eventual and
complete political independence of Nigeria.
The early colonial period witnessed intensive rivalry
between indigenous and foreign business interests. Commercial
experience, superior organisation and business management, and
knowledge of modern business practice, placed such foreign firms
as the United African Company (UAC) in a much better position
than their indigenous counterparts. Local antagonism was
openly expressed, as happened in 1929 when the women traders of
Aba in Imo State rioted in protest against the dominating
presence of foreign traders. Their anger was reflected in
their concerted attack on expatriate shops.
The United Africa Company (UAC) had been formed by 1929
as a result of the amalgamation of the major trading companies.
It controlled nearly half the market, and could dictate the
policies of its main competitors. Independent African traders
were virtually eliminated from the import-export business by
the firms united in the Association of West African Merchants.
By the 1930s the palm oil traders of the East, the Cocoa traders
of the West, the Kola nut merchants of Kano, the Borno
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Merchants of hide and skin and groundnuts were all forced to
become mere brokers and distributive agents of European commercial
firms.
Indigenous middlemen sought earlier on to use the traditional
rulers for private protection of "their own spheres of
operation from the extension of purchasing by the firms into
the rural areas, and the increasing competition of Levantines." 9
It is interesting to note that anxiety over increasing
Levantine involvement in the colony's commerce was not only
expressed by black Africans. The British traders also expressed
similar concern. For example the African Trade section of the
Liverpool Chamber of Commerce was reported to have raised
alarm over Syrian (and Japanese) competition during its annual
meetings in 1932 and 1933. The Chamber adopted a resolution
in 1932 urging the British government to "restrict"
Japanese trade in West Africa. 10 It was with apprehension
that the Chamber noted that the Syrians imported 27% of
textile prints in 1933. According to a report at the time
in West Africa (21/10/33):
"it is feared that the increase in Syrian trade will bring
a large increase in the Syrian population and that there
is a danger that a controlling interest would mean the
elimination of the European merchants and destroy the
livelihood of African traders, clerks and storekeepers."
It was suggested, therefore, that the principle of immigration
restri.ction already enforced in the United Kingdom be enforced
also in the West African Colonies. 11
 Such fears and remarks
as these, were indicative of the prevailing climate of
apprehension among indigenous businesses against both Syrians
and European immigrants in the 1930s.
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The second world war saw the introduction of strict
economic controls and discriminatory export duties, and the
emergence of a currency shortage along with a loss of merchant
shipping. Consequently there was a growing realisation among
educated Nigerians both in business and in professional
occupations that there was no longer any possibility of
harmony and moderate competition with the British. The era
of domination by foreign capital over indigenous capital had
arrived. Towards the end of the War, the old types of
protest were succeeded by a more articulate liberal nationalism
directed by the very politico-economic groups whose interests
were to be most at stake in the post-war period.
However at least two Important characteristics of the
general agitation for independence in Nigeria need to be
mentioned here. First, businessmen and Aationalist leaders
were not unswervingly and comprehensively hostile, and indeed
they exhibited accommodationist tendencies towards foreign
capital. Although Nigerian entrepreneurs and nationalists
consistently remained apprehensive about foreign capital,
many at the same time desired its presence in the country
albeit on a more or less equal basis. The struggle for
"equality" in business led to demands on the colonial
government to give priority to Nigerian businessmen over their
foreign competitors. Neither individual businessmen nor
nationalist leaders aggitated for the wholesale dismantling
of the structure of the colonial economy, or set out to attack
foreign capital per se. The confrontation between nationalists
and imperial rulers did not call for or produce structural
economic changes. This has to be born in mind when considering
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developments in the economy after -political independence was won.
For what actually happened after 1960 was the acceptance of
an uncodified compromise between the nationalists who represented
indigenous business interests, and the departing colonial
authorities who believed that the well-established economic
system could not be replaced. The authorities knew full well
that the very people to whom power was to be handed, had'a vested
interest in the maintainance of the same economic system.
The second feature of Nigerian nationalist agitation
was the way in which nationalist leaders accompanied their
passionate expression of felt economic grievances with moderate
constitutional demands as a means of finding a solution in the
economic plight of the African merchant, producer and
businessman. That is to say, the solution to the economic
difficulties was seen in terms of achieving certain political
objectives. It is true that pan-African idealism and the
appeal to racial solidarity also played an important part in
the nationalists' agitation. Nevertheless, their very
constitutionalism was fundamentally a defence of the whole
community's general political and economic interests 12 as
much as it was a defence simply of indigenous enterprises.
There is no coherent and tangible evidence to suggest
that nationalist leaders fought for independence solely
in order to promote and protect their own economic interests
P
and those of their colleagues in the business professions.
Indeed many commentators have attempted to show there was a
strong countervailing view among the nationalists themselves.
That view turns on an awareness of the general interest of the
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"people" and the country as a whole. A comparison, of the
secondary literature on the nationalist struggle in Nigeria
and other Anglophone West African states with the utterances
of the nationalist leaders reveals that the genuinely
nationalist bent of the leaders has often been underemphasised
or overlooked. The leaders did fight for independence and
nationhood with sincerity and pride. They held consistently to
a desire to liberate their people from foreign rule. The
material interests of the nationalist leaders and the emerging
business group were to become paramount only with the achieve-
ment of political independence, simply as the logical outcome
of the development of Nigeria's post-colonial economy within
the inter-national capitalist system. The "colonial
bourgeoisie" did not necessarily seek freedom only for them-
selves, as for example Dobb has sought to explain from a
marxist standpoint 13 . Nationalists depended for support on
peasants and workers in their struggle against alien rule.
It is equally true that after independence was attained, the
leaders tended to stop participating in the general movement
and became more attuned to the wishes of foreign capital, so
long as their own particular interests were served by that
means.
The first really significant period in the history of
Nigerian indigenisation began in 1945. The ending of world
war II saw two important developments in Nigeria: the beginning
of an incorporation of Nigeria's educated elite into the
colonial administration, and the first stage in the substantial
use of Nigerian marketing board funds for the promotion of
- 40 -
indigenous business and political interests. We shall now
turn our attention to the increasing politicisation of
Africans in general after the war, and then look at the way
they utilized the resources created by the marketing boards.
(ii) Nigerianisation of the Civil Service 
The earliest effective moves towards indigenisation in
Nigeria were manifested in the Nigerianisation of the Civil
Service, prior to the end of colonial rule. It was in about
1948 that participation of Nigerians in the Civil Service
began to reach significant levels. Furthermore, the
democratisation of colonial rule began to issue in
constitutional reforms which could bring African politicians
into the Colony's legislative chambers. Government agencies
also started to respond more favourably to indigenous
businessmen who had previously been treated unsympathetically
in their application for such things as import licences and
bank credits. The colonial government came to be quite
responsive to the demands of the Nigerian elite, as Williams
has pointed out. 14 The increasing complexity of local
administration certainly played a part in inducing the
colonial administration to incorporate the educated and the
wealthy who for a long time had been denied access to public
offices in the running of native Authorities. This situation
resuled in the relative diminution of the authority of
traditional rulers from the North which the colonial govern-
ment had previously tried to preserve.
Co-operation with the indigenous, Western-educated or
influenced elites was finally accepted by the British because
this was seen to ensure some degree of political stability .
The readiness to meet what the British saw as the "reasonable
demands of the Nigerian nationalist movement" was subsequently
to lead to ever more indigenous participation in the civil
service and to a more tolerant attitude towards the nation-
alists. This to some extent eased Britain's colonial burden.
At the same time it paved the way for formation of a post-
independence elite favourable to Britain's interest. The
security provided by such elites partly explains the huge
increase in British capital investment which took place even
after independence, as is shown in Chapter 3, In short:
"In return for their co-operation, aspiring Nigerians,
primarily in the South, obtained access to power,
privileges and patronage available as a result of the
replacement of the British with Nigerians in the terminal
colonial period - especially in the Civil Service and
government agencies. In the North the traditional ruling
aristocracy contiyged to enjoy the support of the
colonial regime."
This attitude on the part of the British Authorities had
not always existed. In the early days of the colonial period,
the colonial administration had been suspicious of Nigeria. .s
"educated Africans" and had resisted the idea of entrusting
them with the affairs of the majority of their fellow
Africans. 16 The official view maintained that the educated
African was a representative of his own Club, the Western
educated indigenous elite, and would by no means be a sincere
representative of all the people. The single factor that most
induced a rapid change in the thinking of the colonial
Authorities in the 1940s was Britain's self-proclaimed
defence of liberty against Nazism in Europe. However, it was
this same defence which was used by the nationalists against
colonialism on the African continent. What is more, Nigeria
14-2
had assisted Britain during the war, in the cause of "freedom",
not only by sending fighting men to the war fronts but also
by subsidising the war efforts through the supply of
agricultural products.
The initial exclusion of the educated "native" from
participation in colonial administration had been a strong
stimulus to the emergence of the nationalist movement. 17
But when the colonial authorities began to show increasing
sympathy towards the nationalists' cause after 1945, and the
educated Nigerians, at least, realised that their interests
were in the process of being accommodated to a greater degree,
a more moderate nationalism began to evolve. This was often
regionally oriented and it contributed the formative stages
of the constitutional development of Nigeria, which culminated
in political independence in 1960.
The end of the second world war in fact ushered in an era
of rejection - the rejection of the old style politics of the
1920s nationalists. After the war, the Nigerian Youth Movement
(NYM) (formed in 1936) also rejected the politics of the 1920s
for a time in its formative years. The new nationalist leaders
realised that the strategies and methods of pan-Africanist
politics of the 1920s were outmoded and futile. A new
political strategy, based on alliance between the nationalist
leaders, traders and agricultural producers, began to issue
demands for political power.
Members of the Nigerian Youth Movement and the National
Council of Nigeria and Cameroon (NCNC) leaders involved them-
selves in grass-roots politics and the presentation of new
economic programmes. 18 The post-war nationalists totally
rejected any claims by the colonisers to a monopoly of
administration and the management of economic affairs of the
colonial state. They sought political power in the running
of the colony so as to promote the general interest of
Nigerians. The gaining of limited administrative and political
power also of course enabled them to acquire rewarding
opportunities in the colonial economy for themselves, by
obtaining access to the necessary sources of public finance.
Thus they were subsequently able to establish themselves as
'entrepreneurs, even though this outcome may not have supplied
the overriding motivating factor in their original pursuit
of political aims. 19
It is significant to note here that indigenisation of
administrative manpower during the colonial period was actually
initiated by the colonial government, over-burdened by the
requirements of administering such a vast territory as Nigeria,
and sensitive to the high cost of employing expatriates.
The government and commercial houses looked to educated
Nigerians to help run the colonial regime and alien firms.
But, until shortly after the end of the second world war,
the British felt that the efficiency and the reputation for
integrity of the service would diminish if poorly qualified
Nigerians of unknown character were placed in positions of
responsibility and trust. Expatriate commercial firms had
A
also share this fear. Nevertheless, they too were compelled
by the necessity of restraining the costs of employing
expatriates, to increase the number of Nigerian employees
as their businesses grew.
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Right from the beginning, as in the end too t Nigerian
leaders did not envisage extensive public ownership of
economic sectors other than the utility industries, despite
the wide gap between the low returns which were enjoyed
by the agricultural producers and the large sums which came to
be accumulated by the marketing boards. Nationalist thinking
on the economy started out, as it remains to this day,
rooted in a capitalist ideology of private material advance-
ment, individual property ownership and free enterprise.
The alternative - quasi-maxist and other radical left-wing
interpretations of economic issues in the 1940s, as were
advanced by such men as Dr. N. Azikiwe, - proved to have little
lasting effect once independence was won. Azikiwe lent his
support to theEhugu Mine Workers in their strike in 1947 and
he depicted the colonial conflict in terms of struggle by
labour against capital.
But neither Dr. Azikiwe nor Chief 0. Awolowo who also
employed socialist rhetoric, was representative of a popular
socialist movement. The majority of Nigeria's politicians
of the late 1950s did not oppose capitalism, except in.so-far
as it neglected their own individual interests. Eventually,
after independence even the quasi-marxist position adopted
by part of the Zikist movement and Northern Elements
Progressive Union (NEPU) was modified to embrace the interest
of Metropolitan capital investors. The disappointment of the
post-colonial formula in the eyes of the small radical
intelligentsia and the few politicians who continued to cling
to a leftist persuasion, and the manner of arriving at this
forumula, are well summed up by Langley:
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"Bourgeois nationalism, however, never succeeded in
penetrating the core of the problem: (i.e. the post-
colonial problems relating to class struggle) it was
to make more explicit the fundamental opposition between
alien rule and the political and economic interests of
the colonized. The paradox is that they too (the qqasi-
marxists of the 1940s and 1950s), like the moderates
before them had to 'seek the political kingdom' first
before settling the less glamorous but more important
question of economic freedom. The 'dialectics of
backwardness' was such that the nationalist leaders
had to start from the super structure, not the economic
basis, in order to lead the peopi8 from the kingdom of
necessity into that of freedom".
Although the demand for economic freedom was not well
articulated, and was not as cogently expressed as was the
argument for political freedom, evidence suggests that right
from the start of the agitation for political independence
there was some awareness that the achievement of political
independence must be complemented by more indigenous
participation in the economy.
The nationalists of the 1940s in contrast to those of
the 1920s, had a better and clearer idea of how best to tackle
British rule in pursuit of their aims. Demands for equal
opportunities for Africans in the colonial administration
became increasingly strong and persistent, along with the
Africanisation of the churches and the military.
In the light of increasing Nigerian demands for
Nigerianisation of the colonial civil service, Sir John
Macpherson who succeeded Sir Arthur Richards as Governor of
Nigeria in April 1948, appointed a commission to make
recommendations about the recruitment and training of Nigerians
for senior posts in the government service. Membership of
the commission was predominantly Nigerian, and included Dr.
Azikiwe, who was later to be the first Ppesident of
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independent Nigeria, and seven other Nigerians. Not surprisingly
the commission submitted a unanimous report recommending
certain principles of policy, the chief one being that no
non-Nigerian should be recruited for any government post unless
there were no suitable and qualified Nigerians available.
The commission also recommended that public service Boards
should select candidates for Senior posts in the government
service, and that a large number of scholarship grants
should be made with a view to training Nigerians for
responsible positions.
The problem of replacing existing expatriate personnel,
particularly the British, in the government services, never-
theless remained. However this did not stop Nigerian elites
from looking even further than Nigerianisation of the civil
service. The colonial government was urged to set-up a
national committee on the Nigerianisation of foreign
enterprises. The committee was formed in 1950, and it
recommended that expatriates should not be allowed to
participate in the distributive trade.
As Britain was gradually preparing to disengage itself
from colonial rule in Nigeria during the 1950s, a large
number of positions in the Civil Service, public
police and higher educational establishments came to be
vacated by expatriates and filled largely by Nigerians.
In 1953 a commission of inquiry was set-up to look into
the way in which Nigerianisation of the civil service was
proceeding. The commission was headed jointly by Sir Sydney
Phillipson, the Commissioner of Special Duties and Mr. S.O.
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Adebo. It reviewed the policy of Nigerianisation at the
national level and submitted its report in April 1953. The
recommendations were:
(a) non-Nigerian officers on contract or in temporary
posts should not be promoted in the future
(b) posts in new departments should restrict promotion
of non-Nigerians
(c) no appointment should be given to expatriates on
pensionable bases unless there are no Nigerians available
for such positions
(d) expatriates should be recruited on contract bases,
so that it would be easy to terminate contracts on expiry
and as Nigerians became available.
These recommendations were not implemented straight away
because of the constitutional Changes of 1954 which led to the
regionalisation of the public service. As the prospect of
independence came closer, it became increasingly necessary to
ensure the continuity of the public services. Accordingly
the federal house of representatives set up a committee on
25th March 1958 to look further into ways of strengthening
Nigerian participation. The committee's report suggested
a policy of displacement, immediate Nigerianisation of
super scale posts in the administrative service, and the
introduction of a lump sum compensation scheme for expatriate
officers who were affected. 21
The government rejected the interim report (submitted on
the 21st June 1958) on practical grounds. It argued that the
existing civil service was already overstretched, and
implementation of the report would create insecurity among the
expatriate intermediate and junior staff who were not directly
affected, and cause them to leave as well. The rejection of
the report therefore left the Federal Civil Service largely
dominated by British Officers. Indeed, even just prior to
independence only 95 out of 658 senior posts in the service
were held by Nigerians, as against 425 overseas officers and
5 other West Africans. The government was nevertheless in
total agreement with the main principle which underpinned
the report. It therefore decided to adopt a cautious and
incrementalist approach to Nigerianisation. This was to be
the pattern of successive Nigerian governments later on
towards all kinds of Nigerianisation, including economic
indigenisat ion.
(iii) The Marketing Boards 
While the early stages of industrialisation in several
of the advanced industrial countries of the North had drawn
largely on domestic merchants and private manufactures, with
limited state assistance, in Nigeria, as in many other ex-
colonies, foreign entrepreneurs supplied the lead, most
notably in the development of import-substitution industries.
One of the principal aims of the state in Nigeria from
1955 onwards was to change this situation by creating a strong
body of indigenous entrepreneurs who could be the bearers of
the country's development efforts. Several government agencies
were oriented towards providing financial help, and the Nigerian
Marketing Boards and the Nigerian Development Bank came to be
outstanding.
The first development finance institution established
by the colonial government in Nigeria was in 1946. This was
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the Nigerian Local Development Board (NLDB). The Board had
two basic functions. The first and more important was to make
loans and grants to the government and government-
controlled bodies for the purpose of financing the establish-
ment of infrastructure, public utilities, land settlement and land
utilization schemes. The second function was to aid and foster
private Nigerian business activities by granting loans to co-
operatives, partnerships and companies registered in the
country.
When the NLDB was abolished in 1949, its assets were
divided among the three regional governments of the North,
West and East and the Colony Development Board. Each region
thereby formed its own Development Board, and these regional
Boards began to provide assistance to private enterprises in
their regions, thereby encouraging the development of Nigerian
entrepreneurs. There was not a chronic shortage of capital
among indigenous firms during the late 1960s. This has been
adequately demonstrated_in Schatz t s study of the Federal Loan
Board's lending system in the 1960s. 22
However, the first seeds of the gradual movement towards
the assumption by individual Nigerians of a more active and
increasing role in the economy can be traced to the establish-
ment of Marketing Boards at the beginning of the Second World
War in 1939.
The Nigerian Marketing Boards were set up as statutory
bodies to handle the export of Nigerian agricultural produce.
Their origin can therefore be traced to the pre-war colonial
efforts of controlling the exports of British West African
territories. The West African Produce Control Board (WAPCB)
was directly responsible for handling Nigeria's major export
crops. But this Board came to be replaced by the Marketing
Boards at the start of the Second World War. The colonial
authorities decided then to re-organise the Marketing
of West African produce and ensure supplies to the UK on a
regular basis during the course of the war.
After World War II, the colonial government decided that
statutory Marketing Boards be established for the main Nigerian
export produce. The first produce Marketing Board was set up
for cocoa marketing and sale in 1947. This was followed in
1949 by the establishment of cotton, ground nuts and oil palm
produce Marketing Boards. These Boards remained nationwide
Marketing Board organisations, set up on a strict commodity
basis, so enabling them to operate on a "Regional Cross-
Commodity basis" until their regionalisation in 1954. After
1954, each region was given the jurisdiction to handle its own
produce. The Western region handled cocoa, the North handled
ground nuts and cotton and the East handled palm oil. In
addition to the three regional Boards there was also a Central
(Federal) Marketing Board, but this was abolished in 1958 and
its functions taken over by the Nigerian Produce Marketing
Company Limited.
The creation of the Marketing Boards was severely
criticised and often resisted by local produce dealers and
1
politicians. Increased government control of the trade in raw
material was to arouse the fury of local produce dealers
such as the cocoa trade association. Furthermore, the
imposition of control by colonial authority on all import and
export businesses, and the issuing of import/export license to
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only British firms, greatly angered the nationalist leaders. 23
Most of the changes which were then introduced in the
system of marketing Nigeria's agricultural produce were
intended to conform to the constitutional demands of the
nationalists. The political and constitutional conferences
in the 1950s led directly to regional autonomy.
In the, mid 1950s "Commodity" Marketing Boards of the
regions were transformed into Regional Development Corporations.
These Corporations came to provide loans for private industrial
and commercial undertakings. They initiated partnerships
with foreign capital in industrial projects, and provided shares
in new firms financed by public funds for individuals. Needless
to say, these shares were quickly taken over by politicians and
their business clients.
There are many reasons for the regionalisation of the
Marketing Boards. A controversy between the Western Cocoa
Board and the Central government was perhaps the most
important factor responsible for the regionalisation of all
the:Boards. In 1953 the Cocoa Marketing Board refused to make
a capital grant to the School Building Programme, as insisted
by the Action Group Party of Chief 0. Awolowo. In consequence
the latter threatened to take over the functions carried out
by the centrally-controlled Board and to retain the revenues
for their own programmes. The London Constitutional;
Conference subsequently agreed in 1953 to the creation of new
regional Marketing Boards, to replace the old system. These
Boards came into existence in 1954, and all the capital
assets were divided among the three Regions. The Western
Region received £42.9 million, the North received £32.7
million and the East received £11.5 million.
24
 The Eastern
Region was not in favour of regionalisation because its share of
the fund was small, and the prospect of revenue from the
Region's produce was expected to be similarly small. With the
discovery of oil in large quantity in the Eastern Region,
the Regions reversed their positions. The West and North came
out against Regionalisation, while the East became in favour
of it.
The Marketing Boards were used by the colonial authorit-
ies to take over the country's export business from
expatriate firms. The government was keen to acquire sources
of revenue so as to uphold "a new philosophy" committed to the
general welfare of the colony and a programme of development.
The export of the colony's products had been quite profitable
in the past, so the government saw control of this business
as a useful source of finance. It began to monopolise the
sector by means of the 13 oards.
The Boards were given the additional responsibility of
maintaining price stability for the benefit of peasant
producers. Moreover, the creation of the Marketing Boards
was acceptable to the colonial authorities because they
could be used to subsidize the Metropolitan consumers in
Britain, and to shore up the revenues and balance of payments
of the sterling bloc, although those objectives would of course
come into conflict with the claims on the revenues for the bene-
fit of Nigerians.
In retrospect the creation of the statutory Marketing
Boards pre-empted the opportunities created by the post-war
economic boom, thereby excluding both foreign and indigenous
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private enterprises from the export trade. Foreign firms
remained however in total control of the import trade. In
1949, no less than 95% of the import business was owned by
expatriates, chiefly Europeans, Lebanese and other assorted
expatriates. Ten years later, in 1959, the African businessmen
were so far behind that they demanded the complete removal of
non-European expatriates from the economic scene. The
Amalgamated Northern Middlemen's Association openly agitated
not only for the removal of the Lebanese but even for the
restriction of foreign capital in general.
By the time the nationalist politicians came to
the fore-front in the mid 1950s, and the prospect of self-
rule for Nigeria was imminent, indigenous businessmen were no
longer appealing to traditional rulers to protect their
interests. They started seeking influence among nationalist
leaders by impressing upon them that "they expected expatriate
trading firms to leave the retailing business to Nigerians".
25
As independence approached, party politics began to
gather momentum in Nigeria. Politicians resorted to use of the
Boards' resources to finance political parties, as well as to
paying for industrial and educational development. Politicians
and influential indigenous businessmen were able to make
fortunes, either by channelling funds into privately owned
firms (with politicians as shareholders), in the name of political
parties, or by the award of inflated public contracts for
industrial developments. Thus although the Marketing Boards
were used to finance industrial investment, indirectly they
helped establish indigenous aspiring capitalists. The
expansion of educational facilities after the second world war
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may have been what produced the indigenous manpower to help
run the colonial administration, but it is the Marketing
Boards which facilitated most of all the emergence of a fairly
well-educated and wealthy elite in the 1950s. In this period,
already there were a number of influential businessmen who
by virtue of their connections with politicians, came to be
favoured with contracts from the government for the import-
ation of various items.
Akeredolu-Ale noted correctly that the "link" between the
nationalists' arguments for political freedom and economic
independence was rather "weak", and this weakness was
responsible for the lack of pressure for policy measures to
help indigenous businesses. That is to say if there had been
strong agitation for the investment of the accumulated funds of
the Boards within Nigeria during the colonial period, rather
than in Britain, then the emerging problem of insufficient
capital for indigenous businessmen in that period would have
been much less acute. However, even if the Board's revenues
had remained in Nigeria, it is doubtful whether the colonial
government would have allowed public money to be used for
the purposes of promoting private indigenous enterprises, let
alone the sort of party political causes which benefited when
the Boards' resources did come under the control of the
indigenous politicians in the late 1950s.
The Marketing Boards were not purposely established to
cater for private indigenous enterprises, but none-the-less ended
up doing precisely that. Between 1955 and 1962, the Marketing
Boards came to be milked by businessmen and politicians as a
source for loans and permitted many of them to purchase equity
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shares in Nigerian private companies, as noted above. The
Regional and Federal governments were also buying shares in this
period. Nevertheless, the regionalisation of the Boards,
and the subsequent appropriation of the funds by regional
politicians, seemed to bear out British fears about assigning
to an educated minority of Nigerians the power to handle
the affairs of the majority of peasant farmers who produced the
wealth.
The expected negative effects of assigning the
responsibilities of the state to the indigenous politicians
was subsequently confirmed in an official report. Drawing
an earlier committee's findings, the Report by the Special
Duties Officers' Committee on the Division of Assets and
Liabilities of the former Government of Northern Region and the
• future of Capital Territory, (14th March 1968), reiterated
that "under the political government (between late 1950s and
1966) a series of malpractices had occurred". The report went
on to reveal that "Non-viable Commercial firms had been
purchased at exorbitant prices, large scale investments had been
made in unsatisfactory firms and loans had been given on
political grounds with neither proper investigation of the
projects involved nor adequate loan agreements. Of 12 projects
wholly financed by the Corporation (the Government owned
Northern Nigeria Development Corporation) and examined by the
Committee of Enquiry, only one was found to be developing
according to plan and worthy of encouragement. Out of 27
commercial ventures also examined in which the Corporation
had financial interests, only 6 were found to be successful". 26
As will become clear later, those comments pertaining to the
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late 1950s and 1960s have a familiar modern (i.e. 1970s
indigenisation) ring.
By 1954 all Marketing Boards were under de facto
Regional party political control. This partly explains why
the regional politicians found it fairly easy to get access
to the finances of the Boards. Had the Boards been brought
under central Treasury jurisdiction, the Boards would have
been less likely to be abused by the regional political establish-
ments, especially since the British were still very strongly
placed in the Civil Service, and colonial rule had not yet
been officially terminated. With the achievement of self-
rule from Britain in 1957 and 1959 27 the Regions' dependence
on the Boards' resources was heightened. Thus the Boards
became subjected to political control and direction in
furthering indigenous business and political interests.
Two unanswered questions about the Boards need to be
mentioned here: why were the Boards not brought under strong
legislative control, and why did the colonial Authorities
agree to the regionalisation of the Boards in 1953? One explan-
ation could be that it was felt, somewhat naively, that the
politicians would use the resources unreservedly to develop
their own Regions. Alternatively, deliberate colonial
policy was to let the politicians handle the Boards' affairs
irrespective of the consequences, although this seems
unlikely when one examines the trial of Dr. N. Azikiwe, the
Premier of the Eastern Region, in the affair of the African
28Continental Bank in 1956.
	
Yet another explanation refers
to one of a series of concessions won by the nationalists.
Regardless of where the correct explanation really lies, the
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surrendering of central government power over the commodity
Marketing Boards in the process of de-colonisation was a
significant landmark in the development of private indigenous
regionally-based capital. Nevertheless a significant
number of aspiring Nigerian capitalists still had to await
the later development of finance capital, which was to be the
phenomenon of the 1970s.
(iv) The Post-Colonial Period Under Civil Rule 1960 - 1966 
On October 1st, 1960, Britain formally terminated colonial
rule in Nigeria, and the first independent Republic (1960-
66) came into existence.
The new political leaders, civil servants, traditional
leaders and aspiring Regionally based indigenous capitalists
together laid down political and economic policies in the
first half of the 1960s. We have already shown that a
struggle for "economic freedom" was simultaneously waged
against British Imperial rule just as political independence
was being sought. Political issues were tied to economic
interests of the nationalist leaders and their regionally-based
aspiring businessmen and, in the North, their aristocratic
clients. After independence, politics became a matter of
standing for, and on behalf of, one's own region and one's own
community, and rivalry among the new leaders for Federal funds
was intensified. In the past, colonial rule had provided to a
large extent a common enemy and a pretext for nationalist
leaders to overlook the differences between them, and an
occasion to form a united front. The hostile stance against
foreign rule now turned inwards as the colonial ruler departed;
and strong domestic competition for the national resources and
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power began in earnest.
(v) Industrialisation and Nigerianisation of the Private Sector
The two most important economic issues in the immediate
post-colonial years were, first, rapid industrialisation
through the use of foreign skills and in part capital, and
secondly the effort to inciease private Nigerian participation
in all spheres of the economy. These two issues were to lead
directly to the policy of indigenisation in the 1970s.
Since independence, successive governments in Nigeria
have tried to restructure the inherited colonial economy and
change public policy in such a way as to allow Nigerians
greater participation and control. The first real attempt to
achieve these aims through state policy had been in 1958 when
the then federal Minister of Commerce Dr. K.O. Mbadiwe set
up a committee to advise the government on how best to
strengthen indigenous participation in the distributive trade,
an area of the economy then considered to be suitable for
indigenous entrepreneurs. The Report 29
 of that committee
highlighted some of the bottlenecks and made suggestions for
improving the position of indigenous participation. For
instance the committee identified lack of capital and
technological and managerial skills as handicaps. The
government was therefore urged to ease these difficulties
by organising institutions and agencies which would provide
A
encouragement and, in particular financial assistence.
Between 1951 and 1958 the industrial development
strategy had taken account of generous ways of encouraging
private capital investment. In 1951, the colonial government
introduced the pioneer Industries Ordinance. 30 Foreign firms
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investing in Nigeria could apply for a "pioneer Aid
Certificate" granting a tax free holiday for a maximum of five
years. Also granted was unrestricted repatriations of profits,
dividends and capital at will after payment of government
taxes. Similarly in 1958 the "Approved Users Scheme" was
introduced under which manufacturing industries were entitled
to import certain types of raw materials either without having
to pay import duty, or by paying very mimimal duty rates. The
idea of this policy was to increase the price-competitiveness
and profitability of these industries, as was stated by Section
41 of the Customs and Excise Management Act 55 of 1958. The
raw materials imported under the scheme must be used for the sole
purpose for which they were allowed to be imported under the
favourable condition.
In return for the series of incentives provided by
government, manufacturing firms were expected to achieve at
least 50% local value-added, as their contribution to the
economic development of the country. However, the actual
contributions of manufacturing industries in this regard did
not become, and to the present day has still not become, very
impressive, as will be argued later in chapter 6.
The Industries Ordinance also required Nigerian
participation in all the foreign firms which applied for
"pioneer status" which enjoyed tax concessions and other
incentives.
One year after independence was attained, the Federal
government impressed upon all expatriate firms that it wished to
see them leave the distributive trade sector for Nigerians,
with the exception of departmental stores and the retailing
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of goods which have a high technical content. Although by the
time of independence in 1960, large European firms had already
started to gradually withdraw from retail trade, Lebanese,
Syrians and other assorted expatriates continued to operate
in this sector, and the overall position of African businessmen
did not at first significantly improve. However, political
independence was the beginning of improvement for Nigerian
middlemen who served as agents to European capital. They began
to enter estate, transport and construction businesses.
These indigenous middlemen were subsequently to supply the
regionally-based big businessmen and politicians of later
years.
The Federal Minister of Economic Development, Alhaji
Waziri Ibrahim urged alien investors to redeploy their
capital into manufacturing industry. Making a statement
in Parliament in 1961, he declared that
"all expatriate middlemen • • • including the big
limited liability companies which play the role of
middlemen in our country's distributive trade and
all expatriate individuals or companies who are
engaged in road transport should at once start 41
gradual withdrawal from those two enterprises."'
Alhaji Waziri is reputed to have reiterated this declaration during
his budget speech in April 1964 by advocating the takeover of
some expatriate firms beginning with banks, insurance, retail
trade and transport. Subsequently a committee was set up charged
with the responsibility of examining the Nigerianisation of
business enterprises.32 The first Republic might properly be said,
then, to have openly entertained the idea of indigenisation, even
though it did not get around to legislating a comprehensive
policy. The government was anyway dissuaded from taking
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radical steps by the risks involved, most notably the likely
withdrawal of foreign capital.
However, to encourage the private indigenous sector in the
long run, the government had to take the lead by indigenising
the public sector first. The idea of government participation
through buying shares, so as to be able to transfer them to
private buyers at a later date, was embedded in a report of a
committee appointed by the government in 1959, on ways and
means of fostering a share market in the country;
"Once government-assisted enterprise had got started,
the governments should stand reagy to sell their shares
to private Nigerian investors".2.)
This idea continues to be entertained to the present day even
though it has not yet been adequately implemented.
There is also an intention made clear in government
documents to assist the private indigenous business sector
directly. Under the government's industrial policy, within
the framework of the 1962/68 Development plan, it was stated
that the government was to enable Nigerians to participate to
an increasing extent in "the ownership, direction and manage-
ment of Nigerian industry and trade". To this end, the Federal
government proceeded to set up the Federal loans Board with an
Initial capital of half a million pounds (£500,000), to provide
financial assistence to "small Nigerian businessessmen in
trade, industry, construction and transport". 34
 This was
to supplement the existing development bank which already had
large undertakings.
The ascendance of the indigenous political class to
C.
government in 1960 led to an unprefedented drive for
industrialisation, and the previously weak link between foreign
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capital and domestic commercial capital was strengthened in the
course of industrialisation. The chief beneficiary was foreign
capital along with the Nigerian political class who directed
the policy, and the rising domestic industrialists and business-
men. A differentiation of classes in Nigerian society proceeded
apace as did growing differences between the industrialising
towns such as Lagos, Port-Harcourt and Kano on the one side, and
the rest of the country.
Industrialisation of course had began to acquire political
as well as economic importance even before independence, but
it was in the 1960s that the government started to provide the
most liberal and attractive incentives to foreign investors.
Critics however maintain that the generous incentives turned out
to be counter productive. The failure of the government to
stress the purpose for which the incentives were given, and the
random manner in which they were awarded to almost any foreign
firm which applied, made the policy unlikely to achieve its
objectives.
Indigenous factors for industrial "take off" were rightly
perceived to be inadequate. Neither the few indigenous
entrepreneurs nor the Lebanese and Syrians who had been trading
in Nigeria for many years, could invest on a sufficiently large
scale. There seemed to be little alternative but for Nigeria's
economy to become even more thoroughly integrated into the
international capitalist and financial systems, with the
probability that most of the benefits would accrue largely
to indigenous bourgeois aspirants and to foreign firms.
Belisco sums up well the process that was taking place:
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"The choice in favour of growth structured by
exogenous capital and technology constitutes a
pragmatic denial of Nigeria's capacity to direct
its own development and makes irrelevant laboured
attention to the role of the local entrepreneur.
For it is primarily the international entrepreneur
who has been the driving agent of Nigeria's
capitalist transformation from.the outset and
continuing into the present." -"5
Although Belisco's observation is to a large extent accurate, his
line of argument must be treated with some caution. The present
substantial levels of industrial achievement in some developing
countries such as India, Brazil and South Africa were and still
are significantly facilitated by foreign finance and industrial
capital, even though the many observers and analysts who employ a
dependency approach might argue that the patterns of change which
are fuelled in this way encourage only "dependent development",
not independent industrialisation. This theme will be returned
to later (Chapter 8).
Some nationalist politicians in some of the political parties,
for instance the Action Group and the NCNC, argued against the
growing presence of foreign capital in Nigeria even before independence.
Reliance on foreign capital and foreign investors was thought by
such politicians as Chief Obafemi Awolowo to be incompatible with
political independence. In particular, the monopolisation of foreign
investment in certain major sectors of the economy was objected to.
However, once Nigerians started to play a part in the colonial
administration in the early 1950s, they began to realize that
substantial economic growth in the country could only come about
with the assistance of massive foreign investment. This conception
of the essential role of foreign capital was held and fostered
further by the new Nigerian government in the period 1960 to 1965.
The government gave a guarantee of dividend and profit repatriation
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at will, import tax exemption, pioneer status, and an assurance of
capital withdrawal at any time preferred by the investors. Before
foreign capital is to be invested in Nigeria, a clause in most of
the contracts provided for an international legal body to be called
upon in matters of investment disputes or nationalisation. This
clause was partly intended to guarantee a fair settlement in the
event of the take over of foreign capital through nationalisation.
The government held to these conditions for most of the 1960s.
However, it did not escape demands from the Nigerian business community,
radical intellectuals and politicians and even some civil servants
for the Nigerianisation of the private sector. The government was
also concerned that most of the highly paid positions in industry
were held by expatriates, with significant repercussions on the foreign
exchange reserves. In July 1958 it issued a policy statement on
the "Opportunities for Overseas Investment in the Federation of
Nigeria", which emphasised the priority of employing Nigerians in
senior positions. Government policy on expatriate employment in
private industry therefore became a matter of concern to the government
as well as the domestic private business sector. The continuous
pressure to reduce expatriate numbers in industry and to closely
monitor the level of performance of expatriate personnel in industry,
came mainly from the government and the newly qualified indigenous
professionals in the industrial sector. Despite this pressure,
industries had little choice but to recruit for some positions such
as production engineer, quality control staff and technicians, from
abroad, because there were not many suitably qualified indigenes.
Government pressure on private industry to increase indigenous
employment in spite of the obvious absence of skilled indigenous
labour, may well have undermined and held back industrial efficiency,
although this cannot be said with certainty because of the difficulty
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of testing such a statement. What is fairly clear however is that
relations on this issue between the authorities and private industry
have not been amicable in the past.
Finally, domestic pressure led directly to an Immigration Act
in 1963. This act attempted to tighten the hitherto liberal immigration
conditions, and it set guidelines for foreign firms on their employment
policy. The policy attempted to control expatriate personnel by
imposing Expatriate quota restriction on those coming to work for
private companies and organisations. Above all the Act required new
foreign investors to inform the Ministry of Trade and Industry as
to their intentions, in order to ensure that a sustained and mutually
beneficial commitment was being entertained. The government was coming
to express a preference for joint partnership between indigenous and
foreign investors, hoping in this way to attach to the necessary foreign
capital some local control and conditions. A change in the pattern of
foreign private investment was to be engendered by a government policy
of restricting expatriate domination. The containment of foreign
capital was not to be superseded by direct and exclusive state participation.
Instead, private indigenous investment was becoming more and more a
major priority in official thinking. Every policy document on
investment and the economy by Nigerian governments since 1960 has
expressed the desire for private Nigerian participation. For example
in 1964 the government encouraged the "establishment of Nigerian
companies which offered at least 10% of their equity to indigenous
businessmen, institutions and/or government agencies." 36 Nevertheless,
the initial aspiration was for more Nigerian participation, whether
private or public, and it was not until the 1970s that the government
started to place far greater emphasis on specifically private sector
involvement.
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In the early and mid-sixties, politicians and influential
businessmen had profited from foreign investment. In some cases,
external interests formed partnerships with members of the ruling
groups or influential indigenous businessmen, or even with the
government's own parastatal corporations. This extended the patronage
and support base of the politicians and their indigenous business
clients. The financial benefits offered by foreign firms were a
strong inducement for the politicians to cooperate in making available
government contracts and in ensuring a political climate generally
conducive to business. The government was in any case anxious to
improve the inadequate infrastructural facilities and the unevenly
developed condition of the country. The government started to
acquire the strategic sectors after independence, chiefly mining, to
add to the already state-owned utilities, and it also began to
participate in commercial sectors which traditionally were part of
the private sector. Government officials and politicians were in
some cases able to misuse their positions to their own private gains.
Given this increasing participation by politicians and officials in
the private business sector, it should come as no surprise that most
of them were strongly against the nationalisation of foreign firms in
the country.
(vi) The Nationalisation Debate
Any historical discussion of conflict between foreign and indigenous
capital, and of the role of the Nigerian state must take account of
the nationalisation debate which took place in the early 1960s.
On 29th November 1961, the Action Group opposition party in the
Federal parliament tabled a motion calling on the government to
nationalise basic industries and "key commercial firms" at least in
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principle. The government rejected the motion, and argued that the
nationalisation of anything beyond the already publicly owned
utilities would be detrimental to the country's economy. Again, two
years later, in a parliamentary debate on 22nd March 1964, the government
responded to the opposition's popular demand for nationalisation by
pointing out that, should the need arise for government participation
in insurance, banking or any other sector, it would form its own firms
37
and operate side by side with foreign owned ones.
	
Interestingly
enough, the NCNC leadership, and Dr. N. AzikiWe in particular, who
had shown radical tendencies in the early 1940s and mid-1950s, was by
now in concert with the predominantly conservative government of
Prime Minister Tafaw,a Balewa in stopping the nationalisation proposal
of Chief O. Awolowo's opposition party. One lesson to be drawn from
this is that in Nigerian politics it has not been difficult to exchange
political principles for personal power and riches. This conclusion
is reflected in the curious alliance between the Northern People's
Congress (MPG) and the NCNC which ruled up to 1966.
The overall policy of the first republic, which was non-nationalisation,
was sufficiently unexceptional to not require explanation. The desire
for joint indigenous-foreign participation was also only to be expected.
Here, the words of Chief Festus Okotie-Eboh, a member of the NCNC, and
the Federal minister of finance in the alliance government are
illustrative of the prevailing mood: "We intend to maintain a climate
conducive to the inflow of capita1 and we extend the warmest welcome 	 •
to foteign private capital for investment in virtually every field of
manufacture." He went on to reveal: "we have no intention of further
nationalisation. Nigerianisation, through increasing participation
by Nigerians in ownership and direction as well as in employment
opportunities, rather than nationalisation is our
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The opposition strongly criticised the government's non—
nationalisation policy and its liberal attitude towards foreign
investment capital, but the government attached greater importance
to the necessity to offer assurances and protection to foreign
investors. Accordingly, Zanna Bukar Dipcharim, Minister of
A
Commerce and Industry, declared that nationalisation played no
part in the government's plans for the future.
Chief Obafemi Awolowo's own thinking on the subject was quite
at variance with the government line. For Awolowo,
"it is not our wish that Nigeria should remain
undeveloped, but many firms are exploiting our
market potentialities and resources to the
benefit of their own countries. In Ceylon all
hotels and the sugar industry were nationalised,
thereby disallowing foreigners from establishing
such enterprises in competition. This move
yields a gre,0 amouni of profit to the Ceylon
government."'"
The chief felt that nationalisation would not frighten away
all foreign investors. He thought that the Western industrial
nations believed that the underdeveloped countries of Africa
must be seen to play an independent role in the ideological warfare
between the communist bloc and the capitalist west, and not appear
as mere appendages of western capitalist countries. This understanding
might be representative of some strategic political thinking of the
time, especially in the West, but with hindsight it would seem to be
naive, particularly in regard to the implied connection between
ideology and development.
We have already seen that the first civilian regime had been
firmly against nationalisation, and it was to be followed in this
respect by the military regime which was established under General
Ironsi in 1966. For example the controversial insurance business
was not to be nationalised outright in 1969. The government instead
established the National Insurance Corporation of Nigeria as a major
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vehicle for harnessing insurance funds locally, so as to finance
Nigerian development. In the same year also, the Petroleum Decree
was promulgated. This Decree installed comprehensive control of
petroleum and gas exploration and production in Nigeria, vesting both
in the Federal government and requiring very extensive Nigerianisation
a
of personnel within ten years of operations of any successful oil
producing company. However, oil was to be very much a special case
and the Decree by no means set the course for a general trend.
As the arguments for Nigerianisation and nationalisation were
mounting in the sixties, the very companies that were at the centre
of the argument began to move into safer ground by the reorganisation
and redeployment of their capital. They moved away from their
concentration in produce and general merchandise and trade, and into
a range of modern consumer goods production. Furthermore some
Nigerian subsidiaries of Multinational corporations began to welcome
increasing indigenous participation both by private entrepreneurs
and' the state. Thia was being done partly in order to meet the
expressed wish of the first National Development Plan (1962/68).
The traditional foreign—owned commercial firms such as the UAC advanced
into manufacturing partly because of the increasing activities of
indigenous import/export businessmen which had been encouraged by
government policy. Indigenous business threatened the profitability
of foreign capital largely in the commercial sector. Long established
foreign companies therefore showed that they were prepared to be
flexible in complying with the government's desire for the Nigerianisation
of the private sector.
The agitation for a policy of indigenisation which had begun
with the regional governments of the West and East in 1955, one year
after the Macpherson constitution, was sustained throughout the 1960s.
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The idea of indigenisation had already been embedded in the pioneer
industries ordinance of 1951. This ordinance became the basis of
the policy, introduced in 1961, to encourage or oblige certain
foreign firms to withdraw in favour of Nigerians. The aim of
indigenous participation rather than outright nationalisation
evolved after the Second World War. Any potential threat of
nationalisation without compensation in the sixties was averted
by rapid adaptation by foreign firms to the aspirations of the
government. They initiated and issued shares to the Nigerian public
and ventured into new industries which the government wanted to see
established.
By 1966, private foreign investment in Nigeria accounted for at
least 70% of total industrial investment and over 90% of investment
in such basic industries as chemical productions and vehicle assembly.
It was no less than 60% in other industrial manufacturing sectors.
In addition, there was extensive foreign investment in banking, in
40insurance, mining and shipping." " The predominance of such huge
foreign investment was not to be seriously challenged until the 1970s.
Comparison of the 1962/68 and 1970/74 tational development plans makes
this clear. According to the 1970/74 plan, less than 20% contribution
was to be made by foreign capital to total private investment which
translates into about £145 million (with the exception of the oil
sector). In contrast, in the 1
was called for from the private sector, and no less than 50% of that
41
sum was expected from foreign private sources.
The formally expressed desire of the Nigerian government for
"economic independence", in the 1960s was pursued through the
encouragement of integration of foreign with indigenous capital.
In stressing the desire for partnership, the government went at some
lengths to declare in 1959:
963/68 plan a total of £389.5 million
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"Our government wish to give every support to
the principle of partnership between overseas
and indigenous capital and skilled personnel.
We prefer that where there are willing Nigerian
investors they should be associated with new
enterprises. Some public funds are available
for investment in suitable enterprises seeking
local participation. There will generally,
however, be no rigid insistence on local
participation but governments may wish to share
in the financing of certain large enterprises
which have a special significance to the public
• it will be expected that posts which can
be efficiently filled by Africans, should not
be filled by non-Africans. Our governments
will naturally especially value enterprises
which are animated by this spirit of partnership
and which make satisfactory arrangements for
the employjit,training and advancement of
Africans."
Increased private indigenous participation was always preferable to
nationalisation, from the government's point of view. It was argued
that, if only for reasons of maintaining adequate management efficiency
and the flow of investment funds, it was best to appease foreign
investors and find a way of harmonising their interests with those
of indigenous businessmen. Hence, in the twin commitments to
industrialisation and Nigerianisation neither one was to be allowed
to fall behind the other, which is to say that neither one was to be
allowed to proceed too far at the expense of the other.
(vii) The Military Era 1966-1969
For reasons of analytic convenience and in order to avoid
confusing contemporary events with the historical factors which led
up to indigenisation, discussion here will be restricted to the
period between the first Military coup (15th January 1966) and 1969.
The events of the seventies which largely revolve around the oil
economy will be treated separately in the next chapter.
The dramatic appearance of the Military on the Nigerian political
scene on 15th January 1966 was accompanied by radical pronouncements.
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The coup makers themselves were commonly referred to as the "Young
Turks". However, the rhetoric did not last long, and did not produce
significant alterations of government economic policy. The established
course of non-nationalisation and increasing Nigerianisation of many
sectors of the economy was maintained. The inherent economic and
political difficulties of post-colonial Nigeria, which are usually
said to have been largely responsible for the interventions by the
military in government, remained unresolved. A change of leadership
in 1966 exposed the weakness of those to whom power had been handed
by the British. The pretences to power and the illusion of superiority
which had been quite peculiar to the first generation of independence
political leaders and to sections of the top civil service, was
finally shattered by the first coup d l etat. The coup was followed
by a continuation of the rise of bourgeois aspirants in the economic
sphere.
In the period 1966-69 indigenous capitalists were not created
overnight. They were a combination of prominent businessmen in the
import/export sector, starting out as distributive agents of transnational
firms in the 1950s, and a segment of the dwindling leadership of the
first republic. The prospects for material advancement led many
members of the earlier political elite to venture into business of
one kind or another during the first era of military government.
Their ambitions of a political career had, after all, been blocked
for the time being by the military.
The core of the Nigerian political elite was composed of nationalist
leaders, the traditional ruling aristocracy of the North, Southern
Chiefs, senior Civil Servants, leading businessmen, high ranking
officers of the military establishment, senior police officers and
a handful of economically very powerful representatives of Transnational
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corporations. As in the first republic, the new military government
pursued policies that benefitted this group. Nafzigar and Richter
have observed that: "A policy of transferring resources from
agriculture to industry through Marketing Board surpluses, agricultural
export duties and limited government expenditures in rural areas
benefitted the political elite in Nigeria even though they were less
involved in the private industrial sector
	 •".4
3
By late 1969, the oil industry was beginning to gain prominence
for the first time, and it rapidly replaced the Marketing Boards as
a source of patronage and funds. But even an industrialisation
process that was fuelled by growing oil wealth still required foreign
capital and skill. Thus the government embarked on a dual process of
both encouraging partnerships and restricting foreign capital in
certain areas. The military regime announced that it intended to
honour all honest and genuine businessmen who were prepared to invest
in the country in mutually beneficial projects. It reiterated the
established official view that further nationalisation did not form
part of the government's thinking. Nevertheless the government was
clearly poised to review expatriate enterprise status in the country
and in particular to restrict expatriate quota allocations in order to
offset mounting unemployment among Nigerians. The government was fully
aware that most business establishments had not employed indigenous
personnel to their full capacity and were not reinvesting a high -
proportion of profits in industrial projects. It also noted the
reluctance of foreign firms to train or to provide meaningful schemes
for the training of Nigerians.
In its seventh month of office the government of General J.A. Ironsi
promised to review the progress of the economy and instituted a study
group to look into the level of indigenous participation in the economy.
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However, the government's intentions were never carried out. This
was because of events beyond the control of the regime. A second
coup d'etat, in July 1966, ousted General Ironsi and brought
General Y. Gowon to power.
Nevertheless a trend towards indigenisation had become increasingly
clearer in the second half of the 1960s. The establishment of an
expatriate Quota Allocation Board in 1967 was an attempt to limit
the employment of expatriates. All existing foreign firms that were
public companies were required by the government to have at least
two Nigerian directors. The companies Decree of 1968 set out to
compel foreign firms to take on more of a Nigerian outlook and to
appoint Nigerians to their Boards. This Decree was one of a series
of Decrees concerning the economy passed between 1968 and 1969. Most
of them displayed an assertive attitude towards foreign companies.
Such an attitude is clearly evidenced in the Companies Decree of 1968.
The latter Decree is particularly significant for not only was it
an essential first step in defining assets which were later to be
indigenised, but also it helped to create a psychological atmosphere
in which the Enterprises Promotion Decree could be conceived and
launched in 1972. The Companies Decree maintained that "All foreign
companies incorporated outside Nigeria shall be deemed to be
incorporated as separate entities from their former parent companies
In respect of their operation in Nigeria as from 18th November 1968. 1
Thus the Decree required that all affected companies must in future
carry'the label "Nigerian". The government made its intention known
on 16th October 1968, and representatives of affected companies were
required to "inform" the Registrar of companies within three months of
promulgation of the Decree whether they wished to comply and so
continue their operations.
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The requirements of the Companies Decree 1968 were not, of course,
even so much as an indirect vehicle for nationalisation. However the
government did perceive a danger of foreign investors misinterpreting
the Decree. The Federal Comthissioner of'Finance, Chief Obafemi Awolowo
tried to explain that the idea of the Decree was far from "backdoor"
nationalisation. Its purpose was simply to indigenise alien companies
and make them consider themselves as Nigerian concerns. The investment
allowances and other concessions were not revoked. Both new and old
foreign investors continued to benefit from government incentives.
Most of the Decrees passed in the 1960s including the Companies Decree
did not in practice affect managerial control. Since the smooth transfer
of profits and dividends out of the country were also not impeded,
hardly any foreign company felt so strongly about the addition of
', Nigerian
 to their existing name to warrant disposal of the assets and
the termination of their operations.
In 1964 three quarters of the book value of the industrial assets
of firms in the country with a value of N25,000 or more were owned
by the British. 45
 The publication of this impressive statistic by
the Federal ministry of Industries in its Annual Report in 1969, stirred
a growing realisation among Nigerian academics, economists and politicians
of the "sobering fact that political independence is not synonymous
with economic independence
	
."46 By 1968, foreign investment in
Nigeria had reached a total of 077.1 million, with Britain the major
contributor, (2202.9 million), followed by other Western European
countties and the United States (L86.7 million and £57.7 million
respectively). Other assorted sources contributed £29.8 *Mimi.
Forty percent of the total investment was in the oil and mining sectors
and 16.4% in manufacturing industry.
Most of the Decrees concerning foreign companies in the 1960s
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did not affect the ownership pattern; and even those that did concern
the ownership pattern in 1972 and 1977 were to a large extent to
foster and strengthen the partnership between foreign and indigenous
companies. This was in a sense to the mutual benefit both of indigenous
businessmen and foreign investors. The private indigenous businessmen
enjoy from the partnership access to foreign funds and above all
management capability. The foreign investor gains greater security
of his investment by virtue of having a Nigerian stake in the business.
Furthermore, access to state officials and the opportunity to obtain
government contracts and other forms of benefit are greatly enhanced
by having a Nigerian partner. Partnership brings the benefit of
protection under the aegis of national business organisations and
associations. As the partnership structure of Nigerian-based enterprises
became apparent in the course of the 1960s, business organisations
like the Lagos Chamber of Commerce came to speak on behalf of both
indigenous and foreign business interests, in expressing grievances
against government actions which they deemed harmful to their interests.
Thus the tendency of indigenous business even in the early days of
colonial rule to act in opposition to European and other alien capital,
rather than to accept a secondary role, came to be superseded in the
1960s by the harmonisation of foreign and indigenous interests to a
degree hitherto unseen.
By the late 1960s in particular trading had ceased to be by far
and away the main activity of some Nigerian businessmen, and an
increasing interest came to be taken by private indigenous businessmen
In the setting up of small-scale industries. In order to encourage
this development, the Federal government embarked upon creating
institutional support. The Ministry of Industry established a division
toward the end of 1969 with the purpose of assisting new industrialists,
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by providing technical assistance to entrepreneurs for the identification
of projects and the determination of their feasibilities, and by
offering management advice. The most significant assistance was
financial. The government set up credit facilities scheme in conjunction
with existing banks. Industrial estates were designed. Significant
private indigenous efforts at manufacturing in partnership with
foreign capital began to substitute imported consumer goods. The
increase in these kinds of modest state 'intervention' in the economy
was perfectly consistent with a private enterprise philosophy. The
reigning belief was that the government would in any case transfer
state-owned enterprises to the private sector once they were mature.
In conclusion to this chapter, the dual process of Nigerianisation
of public and private sectors, and the pursuit of industrialisation
up to 1969 can be divided into at least two phases. First was the
period of "open door' , policy between 1947 and 1962. In this period,
all kinds of inducements were given to private foreign capital to
encourage industrial development. Government legislations conferred
benefits in the form of tax relief, import duties relief and aid to
pioneer industries. Almost unqualified support was given to foreign
private investment in Nigeria.
The second phase, which has come to be known as the ”realisation
47
phase", occupies the period between 1962 and 1968/9.	 The first
National Development Plan (1962-1968) started to shift the emphasis
away from encouraging private foreign investment, towards providing
%
an environment in which Nigerians could become more involved in the
industrialisation process of their own country. Therefore in the
"realisation!" era, both foreign private capital and private Nigerian
sector participation in the industrial sector were considered to be
desirable. There was to be yet a further phase after 1969, which will
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be discussed in the next chapter.
Historically the industrialisation of Nigeria in the period
1950 to 1960 was characterised by an initial growth process fuelled
by foreign capital and management skills. By 1962, and particularly
in the second half of the 1960s, the general policy objective of
government was to carry out economic de-colonisation. The Nigerian
Enterprises Promotion Decrees (NEPD) in the 1970s were to be the most
dramatic extension of this programme of action. It was a logical
continuation of the whole de-colonisation exercise which had sought
to combine foreign and indigenous capital for economic development.
An industrialisation policy which went hand in hand with Nigerianisation
efforts eventually brought a few Nigerian capitalists to combine
their resources with traditionally exclusive multinational subsidiaries.
In some cases also, a few Nigerians, for example Chief Odutala (Lagos),
Chief Henry Fajemirokum (Lagos), Alhaji A. Dantata (Kano) and Alhaji
M. Deribe (Bomb) either single handedly (in the financial sense) or
in combination with others, established new industrial ventures with
limited foreign capital, technical and managerial participation.
After the 1960s official attitudes towards foreign capital and
the accompanying increase in the government's efforts to transfer
the economy to indigenes, were made possible by revenues derived from
the export of oil. Thus the next chapter turns to an account of the
crucially important oil basis of the country's economy and finances
which emerged in the early part of the 1970s.
-)S
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CHAPTER 2 
The Oil Economy and Indigenisation
We have seen in the previous chapter how indigenous businessmen
and nationalists began to attempt to create conditions favourable
to indigenous entrepreneurs in the immediate post-colonial economy
of Nigeria. It has also been mentioned that such conditions were
furthered by various State policies intended to promote indigenous
capital. However, although a conflict of interest between foreign
capital and indigenous actors can be traced back to the nineteenth
century, Nigerian aims to translate economic aspirations into
practical programmes of action at the national level only became
realisable in the late 1960s and the 1970s.
By 1970, and in the period from 1970 to 1974 in particular,
the government became more assertive and espoused policies which
demanded the transfer of ownership and economic responsibilities
to indigenes. 1
 In. order to facilitate such a transfdrmation; the
government was to become involved in the nationalisation of some
major sectors of the economy, and to participate on a more limited
basis in some other sectors. Yet in this period of transition to
indigenisation proper, just as in the earlier periods, cooperation
and partnership between private foreign and indigenous capital
remained the guiding thread. In fact what emerged after 1974 was
not the relegation of private foreign capital to a subsidiary role,
but instead a merger between indigenous (both private and public)
and foreign capital.
The legislative measures taken in 1972 to compel foreign
investors to relinquish part of their enterprises did not scare
foreign capital away, simply because of the opportunities which
were created by the rising oil revenues which were earmarked for
ambitious development projects. The 1972 NERD was itself . a product
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of the economic and financial environment of the time. The aim of
this chapter, therefore, is to review the oil economy upon which
the policy of indigenisation was based and by which it was sustained.
This requires an examination of those official policies which concern
the oil industry and its nationalisation, for these are circumstances
which help to differentiate the Nigerian case from the indigenisation
exercise in most other black African countries.
To illustrate the significance of the oil industry, the post—
civil war development plans, which for the first time stressed
indigenisation proper, will also be discussed. The connections
between indigenisation and the foreign political policy of the Nigerian
government, and the expansion of the country's international trade,
will also be introduced.
(i) Nationalisation of the Petroleum Industry
The consideration of oil policy is important for at least
three reasons. First, government revenues from oil came to be the
vital substitute for the Marketing Board funds of the 1940s and 1950s.
They could be used for public development programmes and for fostering
private indigenous industrial entrepreneurs. Secondly, the petroleum
industry remained ad- a source of hope for a more general commercial
and industrial indigenisation, so long as the international oil
market remained stable. The framework of economic and political
decisions from 1970 onwards was laid down by the oil revenue upon
which government revenues and expenditure and the country's foreign
exchange earnings came to depend. All development plans and policies
geared towards the promotion of indigenous enterprises were founded
on estimates of existing and potential oil revenues. However, although
studies specifically of the oil industry have been published at an
unprecedented rate in the last fifteen years or so, few detailed
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analyses have been made of the role of oil as a strong factor in
accelerating capitalist development. The role of oil in the
indigenisation programme,needs to be underlined.
State ownership and control of the oil industry which generated
the revenue necessary to carrying out economic programmes became by
the 1970s the most pressing public issue, aside from the need for
national reconciliation after the end of the civil war. Hence
nationalisation of the oil companies, as well as the commercial banks,
was effected soon after the civil war had been brought to an end.
In early 1971, the production and marketing of petroleum and
its products, involving around eighty million tons of crude oil per
annum, was predominantly undertaken by foreign firms. Concern was
increasingly expressed in official and non-official circles even during
the war. Finally in 1971, the Federal Commissioner of Mines and Power,
Dr. R.B. Dikko spoke about the government's desire to redress the
imbalance. It was essential, according to the Commissioner, that
the Federal government act in order uto mitigate the paradox of
seemingly less indigenous control and economic independence in a
situation of increasing national prosperity. H2 In line with this
concern, and as part of an across-the-board effort to increase the
participation of Nigerians in the economy, the Gowon regime established
the Nigerian National Oil Corporation (NNOC) in 1971.3 A Board of
State technocrats, economists and oil experts from the Ministry of
Mines and Power was formed to run the NNOC.
The setting up of the NNOC was followed by government acquisition
of 359C of the equity shares of the French owned oil company SAFRAF.
Even more significant is that the latter signed an agreement with
NNOC embracing progressive ownership indigenisation. It was agreed
that NNOC would increase its equity shares to 40% when SAFRAF's
production exceeded 250,000 barrels per day (bpd), and to 45% when
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production was increased to 325,000 bpd, and to 50% if production
reached 400,000 bpd, The greater the level of the company's crude
oil output, the greater the government's share in ownership. 4
 Also
in September 1971, an agreement was concluded between the government
and Agip Oil Company of Italy which allowed the Federal government
1to acquire 33-% of the company's equity shares. This agreement also
3
enabled the government to have an equivalent percentage of "effective
working interest in participation" with Agip Company and the American
owned Philips Oil Company, in oil mining leases in an area of well
over 1.3 million areas. 5
Exports of Nigerian crude oil had commenced only towards the
end of 1957, and were the result of a. lengthy period of extensive
exploration and extraction activities by Royal Dutch Shell and
British Petroleum Company. At the time of the first military coup
in 1966, Nigeria was producing roughly 400,000 bpd and sold at
#2.17 per barrel. By 1971, the production had quadrupled and the
price gone up to #3.05 per barrel. 6
 Shell-BP was the single dominant
company in the production of Nigerian oil, but by the mid-1960s
Nigeria started to attract other petroleum companies such as the
French SAFRAP (ELF)and the American based Gulf Company. Although
other companies had started operations in the 1960s Shell-BP still
remained dominant, accounting for the production of 60% of the 2.07
million bpd figure of 1976. This alone contributed 54% of the
central government's total revenue. The only private indigenous
sector participants in the oil business were Henry Stephen and Son
Ltd., in partnership with Western Petroleum Company (US), Niger Oil,
owned by Chief S.L. Edu in conjunction with Monsanto, a private
West German company. Chief S.L. Edu was also the director of BP
and the Nigerian Petroleum Refining Company. Ado Ibrahim Investment
Properties was in partnership with Agip, ELF Nigas, Crown Central of
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the USIVand Michael Ibru with other assorted companies. This virtual
foreign domination of the country's oil industry and the almost total
absence of indigenous private capital, is what the State challenged
at the beginning of the 1970s, as a first step towards an increase in
both State and private indigenous participation in the economy.
Between 1970 and 1972 the government required foreign oil
companies to sell up to 39% of their interest to the government.
This was not socialist nationalisation. The government expressly
preferred the private indigenous sector to enter the oil business, but
knew that it was incapable of doing so. One of the reasons for this
was of course the existing dominance of the foreign companies. Most
Nigerians remained ignorant about the complexities of oil exploration,
extraction and its marketing in spite of the inescapable significance
of oil to the country's economy. Indeed the indigenous private
sector remained largely unable to participate in most aspects of
the oil business throughout the whole of the 1970s, government
encouragement notwithstanding.
The growth in awareness of the huge oil potential came through
in the increased public expenditure targets of the Second and Third
National Development plans (1970/4 and 1975/80 respectively).7
Moreover the projected ability of the oil industry to generate
foreign exchange enabled the Federal government first to conceive
the plan of indigenisation and then to strengthen its hands in
increasing government participation in the economy and in making
more assistance available to private citizens. In short, the emergence
of the Nigerian oil industry was a significant catalyst for the
indigenisation Decrees.
The oil revenue inflow was accelerated by the government's
partial nationalisation of the oil companies between 1973 and 1974.
The revenue for 1971/72 was about 640 million.pounds, and at the time the
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future revenue prospects from the industry were estimated by
officials to be far greater. As expected, oil revenue rose from
N640 million in 1971/72 to over N61. billion.by 1974.. The motivation for
nationalisation lay in the hope of eventual control of the economy;
and the high returns from the early steps towards nationalisation
only served to encourage the government to increase its participation
even further. The nationalisation of most of the petroleum companies
did not create havoc in the industry or lead to very antagonistic
reactions from the foreign companies; and the ease of achievement
seemed to be highly significant at the time. The affected companies
did not take any serious counter-measures of disinvestment.
The absence of strong resistance from the oil companies can be
explained in terms of their estimation of future prospects, and their
accurate judgment that Nigeria would continue to require the companies'
exclusive technology and other factors of production and marketing
outlets which they controlled. Furthermore, unlike the 1950s and 1960s,
the government was quite selective in providing incentives to foreign
investors, and continued to favour the oil industry so as to stimulate
more exploration. Usually the incentive packages took the form of
financial relief which would not have been contemplated in the
1950s and 1960s.
The post-civil war nationalisation of oil set a precedent for
attempts at the progressive involvement of Nigerians in running the
oil industry. Stressing the importance of private indigenous
participation in the oil industry, Mr. P. Asiodu had this to say
in 1972:
"all the oil companies under our Petroleum Regulation
Decree of 1969 are required to attain at least 70%
indigenisation of their manpower within seven years
of their operation and therefore to indigenise completely
as rapidly as possible. The Ministry is now
receiving the results achieved ty the oil companies
in applying these regulations."
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The Petroleum Regulation Decree of 1969 had put government participation
as a condition before future licenses and leases were to be granted
to foreign companies. Moreover, the second National Development Plan
(1970/74) declared that in the future the Nigerian government must
play a dominant role in the commanding heights of the economy including
oil, and specified public ownership of 55%. The Nigerian National
Oil Corporation (NNOC), set up by the government in 1971 to take part
in the exploration and marketing of Nigerian crude, was of course a
further major initiative, and this Corporation became the sole
beneficiary of all future concessions previously enjoyed by the
foreign oil firms. The most significant step taken by the government
in 1971 was the reservation of 51% shares exclusively for NNOC in
the event of new discoveries of commercially viable oil deposits
by the five concessionaries.
Government control of the oil industry, and also other strategic
sectors such as the development of an iron and steel industry were
strongly supported by the civil service under the military regimes.
This might superficially seem to be contrary to a goal of indigenous
capitalist development, but a close examination of the military
leadership and their bureaucrats —reveals that the intention was to
guarantee the long term interest of the private indigenous sector as
well as the immediate interests of the public sector. Thus the
ownership of the bulk of the oil wealth was to be used to spur the
development of local capitalism. Mr. P. Asiodu pointed out that:
n the goverment desires to ensure public sector
dominance and control of the industry. It will
be the State that will own the bulk of the oil
wealth ale use it as it sees fit for the benefit
of all.”7
Whether every Nigerian or the majority of Nigerians have been, or
will ever become, the beneficiaries of this State ownership remains
open to serious doubt. The State cannot yet be said to have
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successfully created a modern economy with greater indigenous
control by its use of the country's oil wealth.
As has already been mentioned, the government required 35%
shares or more in most of the oil companies as a condition for resuming
operations at the end of the civil war. Agip Philips Company was
1the first oil firm to comply and released 33-% of its interest, and
3
a
later in 1973 the government took over 35% of Shell-BP and made known
its intention of further acquisition. Likewise, the French State
owned SAFRAF (ELF) was made to give up a substantial part of its
concession area as one of the conditions for resuming operations.
On the government's part this was to some extent motivated by the
French government's apparent willingness to give recognition to
"Biafra", during the war. By 1974, the government was the major
shareholder in all the oil companies in Nigeria, with a minimum
share of 51%, up to a maximum of 55%.
The Nigerian government nationalised the whole of the assets
of British Petroleum on 1st August 1979. The reason for nationalising
BP's remaining stake was only partly . to do with national economic
considerations. It was also a matter of exercising pressure on
the British government to modify -its attitudes concerning Southern
Africa. The move was correctly interpreted by both the Nigerian
Press and Western Press as a direct response to the decision taken
by the Conservative government of Britain to allow BP to export North
Sea Oil and other non-sanctioned crude to South Africa. The swift
response to the British government's decision was premised on the
belief)that if Nigeria exported oil to Britain, and in turn the latter
exported crude (whether or not of Nigerian origin) to South Africa,
it was logical that Nigeria would be facilitating Britain's supply
of oil to the apartheid state. Furthermore, the Nigerian government's
move in 1979 was designed to apply leverage over the British
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government's handling of the Zimbabwe (Rhodesia) crisis, chiefly in
the direction of encouraging rapid steps to bringing about black majority
rule.
The decision to nationalise was taken out of political principle
and passion. Nevertheless it did not introduce much of a strain
in economic relations between the two countries. The estimated amount
of BP assets at the time of nationalisation was about one or one and
a half billion Naira. Before the second phase of nationalisation
in 1977, Nigeria was contributing, according to a report in the
Sunday Times (Lagos) 15th February 1981, a profit of L40 million
annually for the production of 10% of BP's total. Considering that
already 60% of the Shell-BP interest had been acquired by the
government, the subsequent takeover of BP shares was of limited
significance to Britain, especially given the extensive development
of North Sea Oil which was then taking place. Nonetheless, anxiety
was understandably expressed in Whitehall about similar actions
which the Nigerian government might wish to take in the future.
As far as domestic opinion in Nigeria was concerned, the mood
of the times is well represented by a contribution to the New Nigerian
newspaper of 15th August 1979 by the weekly anonymous writer, Candido
("man behind the mask"):
"That BP Affair - A warning to Nigerians".
This reflected the diplomatic frustration which had started the
review of economic relations with Britain.
"The British need not to take umbrage against
our action. After all they have had more than
their share of Nigerian largesse in the past.
They have more than recouped their investment.
Now we want to control our economic destiny.
Foreign capital is still welcome. By6 the
terms should be fair to both sides."
By 1979, 55% ownership characterised government participation in
almost all areas of the economy designated as strategic - petroleum,
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petro-chemical, iron and steel and fertilizer industries. After 1979,
ownership was increased by a further 5%. This increase came as no
surprise to the oil companies. Moreover, most members of the Organisation
of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) already had 60% government
holdings in their oil industries.
The reaction of Nigeria's private business community to their
government's progressive nationalisation of the oil industry, even
in the early stages, can be described as passive, owing to that
community's acknowledged inability to provide the necessary investment
funds and the experience to run the industry. However a very few
Nigerians such as Henry Fajemirokue who had already entered the oil
business, were critical and they successfully defended those oil firms
which had private indigenous partnerships from government pressure
for nationalisation. Generally, the government participation in
other, non-strategic areas of the economy was viewed by most members
of the domestic business community as only "random encroachment", and
whenever indigenous members sought to oppose government participation
they attempted to mobilise through Nigeria/US and Nigeria/British
Chambers of Commerce the potential leverage of US and British businessmen.11
These Chambers in turn represented their members' interests to relevant
government authorities. They also organised conferences in which
government officials were invited to be presented with the Chambers'
views.
(ii) The Oil Revenue 
Having put itself in a position of dominant ownership in the
petroleum industry, the State was able to receive huge revenues from
the industry. It is helpful in understanding the genesis of the
indigenisation Decree (1972) to appreciate the size of the financial
benefits which accrued to the government from the increases in oil output.
Table I below shows government revenue from oil exploration and production
between 1964 and 1974.
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Government revenue from the petroleum sector dramatically increased
between 1970 and 1974, as a direct result of increased State
participation in combination with a buoyant international market
and price hikes for oil. This is shown in the following table (II):
Table II
FISCAL FED.GVT. REVENUE FROM SHARE OF PETROLEUM
YEAR CURRENT PETROLEUM IN TOTAL REVENUE
REVENUE (N,000) (%)
(N,000)
1970-71 758,068 218,942 28.88
1971-72 1,305,724 623,037 47.72
1972-73 1,389,911 705,362 30.75
1973-74 2,171,370 1,189,908 54.80
SOURCE: The National Accounts of Nigeria 1973-1975
Federal Ministry of Planning, Lagos.
Between the periods 1958 and 1974, the government received the
sum of W6,200 million in the form of concessions, rents, royalties,
profits, participation interests, premium and other oil related
incomes. In 1967 oil revenue was estimated, at £N19 million but by
1971/72 , the oil revenue was increased to £N224 million (N640 million).
By 1971/72 oil came to provide 73% of the country's foreign exchange
earnings. For most of the 1970s oil accounted for around 90%-95%
of Nigeria's export earnings and 75% of the government's revenue.
Over 90% of the total amount of N6,200 million derived from the oil
industry accrued to the government between 1971 and 1974, a period
12
when itdigenisation through nationalisation was being pursued.
Between 1974 and 1979 oil production accounted for ao% of the
country's GDP, although inspite of this contribution to the economy,
the oil industry's contribution to employment remained relatively
very small. For example between 1974 and 1975 the total number employed
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in all sectors of the oil industry lay between 4,838 and 5,000.
Nevertheless economic policy from 1970 onwards became a function first
and foremost of one variable, oil revenue.
After the civil war had been brought to an end, Nigeria engaged
in self re-examination; and a review of the role of foreign capital
investment was a part of this. In the reconstruction and rehabilitation
of the early 1970s, a number of inexperienced indigenous businesses
were established to seize the opportunities brought about by the
increased levels of oil production and foreign exchange. The government
embarked on spending on reconstruction, in which both foreign and
indigenous firms benefited as constructors and suppliers. Generally,
the lifting of import restrictions which had been imposed on the
economy in war time led to an insatiable demand for consumer items.
The private sector gained from the oil boom which brought the foreign
exchange facilities necessary for the import of various items. The
necessity to import, however, seemed to wed private indigenous firms
even further into partnership with foreign firms.
The rise of the oil economy from the late 1960s, and in particular
the oil boom of 1973/74 pushed the country towards rapid industrialisation
and increased the State's ability to finance new physical infrastructures
such as roads, bridges, ports, airports, and to set up State industries
with foreign technical partners, and to indulge in expenditure on
housing, schools and hospitals.
By 1983, the government had established over fifty new industrial
ventures either wholly our of its own financial resources or in
partnership with private firms. Prominent among these industries
were iron and steel, petro-chemical, petroleum refineries, pulp and
paper, textiles, vehicles assembly, flour milling, breweries, cement,
sugar and salt.
However, the ways in which Nigerian officials handled and
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dispensed the oil wealth gave rise to public concern. Many sectors
of the economy were neglected. Most important of those has been
agriculture, both commodity and food production. The emphasis on
industrialisation itself has even now, in the mid 1980s, not yet
created the industrial tradition which the country has always lacked.
The majority of industrial establishments were and still are in
light industry or assembly operations, for example food processing
and vehicle assembly plants, run by foreign experts, and the raw
materials continue to be imported.
The new enthusiasm for encouraging agriculture which Nigerian
governments has espoused towards the very end of the 1970s and in
the 1980s can be seen as a response to the grim realities of the
dangers which were exposed by the mono-commodity character of the
Nigerian economy in the 1970s. It constitutes a judgment on the
oil wealth-induced industrialisation policies of the 1970s. The
official emphasis which has been formally given by government to
the agricultural sector since the mid 1970s, and the very recent
more practical efforts which produced targeted spending of N1.2
billion between 1979 and 198313 , were brought about by the fluctuating
nature of the international oil market. However, by 1980 the government
had already laid down a pattern of industrialisation, based on oil
revenue, which was bound to make any drastic shift of emphasis towards
agricultural production difficult to achieve. This is in part because
of inevitable resistance from those very groups of people who have
developed a vested interest in the maintenance of the by now well-
established trend. The identity of these groups is explored in
chapter 8 below.
At the time of the NEPD (1972) most large public contracts of
the sort which at one time had been awarded exclusively to large
foreign firms with a high technical input, came to be allocated to
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combinations of foreign and indigenous capital. One rationale for
the first NEPD introduced on the eve of a period of heavy State
spending, was to ensure that private indigenous enterprise would
benefit as well as foreign firms. At the same time the ability to
impose the NEPD on foreign investors smoothly and without severe
repercussions was only made possible by the oil economy which offered
a range of opportunities that were bound to induce most foreign
investors to seek to remain in the country.
The result of the "oil boom" on some sections of the Nigerian
population was summed up by the former Commissioner of Petroleum,
and Chairman of the NNPC, Col. Mohammed Buhari, at an oil symposium
in Lagos on 8th November 1976:
"The most glaring thing that the oil has done
to us is that it has given an almost embarrassing
boost to our capacity to consume foreign goods and
it has provided the means to gratify our appetite
to consume. It has not improved our capacity for
hard work, it has noti. improved our ability to
repair or maintain." ".
Despite the measure of progress which was achieved in improving
some infrastructures and the establishment of some new industries
in the 1970s, the economy is still to this day far from self-sufficient
industrially, and the demands for certain imports such as intermediate
manufactured goods have become ever more entrenched. For instance,
the establishment of industrial estates which were intended to
"nurture" indigenous private enterprises15 , and the provision of
government loans through State owned banks to businessmen and other
related inducements, have led to the increased importation not only
r
of intermediate capital goods but also of many consumer items.
(iii) Public Finance and Post-War Development Plans
It is the second of two very salient features of typical
underdeveloped oil economies which occupies the forefront of public
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attention at the present time - namely the stop-go characteristic
which is imposed by fluctuations in the international energy market,
and which in turn leads to stop-gap external borrowing that can reach
burdensome proportions. Current pre-occupations with this feature
and its attendant problems should not, however, lead us to forget
the first salient historical feature, namely the year-on-year rise
a
in oil revenues of the 1970s which came to be reflected in huge public
expenditure increases of successive national development plans.
The second and third Development plans of the Nigerian government
reflected the financial strength of the public exchequer which owed
almost entirely to oil revenues. The Second National Development plan
(1970/74), regarded by outside observers at the time as ambitious,
projected a capital expenditure of N3.2 billion. The impact of oil
on the economic climate can be illustrated by comparing the second
and third plans. Whereas the second plan expenditure stood at N3.2
billion by 1975, the expenditure for the third plan (1975/80) went
up to N33 billion, with a further N10 billion expected to come from
the private sector.16 The third plan was greeted by some commentators
with scepticism. Critics believed that the spending of such huge
sums would undoubtedly advantage the private material interests of
the military/bureaucratic and members of the business community.
This suspicion was well founded, as various tribunal reports on
contract awards came to testify later on in the 1970s and in the
early 1980s. 17
An indigenisation Decree was first officially hinted in the
Second National Development plan document of 1970. The most important
aspect of the plan was the role assigned to the private sector in
the implementation - a role enhanced by the shift of attention away
from welfare and social services provisions, as in the earlier
colonial plan of 1945/55, towards the encouragement of import
substitution industries and overall economic growth.
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Nigerian Development plans before 1970 always looked towards
foreign sources for the bulk of finance. For example, out of the
N110 million which was to be spent on capital expenditure in the
colonial plan 1945/55, the British government was expected to contribute
about N46 million. Likewise nearly half of the amount estimated for
the 1962/68 plan which aimed at a 4% growth in production, was expected
to come from abroad. Actual recurrent surpluses, government domestic
borrowing and resources from marketing Boards formed the internal
sources for finance.
Government expectations and hopes for foreign financial sources
were never fully realised, sometimes because of the unacceptable
conditions that were attached to loans. At-the end of each plan
period, foreign contributions usually amounted to no more than half
of what had been anticipated. The 1970/74 plan put government
contribution at 57.7% of the total amount of N3,349.9 million
(revised figure), while the expected contribution from foreign sources
dropped from 45% in the 1945/55 to a mere 19.4% in the 1970/73 plan
estimate. As in the two previous plans, the foreign contribution
turned out to be disappointing. Accordingly, in the second and third
plans,policy makers were forced to seriously consider greater capital
self-reliance in an effort to attain their desired objectives of
economic development.
The Third Development plan of 1975/80 started with confidence
that Nigeria would henceforth rely solely on domestic sources of
finance. This proved to be highly optimistic, and by the late 1970s
P
the oil industry ceased to provide steady and increasing revenues. A
lack of adequate capital, as much as shortages of executive capacity
and well-qualified manpower remain effective impediments to the
realisation of self-reliance and total economic control. "The capital
shortage illusion" thesis of Schatz18
 for the period of the late 1960s,
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which contended that, rather than finance Nigerian entrepreneurs
faced problems of feasible projects, management capacity and adequate
planning, must now be updated to take into account recent fluctuations
in the international demand for Nigerian crude. That is to say, in
the light of development plans and expectations which were based on
anticipations of large and increasing oil revenues, finance could turn
out to be still a very major problem for both the public and indigenous
private sectors. It is a problem for the latter because that sector
has, especially since 1960, depended substantially on the prosperity
of the government and its protective role of, in Schatz's words,
"nurturing capitalism".
The Third National Development plan (1975/80) projected investment
of N30 billion, in contrast to the 1970/74 plan which estimated only
N2,415 million. The public sector investments under the third plan
were expected to be N20 billion while N10 billion was expected from
the private sector. The Gross Domestic Product at current prices
under the third plan was expected to attain an annual growth rate of
9.1% after taking into account inflation. By contrast the anticipated
annual growth rate in the 1962/68 plan was only 4%. The phenomenal
rise in development plan estimates was directly due to the country's
oil revenue. The Federal government revenue of N633 million in 1970
rose to N8 billion by 1977, and it was on this basis that successive
"ambitious" expenditure programmes were drawn up and large public
works projects were outlined.
The necessity for the construction and improvement of infrastructural
facilities in the newly created twelve states of the Federation (1967)
demanded adequate financial institutions. Because of the difficulties
faced by the indigenous business sector in obtaining loans from
expatriate banks, the Federal and State governments decided to solve
the problem by establishing their own banks and by indigenising
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expatriate ones. A comprehensive indigenisation policy compounded
this need. Even before substantive shareholdings in these banks
were compulsorily taken over, the Federal government had encouraged
banks to at least cultivate an indigenous image by undergoing changes
of name19
 and allowing increased indigenous participation in management.
In accordance with the post-war changing moods, in 1971 the
a
three main banks - First Bank (formerly Standard Charter), Union Bank
(formerly Barclays Bank) and the United Bank for Africa (UBA) - sold
shares ranging between 8 and 11% of their total equity holding to
private Nigerians, and began to appoint Nigerians to their Boards.
The postponement of the enforcing of these changes until 1972 was
mainly due to the belief that the stock market could not cope all
at once with such a large volume of equity shares. However, the 40%
shares that were eventually taken over by the government, in 1973,
did not significantly alter the pattern of control, as the expatriate
management remained largely intact. When the indigenous (State)
equity ownership was raised from 40% to 60% in 1979, it became
necessary for the government to insist that the Chairman and Managing
Directors to the Board be Nigerian. As for other small foreign banks,
it became equally mandatory to have 60% indigenous ownership, and most
of the 60% shares in these banks were taken up by private Nigerians.
Private indigenous participation in the Nigerian banking system
became considerable in the 1970s. Apart from the 60% private indigenous
shareholding in small banks, at least 12.3% of the equity shares in
the three major banks mentioned above came to be owned by private
indigenes. However inspite of the accompanying expansion in banking,
credit facilities remained restricted and only large borrowers tended
to benefit from the credit schemes of the banks. About 80% of the
total bank credits were granted to only 8,000 customers who formed
just 3% of the total bank customers, and 88% of the . customers received
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only 6% of the total loan. This concentration of distribution has
important implications for the ability to benefit from the opportunities
for share acquisition which were made available by the indigenisation
programme in general, as will become clear later.
(iv) The Changing International Trade of Nigeria and its Benefits
The connection between Nigeria's trade with the outside world and
its indigenisation is not difficult to see. Expanding international
trade constituted a major spur to indigenisation. This is because
the area where the government saw it could promote domestic private
interests most readily was in shifting.trade opportunities to private
indigenous commercial establishments. A brief overview of salient
points of Nigeria's external trade will underline this point.
Increases in the government's oil revenues led to successive
increases in the targets of the three national development plans
which were drawn up between 1962 and 1980. Implementing these
development plans produced a boost in trade in the 1970s. Prior to
1972, foreign private capital was found in both trade and manufacturing.
As a significant part of the oil wealth was to be recycled through trade,
and since the government had already decided that trading should be
dominated by indigenes, the indigenisation policy can be seen to have
been spurred on by the expansion of trade which, if left alone, would
have largely benefited the foreign commercial firms which had branches
in Nigeria.
The country's image abroad both within and outside Africa was
one o4 an oil-rich nation with a large population, an expanding market
and buoyant economy. It is on the basis of this perception that
Nigeria has attracted many eager trading partners, with the industrial
countries of the West and Japan being the main suppliers of imported
goods. In 1972, EEC countries accounted for 60% of Nigeria's imports
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and 59% of its exports. The remaining percentage was largely with
Japan and the USA.
By virtue of historical connection, the UK was the single most
important trading partner as well as investor in Nigeria until the
end of the civil war. The closeness of Nigeria and Britain in trade
owed much to sixty years of colonial rule. Britain had provided
infrastructural facilities which cantinued to require British spare
parts. Furthermore, it was always likely that the colonial financial
aid granted by Britain to Nigeria would require that the latter
continue to buy British goods.
Later, in the mid-1970s Nigeria's trading pattern became more
diverse and the UK started to lose ground to other countries, mainly
Japan and West Germany. Similarly there has been substantial increase
in trade between Nigeria and some other EEC members, principally
France and Italy. The reasons for Britainds loss of ground in Nigeria
are both political and economic. The frustration and impotence
which Nigeria's government felt due to the lukewarm attitude of the
British government towards the Federal government's cause in the
earlier stages of the civil war, may have given rise to the view that
a meaningful independence could only be realised once the excessive
trade dependence on Britain was reduced.
The seeming initial hesitation of the British in supporting
the Federal government was a traumatic experience for Nigeria's
leaders. Britain's attitude was to result in a reduction of the
favour which Britain had once enjoyed. More specifically on the
0
economic front, Britain also lost ground because of cut throat
competition. A table of Sources of Nigeria's Imports 1948-1974
(in Appendix E) illustrates the relative decline in Britain's position
in the Nigerian market between 1948 and 1974.
Although Nigeria diversified its import markets in the 1970s,
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the links with Britain still remained absolutely strong due in part
to the interest shown by Nigerian businessmen and State officials in
London as an international centre of big business, tourism and shopping.
Britain remains a significant trading partner, and a large amount of
foreign exchange still flows to London. It became fashionable for
Nigerian businessmen and State officials to purchase properties there.
In 1970 Nigeria maintained a favourable balance of trade with Britain,
but by 1981 Nigeria's imports from Britain had reached about £1.5
billion and her exports to Britain had fallen from £350 to £98 million.20
Because of this increasing trade imbalance, the Chairman of the Senate
Committee on Commerce and Industries, Senator David Dafinone in 1982
urged the government to base imports on a reciprocal basis. According
to the Senator, the now persistent deficit against Nigeria, in its
trade with countries like Japan, UK, France and West Germany must
be reviewed. In the future, he urged, imports should be encouraged
from countries that purchase Nigerian crude oil.
The diversification of Nigeria's trade partners in the 1970s
can be attributed largely to the imports of the petroleum economy.
As the industrial economies increasingly depended on oil, Nigeria
also expanded her international trade. In 1945, the total volume of
Nigerian import was just over N40 million and thirty years later, this
figure rose to N1,737.3 million. While her exports for those periods
stood at N49.3 million and N5,794.8 million respectively.21
Analysis of the following statistic shows that the import figure
of over N1,078007 million in 1971 had dropped to N99,064 by 1972.
This was partly due to the promulgation of the NEPD in that year,
when enterprises were busy changing hands. But soon afterwards,
import figures increased to N1,224,786. The lifting of import restrictions
was the enabling cause in the increase in imports immediately after
the civil war.
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Table III
The Growth of Nigeria's Merchandise Trade 1946-74
a
Year
1946
1950
1955
1960
1965
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
Export (N000) 
49,292
180,446
265,067
339,427
536,538
885,365
293,338
1,434,212
2,278,415
5,794,837
Import (N000) 
40,918
123,736
272,238
431,782
550,788
756,419
1,078,907
990,064
1,224,786
1,737,324
Source: Fajana - "International Trade and Balance of Payment" -
in: Olaloku et al (ed.)  Structure of Nigerian Economy
p. 225 (from Federal Office of Statistics Trade Report
Annual Abstract of Statistics and Economic Indicator).
Import business improved considerably, satisfying the previously
suppressed consumer demands of sections of the population, and led to
a boost in general commercial activities. Further, both the Federal
and State governments increased spending on the importation of
construction items and general goods and services in the reconstruction
effort. In general, the post-war trade boost improved the financial
base of Nigeria's private sector, and this was particularly noticeable
among indigenous firms with respect both to individual capital
accumulation and to the expansion in number of businesses.
(v) The National Economy and Foreign Policy
The connectedness of the state of a nation's economy and its
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foreign political and economic strengths are obvious enough to all
governments, although the precise nature of the connections are not
uniform and everywhere the same. Of all the governments in Nigeria,
the Obasanjo regime (1976-79) was the one that most explicitly
demonstrated the relationship between a strong, indigenously determined
economy and an independent foreign policy. Soon after assuming office,
the regime made its ideas known on domestic economic policies and
the relations with the outside world.
Nigerian foreign policy between 1960 and 1970 underwent three
distinct phases: The 1960-65 foreign policy of Prime Minister
Tarawa Balewa had been low key and moderately conservative. It
was quite compliant with the arrangements and agreements made during
the 1950s with the British. However, this foreign policy was already
regarded by many radical politicians and intellectuals as unacceptably
subservient, especially by the so-called "Young Turks" who led the
first coup in 1966.
The second phase spanned the period from 1966 to 1975. Nigerians
felt during that phase "bruised" by the initially equivocal position
of Britain over "Biafra" secessionism.
The third phase was inaugurated in the mid-1970s by the Mohammed
and later the Obasanjo regime. This has been characterised as
"assertive" and "interventionist", although we should note that the
help which was extended to left wing movements in Angola, Zimbabwe
and Mozambique in no way betrayed a change in domestic ideological
stance. At home, the government continued on a strongly capitalist
31
path.
An expressed central feature of Nigeria's foreign policy during
the third phase has been to create "the necessary political and
economic conditions . . . which would foster national self-reliance
and rapid economic development." 23
 Conversely, a strong self-reliant
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economy has been seen by the government to underwrite a credible foreign
policy that would befit a country such as Nigeria, Africa's most
populous country and, at the time, financially strong. To bring
about the realisation of this objective, the Adedeji panel, set up
by the government in 1975 to investigate links between the national
economy and foreign policy, stressed a strong economy as a pre-condition
for the successful conduct of non-commercial relations with the
outside world. The imperative to indigenise the economy even further
in 1977 was in part conceived as an indirect attempt to give more
impetus to the new government's drive towards a more "assertive('
foreign policy.
Nigeria's foreign policy between 1970 and 1979 was undoubtedly
underlined by economic factors, and in particular the diversification
of the sources of import supply and the increase in exports. Foreign
policy had been tailored to serve what officials saw as the national
interest, and such interest could only be served if due consideration
was given to Nigeria's traditional partners in trade and those on whom
it depended for investment, equipment, machinery spare parts, and skills.
However with the dawning of a perception of a world energy crisis in
the early 1970s, oil came to be a very crucial commodity internationally.
Nigeria, responsible for 7% of OPEC's total output (Nigeria had joined
OPEC in July 1971), began to attract the attention of industrial
countries and their governments, eager to assume reliable sources of
energy supplies. Under Obasanjo, the Nigerian government's awareness
of its importance to the industrial economies both as a source of oil
and aiso as a potential market for their manufactured goods, became a
significant factor in diplomatic and political encounters with
Britain and the US, especially over southern Africa. As has been
noted already, a divergence of views over South Africa and Zimbabwe
prompted the complete nationalisation of BP's Nigerian interests; and
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also, for a brief period, restrictions were placed on British
contractors tendering for government projects. Likewise the
nationalisation of substantial parts of Barclays Bank (Barclays.'
interest was reduced to a mere 20% in 1979) was connected to the bank's
business involvement in South Africa.
The precariousness of depending on OPEC suppliers for oil, the
series of nationalisation and other control measures which were
enacted in most oil producing states of the Third World in the
1960s and 1970s, along with the likelihood of oil being turned into
a political weapon, jolted the oil co2suming industrial countries in
the early part of the 1970s. With varying degrees of success they
took up energy conserving measures and sought alternative sources of
energy, thereby reducing their dependence on, for instance, Nigerian
crude. The consequences were far-reaching. Firstly, a reduction in
demand for Nigerian crude ensued and this has meant a cut in the
revenues upon which depended not only public capital projects but
also the prosperity and development of indigenous industrialists and
entrepreneurs. Secondly, the country's assertive foreign policy
stance came to be blunted as the demand for its crude began to decline,
although the retirement of Obasanjo and the return to civilian rule
under President Shagari in 1979 might also have been partly responsible.
The demand for Nigerian crude and prices started their most serious
decline in 1980/81, but for most of the 1970s the country's holdings
of foreign exchange remained a strong element in diplomatic matters.
Nigeria's holdings of pound sterling constituted a particular source
of attempted leverage over the British government. However, the
rather clumsy deployment of this financial muscle in 1975-6, when
sterling holdings were deliberately substantially reduced, could not
overshadow the much greater economic power which Britain has always
had and continues to possess. A sensible and realistic appreciation
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of this situation in Nigeria, notwithstanding the relatively
insignificant power of sterling holdings, gave even greater impetus
to indigenisation, in the mid-1970s. In short, indigenisation would,
in theory, enhance Nigeria's economic strength and thereby give
backing to the government's wishes and aspirations in international
relations.
Nigeria of course has foreign relations not only with western
countries but also with other African states. A few African countries
came out in support of "Biafra" during the civil war, but these countries
had hardly any economic ties with Nigeria which would enable the
Federal government to take the sort of retaliatory measures which
were taken against France. In fact the recorded volume of trade
between Nigeria and the Economic Community of West African States
(ECOWAS), which was established in 1975 and of which Nigeria is a
founder-member, was just about 1.6% of Nigeria's total external
trade in 1978. Trade with East African countries including Tanzania
which accorded "Biafra" recognition, is negligible.
Sixty percent of Nigeria's export to Africa in 1979 went to
Ghana alone, while 50% of its African imports were from Senegal and
Niger. This continental trade only amounted to 2% of Nigeria's total
volume of trade.24
A generous attitude by the Federal government of Nigeria towards
other members of the Economic Community of West African States has
been urged by some of Nigeria's own foreign policy experts. However
this advice has tended to be persuasive only as long as the sense of
oil-induced prosperity prevailed. One example of generosity was
sales of oil by the government to ECOWAS members at 2.5O less than
the normal price, even as late as 1981. Another example concerns the
relationship between Nigeria's indigenisation and citizens of other
African countries.
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In many African countries where a policy of protection of
indigenous business interests against foreign economic interests
has been adopted, non-nationals of African origin including Nigerians
have been adversely affected. 25
 In Nigeria, the decision to indigenise
the economy was definitely not taken in response to measures taken
against Nigerians by other African countries. The leadership posture
which Nigerian governments had already begun to assume in Africa by
1970, did not allow actions that would tarnish their image on the
continent. Hence inspite of the expulsion at different times, of
Nigerian citizens from Equatorial Guinea, Congo and Ghana, the Federal
+0 j44.. &A/v'-
government has consistently allowed non-Nigerians
A
after the promulgation
of the indigenisation Decrees.
The long-term and, perhaps, somewhat visionary aim of economic
integration of the African continent as the means of freeing African
countries from economic dependence on the North, is perfectly
consistent with practising an indigenisation policy which allows
citizens of Organisation of African Unity (0AU) countries to operate
in Nigeria. The early 1970s marked the beginning of a concerted move
in West Africa to effect economic changes not only at the national
level but also at a regional continental level. The formation of the
nucleus of what was to become ECOWAS, involving Togo and Nigeria in
May 1972 reflected the value which the Gowon government in Nigeria
placed on taking steps towards some eventual goal of collective
economic self-reliance. Like Nigeria, Togo too was concerned about
its dependence on foreign investment. In 1972, over 70% of its
indusirial and commercial establishments were owned and controlled
by foreign private investors, although the Togolese had already made
considerable progress in petty trading and retailing.
Nigeria and Togo together launched the economic initiative that
was to form the ECOWAS, finally established by Treaty in 1975. Apart
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from encouraging the formation of the economic community of West
African states, Nigeria also became increasingly involved in the
pursuit of Africa's economic emancipation in other ways. Nigeria
has made investments in agricultural and industrial joint ventures
in several African countries. Examples are the joint commissions
with the Republic of Benin in cement and sugar production, with
Guinea, Niger and Liberia in the development of iron ore and uranium
industries, and with Swaziland in the production of sugar. Furthermore,
Nigeria has been the most substantial contributor to the African
Development Bank (ADB) and Nigerian Trust Fund (NTF) from which other
African countries benefit. In the final analysis Nigeria's direct
and indirect participation in the economies of other African countries
might bestow on Nigeria a leadership role in international issues
affecting African peoples. This is a major point which the designers
of indigenisation policy might have wished to score. The NEPB
recommended to the government in 1983 that at least 20% of locally
manufactured products be exported to ECOWAS region.
In summary and conclusion to this chapter, it can be said that
Nigeria has for a time been able to cope with indigenisation better
than have most African countries, because any capital outflows
which were occasioned by indigenisation could be financed out of
oil revenues, and because of the obvious attraction of the oil
economy to foreign firms. The public sector did not face serious
financial obstacles until the end of the 1970s.
The level of financial resources generated by the oil industry
betwedn 1970 and 1974 was such that the need for foreign private
capital could be viewed as peripheral to the country's development
prospects. The analysis of the impact of oil on indigenisation policy
is crucial to the political economy of Nigeria. The description of
the Nigerian economy in the 1970s as one based on the ”petro-Nairan
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testifies to this significance of oil.
Corresponding to the changing pattern of Nigeria's economy was
the emergence of a group of wealthy indigenous commercial capitalists
and small scale industrialists. On the whole, it has been possible
through indigenisation to use the oil revenues to assist private
indigenous businesses. Nevertheless the majority of the population
may have become no better off for the experience, and may even be
worse off than in the pre-oil boom days. General price inflation,
declines in agricultural production throughout the 1970s, and population
migration from rural areas to the cities leading to overcrowding there,
have been some of the adverse effects of the oil boom. Perhaps above
all, the policy of indigenisation, has added to and served to aggravate
the threats posed by these problems by exacerbating the already wide
gaps in income levels which exist in the population as a whole. This
theme is returned to in chapter six.
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CHAPTER 3
The Aims and Objectives of The Nigerian Enterprises Promotion Decrees
1972 and 1977
In this chapter the aims and objectives of the Indigenisation
Decrees will be examined. Before proceeding, however, it should be
reiterated that indigenisation is a continuous process of economic
rearrangement, and that no fixed time scale has ever been given by
the governments in Nigeria for the full realisation of the general goal.
Therefore the separation of the 1972 and 1977 Decrees may be somewhat
arbitrary. The 1972 Decree was the first practical legislative step
taken for a progressive movement towards the development of an economy
largely dominated by Nigerians. The 1977 Decree provided for a
continuity of the basically capitalist developmental strategy which had
been advanced by the earlier Decree (1972), with only marginal
adjustment. The Nigerian Constitution which ushered in a return to
civilian rule in 1979 included a provision that the government of
Nigeria would continue to make changes in the ownership, control and
management of the economy as circumstances necessitated in the future.
The intention of this chapter is to examine the economic, political
and social arguments presented for indigenisation and what the Decrees
were supposed to achieve.
(I) The Official Account of the Nigerian Enterprises Promotion Decrees 
The objectives of the indigenisation Decrees were derived from
the Development Plans of 1970/74 which conceived indigenisation as
a logical continuation of the Nigerianisation pursuit of the previous
three $ decades. The NEPD was launched in 1972 to fulfil the second
Plan's objectives. Theses official objectives are: the creation of
opportunities for indigenous businessmen; the maximisation of local
retention of profits, through a reorganisation of the ownership
structure of the economy in favour of domestic capital; and the raising
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of the level of industrial intermediate capital goods production.
The last was to be achieved by compelling the alien business community
to move into more capital-intensive and more technologically advanced
production, particularly in manufacturing.
The three stated objectives were also central to the 1977 NE?
Decree. Brigadier Shehu Yar l Adua, Chief of Staff, Supreme Headquarters,
stated in 1976 that the "objectives for the first phase of the
indigenisation exercise still remain valid for the second phase • • oft 1
The second NE? Decree made changes in the number of businesses and
the level of ownership covered by the 1972 Decree. Having increased
the number of enterprises under Schedule I and II, the 1977 NE? Decree
also covered all unaffected enterprises under a third Schedule. However,
Nigerian ownership under the new Schedule III was limited to 40%. In
Schedule II, 60% of shares were to become Nigerian, and 40% foreign.
The most striking difference between the two Decrees is the addition
of what government spokesmen called an "egalitarian" objective to
the 1977 Decree.
Dr. A. Adedeji, the former Federal Commissioner of Economic
Planning, and one of the chief architects of the 1972 Decree, clearly
stated that "the primary purpose of indigenisation is economic
decolonisation, the reduction of economic dependence and the achievement
of an increasing measure of self-reliance through internally located
and self-sustaining growth. Once we define indigenisation in this
way, we have to relate our analysis of the problem to its political
base."2 Nobody is better placed to describe the objectives of
P
indigenisation in Nigeria than the much respected Dr. A. Adedeji.
He claimed the economic motives of indigenisation to be pre-eminent
and yet also acknowledged that political factors must play an
important part in the formation and execution of the NEPDs. The
configuration of economic forces in the country and the private and
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sectional pressures on government have significantly influenced
post-colonial administration in Nigeria in the direction of greater
indigenisation. Nigeria's method of achieving the very "economic
autonomy" which was supposed to complement political independence
can be seen in the government's indigenisation programme.
To compound the overall intentions of indigenisation, in a
widely reported speech, General Y. Gowmn, then head of State, during
a state visit to Britain in 1973 provided an official summary of
the perceived essence of the 1972 indigenisation Decree. He claimed
that the government was consolidating political independence by doing
all that it could to provide more participation by Nigerians in
economic life while attracting more investment in sectors of the
economy where Nigerians are not yet able to rely on themselves.
The same arguments for indigenisation were presented by one of his
successors, General O. Obasanjo in a speech to members of the National
Institute of Policy and Strategic Studies in Jos on 3rd September 1979.
He reiterated that "meaningful development and transformation of our
society can only be achieved through self-reliant and self-sustaining
economic programmes and policies . • • the idea of a self-reliant and
self-sufficient nation is something which must be pursued." The
NEED came to form the policy instrument for the realisation of those
pursuits - namely "economic independence", political stability and
social progress at large. In all the interviews conducted, and
discussions held with government officials, including NEPB and NEEC
staff in the course of preparing this study of indigenisation, one
question on which there was unanimity was on the original officially
declared aim of the NEPD - namely economic independence.
Furthermore a strong economy controlled by the indigenous business
sector, was seen by officials of the GowAn regime as a cornerstone of
domestic political stability; and in addition, as a necessary condition
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for a stronger voice in international diplomacy by the Obasanjo
Government which followed Gowan. Successive Nigerian governments
have also been quite clear on the necessity of domestic political
stability, which is hardly surprising given the traumas which were
experienced during the civil war. 3
 The realisation of socio-economic
prosperity and political stability are supposed to be aided by the
s
redistribution of wealth, from foreigners to Nigerians. In this regard
the denunciation by a few radical intellectuals oflbxploitation" by
capitalists who are also foreigners, has been far less influential
than elite perceptions of external economic domination of the country
and the claims of rising indigenous businessmen.
The indigenisation of the economy was aimed partly at a change
of enterprises ownership in favour of indigenes, through a gradual,
step by step transition, and partly at the retention of a greater
share of the profits generated in the economy through indigenous
ownership. The government would gain leverage in conducting effective
development programmes. Accordingly, it has been argued that "while
political self-determination is philosophically desirable as the
inalienable right and ultimate goal of any country under a foreign
rule,what is needed to make it meaningful, and to translate available
resources into national prosperity is a firm economic base." 4 In the
government's view this economic base can only truly benefit the country
if it is formed and controlled largely by Nigerians. The belief that
economic independence was imperative as a precondition for development
only came to be fully realised with the first development plan (1962/68).
r
The sense of a need for indigenisation became most compelling
towards the end of the 1960s. Political independence did very little
to change the lives of the mass of the peasants and workers in the
country. Moreover, the frustrating dtuation of unsatisfied expectations
among the literate and semi-literate, particularly employees (manual
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and non-manual) of expatriate companies who had played a part in
the agitation for the Nigerianisation of personnel in the economy,
coupled with an awareness of the deepening of the dependence of the
Nigerian economy on the Western industrial countries, became acute.
Nigeria had imported capital goods, technology, skill and machinery
parts since colonial times. By 1970, the dimensions of this reliance
were found to be quite alarming (see table 3 chapter 2). The hesitance
of what Nigerian leaders considered a traditional ally, in this case
Britain, to lend support to the Federal government and the payment of
oil royalties by some oil exploration companies to 'Biafr s at . the initial
stage of the civil war also heightened official concern. Indigenisation
was therefore in part a product of the civil war, which led officials
•
to seek greater economic security for the country.
The nationalisation of parts of the oil industry, commercial
banks and insurance companies in the very early 1970s reflected in
part the heightened concern of the government about the levels of
foreign capital participation in the Nigerian economy. The development
of the oil industry certainly enabled the government to contemplate
a transformation of the economy in favour of indigenes. The Federal
government came to a conviction soon after the end of the war that
foreign capital in many non-strategic areas of the economy had been
an impediment to the development of indigenous entrepreneurs, and had
not aided development adequately. The government's view was that if
foreign capital was reorganised and its activities limited to certain
closely defined areas, and partnership encouraged with existing and
new indigenous enterprises, then the country would gain much greater
benefit from foreign capital investment.
It was the release of the Federal Government's National Development
Plan (1962-68) in 1962 that first indicated official thinking about
restructuring relationships between the country and its foreign business
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guests, but the civil war (1967-70) intervened. The second four year
National Development Plan (1970-74) which was to have followed the
First Plan, was even more explicit. The NEPD finally emerged in 1972.
(ii) Uncertainty of State participation
The Federal government, in the pursuit of "economic independence",
resorted to partial nationalisation in banking and insurance in 1973,
contrary to earlier statements that such measures would be avoided.
The 1968 policy of the Federal government on Statutory Corporation
and State-owned Companies clearly stated that "corporations and State-
owned companies should neither be scrapped nor translated into Government
5departments • • •" Whether or not the nationalisations which have
occurred turn out to be a relatively short-lived phenomenon, depends
on a host of factors including the performance of the parastatals
themselves, changes in the leadership and the long term effects of the
indigenisation. The private sector has yet to show an ability to
take over from the State, and the government comes increasingly to
acquire a vested financial interest in the maintenance of State ownership.
The promulgation of the 1977 NEPD, involving yet more enterprises
(81) 6 may have been motivated by the desire of government to enjoy a
larger share of the direct benefit of Nigerianisation, namely the
purchase of shares. However, the purchases by the State and Federal
governments, which were made out of a desire to gain access to a flow
of annual dividends, could yet defeat one important purpose of
indigenisation, namely the growth of the private entrepreneurial
ability of Nigerians. Many Nigerian businessmen, including late Chief
Fajemirokun, Chief Akin-George and other notable business personalities
have complained about the role of the State in competing head-on with
the private sector.
State governments have tended to hold on to the shares which they
have bought, contrary to initial declarations about withdrawing in the
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future. When General Obasanjo came to power in 1976, the Federal
government also affirmed the principle of maintaining existing State
ownership. It did not commit itself to de-nationalisation. At best,
the then Chief of Staff Supreme Headquarters, Brigadier Shehu Musa
Yar l Adua assured the private sector that "The government is not
embarking on creeping nationalisation." But he added: "it is the
intention of government from now on to consolidate what gains have
been made and ensure that the real objectives of government including
increased equity ownership and the speeding up of the process of
acquiring management and technological proficiency are achieved." 7
However, with the return of government to civilian rule in 1979,
indications were given that both de-nationalisation and de-indigenisation
could come to be placed on the political agenda at some future date.
The future de-nationalisation of government owned enterprises
is at the time of writing difficult to predict. But what is fairly
clear from past and present policy statements, is the consistent
determination of successive governments in Nigeria to pursue a
development policy which is compatible with the enlargement of a private
indigenous entrepreneurial group.
The extent of direct State participation will remain contingent
upon the prevailing political climate and also the level of business
maturity among the private indigenous investors. 8
 Moreover any
commitment by Nigeria's top political leaders to economic development
by the private sector may yet have to compete with the rise within the
ranks of government bureaucracy, both at Federal and State levels, of
an even stronger desire to retain existing State ownership and
management of enterprise. In addition, the Nigerian Trade Unions
and the Nigerian Labour Congress (NLC) are strongly in favour of
retaining State ownership of enterprises that were originally developed
by the State. In the long term this situation may engender a conflict
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of interest between the State bureaucracy and Labour Unions on the
one side, and the business community on the other. But it is only
when a stronger political consciousness in one or other of these two
groups becomes manifest that the State will be forced to move either
towards more public ownership, or alternatively to de-nationalisation.
On balance, on the basis of past and present officially-reiterated
a
objectives of increasing the opportunities for indigenous businessmen,
the privatisation of State industries might seem to be the more likely
in the long run.
(iii) Foreign Investment 
Relative to other African countries (except South Africa),
Nigeria has enjoyed the largest share of total Western investment in
Africa. At the end of 1966, foreign investment both long-term and
short-term stOod at N733.6 million, excluding the banking sector.
In spite of the civil war, in the later part of the 1960s private
foreign investment grew at an annual rate of 8.2%, and at the end of
1970, the official estimate was N1,003.2 million. According to CBN
reports, investment in the mining and quarrying industries accounted
for about 47.2%, while in manufacturing and processing, which the
government was keen to encourage and develop, total investment accounted
for only 21.2%.
Furthermore, in spite of indigenisation foreign investment in
fixed assets between 1966 and 1977 trebled to N2 billion with British
sources providing nearly half the total; followed by the U.S. with 30%.
Britain invested N750 million between 1966 and 1977. Investment in
the oil sector was 50% of the total foreign investment in 1
1977, it had fallen to 39%, due partly to the nationalisation measures.
The non-oil sector had a 60% share in total foreign investment. 9
In 1977, about 39% of total foreign investment was in the oil
966. By
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industry alone. The government 'has always entertained the suspicion,
rightly or wrongly, that most foreign private investment is fundamentally
geared towards making a quick profit. The failure of the government's
fiscal incentives which were aimed at securing a mutually beneficial
foreign private investment in areas of the economy that are not
necessarily productive of quick profits, gave additional support to
a
the government's decisions in the 1970s to adopt measures of nationalisation
and indigenisation. The previous incentives were sharply curtailed.
Even more worrying to the government and indigenous businessmen
alike was the pattern of ownership in investment prior to 1972. For
example in 1963 about 68% of the equity of all the large-scale
industrial establishments was foreign. The domestic private sector
accounted for only 10%, the three regional governments held 19% and
the Federal government owned 3%. The domestic private and the public
sectors combined held only 32% of the total equity shares invested in
large scale industries.
The pre-eminence of foreign private capital in the Nigerian
economy had not lessened in the 1960s. By 1966, six years after
Nigeria's political independence, foreign private investment comprised
no less than seventy percent (70%) of total investment in some
individual industries. On the whole no less than 70% of all industrial
establishments were owned and managed by foreign investors. It is
quite understandable in the light of these facts, that members of the
indigenous business community, government officials, politicians and
the intelligentsia in the country should demand a substantial shift
in faitour of Nigerians. The NEPD of 1972 was intended to achieve
precisely this. There had been no change in the picture of large
foreign ownership and participation, as late as 1970, just two years
before the first NEP Decree and the year in which the Second National
Development Plan was launched. According to a case study conducted by
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Teriba, Edozien and Kayode, out of 1,320 businesses representing
about 80% of all companies registered in Nigeria in 1970, Nigerians
held less than 40% of the equity shares of the total number of
Nigerian and non—Nigerian companies covered in the survey.10 The
balance of 60% shares were comfortably in foreign hands.
In the early 1960s Chief Obafemi Awolowo, the then Federal
Commissioner of Finance is on record as having said to foreign investors:
"Come to our aid in the meantime but in due course we will buy you out." 11
In 1970, a government in which the Chief was one of the most influential
figures in economic policy—making, now started to put into effect
the view which he had first expressed at a time well before the country's
oil potential was fully appreciated. With increasing petroleum exports
and substantial foreign exchange inflow in the 1970s, it was not
surprising to see a military regime which included some political
figures who had been outspoken towards foreign private investment in
the past, pursue a path that ultimately would lead to indigenisation.
A new breed of technocratic civil servants, professionally qualified
and trained, working under a strong nationalistic sentiment at the
centre, lent their support.
(iv) Profit Remittance
"Earning leakages" and other forms of money transfer out of the
country instigated by foreign investors were a cause of official
concern and discontent which was expressed as early as the Second
Development Plan (1970/74) document, prior to the NEPD.
The "excessive profit" 12
 level and the unacceptable level of
remittances by transnational subsidiaries had been trumpeted by
radicals and socialists in the country for a long time, and, quite
typically, has led to some allegations of foreign "exploitation"13.
Such expressions of concern outside government have not fallen on
deaf ears. Public officials also have for many years been aware not
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only of the simple fact of the country's dependence on foreign
capital but also of the annual cost to the country's balance of
payments of that dependence. Writing on "Multinational corporation
in the Third World (a threat to national independence)" P.F. Wilmot,
a lecturer at ABU, claimed in 1978 that UAC"(Nig.) "made pre-tax
profits of 92 million Naira on a paid-up capital of N40 million (in
1976). Even after taxes UAC's profits were still over N6 mil/ion
higher than share capital." 14
Most foreign companies' declared profits remain relatively higher
than those of indigenous companies • John Holt's declared profit for
1967/8 was E.N853,000, whereas the Daily Times 15 made a profit of
EN201,089 in 1969. Lonrho's total profit in 1969 was LN131- million.16
Amalgamated Tin Mines of Nigeria (part of the London Tin group) made
a pretax profit of LN765,000 in 1970, Costain Nigeria's net profit
for the year 1969 was L11810,311. A.0.0. Nigeria (subsidiary of the
London Tin corporation) record a profit of LN2,004,145 in 1969. 17
The recorded sales and profits of the most dominant foreign
company in Nigeria, the UAC (Nigeria) Ltd. is shown below.
Table I	 UAC (Nigeria) Ltd.'s Sales and Profits 1972-1976 
Year 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 % increase
1972-76
Sa1es
+ 201,560 213,403 248,401 395, 071 576,065 185.8
Profits+ 14,993 17,139 30,472 57,925 .91,293 508.7
Profits as 7.44% 8.03% 12.27% 14.66% 15.84% 212.90%
% salas
(Thousands of Naira)
Source: P.F. Wilmot: In search of Nationhood (The Theory and Practice
of Nationalism in Africa), Lantern Books Lagos 1979, table 8, p. 140.
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The profits derived by the foreign oil companies before nationalisation
in the 1970s were much higher than those of the foreign companies in
the commercial sector. Table II below shows the assets and profits
of the oil companies in Nigeria in 1963.
Table II
	 Assets and Profits of major MNCS 1963
Company	 A Assets	 million Profits	 million
Standard Oil of New Jersey 3,800 240
Shell - BP 3,300 180
Gulf 1,700 120
Texaco 1,700 140
Secuny - Mobil 1,500 68
Standard Oil of California 1,200 100
British Petroleum 900 65
Companie Francais Petroleum (CFP) 600 42
Others 1,250 45
TOTAL 16,550 1,000
Source:	 S.A. Aluko and M.O. Igere (1965) "The Economics of Mineral Oil"
Nigerian Journal of Economic and Social Studies, 7: 210 - in
Onimode, B. - Imperialism and Underdevelopment in Nigeria (Zed press
London) 1982, p. 142.
The awareness of profit and dividend remittance was heightened
further by payment in foreign exchange of interest on capital, foreign
contractor services, suppliers credits, rent and other service charges
in the early and mid 1970s which owed to the general increase in
economic activity. For example the Federal Commissioner of Finance,
Chief O. Awolowo's 1969/70 budget speech indicated that £1,150 million
be spent on "National Reconstruction and Development", largely to be
financed from domestic resources, and out of this amount £25 million
would have to be paid to foreign creditors. The CBN's overseas reserves
— 129 —
at the time totalled only £37 million, andso overseas payments were
bound to cause problems for domestic planning. These situations help
to shape a climate of opinion in Nigeria that was conducive to demands
for indigenisation. The desire also to share in the profits made by
foreign companies with both the public and private indigenous sectors
remained a strong spur to the indigenisation Decrees.
Since the ownership of enterprises under Schedule I of the 1972
NEPD were in any case largely Nigerian—owned even before the 1972
NEPD, it is obvious that the NEPD could do little to raise the level
of profit retention there. However, with respect to Schedule II and
III enterprises of the 1972 and 1977 NEP Decrees, Nigerian ownership
prior to the Decrees was minimal. For example while in 1967 the
Nigerian ownership of enterprises under Schedule I was about 56.0%,
under Schedule II it was just about 3.24%18 and enterprises under
Schedule III of the 1977 NEP Decree were entirely dominated by foreign
firms. Hence there was scope here for indigenisation to cut down on
profit remittances.
Before the promulgation of the NEP Decree, proprietors of alien
businesses in Nigeria were free to repatriate all profits made in
Nigeria. With the promulgation of the 1972 NEP Decree, all profits
generated by enterprises under Schedule I should be retained in Nigeria
with effect from 1st of April 1974, the date by which all those
businesses should have been placed under complete Nigerian ownership.
Profits made by enterprises under Schedule II need not be retained
entirely. Since 60% of each enterprise under Schedule II could be
foreign owned, it was only 40% of the profit made by them that had to
be kept in Nigeria. Most of the capital—intensive and highly
sophisticated enterprises were unaffected, and they continued to remit
their profits. Furthermore, the indications are that the restriction
of excess profits remittance since the NEPDs has forced Lebanese and
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Indian investors to devise new ways of sending profits out of Nigeria,
for instance by taking advantage of African citizenship qualifications,
a fact which has been confirmed in private conversations with local
businessmen in Nigeria.
(v) Industrial Development
Despite the concern expressed about the liabilities of foreign
capital investment, governments in Nigeria have all been equally
aware of limitations in the private and public indigenous sectors.
Therefore they have still had to face up to the task of harmonising
domestic and foreign capital, once the indigenisation Decrees were
largely put into effect.
The official purpose of indigenisation in Nigeria is not simply
one of ownership for its own sake but also an increase in the involvement
of Nigerians in the day-to-day management and actual control of the
country's economic life. Unfortunately Nigerian governments have
tended to assume rather too readily that by indigenising ownership,
full control of the enterprises would be indigenised too. As will
be argued further in chapter 5, this assumption is naive.
Furthermore, indigenisation has rested on a hope that local
technological innovation would rapidly emerge, although this hope
is more'implicit in government thinking than explicitly contained
in the documents of the NEPDs. Indigenisation was bound to run into
problems, precisely because of the technological dependence of the
economy upon outside sources and the lack of a strong domestic
resear,ph capacity. If the hope of domestic technology creation is
far-fetched, at least a mastery and efficient adaptation of foreign
technology could, and should, be encouraged. Before the colonial
period, activities such as timber milling, nut crushing, palm oil
pressing, carpet making and the production of leather articles,
could be found throughout Nigeria. The advent of colonial rule
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brought in its wake foreign private capital which converted some of
those local industries into the medium-scale manufacturing firms of
today, in addition to the newly established foreign-owned manufacturing
industries. Such industries were largely owned and controlled by
foreigners. Only approximately 30% was Nigerian owned before the
1970s. Indigenisation therefore intended not only to transfer
majority ownership of those industries, but also was supposed to
uplift the production of intermediate and capital goods, by the
redirection of foreign capital into ever more capital intensive areas.
The 1972 NEPD did not encompass any of the main capital intensive
manufacturing industries. Only in 1977 did the government feel it
necessary to include manufacturing sectors of all sizes and complexity
for at least some stipulated minimum level of indigenous participation.
At the same time new opportunities for foreign investors were opened
up in the areas of the economy where Nigeria still needed a relatively
advanced technology, managerial skills and capital in manufacturing,
processing and assembly plants.
The importance of scientific and technical skills and know-how
in the production of capital goods in particular cannot be over-
emphasised. Here, joint ownership and cooperation between foreign
capital and either the State or private indigenous capital, in
enterprises of medium and relatively high level technology, should
both increase capital goods production and bring about a transfer of
the skills, technology and other essentials necessary for improved
indigenous industrial capability.
The government believed that with assurances of cooperation and
the prospect of a better economic climate in the future, most foreign
investors would be tempted to stay in the country and turn to the sort
of intermediate and capital goods production which Nigerians were as
yet ill-prepared to undertake. In fact the government's assurances
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and the continued expansion of the economy in the 1970s appeared to
be sufficient to retain most foreign investors, apart from one brief
set-back between 1972 and 1974 when there was a decline in foreign
capital inflow and an outflow of a relatively small amount of notably
U.S. capital. This was the chief, and brief negative effect of the
NEP Decree, reversed by 1975.
(vi) The NEPD 1972
In February 1971, the Federal Commissioner of Trade and Industry
first hinted at the possibility of launching the Nigerian Enterprises
Promotion Decree (NEPD), by making it clear to a visiting Lebanese
trade delegation that the Federal government intended to overhaul the
commercial sector of the economy in order to allow Nigerians to take
over the distributive trade.
On the 23rd of February 1972, the Nigerian Enterprises Promotion Decree
(Decree No. 4)wa5 promulgated by the government. As expected, the
NEPD listed those enterprises that are within the competence of
Nigerians and are not capital intensive. Above all it listed those
which were assumed to be within the ability of Nigerians to buy
directly or with money which the government was willing to lend, or
with credits which the government hoped the commercial banks would
provide. Accordingly the NEPD categorised the enterprises into two
sections according to their level of complexity and capital intensity.
Twenty-two enterprises fell under Schedule I of the 1972 NEPD
and thirty-three enterprises fell under Schedule 11.19 Schedule I
bore the brunt of 100% indigenisation. All those enterprises that
come under Schedule I were exclusively reserved for Nigerian citizens.
Under Schedule II of the 1972 NEPD, 33 types of enterprise were to be
owned and managed on a partnership basis. The NEED required that all
those enterprises under Schedule II that were owned by foreigners
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must sell 40% of the equity shares of their businesses to Nigerians.
Both the 1972 and the 1977 Decrees barred aliens under Schedule II
tf their turnover or share capital were not more than one million Naira
and four hundred thousand Naira respectively. What the NEPD sought to
achieve under Schedule II was the retention of the expertise and
capital of the former foreign owners, by allowing them to own 60%
a
in 1972, subsequently reduced to 40% in 1977.
Above all, what the government wanted to achieve was indigenous
control of areas of activity considered to be crucial for a rapid
transformation of Nigeria into an industrial country. This was
succinctly expressed by officials around the time the Decree was
launched. For example the Federal Commissioner of Communications, the late
J.S. Tarka, delivering a speech to members of Gruppo Bottego of Italy
in Milan on the 18th of April 1973 informed his guests:
"What this simply means is that Nigeria like
indeed any other country does not like the
strategic sectors of the economy to be
dominated or solely controlled by foreigners.
She wants to have an effective say, and to
•achieve this end thegovernment has
promulgated a Decree reserving certain areas
particularly retail trade to Nigerians."
He added that foreign and domestic businessmen have a lot in common,
and that it was better and safer for the former to be in partnership
with Nigerians —
"In other areas, the government wants to
encourage Nigerians to participate
effectively with foreign partners. The
policy is not adopted to hunt or scare away
foreign investors. Rather it ensures that
foreign investments are saf 0e since Nigerianse
will have a stake in them."
At least two messages are clear in this speech. One is the
imperative for greater participation by Nigerians in the economy.
A second is the necessity for partnership between Nigerians and, on
this occasion, Italians in certain kinds of enterprise; which tends
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to confirm the thesis that there is an affinity of interest between
the two sides.
Although the NEPD has indigenous control of the economy as its
major objective, the likely effectiveness of the new policy could
not be so easily assured. Indeed there is increasing evidence that
the mere creation of opportunities for Nigerians within foreign owned
enterprises, particularly large firms, will not automatically ensure
indigenous control. Nevertheless, at the time it was hoped that
indigenous businessmen would be enabled through their participation
in ownership, to learn the expertise and acquire the managerial and
technical capabilities of their foreign partners.
The strong focus of the 1972 NEPD on private indigenous participation
was not very obviously in close accord with the philosophy of State
sector leadership which had been emphasised in the Second Development
Plan of 1970/74. The change towards favouring the private indigenous
sector can only be explained in terms of a combination of changing
circumstances in the country and in the rest of the world. Central to
the former were the improved lobbying techniques of the private
indigenous sector in Nigeria in the early 1970s, when such bodies as
the Manufacturers' Association of Nigeria (WA N ) came into existence.
No situation better explains the Nigerian businessmen's improved
relations with the State than the events which led up to the 1972
NEPD. The Lagos State Chamber of Commerce and Industry, one of the
most influential and the oldest chambers in Nigeria, has been reported
as having "sold" its ideas to the Federal government. The president
of the Chamber, Chief J. Akin \i-George is on record as having said
in 1981:
"Perhaps our greatest achievement so far is the
role we played in getting through the Enterprises
Promotion Decree in 1972. It was the chamber that
initiated the idea and sold it to government through
memorandum. Even though the government did not say
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so, most of the salient points contained in 22
those memoranda were incorporated in the Decree."
(vii) Amendments to the 1972 NEPD and the Nigerian Enterprises 
Promotion Decree 1977
After the inception of the first NEPD in 1972, there were at
least four formal changes between 1973 and 1977, including the 1977
NEPD which was the most substantial. Such amendments were made on
an ad hoc basis to rectify problems as they emerged.
On the 23rd June 1973, the NEP (amendment) Decree 1973, Decree
No. 28 repealed the sentence "within such period not being earlier
than four months" of 1972 NEPD, Section 5 (3) (6). This amendment
allowed more time up to 31st March 1974 for foreign firms to apply
for exemptions. The 1973 amendment also permitted the "designation
of members of the public services of the Federation and of States as
'inspectors' of enterprises." 23 They were empowered to exempt enterprises
subject to the provision of Section 9 of the 1972 NEPD. The 1973
amendment also repealed such blemishes as "be sentenced" and substituted
"be liable".
The NEPD was amended again on 23rd February 1974. The NEP
(amendment) Decree 1974, Decree No. 7 reclassified haulage by road
of petroleum products from Schedule I to II. The reclassification
was largely due to the insufficient number of experienced indigenous
businesses in the petroleum haulage sectort which had quickly led to
petrol shortages in many cities. 24 The Indigenous Transporters'
Association was critical of the amendment and threatened to by-pass
what A saw as the arbitrary decision of the Federal Commissioner
of Industry, and put its case to the Supreme Military Council. The
Federal Commissioner responded by pointing out that the decision came
from the Supreme Military Council itself. Newspaper editorials were
varied in their comments. The Daily Times (20/2/74) was scathing in
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its comment, but the New Nigerian agreed with the government's
decision, while also suggesting the formation of government-supported
companies to distribute petroleum products. This encouraged such States
as the North East to enter the sector.
The NEP (amendment) Decree No. 7 of 23/2/74 was followed by the
NEP (amendment) Decree No. 2 ( 21/3/74) which empowered the Commissioner
to determine such enterprises as "Retail Trade, Supermarket, Departmental
Stores" and "Wholesale distribution" and reclassify them with the
approval of the Federal Executive Council.
The NEP (amendment) Decree No. 2 ( 21/3/74) also reclassified
three enterprises from Schedule I to II, after representations were
made to the Federal Ministry of Industry by such companies as UAC
which relied on an efficient distribution network for their operations,
and Association of Electronic Firms. Clearing and forwarding agencies
(lack of sufficient number of experienced indigenous businesses with
equipment, again explains the shift), electric device assembly firms,
and departmental stores, and a few other enterprises that had an
annual turnover of less than N2 million were removed from Schedule II
to I. Fifteen companies were exempted from the provision of Section 5
of the 1974 Decree (40% Nigerian participation), but were also required
to re-structure their ownership so as to give more indigenous participation
or, in some cases, to increase the equity shares of the companies in
favour of Nigerians. 25
The above amendments are relatively insubstantial in comparison
with the 1977 NEPD which resulted from the Industrial Panel's report
on its own investigation of the 1972 NEPD implementation.
By the mid-1970s the indigenisation Decree of 1972 had become
a highly political issue. This was because of the inequitable distribution
of shares which had taken place under the NEPD, and also because
vital sectors of the economy remained in foreign hands.
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A panel was appointed on the 17/11/75, less than six months
after the new regime of Murtala Mohammed came to power.
The Panel's terms of reference were as follows: First, to report on
the implementation to date and to assess the extent to which the aims
and objectives of the 1972 NEPD had been attained. Secondly, to
recommend amendments to the Decree with a view to expanding the
number and range of enterprises affected by it, as well as increasing
the level of indigenous participation in such enterprises. Thirdly,
to examine the present market for stocks and shares and report on ways
by which a freer market could be established. Finally, to identify
suspected fraudulent sales and cases of fronting.
The fourth clause sounds like an attempt to indict members of
the previous regime and their business associates who were suspected
of taking undue advantage of the provisions of the NEPD (1972) to
build up private shareholdings. In one particular instance, a company
which had allocated shares worth- N150,000 (12% of the saleable shares)
to a Military Governor was transferred to the State government after
the change of regime.
The report of the Panel pointed out that the 1972 NEPD had been
"ambivalent, diversionary and ineffectual", and had not fully achieved
its objectives. This conclusion '
 was derived from the fact that of
the total number of 950 affected enterprises (excluding exemptions),
357 (Schedule I) and 593 (Schedule II) had not fully complied. The
Panel revealed that by June 30th 1975 only 58% and 89% of the enterprises
had provisionally complied under Schedules I and II respectively.
P
Furthermore, the Panel noted that none of the defaulters had been
"brought to book" two years after the original deadline of 31st March
1974. The government's failure to "punish" 26
 defaulters of the first
phase of indigenisation is not altogether surprising, given the absence
of an effective enforcement agency and the very limited powers of the
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NEPB, and also given the type of people who were chiefly involved.
These - both foreign and indigenes - were people with sufficient
influence and wealth to delay and distort the application of the law.27
In 1977, a revised and updated version of the 1972 NEPD was
launched. The 1977 NEPD had a retrospective date of 19th June 1976
and was intended to be effective by 31st December 1978. The 1977
NEPD strengthened the powers of the Board and the Capital Issues
Commission (dc), hoping to both complete the unfinished programme
of the first NEPD and embark on the second Decree.
The 1977 NEPD listed 40 enterprises under Schedule I and 57
under Schedule II. Businesses under Schedule I continued to be
reserved exclusively for Nigerians, while the Nigerian equity shares
in Schedule II were raised from 40% to 60%. Further, the 1977 NEPD
covered enterprises that were excluded from the first indigenisation
exercise. Thus a third Schedule was added to the 1977 NEPD. In
Schedule III, 40% of the shares of the businesses listed were reserved
for Nigerians, while 60% were allowed to remain foreign owned.
Just as a public concern for social justice, voiced in official
and non-official circles, was to play a part in inducing the government
of the day to introduce the new Decree, so the public reaction to the
1977 NEPD was, again, to focus on the egalitarian issues raised by
the content of the 1977 NEPD.
The most common criticism was that even the revised measures
would be likely to concentrate new wealth in a few hands only. This
attack was in a sense misdirected becauselndigenisation had never
been intended or designed so as to achieve a very wide distribution
of bhares. Indigenisition was fundamentally aimed at promoting
indigenous business enterprises, and could by no stretch of the
imagination be construed as a social policy objective. At the very
most it could be said that some of the main spokesmen for
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indigenisation believed that by fostering an aspiring capitalist class,
overall national economic and political development would be promoted,
and that this would in the long run lead to the improvement of the
living condition of the mass of the people. For the immediate future
however, only a small minority of indigenous industrialists and
entrepreneurs were expected by the drafters of the Decrees to benefit
in a substantial way. Indeed, the 1972 NEPD did not embody any
egalitarian provisions at all.
However, a measure of egalitarianism was introduced into the 1977
NEPD. It expressed an intention to benefit both the managerial and
non-managerial workers of the affected enterprises, by the reservation
to each group of 5% of the shares which were to be disposed of or
relinquished by foreigners. It was believed that through this arrangement
the manual and non-manual staff of the enterprises would in some sense
be protected against the few citizens who had sufficient financial
standing to take greatest advantage of the indigenisation measures. 28
The incorporation of this social objective was recommended by
theldeoaun.Industrial Panel which had been set up in 1976 by the
Obasanjo government to inquire into the workings of the 1972 NEPD, in
particular the acquisition of shares. The appointment of Chief
Adeosun i s Panel within such a very short time of the change of
leadership raises some interesting questions about the economic
factors that might have contributed to the 1975 coup d l etat. The
timing of the revision of the NEPD seems to support the thesis that
perceived failings in the implementation of the 1972 NEPD played a
part in bringing about the change of government in 1975.
According to the Panel, a wider distribution of equity shares
would ensure social peace and harmony and strengthen industrial
relations in the country. The Federal' government, however, believed
that a highly diffused shareholding could make central management
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control very difficult.29
 Hence it was less enthusiastic than the
Panel, and remained largely committed to the expectation that only
a relatively small number of shareholders would benefit directly, and
only indirectly provide much longer term benefits to the rest.
For officials of the NEPB and the Ministry of Trade and Industry,
and especially for some sections of big business circles, the 1977
NEP Decree constituted a real advance, by increasing Nigerian ownership
of all enterprises operating in Nigeria, and thus they considered that
the NEPD had enhanced further the retention of profits in the country.
The retention of profits was to be re-enforced by a strict foreign
exchange control Decree to be applied to both foreign and Nigerian
firms and citizens.30
 There was no fundamental change in the government's
strategy. In fact the new political regime was in effect only
re-confirming the stated objectives of the 1972 NEP Decree, by its
willingness to meet the demands of new pressures for more indigenisation.
The private sector-led model of development which countenances only
limited and absolutely necessary public sector involvement, became more
deeply rooted than ever. The overall desirability of this pattern of
development was not questioned by Nigerian government officials at the
time, and indeed has never been officially raised.
Apart from the broad policy objectives, which are common to
both the 1972 and 1977 NEPDs, there were some differences of nuance,
owing to differences between the two governments responsible for
introducing the Decrees. The Obasanjo government sought a spectacular,
legitimising, foreign policy stccess, by being seen at home to be
instituting measures that would squeeze concessions out of countries
with large investmentsin Nigeria, as well as back up its stance over
contentious international issues, notably apartheid in South Africa.
Under the Gowom regime, in contrast, connections between indigenisation
and foreign policy objectives had been rather weak. Instead of aiming
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• at foreign policy targets, the most important priority under Gowln had
been the internalisation of the benefits of the oil boom. Brigadier
J. Garba, the External Affairs Commissioner is quoted as saying in
1976 on the theme of economic strength and diplomatic success, that
"no nation can effectively pursue a dynamic and independent foreign
policy with a weak and dependent economy." "Indeed", he declared,
"Nigeria's ability to succeed in her diplomatic endeavour will to a
large extent depend on her economic strength." 31
 The Commission
appointed by the new Mohammed-led regime in 1975 and headed by
A. Adedeji to review "the rationale underpinning Nigeria's foreign
policy", emphasised that a strong domestic economy firmly rooted in
Nigerian hands was the only basis for a sound foreign policy.
In 1977 some members of the indigenous business community were
even suspicious of the increased determination of the Obasanjo regime
to squeeze foreign capital. The more assertive foreign policy was
feared as a potential threat to their continuing and vital alliance
with foreign capital, and the pattern and style of implementation
of the NEPD was felt to constitute an immediate threat even to their
own domestic position. The series of calls made after 1977 by members
of the Manufacturing Association of Nigeria (M A N ) and Chambers of
Commerce and Industry to halt and relax the indigenisation measures,
is evidence of their concern. This clearly modifies the interpretation
of the 1977 NEPD as simply a measure well designed to gain support
from the business community for the new government; even though the
Panel's recommendation by and large led to the generation of yet
further opportunities for private benefit by forcing large amounts
of shares on to the market, through the subsequent 1977 NEPD. However, the
increase in opportunities was to convey personal material benefit not
just to privileged individuals in the private sector but also to
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individuals in positions of public sector power, as will be shown in
chapter 5.
The next chapter assesses the machinery for the implementation
of the NEPDs and the pattern of compliance by firms that are affected
by the NEPDs.
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CHAPTER
Machinery and Implementation
The aims and objectives of the Nigerian Enterprises Promotion
Decrees (NEPDs) have been introduced in the previous chapter. The
1972 NEPD had only a limited impact in achieving its intended objectives
before it was overtaken by the 1977 NEPD which attempted to remedy
some of the deficiencies of the earlier Decree. However, even that
did not create significant opportunities for the widest section of
society which had been completely left out of the 1972 NEPD. With
the exception of a few individuals which the July 1975 coup brought
to power and influence on the fringes of government, the beneficiaries
of the Second indigenisation Decree remained predominantly the
participants of the first NEPD. This owed in part to the wealth, the
contact with bankers, and the confidence and experience which had
been acquired under the first indigenisation exercise. The new owners
of indigenised enterprises, members of the armed forces and the top
echelons of the bureaucracy at both Federal and State levels, and
some businessmen pre-empted the purchase of private small enterprises
in 1977.
The first year after the implementation of the 1972 NEPD saw a
fall in industrial production. This reflected a decline in the inflow
of foreign capital which owed directly to the implementation of the
first Decree. 1
 However, after 1975 production started to pick up,
because both new and old foreign investors started to venture into
new business areas, which is precisely what the government hoped would
happen. The expanding and buoyant nature of the Nigerian economy in
the mid-1970s attracted foreign investors into manufacturing, aided by
official encouragement in the form of assurances for better partnership
opportunities and a general disavowal of wholesale nationalisation.
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In this chapter, we shall examine the machinery and some problems
of implementation of indigenisation in the periods 1972-74 and 1976-80.
(i)	 The Nigerian Enterprises Promotion Board
The structure, powers and modus operandi of the Nigerian Enterprises
Promotion Board (NEPB) and its committees were central to the
implementation of ihdigenisation and critical for the success of the
Decrees. The NEPB came into existence simultaneously with the promulgation
of the NEPD in March 1972. This Board is empowered to supervise the
implementation of the NEPD of 1972 and the subsequent NEPD of 1977.
Although the Board was reconstituted in 1976, and its powers extended,
the coordinating function of compiling data on enterprises, introducing
potential buyers to sellers and the general task of implementation have
remained the same.
Section 1 - (1) of the NEPD effectively established the NEPB, and
its activities commenced on 23rd February 1972. The "general" purpose
of the Board was to enhance the advancement of enterprises in which
Nigerian citizens are to play the "dominant role". To this end, the
Board was conferred with the power to determine and advise the Federal
Commissioner for Trade and Industry on matters relating to the Decrees.
Furthermore, the Decrees specified that the Board is responsible for
carrying out any other tasks that may be assigned to it from time to
time as circumstances necessitate. As a government institution, the
Board must operate only within its official limits and does not have
the authority to indulge in any commercial undertakings.
Bcrth the Federal Commissioner and the Permanent Secretary of the
Ministry of Trade and Industry have played a considerable part in
issuing policy guidelines to the Board.
The Federal Commissioner has the power to appoint the Board members.
Members of the Board are drawn from the Ministries of Trade, Finance,
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Economic Development and Reconstruction, Internal Affairs and three
representatives from Development or Investment agencies incorporated
in Nigeria. The Chairman of the Board under the 1972 Decree was the
Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Trade and Industry, while the
Secretary of the Board was also appointed from the same Ministry.
As the Board acquired more autonomy under the 1977 Decree, the Chairman
of the Board does not necessarily have to be an official of the
Federal Ministry of Trade and Industry. The wisdom of heading the
NEPB at its inception by the Permanent Secretary of the Federal
Ministry of Trade and Industry was in fact questioned at the time.
The 1Vew NIP:erian Newspaper editorial (9/3/72) commented that
"considering his onerous official responsibilities, including compulsory
attendance at the weekly meeting of the Federal Executive Council
and automatic Chairmanship of all corporations and government-owned
companies answerable to his Ministry, it is obvious that the Permanent
Secretary to the Federal Ministry of Industries will find no time to
attend to the business of the NEPB • • ." The Chairmanship of the
NEPB was taken over in 1972 by Mr. Al-Hakim, a banker by profession.
Subsequently he was succeeded by M. Gadzama, a former State Commissioner
of Land and Survey in Borno State, who later retired in 1983. The
incoming military government (1983) reverted to the earlier system of .
assigning the job to an official of the Federal Ministry of Trade
and Industry. In early 1934, the government appointed Dr. C.P. Ezeife,
a Harvard graduate from the Ministry of Trade and Industry.
At the start the Board was practically an arm of the Federal
Ministry of Trade and Industry. The Ministry dominated representation
in its political and administrative tasks. According to the NEP
Decree, the NEPB has the power to invite now members to its existing
list, and such members can remain on the Board for such periods as
determined by the appointees. However, since the establishment of
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the Board in 1972 there has hardly been any invitation to outsiders
to sit on the Board.
The Board is composed of three parts - (a) Administrative
division, (b) an Inspectorate division and (c) an Evaluation division.
2
The first of these deals with matters relating to general
administration and office work, while the second has the task of
visiting business premises and inspecting affected enterprises to see
if such enterprises have complied. The inspectors are legally
empowered to enter premises and inspect the business capital. In
cases where they are not satisfied with the compliance of a company
or companies, they write a report and the Board takes action by
issuing a warning to the alien business owner, or sealing up or
co-managing the enterprise.
The third category of staff are the evaluation team. This team
is usually at the service of the Nigerian business community. They
determine the value of an enterprise and advise Nigerian citizens on
how much to pay.
Other government departments are also involved in assisting the
Board in the implementation. For example, the Ministry of Internal
Affairs and the Ministry of Finance have been helpful in demanding
compliance certificates before a company is served by those Ministries
with, for example, expatriate quota allocations and dividend remittance
permits. They are empowered to make sure that before foreign companies
get their approved-user status, they have complied with the NEPD.
Attempts were made by the Board to obtain similar assistance from
the Nigerian Port Authority (NPA) and Customs department, but they
have not been quite as helpful as some other departments, according
to the Chairman, M. M. Gadzama. This situation gives discretion to
other government departments and agencies to determine a company's
position in aspects regarding the specific interest of the department
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concerned. For example, the Federal Ministry of Finance may focus
on a company's sources of finance. If the company has raised loans
within Nigeria (after 1982) it is likely to consider the company to
be a case of non-compliance. Another government agency may choose
to be strict on the 10% equity provision for employees which was
introduced in the 1977 Decree (see discussion in chapter6 below) as
the NEPB's confidential letter to one company points cut:
"There is no mandatory minimum authorised and
paid up capital for new companies . . . But we
would like to add that other arms of Government
reserve the right to impose any condition they
deem fit. As to compliance with the workers
equity participation is not mandatory for new
companies."
Two points are clear from this letter. First is the element of
discretion left with governmental agencies. In a society where
members of the bureaucracy are predisposed to look for pretexts to
demand kick backs from clients, this discretion creates conditions
in which corruption will inevitably thrive.
The second point concerns the vagueness of the 10% equity
provision with respect to new companies which is bound to make
administration difficult. Individual letters to companies such as
the one above can only encourage avoidance of the provision. Yet
a
the official policy explicitly states that a morAtorium of two years
only is to be granted to new companies, after which they are required
to issue 10% of their saleable shares to the employees.
The recommendation and the acceptance of the Industrial Panel's
report in 1976, not only brought about a revision of the 1972 Decree,
is
but also changed the structure and powers of the NEPB. The report
expressed concern at the limited powers of the NEPB which resulted
from its constitutional inability to undertake effective implementation.
Hence the Panel recommended that the Board's authority should be
extended to consider cases without reference to the Federal Commissioner,
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particularly in matters involving non-compliance.
Although the NEPB was set up to facilitate the transfer of
foreign-owned enterprises to local hands, its initial activities
were limited to the task of introducing potential buyers. to the
relevant enterprises. The Board started to compile results of the
exercise and to disseminate information in the early part of 1974.
This brought the Board into much greater prominence, in time for the
implementation of the second phase of indigenisation in 1977 when it
adopted a more aggressive posture, as well as granting exemptions in
the case of certain enterprises. The Board has no means of enlightening
the public other than by means of the mass media, but the media was
made use of to contact and inform relevant enterprises to submit their
data forms and other information at the beginning of the first
implementation exercise. In contrast, in the second exercise
emphasis was increasingly placed on informing would-be buyers about
how to acquire shares. But the administrative tasks and field surveys
were still difficult to carry out, because of limited resources. The
Board's annual allocation from central government (N1 million) was
inadequate and it voiced concern about this in its 8th progress report.
It recommended to the government that the Board levy N100 on each
employee Trust Deed vetted and approved by the Board; and a fee of
N500 on each compliance certificate issued. 3 Both of these recommendations
are, however, questionable, particularly the N500 levy, for the
financial dictates could well encourage weak screening of those
companies willing to pay the N500 levy, and a speedy but unwarranted
1
issuance of the certificates.
The inspectorate and the valuation units were quite crucial in
the implementation process. However, because of the large number of
enterprises involved, the valuation unit became overloaded with the
day-to-day problems of evaluation. Realising this, the government
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established the Capital Issues Commission (CIC) on 27th April 1973
by reorganising the CBN I s Capital Issues Committee (CIC) to facilitate
the effective implementation of the Decree. As from that date all
shares of the affected enterprise must be valued and approved by the
Commission before any transaction could take place. Thus the pricing,
timing and amount of shares to be sold became subject to the approval
of CIC. The Capital Issues Commission was itself replaced by a
Securities and Exchange Commission, by Decree No. 71 of 1979.
Henceforth, the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) was empOwered
to determine the amount of securities of any company that are to be
sold; to register the date when securities are to be sold, and the
terms, in both private and public companies. It is also empowered
to approve or disapprove the proposed price at which the securities
of any public or private company with alien participation shall be
issued or sold. It also determines when issuing houses or registrars
should return surplus application monies, and the penalty payable for
non—compliance. These are the most significant powers of the SEC.
The valuation unit of the NEPB consists of such professional people
as engineers, accountants, lawyers and architects who are supposed to
provide all the expertise necessary for evaluation and the conduct of
transactions. Despite the diversity of professions, the total manpower
in this unit was simply not sufficient to do the job, and the Board
had to rely on the Industrial Inspectorate Division of the Federal
Ministry of Trade and Industry for assistance. Even well into the
19808 the shortage of manpower probably remains the greatest single
constraint on the Board in its implementation efforts.
The reconstitution of the Board in 1976 coincided with the release
of a government White Paper on the Report of the Adeosun Commission,
in July 1976. Between this time and October 1977 the Board met 15
times, an average of one meeting every month. In the period from
- 153 -
July 1976 to January 1977, it was mainly concerned with mopping up
in regard to the previous Decree. By January 1977 the Board was set
for the more serious task of implementing the 1977 Decree.
The major preoccupation of the Board soon after its reconstitution
was to study and clarify major aspects of the Decree in order to
avoid misinterpretations. Since it now became the responsibility of
the Board to approve terns and conditions of sales and other forms
of transfers, numerous matters of sale and transfer had to be dealt
with fairly quickly in order to keep to the original datelines.
Shortage of staff and other related factors necessitated that the
Board "delegate" to the State committees powers of processing and
determining the applications of those local firms which do not operate
beyond the borders of more than one State in the country. Examples
of such businesses are small department stores and supermarkets.
The Board usually requires that the committees submit a short list
of prospective buyers for recommendation. The method of the committees
in selecting prospective buyers is not very open, and there is no
uniformity of method among all the various States. The failure df
the Board to set a specific guideline for the selection of buyers by
the committees, leaves the latter with a great deal of discretion in
choosing who will be allowed to purchase shares.4
 This ultimately
may have led to favours being sought by businessmen from the members,
a tendency which could easily have been foreseen.
The inspection of enterprises is carried out three times. The
first is a precompliance inspection to substantiate the information
given by the company on the forms (about 300 inspections were carried
out between 1977 and 1978). The second is a post-compliance
inspection, done to verify the sale and transfer. Finally there is
an inspection on a continuous basis to prevent or detect any reversal
of the trend, and to observe enterprises whose activities overlap
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different categories and who might try to take advantage of that fact.
The classification of foreign enterprises was not simply based on
the information contained in the data forms submitted by the affected
enterprises. Pre-compliance inspection was the major determinant in
placing enterprises in one or other of the schedules. Errors made
in pre-inspection explain why certain enterprises were placed in
inappropriate schedules. There were petitions to protest to the Board
about the restrictions imposed on tome of the enterprises. The NEPD
does not empower the Board or the zonal offices to co-manage defaulting
companies, but instead to seal them up. Similarly the Decree does
not authorise the Board or its Committees to dispose of defaulting
companies in Schedules II and III. However, the Board has used its
discretion to avoid sealing defaulting companies, and has determined
to co-manage them because of a desire to avert unemployment and "loss
of production to the economy". 5 There are only six cases of
co-management under the Kano zone, according to current official
information, and there is strong evidence in the case of one company,
that the co-management has been lifted. In our investigation of the
145 companies we found five companies sealed, although only one was
officially acknowledged. Three of these had been immediately
reopened, and one company was recommended for sealing up.
Section 22 of the 1977 Decree provides "that once an aggrieved
has exhausted the rights of appeal as stipulated in the Decree the
Board's action could not be challenged in court." But officials of
the Board report that lawyers and solicitors of some newly established
companies'claimed that the Section was voided by the coming into effect
of the 1979 Nigerian Constitution. Thus the Board has been taken to
court on a few occasions. Some of the cases were still pending when
the civilian government which was established under the 1979
Constitution was overthrown in a military coup.
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The Board's powers over enterprises came under continual attack
during the civilian administration of President Shagari (1979-83).
The power to seal defaulting companies under Schedule II was taken
away, in 1979. The Board was then taken to court by Eurogans Nigeria
Ltd. and Kleide and Company, who protested against the Board for
co-managing them, arguing that the Board had no authority to appoint
co-managers. Eurogans and Kleide eventually succeeded by obtaining
injunctions which effectively led to the withdrawal of the managers
appointed by the Board. The Board realised that from then on, it
had no constitutional power to seal or co-manage Schedule II and III
enterprises. In any case, the Board was only able to seal a very
small number of companies even when it was assumed to have the
constitutional power.
An enhancement of the Board's authority became of paramount
importance, as a response to the developing crisis of its power.
In 1983, a recommendation was submitted by the Board to the
National Assembly to amend the 1977 Decree, giving it wider powers
to sell defaulting companies. Before a decision was reached, the
National Assembly was dissolved by the military coup (December 1983).
The suspension and modification Decree (1984) appears to "restore
6
the Board's power to the status quo ante" , but the courts have not
yet ruled on any case to confirm the new position.
The NEPB has all along been faced with the problem of how to
ensure "Nigerian control" of those enterprises where only part of
the ownership came to be in Nigerian hands, under Schedules II and III.
The monitoring of foreign business activities in the country has
become part of the NEPB's task, in spite of the shortage of inspectors
and funds.
Handling the establishment of new enterprises has also become a
part of the Board's duties; but above all is the task of ensuring the
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expansion and growth of indigenised firms. In general, therefore,
the Board continues to look for unclassified enterprises and to place
them in the appropriate Schedule. 7 For example, under the Kano zonal
office, 34 newly established companies were detected during a "mopping-up
operation of all commercial and industrial establishments operating
within the State (Kano)" in 1981. 8
The Board also recommends reclassification of enterprises where
the original classification was based on wrong assumptions, or where
there have been unanticipated problems in implementation. The Federal
Commissioner of Trade and Industry takes the final decisions.
In 1933 the Board's Chairman, Mr. M. Gadzama, accused Senator
David Dafinone, Chairman of the Senate Committee on Commerce and
Industry, of blatantly blocking an executive bill intended to provide
greater powers to the Board in its task of enforcing the law and
dealing with non-compliance cases. Although the bill had been passed
by the House of Representatives, the Senate Committee delayed the final
passing of the bill by tactically suggesting amendments to the 1977
Decree. The Committee initiated a change in Section 8 of the latter
Decree which originally stated: "an enterprise shall be deemed to be
an alien enterprise unless the entire capital of propriety interest
whether financial or otherwise, is also owned and controlled by
Nigerian citizens or association." The definitional problem of the
A
expression "Nigeria, Association" continues to confuse officials.
This is due to the part ownership structure of Schedule II and III.
Demands have been expressed in certain official quarters in the 1980s
for modification of Section 8 of the 1977 Decree - chiefly the
inclusion of enterprises in which indigenous equity participation is
not less than 60%. "This will enable a number of large Nigerian
controlled companies to play a more decisive part in promoting new
a
enterprises and indeed, in attracting additional investment."
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Between 1982 and 1983 there was an indication that "Senate was working"
on the possible changes to the 1977 Decree.
Recent events (1983) in which Senator Dafinone acted to prevent
the NEPB acquiring greater legislative powers to enforce compliance
have shown that official thinking, under the influence of the lobby
of M A N , is in agreement with aspiring indigenous bourgeoisie and
does not want to frighten away foreign capital. However, the increased
government sensitivity to the needs of foreign capital has to be
understood against the background of decline in Nigeria's oil-based
prosperity.
Nevertheless, despite the lamentations still voiced by the Board
about its lack of formal powers, 10 the authority granted to it by the
1977 Decree was still greater than it possessed before. Although the
Decree did not give the Board any power to intervene in the running
of enterprises, the Board has in fact been able to intervene on
occasions under the pretext of the general spirit of the Decree.
Indeed, activities of the Nigerian Enterprises Promotion Board
are even now becoming more widely appreciated. The continued existence
of the Board appears to have been guaranteed under Section 16
paragraph 3 of the 1979 Nigerian Constitution. It has become a
permanent State institution with its own powers, procedures and corps
of officers working for the promotion of private Nigerian enterprises. 11
(ii)	 The Nigerian Enternrises Promotion Committees 
The establishment of the NEPB was accompanied by a similar
establishment of Nigerian Enterprises Promotion Committees (NEPCs)
in each of the twelve States which then made up the Federation. The
gigantic task of national promotion of enterprises and the
implementation of the indigenisation policy could hardly have been
left to the Board at Lagos, whose area of competence is restricted
to Lagos City. Although most manufacturing industries with foreign
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participation are concentrated in a few areas, chiefly Lagos, Kano,
Aba and Kaduna, commercial enterprises extend to every State. The
committees serve as watchdogs on behalf of the Board.
The NEPD in establishing the committees stipulated that the
Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Trade and Industry in each
State of the Federation was to head the committee. Members of the
committee are drawn from the Ministry of Trade and Industry, and include an
officer from thecCooperative Societies12
 and three members of the
public who are usually drawn from private business.
Like the Board, the State committees also have the power to "coopt"
Nigerian and non-Nigerian individuals to attend committee meetings,
to offer advice based on their business experience.
The Governor of the State was given sole power to determine the
length of time for which members are to serve on the Board. Whereas
decisions on the Board are collectively taken by the executive council
(during the periods of military government), important issues
pertaining to the States are matters which have been left in the
hands of respective Governors of the States concerned.
The committees also have the duty to assist the Board by making
sure that foreign business residents who are affected by the Decree
have complied with the law. In general, the State committees are
supposed to identify areas of difficulties, send periodic reports to
Lagos, make suggestions for changes where necessary, and are obliged
to carry out any other tasks that are assigned to them by the Board.
The State committees' staff who are also the employees of the
r
State government, are assigned the task of persuading the business
community in their State to take part in the implementation. There
has been a lack of expertise, in particular trained accountants,
book-keepers, auditors in most of the State committees. As is the
case with the Board, the committees are inadequately financed. For
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example in 1982, the budgetary allocation for committees was only
45,000 to each Stato.
13
 The evaluation team of the Board has often
had to travel to various States to assess and determine the Schedules
of the affected enterprises. The ineffectiveness of the State
committees became even more obvious between 1980 and 1983. Interference
by local politicians was common, and both State politicians and
businessmen who had increased their involvement in joint ventures
with foreign capital sought to protect their interest by improper
interference. This state of affairs was admitted by Mr. Gadzama, the
Chairman of the Board, in July 1983. 14 The experience of the
NEFC in Bomb State can be turned to, to illustrate the difficulties
experienced by the non-zonal committees in other States.
(iii) The Nigerian Enterprises Promotion Committee, Bomb State 
Before the creation of Borno, Bauchi and Gongola States by way
of the dismemberment of the former North Eastern State (NES) in 1975,
the three States were served by the NES Nigerian Enterprises Promotion
Committee. However in 1975 Nigeria was divided into 19 States and
each State, including Borno, set up its own NEPC.
Interviews were conducted by the author with all past and present
members of the NEFC of Borno State and with those officials of the
Ministry of Trade and Industry there, who were closely related to the
implementation of the NEPDs in the State. These included enterprise
inspectors, officials involved in decision-maing, and State delegates
who attended NEPB annual meetings (although the records show that
representatives of Borno State and a few other States have failed
to attend some annual meetings). Two official files of information
on indigenisation in the State were examined. Correspondence with
the NEPB, Lagos and NEPC Kano zonal office the Ministry's own Minutes
on the decisions taken, and copies of letters written to the State's
Chamber of Commerce and Industry were also consulted.
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Three important facts emerged from the personal interviews and
official documents. First, are the persistent difficulties experienced
in finding competent committee members from the private sector, and
the indifference of those businessmen chosen to serve on the committee.
On 22/10/81 the NEPC Borno State had to be reviewed and was reconstituted.
Secondly, and perhaps most importantly from the point of view of
promoting private indigenous businesses in the State, is the poor
working knowledge, and misconceptions of the official brief of the
NEFC by its own officers. This point can be illustrated by reference
to correspondence between the NEPB and the State's committee, and
actions taken which were harmful to the State's private sector.
Since the promulgation of NEPD 1977, the NEPB has passed on to
NEPC Borno State, proposals and requests from eight foreign companies
seeking partnership with private indigenes. For example Trade and
Technology nanagement of Brussels sought a partnership
to establish a biscuit-making factory. This opportunity was passed
on to the Chamber, but only because the State government had already
signed a contract on its own behalf for the establishment of a
biscuit factory with another firm.
The NEPB forwarded to NEPC, Borno State, another letter (1/12/81)
from V.J. Engineering of Leamington Spa, UK who wished to identify a
company in Nigeria who would be interested in expanding into areas
within the competence of V.J. Engineering. "Assistance may take the
form of supplying detailed drawings to suit locally available chassis
enabling a large degree of local manufacture with back-up in the
form of kit packed circuitry . . ." The company produces mainly
special commercial vehicle bodywork and small aircraft support
tankers for airlines/airport
company, it was considered by
areas of the State government
authorities. As a vehicle-related
NEPC officials to be one of the priority
. Hence the government became keen to
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enter partnership, if V.J. Engineering would be prepared to restrict
itself to manufacturing or supplying vehicle components. In the end
officials dropped the venture proposed because the Products of the
company were considered unsuitable for local needs and because the
State entered into an agreement with an Indian firm for the manufacture
of vehicle parts. V.J. Engineering Ltd.'s quest for partners was
only then paseed on for consideration by the Chamber, as a last resort.
Bhandari Crosfields Ltd, of India, specialists in the manufacture
of animal feeds, also sought indigenous partners. "We are interested
in entering the Nigerian market and for this we are prepared to go
in for a joint venture. We would appreciate if you will kindly
circulate our enquiry to your members as we seek a local influential
and financially sound party."
15
 The information was passed on to
Animal Feed Mills, a State owned company, but no response was forthcoming.
The message should have been availed to the Chamber for circulation
to all its members, instead of merely being channelled to the one State
owned firm.
However, there have been a few instances of the State directly
passing on opportunities to the Chamber of Commerce and Industry.
For example, seeking buyers on behalf of Akin Taylor International
Consortium Ltd., the NEPB sent a letter to NEPC (Bomb) requesting a
list of prospective buyers for the company's local assets. Also
passed on 25/3/82 were Roads Nigeria Ltd.'s application forms for
subscription, which was due to expire on 29/3/821
Thus although the NEPC is supposed to play a very active part
in linking private indigenous businessmen and potential foreign
investors, the records show that in Bomb State at least, the NEPC
tends either to be passive or to explore the more promising opportunities
notified by the NEPB for the benefit of the public sector in the State.
Since the NEPC is an integral part of the Ministry of Trade and
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Industry, any intending foreign investor in the State is seen as
a potential partner of the public sector in the State. Only in
instances where the venture would possibly duplicate an already
existing State venture is such an opportunity re-directed to the
private sector. This bias perhaps owes to misunderstanding of the
NEPC's official role, which needs to be clarified. It is not yet
obvious that the NEPC should enthusiastically promote the interests
of private indigenous business, or instead consider first the State
sector, or somehow serve both. 16 If the answer is both, who should
be given priority?
The third fact to emerge from the records in Borne State is the
difficulties created for share acquisition by distance and the pattern
of distribution of application forms for the shares. First, is the
inability of the State to receive correspondence on time, owing to
such factors as poor postal service, which provides a major constraint
on participation. 17 This problem is of course recognised by the NEPB,
as in a letter of 21/4/77 to the NEPC, Borno State. The NEPC has
pointed out On nany occasions that application forms for the purchase
of shares were late. For example, the forms for United Nigerian
Textiles Ltd. were received by the State Committee on 8/6/77, and
the closing date for applications was 27/3/77. In his address to
the NEPB's second annual meeting of the executive Chairman and
Secretaries of NEPC in Sokoto (9/8/82), Mr. Alile, Director General
of the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) referred to difficulties
in the delivery system in the ptock Market involving the receipt of
the sffare certificates and dividends, and in some cases to surplus
money from unallottod shares. Mr. Alile talked of "high percentage
of nails for shareholders usually returned as unclaimed even at times
to well-known addresses."
Further difficulties experienced by the State, and not unique to
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Borno State, result from the 'irregular and/or uncontrolled distribution
of forms by banks. Staff of banks involved in the distribution of
application forms and prospectuses have been known to restrict the
distribution of such documents to themselves, their close friends
and relations, and, perhaps less objectionable but still discriminating,
to their important customers. This is widely practised in many States.
t
On 30/4/79, a correspondent of the New Nigerian newspaper reported
a similar problem of obtaining prospectuses and application forms of
U,A C Nigeria Ltd. for the sale of its shares in Kaduna. All four
banks that were investigated were not willing to issue forms when
requested. The instance of irregular distribution of forms was
encountered by the author in one of the commercial banks in Lagos
in 1985, when West African Glass Company's application forms for
the offer for subscription were released only reluctantly and after
argument.
In Borno State, the existence of the Enterprises Promotion Committee
is hardly noticed except on paper. 18 This reflects the absence of a
significant number of small foreign owned firms. There were only 17
such enterprises affected by the 1977 Decree in the State. In
contrast, the records which were examined in Kano State had 135. Where
there are subsidiaries of large firms, such as U A,C., S C 0 A and
U T C , the correspondence is handled by the NEPB itself. Hence the
activities of the committee in the State are very limited indeed.
There was no evidence of any periodic meetings of committee members
since the creation of the State. Some officers of the Ministry were
31
conversant only with the 1972 Decree's outdated guidelines and not
at all with the guidelines of the 1977 Decreet
One notable difficulty of the committee is in the area of
communicating information and advice to bu3inessmen. 19
 This problem
came to the fore in the personal interviews carried out by the author
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in 1982. Occasional visits by committee officials to the offices
and residences of prominent State businessmen nearly always seem to
end in frustration and failure.20
(iv) Compliance 
The amount of N120 million spent during the 1972/74 implementation
exercise represented 77.5% of the 954 businesses listed under Schedules
I and II, i.e. 740 affected enterprises had complied by September 1974.
About 237 of the 326 business units listed in Schedule I, amounting
to approximately N13, complied. In Schedule II, 503 of the total
628 enterprises were bought for approximately N109 million and changed
hands.21 By 30th June 1977 13 companies had complied with the provision
of the 1977 NEPD.22
 The sale of parts of all these companies amounted
to N50 million, and the sale was conducted between April and June 1977.
Both government and private indigenous investors bought shares in
the companies. Because of the large stake such major companies have
in the Nigerian economy, they could not afford to be seen to obstruct
the workings of the law.
Given that the NEPD specified 31st December 1978 as the deadline
for compliance, it was pointless to hurry enterprises in the way
that the NEPB and CI C suggested.23
 A new timetable for all affected
enterprises was drawn up. The Board recommended that all those
enterprises that came under Schedule III be required to comply by
30/6/78. New enterprises under Schedule II, excluded from the 1972
NEPD, were to comply by 31st August 1978. Schedule II enterprises
already listed under the first NEPD were to comply by 31/10/78, and
Schedule I enterprises by 31/12/78. The Board's concern for possible
non-compliance is understandable, but the enterprises needed time to
_
look for appropriate buyers. The various attempts made to persuade
foreign investors to speed up the process achieved very little success. 24
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After the promulgation of the 1977 NEPD, at least 20 petitions
were written to the Commissioner and/or NEPB, mostly trying to seek
reclassification of firms from lower category to higher ones. At
least three petitions were for total exemption.
25
Such petitions
were written in part to gain more time, and the parties recognised
that their chances of success were quite remote.
26
There were 500 firms that had not complied by June 1978, out of
the total number of 993 listed under the 1977 NEPD. The majority of
defaulters were, according to the Chairman of NEPB, Mr. Gadzama,
during an interview on Nigerian Television (NTA, Lagos) Lebanese,
Indian, Greek and Italian firms. This is also true of our survey
in the North. Over three-quarters of the defaulters are Lebanese.
As at the date, those enterprises yet to comply had been given six
months to do so by the dateline of 31st December 1978. They were
also advised to proceed with sending necessary documents to the Capital
Issue Commission (dc) for valuation before the end of June 1978.
The first progress report on the implementation process of the 1977
NEPD noted that ua definite milestone needed to be established by
which affected enterprises can be deemed to have complied." 27 In
view of this, all companies that were to sell shares through the
issuing houses decided that the final meeting at which prices were
agreed must be considered as the date of compliance. However, mere
agreement on prices need not necessarily bring about a change of hands
of those businesses, and so not really fulfil the requirement of
compliance in a meaningful sense.
Between 1977 and 1982 18 firms were sealed and 26 co-managed for
a brief period because of non-compliance.
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Table I 
Federal Government Press. Economic and Statistical Review 1978
Indigenisation Decrees: Rate of Compliance 
Description	 1972 Decree 1977 Decree 
(1) No. of enterprises affected	 950	 1,200
(2) No. of enterprises complying	 730	 1,120
N.A .(3) No. of shares s 'old 	 280,000,000
(4) Sales value of the shares	 N122,000,000 N350,000,000
Sources: Nigerian Enterprises Promotion Board, Lagos.
Nigerian Stock Exchange, Lagos.
+
N.A. - Not Available.
It must be noted that even in 1983, there were still over 240
enterprises under Schedules II and III that had yet to fully complete
the process of complying.
In the north of Nigeria, 194 enterprises have complied with the
1977 NEPD, according to NEPC Kano zone records. 152 of these are
in Kano and 42 in Kaduna. There are also a total of 54 enterprises
reported not to have complied. 28 of these are in Kano, 7 in Borno,
7 in Sokoto and 12 in Kaduna States. In our sample of the companies
in the North, the post-compliance reports show 21 firms who claim to
have complied with the 1977 NEPD but have failed to convince the
inspectors. The post-compliance reports describe six cases as
"suspects" and one company is under co-management. About 17 companies
have been issued with the certificate of compliance in 1983. 28 The
sfailure to comply in the case of these companies relates to such matters
as the non-fulfillment of 10% workers' participation (see chapter7),
unsatisfactory information, lack of proof of a claim to 0.A.U. or
Nigerian citizenship, lack of proof of sale of shares or payment for
shares by aliens and Nigerians. In only about four cases are alien
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proprietors reported not to have been able to find buyers. In another
company where four persons were offered N13,200 worth of shares, they
declined.
There are 50 new companies which are still in the process of
complying. 45 of these are established in Kano, 2 in Kaduna, 2 in
Jos and 1 in Sokoto. These companies were established without the
knowledge of the Board or NEFC Kano zone. They were eventually
discovered during a tidying up operation between 1980-81. In addition,
there are probably many non-complying cases as yet unknown to the
authorities, of the sort which are uncovered by the press from time
to time and which have been reported in Lagos, Kaduna and Sokoto
since 1983. Some influential indigenous companies carry out independent
investigations of foreign companies which are suspected of undertaking
businesses reserved for Nigerians. For example, Odutola Tyre,Company
had written a petition (3/8/78) to the NEPB protesting an alleged
practice of tyre treading by some foreign firms. Odutola Tyre Sales
Company Ltd. maintained in a confidential letter that there was a
"flagrant violation of the laws • • • by some expatriate construction
companies currently operating in the North of Nigeria, where four
road construction companies of Italian origin (Bacoloni, Stirling
Astaldi (sic), Roccon Construction Company Ltd., Boroni Prono Nigeria
Ltd.) have set up plants to retreat tyres • • This is done with
impunity in the face of the Nigerian Enterprises Promotion Decree 1977,
Section 1, item 38, which stipulates that tyre retreading is the
exclusive reserve of Nigerians." This allegation was partially
investigated and reported in respect of only one of the companies,
Stirling Astaldi (8/5/79). The report was based on one visit by an
inspector to the company's premises and an interview with the company's
commercial manager and two employees. The inspector concluded that
Stirling Astaldi Nigeria Ltd. was not operating Retreading of Tyres at the
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time of . . . inspection.
As a watchdog in other States, the zonal branch, Kano was recently
able to detect one case of non-compliance in Maiduguri, that of
Hawker Siddeley Power Nigeria Ltd., part British subsidiary with its
main head office at Ibadan. The company was awarded a contract . worth
f,N15 million by the Federal government to install heavy generating
plant in New Marte as part of the Chad Basin Development Authority
Irrigation Scheme. Hawker Siddeley Power Engineering U.K. came to
Nigeria in order to cope with the growing demand for new power stations.
Although the method by which the firm was found out is not known,
it is clear that Kano zonal office, not the Bomb State Committee
which was situated barely two miles from Hawker Siddeley l s office
at Baga Road, made the detection. The firm was given a further three
months within which to comply. The official correspondence from the
Ministry of Trade and Industry, which acts as the NEPC of the State,
showed that the zonal officer, Kano Committee, had sent a "Board
circular" to the Ministry of Trade and Industry to arrange a 24 hour
surveillance of the firm. The circular was never received by the
Ministry due to the poor state of the postal services. A letter of
notification was written (13/1/83) to the Borne State Commissioner
of Police to seal up Hawker Siddeley. The Police were also requested
to provide a one week surveillance after which a private security
arrangement would be made.
Before the request was made to the Police, the zonal secretary,
Mr. Mohammed, presented the letter of instruction to seal the firm.
Letters were also sent to Permanent Secretaries of the Ministry of
Trade and Industry, Internal Affairs and the Central Bank of Nigeria
(CBN) notifying them of the sealing of. the company. But by 4/2/83,
a further decision was taken by the Board to allow Hawker Siddeley
three months to comply.
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Similarly, Sokoto Furniture Factory, jointly owned by a Lebanese
proprietor (60%) and Sokoto State government, was first sealed and
then reopened. The alien proprietor was supposed to sell 20% of his
holding to the State government, according to the Board's directives.
The alien proprietor insisted instead on selling to what the Board
calls "his fronts"- private Nigerians. This led to the co-management
of the company, but the officer assigned to co-manage the company
was resident at Kano and this allowed the alien proprietor an
opportunity to sell the 20% to private Nigerians of his choice for
cash, without the approval of the Board.
All the indications show that Nigeria's methods of implementing
its Enterprises Promotion Decrees have been characterised by a
"softly, softly" and lenient, not to say lax approach. A second
conclusion that can be drawn is that there is no efficient system of
inspection from the non-zonal Committee offices, as in the case of
Bomb State. Even where a firm is detected there is no effective
and adequate machinery to enforce the decisions of the Board.
The poor record of handling implementation is of course not
entirely due to such administrative deficiencies as ineptitude, poor
communication and insufficient numbers of inspectors. A former member
of the NEPB inspectorate team has identified a further political
cause discovered from his own experience. Balahany Company, a
borehole digging firm, jointly owned by Nigerians and foreign
shareholders, was at one time clearly seen by the NEPC to be non-complying.
The NEPC simply shied away because the company's indigenous share-
s
holders constituted prominent and influential Nigerians (an ex-governor
and traditional rulers). Only in 1980 was 34% of the 40% alien
holding reallocated to indigenous shareholders, leaving the aliens
-rith 6%, of the total equity.
The weakness of the Board in its efforts at policy implementation
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has been officially confirmed by the Chairman of the Board, Mr. Gadzama,
to the effect that the Board was not interested in co-managing, sealing
or taking over non-complying companies. This timidity has, quite
naturally, not gone without public comment. For example the NOT
NiTerian (6/4/79) asserted that "the crucial task of making defaulting
companies cooperatp with government in order to achieve national
objectives still remains • • • a task that the authorities can best
handle. Action is what is needed in this matter of laid down rules,
not wishful hopes that our erstwhile exploiters will gracefully hand
over the geese that lay the golden eggs."
29
The slow rate of compliance was abetted further by changes
introduced to the NEPD by the civilian government in October 1979.
While prior to 1979, affected enterprises were not able to take the
Board to court, this position was overturned as a result of repealing
Section 22 of the 1977 NEPD in October 1979.
In the past the Board had the power to freeze the accounts of
non-complying companies and take whatever other measures were
necessary to enforce compliance. Yet, the Chairman admitted in 1983:
"We did not exercise these powers indiscriminately. We used our power
to seal under Section 14 sparingly, even when many companies under
Schedule I did not comply, because we do not want to put people out of
a job."30 This point was also forcefully expressed by an official
of NEFC in private conversation. The records show that the NEPB has
been responsible for paying the wages in sealed up firms. The
financial burden imposed on the Board by maintaining the workers
during the company's non-operational period may well have contributed
to its general reluctance to seal up firms.
The Problems of sound implementation of the NEPD seem to be
intractable. Many old and new enterprises continue to flout the
NEFD's requirements. Another recent case was in March 1984. The
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New Nirerin newspaper ( 24/3/84) reported that Inco Beverage of
Sokoto was found to have "refused to comply with the requirements
of the NEPD, almost 18 months after its establishment." As a soft
drink factory, classified under Schedule II of the 1977 Decree, 60%
share ownership should have been held by Nigerians. But the State's
Commissioner of Trade, Industry and Cooperatives, Alhaji Bello Shehu
a
Usman, announced to the press that the firm had yet to dispose of
about one third of its shares. A unique type of "fronting" was
reported in this case. The company was said to have been provided
with land to build the factory ,
 by a Nigerian who subsequently became
Chairman of the firm. Upon presenting a list of Nigerian directors,
the local authority not only undertook to improve the land, but also
to issue a new immigration business permit. Later, according to the
report, none of the Nigerian directors was found to have fully paid
for their shares. Moreover, the 10% mandatory workers' shares had not
been released to the employees. The NEM which should have been
responsible for investigating the affair had yet to show any signs
of life, and had to be reconstituted by the new military administration
in 1984.31
A further case reported by National Concord (7/4184) concerned a
Lebanese furniture company already sealed by the NEPB. Apart from
tax evasion and smuggling, the company operated under two different
names (Sleepwell Comfort Ltd. and Decoral Activities Company) as a
means of escaping the requirements of the 1977 Decree. It is not
the fact that a Lebanese firm Was attempting to avoid compliance,
s
but instead the response of the Board that is interesting. Here, as
in other cases, the Board was unable to do much. Mr. M. Owanuwa,
the Secretary of the Board, allowed that if the owners of the firm
could prove that one of the firms, Decoral Activities Ltd., was
being liquidated', and there was evidence of share ownership in the
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other (Sleep Well Comfort), then the firm would be allowed to reopen.
Any approach by the monitoring authorities that is as generous as
this will only serve to encourage complacency and malpractices among
foreign investors and their Nigerian partners who know that the Board
is disinclined to be severe.
Many of the more genuine difficulties and delays experienced by
companies in complying with the NEPD owe to the following reasons.
First, is an inability to find indigenous buyers with adequate
financial resources. Second is the past unprofitability, and hence
the unattractiveness of the companies in question. Third, is the
remote geographical location of the firms and their lack of proximity
to potential buyers. Nigeria is a large country, and moreover, if
the business (particularly small proprietorship type) is located
outside the region of a potential purchaser then he may hesitate on
political grounds, most notably concern about inter-ethnic and inter-
regional sensitivities.
At the'national level, out of a sample of 1,888 (from a total of
about 3,025) companies registered with the NEPB between 1972 and 1984
about 73 are either liquidated or wound up: Many of the firms that
formally declined to teet the NEPD's stipulated requirements were of
U S. origin, and eventually chose to leave Nigeria. Nevertheless, a
majority of both U S. and non-U S firms chose to comply. CBN records
show that "In 1971, the increase in inflow was shared by all sources
of foreign capital but in 1972, the sharp decline in inflow due to the
United States companies more than offset the continued increased
infloll from all the other sources." 32 Similarly in 1977, the large
Schedule III firms that decided to leave were of American origin.
For example, International Business Machines (IBM), after long
negotiations with the Federal government in search of total exemption,
decided to leave rather than to comply with the requirement of 40%
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indigenous equity ownership, under Schedule III of the new Decree in
1977. Curiously enough, after it left, IBM reappeared in Nigeria in
1978 as a 40% share owner of Data Processing and Maintenance Services
Ltd. (DPMS).
The withdrawal of such companies did not generate significant
unemployment at the time. The total indigenous staff of 140 working
for IBM was relatively small compared to the capital involved.
Moreover, most of IBM's staff were expected to be absorbed by a wholly
indigenous firm that was to serve as agent of IBM, carrying on
maintenance and marketing services. Another American firm, classified
by the second NEPD under Schedule II, was National Citibank of New
York, which at first refused to accept 60% Nigerian participation.
Twenty-one senior Nigerian employees were required to leave. Subsequently,
however, 60% of the shares was Nigerianised.33 Palmolive Colgate
Company actually left as a result of the 1977 Decree.
In summary of this chapter, it can be said that the NEPB and
its committees which were set up to implement the NEPDs and monitor
the performance of affected enterprises, and at the same time undertake
to promote indigenous enterprises, have been constrained by limited
legislative powers and inadequate financial and human resources. The
experience of the NEPC from some States also suggests that the
committees have been confused about the guidelines which they should
follow. In the case of Borne State, the NEPC has tended to serve or
promote the State's interest rather than the private sector.
With regard to the rate of compliance, many enterprises were
dilatory and a variety of methods has been deployed by foreign companies
to avoid or at a minimum postpone compliance. However, the majority
of companies were willing to comply and remained in Nigeria. As will
become clearer in the next chapter, the methods of compliance also
varied, from raising the equity capital base of the company to enable
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alien proprietors to retain their position, to allocating shares to
a small number of people, or obtaining Nigerian citizenship. Such
methods as these are practised mainly by small and intermediate sized
Lebanese firms in the North. As for the publicly quoted companies,
shares were offered for subscription and sale which enabled some low
income brackets to acquire token shares through low valuation of
shares.
In the next chapter, we shall attempt to identify the main
categories of beneficiary of the NEns, difficulties encountered
in funding the indigenisation scheme, and management and control
problems in partially indigenised enterprises. Lastly we shall
examine the issue of Nigerian citizenship which has led many aliens,
particularly the Lebanese, to apply for naturalisation to enable
them to remain in business.
1
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CHAPTER 5
Beneficiaries and Shares 
It has been shown in chapter 4 above that the NEFB and the
NEPCs were created to ensure the implementation of the Decrees/
provisions, and some of the difficulties faced by the Board and
its State Committees have been discussed along with the problems
of compliance. We must now look at the issue of share distribution
2
and the identity of beneficiaries.
(i) Beneficiaries
The Industrial Panel's report (1976) not only confirmed a
record of only limited compliance with the first Decree, but also
was critical of the failure to lay down a basis for ensuring an
acceptably wide spread of ownership of shares.
Given the way that shares under the first Decree had become
concentrated in a few hands, the report recommended (1) revocation
of transactions where purchase of 40% of equity shares of enterprises
in Schedule II was by less than: ten persons (2) revocation of transactions
where acquisition involved no purchase (3) an upper limit in the future
on the amount of shares a single Nigerian can acquire per enterprise
i.e. 5% or N50,000 restriction (4) some enterprises under Schedule II
should be acquired by public sector institutions on behalf of the
Nigerian public, through the Lagos Stock Exchange (LSE) and (5) 10%
of shares of any "going concern" be allocated to company staff.
First, the government wished to see enough companies go public
to enable a substantial body of Nigerian citizens to acquire shares.
As a result of the 1972 NEPD, there were just under 400,000 shareholders
0
recorded at the Stock Exchange in 1976. The number rose to over one
million shareholders after the implementation of the 1977 NEPD. But
essentially the overall outcome was still the enhancement of a
relatively small number of shareholders — those who possessed sufficient
information and financial wherewithal to take advantage, rather than
a broad and even spread of shares. This point is easily conveyed by
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simple reference to the total population of Nigeria - upwards of
over eighty and a half million, according to National Population
Bureau, Lagos (1978) (the exact number is difficult to gauge and is
very sensitive politically because of the critical question of its
regional distribution).
In 1972 there were 13 companies quoted under LSE by firms
complying with the 1972 NEPD. As a result of the government's
request to sell shares to the public, 70 companies sold shares worth
about N200 million to the public through the Stock Exchange. N70
million worth of shares was by offer for subscription, while the
remaining N130 million was by offer for sale.
In 1977, 78 companies dispensed over 300 million ordinary shares
valued at around N210 million so as to comply with the 1977 NEPD.
Over 70% of the shareholders affected by the NEPDs between 1972 and
1983 are individual Nigerians, and their aggregate interest amounts
to about 30% in value of quoted shares. Most of the 103 publicly
quoted foreign-owned companies in 1985 have their shares thinly
distributed through a low per share valuation of the saleable stock,
although the beneficiaries are still a tiny minority of the population.
On average these companies have N0.05 per share valuation that has
enabled some people in low income brackets to acquire a token number
of shares. The executive director of the Securities and Exchange
Commission, Mr. G.A. Akamiokhov, and the Chairman and Chief Executive
of the Nigerian Acceptances Ltd. and Chairman of Cadbury Nigeria Ltd.,
Mr. Onosode, have reported that the Lagos Stock Exchange (SEC)
allottment policy has been in favour of the smallest investors
"who invariably are allotted 100% of what they have applied for whilst
the largest investors may get no more than 5% sometimes even less."
Although no data was presented in support, there is no reason to dispute
the claim since both men are prominent insiders and participants
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in the indigenisation exercise. One can therefore only calculate the
average Nigerian's total maximum he has applied for on the basis of a
few companies' data.
To take one example, in selling 60% of its shares, UAC (Nigeria)
with an authorised and paid-up capital of N297 million (in 1980) allotted
14.3% of the saleable shares to 98,030, 5.32% to 20,823, 7.40% to
14,850, 0.73% to 137, and 96 Nigerians acquired 31.31%. 1 The table (I)
below shows UAC's 60% share distribution to the indigenous sector.
The aggregate majority of individuals who hold 14.30% of the
company's equity may have, on average, applied for a maximum of N433.2
worth of shares each, as can be seen from the table. On the whole the
average Nigerian holding in the 60% of the saleable stock is N1,326.9.
About 92% of the indigenous shareholders own less than the average
holding and 8% own more.
A very similar pattern of distribution is also recorded for Pfizer
Products Nigeria, another public company with an issued and paid up
capital of N4,687,500.
By contrast, most of the Lebanese, Syrian and Indian owned medium
or small enterprises (which are wrongly assumed by some observers 2 to
have been within the sphere of sole indigenous ownership) are still
partly owned and controlled by alien proprietors, as our inquiry has
revealed. Unlike the publicly quoted companies, the private Lebanese
and Indian enterprises that are examined in the Nmrth show two distinct
characteristics. First, the valuations of their shares are higher than
those of the public companies. The average per share valuation in
the sample is about N2, and some are as high as N20 per share valuation.
Secondly, the shares are highly concentrated in the hands of the same
alien proprietors and the State and Federal governments. Because the
private companies are legally entitled to limit their membership
(shareholders) to between 2 and 50, their position has inhibited the
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government from making any more egalitarian demands. In this group
of enterprises, the aggregate low-income individual Nigerians are
almost entirely excluded. These two patterns of distribution of shares
are highly relevant to the issue of control which is reflected in
almost all discussions about indigenisation in Nigeria, and which will
be discussed in Section 3 below.
Between January 1977 and December 1981 the CIC (SEC) valued
1,078 enterprises made up of 916 private companies and 162 public
companies with shares totalling 787 million. The value of the enterprises
considered during the period was N551.2 million made up of N138.6
million for offer for sales and N413.14 million for offer for subscription.3
The manner of involvement of the CIC and LSE in indigenisation
was to engender a critical response from some foreign business
representatives such as Mr. E.C. Judd. In a speech to The Royal
African Society (20/5/76) he noted that share offers were made under
an arbitrary pricing system and that most of the prices which were
determined by the CIC tended to be well below the seller's view of
a fair figure. 4
 One reason given for the low prices was that they
would encourage a wider section of the public to buy shares, and thus
diversify ownership. However, it is not surprising that a government
so keen on its programme of achieving economic independence should look
for a transfer method that would ensure the best deal for its nationals.
It was precisely in order to protect the investing public against
companies that misrepresent their actual situationS that the government.
decided to bring in the Stock Exchange and the CIC in the implementation
exercise. Indeed, some of the discrepancies in valuation may be due
to the companies' own previous practices of under-declaring profits
for tax purposes. In the initial fixing of prices, the CIC adopted
the conventional methods of valuing shares such as fixed assets,
previous and present incomes, the amount of dividends paid annually
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and expected growth in the future. A range of other factors have
also been taken into account, including forecasts made about the future.
What is interesting is that in spite of issuing complaints, foreign
firms by and large put up with the methods proposed and went on to
take advantage of the alternative business opportunities created for
them.
I
Since under the 1972 NEPD there had been no compulsory valuation
by CIC or limits placed on what an individual Nigerian could acquire,
the firms were free to determine the value of the shares and their
buyers. After the valuation, the firm usually arranged bank loans to
the prospective shareholders, and then the loans would be repaid out of
the dividends which the shareholders obtained. Companies opted for
this pattern of compliance with the Decree in the interests of business
secrecy. It is safer to disclose company operations to a lesser nuffiber
of people than to a larger number of shareholders for valuation.
Passing on 40% shares to a selected few would not require the original
owners to publicly disclose details for the purposes of evaluation.
The new Nigerian directors were not necessarily selected according
to relevant business expertise, although in some cases ex-State officials
were recruited from Ministries of Finance or other government agencies
which dealt with business or had business orientations. However, the
absorption of top military brass and traditional rulers who possessed
no business experience can only be explained in terms of their public
relations value to the firm. Examples of such appointments are numerous.
At least 4 of the military Governors in the North under the Gown regime
P
and other army Generals were allocated significant shareholdings.
Traditional rulers, Emirs and other traditional title holders and
members of their families have acquired shares or were given directorships.
Eleven Northern aristocrats acquired N91,100 worth of shares and
50,000 unvalued shares in 7 companies under the 1977 Decree, and
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another company allocated 40% of its shares. However, in comparison
with the military/bureaucratic group and businessmen their holdings
are very small. They may have been allotted shares and directorships
only in order that they then patronise companies which operate in
their area of reign and political influence.
Other ex-State officials can also be mentioned here. The former
Secretary to the Federal Military government, A. A. Ayida, later
became director of the German company Continho, Caro and Co. Ltd.,
and director of Lever Brothers Nigeria Ltd. A dismissed Chairman of
the Federal Public Service Commission, Alhaji Sule Katagum5
 became the
chairman of Continho, Caro and Co. Ltd. The retired Federal Commissioner
of Finance, Major General J.J. Oluleye, was appointed director of
UTC, Mr. Liman Ciroma6 , a former Secretary to the Federal military
government, was appointed chairman of UTC and of Tate and Lyle Nigeria
Ltd. Chief Asabia, deputy Governor of CBN, became the director of the
First Bank (Chartered Standard) Nigeria. Mr. J. Udoji, head of the
Eastern Nigerian Civil Service, and later to become the chairman of
the Wage and Salary Commission (1974), became director of Nigerian
Tobacco Company (NTC). Mr. Ahmed Joda, a former Federal Permanent
Secretary, Ministry of Information and Labour, took the chairmanship
of SCOA.
The Nigeria Company Handbook (and guide to Operating Business in
Nigeria), 1980, also contains the following information about current
. and ex-State officials and their connections with foreign firms.
Vice-Admiral J.E. Akinwale Way, head of the Nigerian Navy under the
Gowan regime, acquired jointly with Chief L.E. Edet, 40% of ARBICO Ltd.,
a building construction 60% owned by the foreign firm B.C. Economides.
This business is classified as Schedule II, yet it has remained in
foreign majority ownership. 8 Alhaji Ado Bayaro 9 , Emir of Kano, became
director of BEWAC Ltd., importer and distributors of motor cars,
commercial vehicles, agricultural tractors and machinery. 10 The Emir
it also director of R.T. Briscoe Nigeria Ltd., while J.O. Udoji is
its chairman. (R.T. Briscoe deals in the importation and sale of
technical equipments, printing machinery and paper, pharmaceuticals,
telecommunications equipment, motor and parts). The major shareholders
in Bhandari and Company (Nigeria) Ltd. (manufacturers of stadium and
sports equipment, dealers in sports scientific goods and school
suppliers) are S.A. Pitan, Alhaji Ibrahim Imam, a prominent politician
of the First Republic and M.A. Diete Spiff, a former Military Governor
under the Gow4n regime. 11 Major General O. Olutoye and Dr. A. Bamisaiye
12
wholly own Concorde Furniture Manufacturing Co. Ltd.	 Alhaji Ibrahim
Damcida, former Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Defence, at the centre
of an inquiry into the scandalous importation of cement which led to
his retirement from office, was later appointed the director of ENPEE
Industries Ltd., textile manufacturing, weaving and processing business. 13
Alhaji Shehu Shagarit former Federal COmmissioner of Finance (later to
become the civilian President of Nigeria in 1979) was the director of
Paterson Zochonis Industries Ltd. (PZ) (manufacturers of soaps,
detergents, cosmetic and perfumery). This company is 60% Nigerian and
40% foreign owned.
There are also many ex-heads of diplomatic missions appointed to
the chairs of public companies in Nigeria, such as E.O. Ogbu, former
Nigerian permanent representative to the United Nations during the
Gowan government, who was appointed to the Board of John Holt in 1977.
Bringing prominent Nigerians, and especially ex-officials, into foreign
firms fn this manner would provide a valuable insurance policy to
the foreign partners. Such shareholders were usually well versed in
government policy-making and measures relating to foreign investment,
and they could supply well-informed advice. Furthermore, firms with
those sorts of Nigerian at the top executive levels are more likely
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to obtain local concessions from the public authorities quickly and
with fewer difficulties, because of connections with currently serving
government officials and other top Nigerian directors.
The attitude of the Federal government towards private deals
under the 1972 Decree was one of neutrality and indifference. The
NEPB made it clear that "the Federal government had no intention of
fettering the freedom of an individual to negotiate the sale of a
business on terms he considered equitable." 14
 Under the 1972 Decree,
foreign vendors were not required to inform the NEPB and the Ministry
of Finance prior to transactions with Nigerians. Most did so only
after the conclusion of the deal. Nigerians involved in the purchases
were not even required to report either to the Board or the Ministry
of Finance. This state of affairs left the authorities in darkness
as to who was selling what, and who was purchasing from whom. Not
until after 1974 did the authorities and members of the public begin
to realise what had been going on, and the serious implications.
Although by March 1974, the concentration of ownership in a few hands
was becoming fairly clear, it was nonetheless not possible to determine
exactly the extent to which the Nigerian economy was indigenised. It
was only after the dateline, March 1974, that conclusive evidence
started to emerge.
Contrary to the Federal government's previous indifference to
the sale and transfer methods of enterprises, the 1977 NEPD classified
enterprises into private and public, and put the latter under the
jurisdiction of CIC and the LSE, and the former under the NEPB.
Howevei', it has become a standard practice since 1979 that in both
private and public companies' transactions the Securities Exchange
Commission (SEC) must determine the price of sale. Any business
transaction-that does not involve the above rules is considered to
be "null and void". 15
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Before the inception of the SEC, the Allottment Committee of CIC
was empowered by the Decree (Section 11(1) ) to ensure first, that
shares be spread as widely as possible. Secondly no enterprise should
be sold or transferred to one person (except in the case of owner—manager),
nor would an individual be allowed to control more than one enterprise.
Thirdly, the Committee must ensure that no more than 5% of the equity of
an enterprise or an equity valued at N50,000 be allotted to an individual.
Fourthly the Committee must ensure that no less than 10% of the saleable
shares of any enterprise under Schedules II and III be reserved for
the employees of the enterprise concerned.
The intent of the Decree on wider share distribution has not been
respected in many cases. From our sample of privately incorporated
(and six publicly quoted) companies in the North, at least ten companies
have been taken over individually by ten Nigerians each acquiring the
whole of the company. Eight of these companies are in Schedule I
and two are in Schedule II (in which 60% was taken over). The highest
numbers involved in acquisition of one company's saleable share is 22.
On average, the number of allottees range betNieen. tlio and ten.
Furthermore, there are 40 individuals and families who have shares in
more than 2 companies. The two highest shareholders possess N1,782,870
and N1,522,788 in 5 and 8 companies respectively.
The NEED required that the CIC be provided by the affected enterprises
with all relevant information about the existing Shareholding. Official
records suggest, however, that no special efforts were made to obtain
such information. Both the NEPB and the CIC relied on the data forms
which had been completed by foreign enterprises in 1972. Despite the
Decree's guide to the Board and the CIC on how to avoid a concentration
of shares in a few hands, very little has been achieved in this regard,
as is shown in the example of shares issued by such publicly quoted
companies as the UAC (Nigeria) referred to above(rage3 ) and to an
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even greater extent in the case of private companies. In our sample,
shares in private companies with authorised, issued and paid-up
capital of between N200,000 and N600,000 have been allocated to a
select group of ex-State officials and businessmen. 16 The
concentration of shares is greater among intermediate Lebanese and
Indian firms under Schedule I and II (see chapter 8). The method
of acquiring shares shows that some transferees have not even paid
for their shares, and in a few cases cheques issued to the vendors
have not been cashed. In some cases indigenous buyers have paid for
their shares by contributing office premises, furniture and equipment.
Thus 2 companies allotted N185,000 worth of shares to 3 Nigerians as
payment for office furniture, rents and writing off earlier debts owed
by the company to the Nigerian allottee (buyer). Evidence also exists
of loans being taken up by Nigerians from a company so as to pay for
the shares they have acquired in it. Four companies gave loans
totalling N218,000 and 4,450 unvalued shares to four Nigerians.
The references made by Dudley in his study of Nigerian government
and politics 1982, to the report of the Federal Assets Investigation
Panel's report, can be turned to here, for further illustration of the
methods by which State officials have acquired shares and the ways in
which foreign firms have connived in this.17 The former Commissioner
of the Federal Ministry of Works, Mr. F. Okunnu, was assisted by a
private company to acquire loans from a commercial bank, United Bank
of Africa. The Ministry of Works which Mr. Okunnu headed, was one of
the lucrative Ministries through which the Federal government spent
so much by awarding contracts to private firms in the 19708. 18
Although it is not clear as to how and under what circumstances
Mr. F. Okunnu and the company first came to know each other, the
relationship between the two brought to light by the Panel clearly
establishes that in 1974 Siemens Ltd. guaranteed a loan of N35,000
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by United Bank of Africa to Mr. Okunnu who proceeded to purchase
shares from the same company, Siemens Ltd.
A second case concerns the retired chief of banking operations
at the CBN, Mx. P.A. Ijewere. Like Mr. F. Okunnu, Mr. Ijewere was
also involved in acquiring shares from a foreign company, Smeaton
(Nigeria) Ltd. (specialises in electrical and plumbing). Why and
how Mr. Ijewere became the owner of the firm after indigenisation is
not difficult to guess. Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) awarded
substantial contracts to Smeaton Ltd. running to N3,900,135 directly
and indirectly.
By contrast to such devious methods of share acquisition, there
is the more open route by which officials make use of loans from the
banks. The immediate beneficiaries of the State's directives that
commercial banks grant loans to indigenes were State officials. One
example was the Federal Commissioner of Ministry of Health, Dr. J.E.
Adetaro, who secured a loan of N118,932, from which he was able to buy
60,201 shares in at least 13 different companies. Another high ranking
government figure, Mr. Philip Asiodu, was able to obtain two loans,
between 1974 and 1975, N345,000 and N1,105,000 respectively. The first
loan was a personal one, and the second loan was granted to firms in
which he or his relations were shareholders. 20
No account of the beneficiaries of indigenisation can leave out
the institutions of the State, for government was sufficiently determined
to make indigenisation a success that it was even prepared to resort
to public ownership (with adequate compensation), at least on a temporary
basis, if private Nigerian capital proved unable to do the job. The
clash of interests between the private and public sectors became obvious
in the course of implementation in both phases of the exercise.
Government involvement in the purchasing of shares came to be as
significant as private share acquisition, particularly after 1977.
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Comprehensive information on the extent of State and Federal governments'
participation in enterprises affected by the NEPDs is not available.
Records on government (both States and Federal) participation are
held by individual Ministries and departments who acquired shares.
But the paucity of publicly available data in respect of shares held
by the governments has been acknowledged by the NEPB, which, in 1984
drew attention to the need to set up a single government Department
charged with monitoring and coordinating all government investments.
After all, the government collectively came to hold the most substantial
block of shares to be acquired by Nigerians. Out of the 114 companies
with authorised, issued and paid up capital of N119,410,403
21
, Northern
State governments and the Federal government acquired shares worth
N53,719,380 in 48 companies with authorised issued and paid up capital
of N74,310,221. Large State capital concentration in a relatively
small number of firms such as this strengthened the government's hand
in the management of companies in which it enjoys majority ownership.
Apart from the companies with government interest in our sample,
other official records also show that approaches were made to numerous
foreign businesses by the State governments to buy shares in their
enterprises. For example Kano State govetnment became involved in the
proprietorship of Cinema Houses, taxLbusiness; Kaduna State government
in cinema business; the former North Eastern State in intercity transport
and haulage of goods; the South Eastern State in Hotel and Catering (in
Lagos). There are also other States in the South, particularly Rivers
and Cross River States involved in the acquisition of boat-making
enterprises. In implementing the 1972 NEPD, UAC allocated N1 million
worth of shares to each of the 12 States of the Federation.
22
 Two
State governments were involved in the supermarket business. One
State government was involved in the distribution and servicing of
motor vehicles. 23 The extent of State and Federal government participation
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1/4
outside of what might be called the ”commanding heights" of the economy
has understandably become quite considerable. It was precisely because
of government participation in areas of the economy traditionally
occupied by private entrepreneurs that some indigenous businessmen have
attacked the government for what they see as "intrusion" and "creeping"
nationalisation. The objections to government involvement from the
business community were couched in general ideological terms, but of
course the arguments also have a close relationship to the private
interests of the particular businessmen. The private buyers found
themselves in competition for the purchase of shares, both privately
and on the Stock Exchange, with Federal and State governments. This
led to many calls by private businessmen on the government to refrain
from purchases of shares, and to restrict itself to the creation of
conditions favourable to private businessmen.
In 1977 the NBCI, NIDB, Nigerian Insurance Corporation of Nigeria
(NICON), National Provident Fund; Federal Saving Bank, New Nigeria
Development Corporation (NNDC) and other similar State parastatals
formed into a consortium, a move approved by the Federal Executive
Council on 24/8/77. Thus, unlike the 1972 NEPD in which ownership
in most of the enterprises was transferred to private individuals and
individual State governments, the 1977 NEPD led to an increase of more
coordinated direct participation by the State. Some companies even
offered the affected percentage of their enterprises to public
subscription and approached State governments directly, partly in
order to gain goodwill, and partly because of the ability of government
institutions to pay higher prices for shares. This applied especially
where foreign owners already hdd close business connections with the
public authorities. Government officials endorsed the prices determined
by the foreign owners. Such practices were reported to have occurred
in such places as Kano and North Central States where, for example,
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Lebanese businessmen, who had been established for many years, possess
detailed knowledge of local politics and were able to approach
appropriate officials to arrange favourable sales.
24
 One instance of
this practice was the acquisition of a haulage business by the North
Eastern State govennment, through the payment in excess of the
recommended price. Such practices were supposed to be reduced by
the involvement of the CIC, under the 1977 NEPD which ordered all
sales and transfer to go through the CIC.
To avoid conflict among State public sector agencies over who
should buy what enterprise or shares, the Board set guidelines after
the 1977 NEPD. First, priority is given to those whose application
is in excess of 5% or N50,000. Such applications are automatically
considered and approved — without any consideration for upper limits.
Secondly those whose application is above 5% or N50,000 shall be
automatically approved in accordance with 51% controlling interest. 25
Thirdly all other applications beyond upper limit of N50,000 or 5%
shall be considered in the light of individual merits.
The first priority above, applies to- Federal government Ministries
or agencies directly related to national industrial activities e.g.
Mining Corporation, NNPC, NEPA, Federal Ministries etc. Among these,
the NNPC had already obtained approval to purchase all shares that it
wanted. (Again it was not possible to obtain figures for the amount
acquired by these parastatals, from the NEPB). The significance of
this particular corporation for the Nigerian economy dated back to the
1969 Decree on petroleum.
The second priority above is given to Federal and State Ministries
who have initial involvement in the establishment of, or the "subsequent
development" and expansion of, the enterprise or project. Similarly
if the public agency concerned had a "significant equity interest"
in the project or enterprise before the first NEPD, such agencies
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are allowed 51% of the total paid up capital of the enterprise. For
other, non-automatic cases, the decision taken should reflect the
government's policy of spreading shares as widely and equitably as
circumstances permit. Another criterion in the allocation of shares
was that in the event of oversubscription, applications from State
governments and institutions must be tendered on an equal basis. But
again preferential treatment was in practice given to public institutions
over private individuals or associations, in direct contradiction of
official policy to promote the private sector.
The obvious displeasure of many Nigerian businessmen should not,
however, be allowed to conceal the frequent evasions of the limit.
There was for example a public admission by management personnel of
significant anomalies within Mobil Oil Nigeria Ltd., as revealed in a
general meeting of the company held at Lagos in September 1979. Two
Nigerian directors of the company held 100,000 and 75,000 shares
respectively. When a shareholder suggested that these shareholdings
be reduced to 8,000 so as to comply with the NEPD, the Chairman of the
company, Mr. R.S. Hebberd simply replied: "What the two directors
have were just drops of water in an ocean and could not result in a
breach of any provisions of the said Decree." 26
Knowledge of company affairs gained by new Nigerian managers,
directors and other top personnel has enabled them to allocate equity
shares beyond the limit imposed by NEPD. The dubious methods adopted
include the use of relations names, and, according to national newspapers,
even the use of the names of pets, to buy shares% In any case, an
individual who had acquired 5%27 or N50,000 worth of shares in one
enterprise could go on to buy into as many other enterprises as his
financial capacity allowed.
The overt tension between the private sector and the g overnment
was complicated by covert sectional politics. There were some fears
in certain States of commercially and educationally advanced ethnic
groups out-pacing others who were relatively less well endowed. For
example in Kano State, a lot of people we talked to expressed regret
over the timing of the NEPD because they believed that the relatively
underdeveloped position of the Northern States would permit the
Southern States to take over enterprises. Similarly individuals in
certain States in the South, particularly Rivers and Cross River, have
been reported in national newspapers as expressing mistrust of the
Igbo residents, who before the civil war were dominant in the local
economy. C.S.A. Ogbuagu similarly reported the misgivings of Igbo
businessmen against Yoruba bureaucrats and businessmen and a few northern
elites.28
 Nevertheless no dissatisfaction was officially expressed
by any State government either about the priorities of indigenisation
or the method of implementation, or for that matter, about other States
taking undue advantage at the outset of the indigenisation exercise.
However, once the consequences of the indigenisation exercise started
to become clear, an official of the Securities Exchange Commission
revealed that "there were general complaints" that the hinterland
could not effectively participate. It was this kind of complaint that
led to the system of preferential treatment for governments.
Usually in discussing the pattern of acquisition under the NEPDs,
a distinction is drawn between Northern-based businessmen and Southern-
based Yoruba businessmen. The Igbos, who before the war had been very
prominent in the commercial sector of the economy, appeared by the end
of the civil war to be less conspicuous. Generally the feeling in Nigeria
at least after 1973 was that "the Yoruba areas" enjoyed more than their
fair share of the benefits from indigenisation. However, many commentators
have overlooked the metropolitan character of the Federal capital, Lagos.
As an industrial, financial and political centre, the Lagos big
business population is largely composed of people from many regions
and of several different origins. Some household business
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names in each of the former regions are closely connected to Federal
affairs in Lagos, and have political and commercial interests there.
For example, some Northern businessmen have established their business
head office and/or sub offices in Lagos. A trend in this direction
characterised the period after the civil war, in particular when the
Federal government embarked on huge expenditures prompted by the boom
in oil revenues. Also Federal contracts are usually awarded in accordance
with the extent of influence and the personal contacts which indigenous
firms have among Federal government officials in Lagos.
Thus, although on the whole the Yoruba are generally thought to
have benefited' most, this may be due in part to the concentration of
enterprises in the Lagos area. For example of the 2,000 registered
industrial establishments in 1972, 1,200 are concentrated in and
around Lagos29 . Similarly, of the 1,888 companies registered with the
NEPB, 1,247 companies are located in and around Lagos. Likewise the
share issues through which the transfers were being made are handled
by institutions situated in Lagos. It was awareness of this Lagos bias
that led the Federal Minister of Trade and Industry, Alhaji Bello Maitama
Yusuf to state in 1983 that the "Federal character is reflected in the
issuance of import licences" 30 . No State should claim that it had
been cheated, unlike in the past when Lagos State got about 85% of total
import licences issued.
Another reason why indigenes of some States may be seen to have
benefitedc. more than the indigenes of other States can be found in a
comparative analysis of loan grants by the commercial banks, to the
12 States of the Federation, between 1972 and 1975. It is assumed here,
that the States with high commercial bank borrowings are likely to be
the ones with large private sector borrowings. Thus such States as
Lagos and Kano can be considered to have high private sector borrowers,
reflecting in large measures the level of economic activities (commercial
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and industrial) in those States. The commercial and industrial strength
of the State in turn determines the number and size of commercial banks.
The close proximity of banks was again one of the main factors which
may have given individuals and private businesses relatively easy
access to banks. Out of the total loan of N1,429.6 million injected
into the Nigerian economy by commercial banks in 1975, Lagos State
acquired 66.5%. This was followed by Kano State, with only 7.7%;
while Western State was third with 5.4%.31
Not surprisingly most beneficiaries of indigenisation are situated
close to where industrial and commercial activities are concentrated.
Within the period reviewed by the CBN report (December 1978), indigenous
businessmen received the highest percentage of the loans advanced
i.e. 80% in 10 of the 12 States. 32
 Lagos and Kano States were exceptional,
the indigenous businessmen's share of the loans being 52.4% in Lagos
and 64.4% in Kano.33 The concentration of foreign enterprises which
also participated in borrowing reduced the indigenous businessmen's
share of the loan.
Despite the high proportion of loans made to indigenous businessmen
and the absence of foreign borrowers to compete in those 10 States,
Lagos and Kano State surpassed the other States in the acquisition
of shares simply because of the concentration of foreign enterprises
there. According to T.J. Biersteker, the concentration of manufacturing
investment in Lagos and Iheja areas accounted for 33% of the total
national figure. Port Harcourt, Aba areas in the East and Kano and
Kaduna in the North, taken all together accounted for only 37% of
the total national investment.34
The majority of people who have acquired shares in private companies
tend to be resident close to the business, although there has been some
small cross-regional (North-South) and inter-State participation by
individuals and g overnments in the North. About N787,150 worth of
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shares and 649,998 unvalued shares were acquired by private citizens
based in the Southern States (majority from Lagos) in Kano based
enterprises. Indigenous businessmen from Borno State acquired only
N141,458 worth of shares and 1,67 0,915 unvalued shares in Kano and
Kaduna based enterprises. Compared to non-Bomb State indigenes,
the businessmen and ex-State officials from Borno acquired N1,002,0004
wotth of shares and 185,225 unvalued shares in Maiduguri (Bomb) based
enterprises, by far the highest of the total figure affected by NEPD
in the State.
The States of course differ in their number of industrial
establishments, in the capabilities of the indigenous businessmen,
in the existing structure of ownership, in the extent of the authorities'
attempts to persuade businessmen to take part in indigenisation, and
above all, in the inclination of the State government to acquire shares
itself, and in the reaction to such moves from private entrepreneurs.
(ii) Sources of Finance 
An issue which was to become of increasing concern to government
and businessmen alike ever since the 1950s was the difficulties
experienced by Nigerian businessmen in obtaining bank credits.
In the past, according to Dr. C. Isong, the former Governor of
GEN, the CEN took the matter up with the commercial banks informally.
However, in 1970, the latter were required by the CBN to make available
to Nigerian businesses a minimum of 35% of their total credit
outstanding by the end of 1970. That target was not achieved, according
to the,CEN Governor35 , although some banks, for example, the Standard
Nigeria Ltd. were fully cooperative. The latter even exceeded the
35% target, and provided up to 40% of its overdrafts on loans in March
1974.36 The executive vice chairman of Barclays Bank of Nigeria Ltd.
(now Union bank) also revealed that in the 1972/74 implementation
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exercise, his bank granted loans totalling H20 million for the purpose
of buying shares in part or wholly owned foreign firms. The importance
of commercial banks as a source of finance finally led the government
in the 1978/79 budget to exempt borrowed funds used for the purpose of
share acquisition from the 40% limit on the growth of bank loans.
The prelude to. the 1972 NEPD witnessed the acquisition of 40% of
all commercial bank interests by the Federal government and the prelude
to the 1977 NEM led to further acquisition of 20% of the commercial
bank interest by the government, bringing to 60% the public sector
participation. Before these acquisitions, indigenous interest in
commercial banks had been about 30%. The 40% holding ( and 60% in
1976) was supposed to enable the Federal government to influence the
loan policies of the banks, and in April 1972 the CBN officially
called on all commercial banks to increase the allocation of their
annual loans and advances to indigenous businessmen for the purpose of
buying alien enterprises. Previously, most of the commercial banks
were known to favour foreign businesses operating in Nigeria, due
to the relatively poor business performance and the lack of sufficient
guarantees on the part of Nigerian businessmen. Their foreign
counterparts had fared much better in business, and they had the
immense advantage of enjoying the patronage of the parent company abroad.
In general, small enterprises could not meet the security requirements
of lending institutions.
The head of State, General Gown, announced in a budget speech in
1972 the establishment of the Nigerian Bank for Commerce and Industry
(NBCI) with an authorised capital of ii50 million to support the
indigenisation exercise. In addition, an increase of CN 2 million
was made to the existing Industrial Development Bank (NIDB) 37 in order
to extend its loan programme. By 1977 the NIDB had sanctioned direct
loans of "469.9 million in facilitating industrial project, 90% of the
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total value being owned by Nigerians.
The 1973/74 budget doubled the NBCI's authorised capital to
N100 million for the immediate task of financing implementation. The
bank was supposed to operate on a strictly commercial basis. It was
designed in such a way as to cater for long and medium term "viable',
industrial and commercial projects involving not less than N20,000 for
each application. The bank was authorised to buy shares in the absence
of private Nigerian buyers. The NBCI approved a loan of N54.9 million
to 60 enterprises and made a total equity subscription of N4.8 million
between May 1973 and December 1975.
The Nigerian government was aware that if a Decree which excludes
foreigners totally from various types of enterprise and compels 40% local
participation in capital for many other enterprises,was to be implemented
effectively by the target date of 31st March 1974, a substantial amount
of money had to be raised by the indigenous private sector. However,
no reliable estimate of the amount that would have to be paid to the
affected enterprises was arrived at in 1972. The calculations of the
government were based on the recorded number of industrial, commercial
and service establishments compiled by the Federal Office of Statistics.
Particularly in the case of manufacturing concerns, information was
exclusively based on the Department of Statistics Compilations. However,
the poor quality of data and the evasive attitude of many firms made
it difficult to judge precisely the total number of enterprises to be
affected and hence the total amount to be spent. Nonetheless, it was
estimated that no less than ZN100 million was expected to be raised
by Nigbrian individuals and organisations.
The NEPB endeavoured to determine as closely as possible the amount
of capital required for the takeover of foreign businesses soon after
the promulgation of the Decree. The approximate figure of over N80
million was arrived at, based on the Board's data forms received from
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the relevant enterprises. The figure of over N80 million is only for
the takeover of enterprises under Schedule I and 40% shares under
Schedule II. However, such a figure cannot be considered definitive.
This is for two reasons. First, it was most probable that there were
enterprises that had yet to register, and submit more forms. Secondly,
the figure is based on the assumption that shares bought or intended
to be sold are at par value. Scepticism about this was expressed by
Mr. V.I. Bello, the Secretary of NEPB in 1974. "A likely figure taking
account of the usual upward movement of the market value of shares
and from the returns so far received from the companies affected by
the Decree which have complied might be in the region of N120 million."38
Somewhat surprisingly Mr. V.I. Bello (the first Secretary of the
Board) indicated the absence of any problems as far as finance was
concerned. "There were more buyers than businesses", he asserted.
Although the total estimate of the amount involved in the implementation
exercise varies from source to source, the differences in estimates
are marginal. The previous estimate made by Mr. V.I. Bello closely
corresponded to M. Ekukinam, the former Federal Commissioner of
Finance's estimate. Mr. V.I. Bello's amounted to N83 million while
the Commissioner's estimate was N80 million. Nevertheless, by March
1974, the amount incurred on the first phase of the indigenisation
exercise rose to N120 million. 39
By 1975 about H122 million had already been invested in equity
participation to take advantage of the indigenisation Decree. The
difference between the original estimate of N88 million and the total
amount of 14122 million spent on actual purchases, has been explained
by Ezeife in terms of the speculation engendered by the transfer process. 40
Even the market value of 14122 million appears to be a very conservative
estimate. A lot of private sales were not reported to the Board.
This large sum of money came from many sources, including private
- 202 -
savings which the government had hoped would be used extnsively in
the purchase of shares. Other major sources were commercial banks, loans
from Federal government-owned financial institutions, State government-
owned banks, insurance companies and cooperative agencies. The
Nigerian Bahk for Commerce and Industry provided N13.8 million for
the purchase of shares in 24 public companies, and made N6.2 million
z
available to the private sector for the same purpose in 1972.41
Another N14 million came from private savings and funds from private
savings institutions.42 Private treaties and special agreements were
made between private foreign owners and Nigerians who could not provide
immediate cash payment.
The Federal government, wishing to cushion the effect of the
Second Decree on the balance of payments, delayed the immediate
repatriation of money acquired from sales of enterprises. In circumstances
where a Schedule I enterprise was sold, no more than N10,000 would be
allowed for remittances abroad even if the vendor was withdrawing from
Nigeria. Where the amount was more than N10,000 but less that N150,000
it would be repatriated on six-monthly, 100,000 instalments. But
where the amount was more than N150,000 the rate and time of repatriation
was subject to negotiation, with a view to encouraging reinvestment
of a proportion of the amount. With respect to Schedule II, the vendor
was required to reinvest a minimum of 50% of the proceeds of sale in
expanding business. The amount allowed for repatriation was again on
an instalmental basis.
The government policy of blocking total sale proceeds of foreign
investors from repatriation began to be reversed by 1980 anyway. In
August 1980, the Minister of Finance Professor S. Essang announced:
"that in order to facilitate the repatriation of the accumulated
proceeds of sales resulting from the 1977 indigenisation Decree, all
outstanding balances would henceforth be repatriated within a period of
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two years with effect from April 1st 1980.1143
The system introduced in 1980 allowed N50,000 six-monthly instalmental
transfer of proceeds resulting from such sales, in cases considered
"appropriate", providing the whole outstanding balances could be
cleared out of the country within two years. However, in cases where
the amount is so much that it could not be cleared within two years of
4
the six-monthly rate of N30,000 this amount was to be increased in
44order to clear any outstanding balances within two years.
(iii) Management: Training and Control
There has been a serious shortage of competent managerial
personnel in Nigeria since long before the NEPDs. In the Second
National Development Plan 1970/74, an annual demand for high level
managerial manpower of 3,500 was expected over the plan period, and
by 1974 it was expected that the total demand for high level manpower
would reach an estimated target of 21,000 managers and directors. The
figure for junior managers and supervisors was expected to reach 66,000.
The need for training of Nigerians in management of enterprises was,
then greatly increased by the indigenisation Decrees.
The Federal government recognised the need to establish training
institutions to help Nigerian businessmen to operate their new enterprises.
A Council for Management Education and Training was set up in 1973 to
devise training programmes. The Centre for Management Development and
its Units set up in 1973 also provided information to Nigerians on how
to acquire and benefit from opportunities created by the Decrees. Units
are si .yilated in Lagos, Zaria, Kaduna, Ibadan, Port Harcourt and Enugu.
In addition, the University of Lagos and many other universities have
provided intensive training courses for businessmen and new investors
and other educational establishments and polytechnics have organised
seminars and symposiums too. The Centre for Management Development
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held a conference in each of the twelve States in 1973 on methods of
buying shares. Such hurriedly arranged conferences could hardly provide
sufficiently detailed answers to the range of questions generated by
the Decree.
Many of the companies in Schedules II and III of the 1972 and 1977
NEPDs were the most likely to maintain their existing management
A
structures and expatriate personnel, whereas small Schedule I companies,
where expatriates were required to relinquish, in most cases, both
ownership and management control, were the most likely to suffer from
management deficiencies under the new Nigerian owners.
A failure to match indigenous equity participation with adequate
local management control was indeed one of the findings of the 1976
Industrial Panel when it concluded its investigation of the implementation
of the 1972 NEPD. Accordingly, the Panel recommended that large firms
under Schedules II and III should be required to provide training
schemes so as to Nigerianise the top management by 31st March 1979, and
this recommendation was incorporated into the 1977 NEPD. In addition,
in order to combat "fronting", Nigerian owners of Schedule I firms
were prohibited from employing the previous owners of the business,
unless they have obtained express permission from the Federal
Commissioner of Internal Affairs, and a penalty of N15,000 fine or
a five year imprisonment was threatened for offenders. Out of 13
companies (mostly naturalised Lebanese) in our sample of companies in
the North which applied for expatriate allocations, only 2 were granted
approval.
The exercise of managerial control is, of course, a vexed issue
which is bound to fire local interest and provide occasion for
nationalistic resentments; but before sides are taken such questions
as control of what, by whom, how and for what end should be clearly
defined and answered first. Control is often assumed to rest with
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the owners of the enterprise, whether alien or Nigerian, but how and
for what end? How can the government's goal of indigenisation of
control of the Nigerian economy be reconciled with the maximisation
of private profit in circumstances where Nigerian management is weak,
and expatriate personnel better qualified and skilled? The original
alien proprietor is likely to be given considerable freedom by his
new Nigerian partners in the running of the company, for the sake of
his own financial gain.
Moreover, some of the indigenous block shareholders have commitments
to several large publicly quoted companies, as directors and shareholders,
There are already about 40 individuals and families who have shares in
more than two companies, of the 145 companies examined by the author
in the North. For example; the Gashash family and Alhaji A. Dantata
held shares in 8 and 5 companies, holding N1,522,788 and N1,782,870,
respectively. In this kind of a situation even a majority indigenous
shareholder is likely to delegate the management responsibility to
some of the original partners. Accordingly the NEPB has recently
recommended in its annual report (1984) restricting any one Nigerian
to 3 directorships and 2 chairmanships. However, if this recommendation
is implemented, then in small companies which combine foreign and
indigenous partners the alien owners could be strengthened in their
control simply by virtue of the restrictions upon Nigerians with
major shares in more than 5 companies.
In public companies where a majority of shareholders hold a
minority of total shares, managerial control tends invariably to rest
with expatriates. This was apparent as early as 1973, in a study of Nigerian
indigenisation and management development, by Rimlinger and Stremlau.45
The table below summarises the extent of expatriate control in some
of the companies studied.
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Table II 
Distribution of Expatriate Personnel by Functions and by Industries 1973
inaustry MD, um
AND, AGM
rinance marketing/
Sales
Froa./
Tech.
ham. TUTAL
Beer and 10% 5% 21% 56% 8% l00%
Soft Drink
Enamelware 8% L. 1 84 3 100
i
Metal
fabricating
18 10 11 53 100
Petroleum
marketing
8 17 32 31 12 100
Petroleum
producing
1 6 o 75 18 100
Pharmaceutical 29 7 50 11 3 loo
Textiles 4 2 1 90 3 100
Trading 3 5 55 " 2 100
kverage 10.1 7.0 21.4 55.0 6.5 100
+
MD - Managing Directors, GM - General Managers, AND - Assistant
Managing Directors, AGH - Assistant General Managers.
++
Non-technical goods.
+++
Motor and technical goods.
Source: Indigenisation and Management Development in Nigeria„by
G.V. Rimlinger and C. Stremlau 1973, p. 28 Table 2.
As can be seen from the table the highest expatriate figures are in
production and technical control, and this is followed by marketing
and sales personnel. However, evidence from our sample of 145 companies
shows that even in the private companies where part-Nigerian owners/
directors are well qualified and have relevant administrative experience,
control of the firms' administrative and technical operations remains
largely with the original alien proprietors. On visits to these
companies by inspectors from the NEPC, information about the company's
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affairs was disclosed by the original alien proprietors in fifty-one
cases. No major indigenous shareholders were present at the time of
the visits by inspectors. Sixty of the inspection reports which
indicate "person interviewed" show that 51 companies still have aliens
as Managing Director, Executive Director or General Manager in charge
of their company's information files. In 9 companies Nigerians occupied
grades of Company Secretary, Public Relations Officer, Legal Adviser,
Deputy Accountant and Branch Manager. In circumstances where the
alien-in-charge was not available at the time of the inspector's visit
to the company, the inspector was asked to return at a more convenient
time, even in cases where the alien owner/managers constituted minority
shareholders.	 •
It might be expected that given their professional and administrative
background, ex-State officials who are now in partnership with
foreigners would be able to fully participate in handling company affairs
and be able to reveal information to inspectors. This does not seem
to be the case, however, even in companies with shareholding by government
institutions and parastatals.
No evidence was found of indigenous shareholders actually attempting
to influence company policy,over such matters as the purchase of raw
material (in the case of manufacturing and processing firms), allocation
of products to distributors, opening new branches, design of products
and labour relations. These matters are essentially determined by
the imperatives of profit maximisation, in which both the alien and
indigenous partners have the same overriding interest. The alien
partners are generally recognised to be the most acute in promoting
this shared interest. Hence their domination of management often goes
unchallenged.
The wisdom of just a few Nigerian individuals or institutions
owning a large block of shares has been advocated by some foreign
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investors such as Mr. C. Leventis of Leventis Group Nigeria: "There
are financial institutions which have large blocks of shares in the
big companies and who can exert a decisive influence. They can take a
long term view of development of the business rather than a short term
one 
,,,16 
"Persons or institutions with controlling block of shares
usually have sufficient at risk in the company to make it desirable
for them to take a long term view and not to take rash decisions,"
Drawing from his business experience, Mr. Leventis concluded that
companies without holders of a significant block of shares would fail
in the end, because of a lack of major shareholders who are able "to
exert the kind of influence" required to guarantee effective decisions.
The conclusions drawn by Mr. Leventis are not disputed here.
But the predisposition of new Nigerian owners of blocks of shares to
insist on decisions that are in the general interest of society as a
whole, or the interests even of all "atomised" shareholders, is surely
open to doubt. Such shareholders cannot even be assumed to subscribe
in full to the government's intentions of "economic independence".
Whether the particular interests even of Nigerian-managed firms can
be wedded to the long term development interest of the nation as a whole,
and in particular to the "egalitarian" objectives which were apparently
envisaged by the authors of the 1977 NEPD, has yet to be properly
discussed by the country's socio-economic and political elites.
The final section of this chapter turns to an examination of how
well the Decrees 'Anticipated and dealt with the situation of those
expatriates who wish to naturalise and accept Nigerian citizenship.
(iv) Citizenship and Naturalisation 
The issue of citizenship under the Decrees is important for many
enterprises because it concerns the rights, benefits and privileges
af the company and its foreign, or ultimately its indigenous, status.
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In the context of indigenisation Decrees, a Nigerian citizen
is defined by the 1977 Decree as (i) "a person who is a citizen of
Nigeria by virtue of the Constitution of the Federation; and
(ii) any person of African descent, not being a citizen of Nigeria,
who is a national of any country in Africa which is a member country
of the Organisatiory of African Unity (0.A.U.), and who continues to
reside and carry on business in Nigeria, if the country of which he
is a national also permits citizens of Nigeria to establish and operate
businesses or enterprises in that country on the basis of reciprocity • • . " 48
The breadth of definition of a "Nigerian citizen" partly stems
from the government's awareness of the number of 0.A.U. citizens who
have resided in Nigeria for generations, in particular citizens of
Tchad, Niger, Ghana, Libya, Cameroon and other neighbouring countries.
Significant numbers of Nigerians live in those countries too, although
the nature and extent of their involvement in the economies of those
countries may be relatively insignificant. For example, of the 175,525
4
(figure based on 1960 Ghana Census) non-Gharpn Africans, Nigerian
citizens were in a majority of 60,977•49 The heightened public awareness
of an increasing responsibility for Nigeria in the 1970s, and the
leadership role that the government was aspiring to play in Africa,
required tolerance, flexibility and care in formulating policies such
as indigenisation which affectscitizens of other African countries,
including some countries which in the past had taken meas7es adverse
to Nigerian residents.
The NEPB's fourth progress report on the implementation of the
1977 NEP]) lamented the exclusion of individuals who were domiciled in
0.A.U. countries but whose parents were not of African descent. The
classification seemed to exclude 0 A U citizens who were not of
negroid features. An Afro-American, Afro-Caribbean or a black French
or British citizen could in principle enjoy the citizenship concessions,
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whereas some natural 0 A. U. members could not. However, the Board
encountered difficulties in determining who were persons of African
descent. By the time of the fifth progress report, the Board decided
that the phrase "of African descent !' should be excised from the Decree.
If naturalised Nigerians are given equal treatment with non-naturalised
(i.e. natural) Nigerians, the same treatment should be accorded to
all citizens of 0 A. U member States. 50
The privilege accorded to the citizens of 0 A U countries under
Section 23 (1) of the 1977 Decree, treats as Nigerians the citizens
of any member country of the 0 A U which provides the same privileges
to Nigerians residing in such countries. This status and privileges
for 0 A U citizens was revised in 1978/79 due to fears of abuse. 51
The Board, in consultation with the Ministry of External Affairs,
agreed that such privileges should extend only to those 0 A U citizens
whose parent or parents were of an African descent. This decision
stemmed from the fact that Lebanese and Indian citizens with business
1. nteressts in Nigeria started to acquire citizenship in neighbouring
countries in order to retain their business rights. Those whose
parents are only naturalised citizens of such countries, and not of
African descent, are excluded from benefiting under the Decree. To
enforce this rule, the Federal Ministry of External Affairs informs
the Board from time to time of the positions of Nigerians living in
other C A U and especially ECOWAS countries.
Given that a majority of the small enterprises falling under
Schedule I and II were owned by Lebanese and Syrians in particular,
and aneicipating the possibility of their applying for Nigerian citizenship
merely so as to retain their enterprises, the Federal government in 1974
issued a comprehensive citizenship Decree. Replacing the Nigerian
Citizenship Act of 1960 and the Nigerian Citizenship Act of 1961, the
new Citizenship Decree - The Constitution (amendment) Decree (1974)—
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attempted to restrict and tighten the original five year duration
of stay in Nigeria as a condition for citizenship. However, an alien
who has stayed in Nigeria for 20 years, but not continuously, is
eligible if he had stayed an aggregate of 15 years out of the 20
years immediately preceding the 12 months continuous stay. The 1974
Decree abolished automatic citizenship privilege for an alien who
marries a Nigerian woman. But foreign women married to Nigerian
men would qualify after 5 years , continuous stay. A certificate of
renunciation of original citizenship52 , and an ability to speak one
Nigerian language were new conditions introduced in 1974, before
Nigerian citizenship could be granted. 53
Despite the new restrictions imposed on naturalisation and
citizenship, the Federal Ministry of Internal Affairs recommended in
1974 260 aliens for citizenship, half of whose businesses were affected
by the 1972 NEPD. Through the submission of applications for naturalisation,
many firms at least gained time to wind down their enterprises or
make alternative arrangements. In 1974 the dateline was extended for
certain firms to enable them to comply with certain aspects of the 1972
Decree, and further time was given to those whose applications were
pending decision for naturalisation. Twice a six-month extension
was given as at April 1st, 1974, which finally expired on March 31st,
1975. Even after this date, some alien enterprises were still in
operation under the pretext of awaiting a decision on naturalisation
applications. The time extensions between April 1974 and March 1975
were mostly granted to those expatriates whose businesses were classified
under Schedule I and were expecting to sell the whole enterprises to
Nigerians. There were also a few planning to transfer 40% of the businesses
to Nigerians. The NEPB became critical of the Ministry of Internal
Affairs which is responsible for granting or refusing citizenship for
alien applicants affected by the Decree. The failure by the Ministry to
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supply information about their own decisions tied the Board's hands,
and enable expatriate proprietors to continue to operate their
businesses, This was simply because of the slow pace of work of the
Ministry of Internal Affairs. In fact, to avert such problems, some
officials argued that the last extension given to alien proprietors
was on the explicit understanding that by or before 31st March 1975,
the Ministry would complete its work. However, there were further
extensions granted to expatriates, even though this was not officially
made public. Even the Board itself was kept in the dark, as the
citizenship applications continued to be delayed at the Internal
Affairs office. Not surprisingly, disquiet among prospective indigenous
buyers increased. The number of enterprises anticipated to be transferred
after the Ministry of Internal Affairs finished its task in 1975 was
around 400.54 Soon after the 1977 NEPD the NEPB listed 52 aliens
who applied and obtained citizenship in July 1977. Twenty of these
are aliens resident in Kano, 18 are from Lagos, 3 from Bomb State
and the rest spread across the country. Another list of 32 unsuccessful
applicants showed 16 from Kano, 9 from Lagos, 1 from Borno and the
rest from other States.
The Ministry of Internal Affairs was the centre of control and
coordination of matters regarding the establishment of foreign business
in Nigeria and was, ever since the Immigration Act of 1963, responsible
for immigration control. Perhaps the administrative burden which owes
to its dual functions has been partly responsible for the delays.
Although the Business Division of the Ministry functions in conjunction
with a Business Advisory Committee (BAC), whose major concern is
purely to determine individual applications for business establishment,
the Ministry has been quite inadequate in dealing with the problems
introduced by the Decrees. In future the contact between the NEPB and
BAC should be strengthened, and if necessary the latter should be
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moved from the Ministry of Internal Affairs to the Board's office,
in order to provide a link between the Ministry and the Board. This
would ensure a more speedy processing of new applications and continuous
determination of the status of existing enterprises, so as to guarantee
effective compliance. It is important that aliens who were naturalised
after the Decree, be restricted from the full benefits of citizenship
pertaining to the Decree, until after five to ten years of naturalisation.
This is in order to prevent possible abuse of the citizenship status
by aliens whose motives might be solely to buy time to run down
enterprises and strip the assets. Perhaps even more important is
for the Ministry of External Affairs to seek greater cooperation
from governments in those neighbouring countries which are noted for
granting citizenship without proper screening. The goodwill and
opportunities granted by the Nigerian government to those OAU
countries must not be allowed to be abused.
•
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CHAPTER 6 
Indigenisation and Labour
Almost all of the accounts of indigenisation in Nigeria and
other African countries such as Kenya, Ghana and Tanzania, overlook
the implications for the workers employed in the commercial and
industrial establishments which are partially or wholly transferred
to indigenous public and private hands. This chapter attempts to
make good the customary oversight by examining the role played by
what can loosely be termed the Nigerian workers, in the course of
indigenisation since the first Decree was launched in 1972.
The purpose here is not to discuss industrial relations for its
own sake, but instead to raise a number of questions relating
specifically to indigenisation. These concern the -type of empldyees.
the 1977 Decree was intended to benefit and the manner in which they
were supposed to benefit, and the extent of the actual involvement of
workers in enterprises since promulgation of the Decree. Other
questions to be touched on include: Which workers have actually
participated in the equity ownership? What is the influence of the
average shareholder in terms of day to day running of the firm? Has
the 1977 Decree achieved industrial peace, through the 10% equity
shares mandated to workers; and was the 10% share allocation a conscious
attempt to popularise indigenous capitalism among the employees?
Much has been said about the inequitable nature of the
indigenisation process in Nigeria. The benefits conferred on the
wealthy, powerful and influential have been pointed out well enough.
But it is not sufficient to merely state, as is so often done, that
indigeilisation failed to take into account the interests of the workers
without referring also to their level of involvement in the exercise
and their reaction to its achievements.
The tentative conclusions that can be drawn from a study of the
1977 Decree in particular, are, first, that on the general level,
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enterprises affected by the Decree have managed to involve only a
very limited number of employees in the equity ownership of those
enterprises. Secondly, the government exhibits an ostrich-like
attitude towards the lack of serious efforts by enterprises to help
their employees gain equity shares. Thirdly, there have been adequate
financial resources at the disposal of the National Provident Fund
(NPF), largely financed by workers over the years, and which could
have been utilised to buy shares on behalf of the workers. Finally,
the expectation that wage increases would help workers to participate
in indigenisation has not been realised partly because of the reluctance
of private domestic sector employers to pay arrears to their workers.
The points that need to be looked at more closely fall under the
following headings: The political involvement of workers and trade unions
in the movement for indigenisation; the size of the Nigerian labour
force; the Udoji salary and wage awards implemented by the Federal
government in 1974-5; the 10% worker provision in the 1977 NEPD;
industrial relations; the National Provident Fund and the view from
the Nigerian Labour congress.
The discussion that follows is mainly based on interviews conducted
in 1982 and 1985. The first responses are from the employees of four
public companies interviewed in 19821 andthe second, responses received
from 145 employees of five companies in Kano and Lagos and the results
of interviews with NEPB, NEFC and NLC officials. Two of the latter companies
are public, one of which is a service industry (construction). The
other three are private Lebanese owned manufacturing firms. In addition
to the 1977 NEP Decree's clause on ten percent equity participation
for workers, evidence is also drawn from official pronouncements on
labour and indigenisation; separate Decrees which deal with industrial
relations; organised trade union leaders' attitudes towards the
NEPD, and general official policy towards labour as embedded in
the Decree and subsequent official progress reports
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of the NEPB; committee reports t and government White Papers.
(i) Early Involvement of Workers in the Movement for Indigenisation
The presence of an organised labour movement has been an integral
part of Nigerian political history dating back at least as far as
the 1940s. At that time Union demands were not only economic but
also political in:character. This adds  piquance to the consistent
failure of the labour movement to gain significant concessions from
the post-colonial State, despite the real contribution it has made to
the shifting of political and economic power and wealth into indigenous
hands, both during the colonial days and after.
The early preoccupation of opposing colonial rule as a political
abhorrence was transformed into a coordinated struggle for wage
demands and a general economism, once Nigeria's political independence
had been won. After having waited patiently for "economic independence"
and the Nigerianisation of almost all departments of foreign enterprise
in one form or another, it became clear that such gains would produce
very little of value for workers in either the private or the public
sector. Labour was bound to turn (sooner or later) in their frustration
on Nigerian enterprises. Strikes have come to be the main weapon left
in the posturing of Unions in their struggle with new indigenous
business owners and their foreign partners. Industrial relations
cannot be said to have become more harmonious in indigenised than in
alien enterprises as a consequence of indigenisation, as will be shown
below.
In the colonial period nationalist loaders and other politicians
encouraged workers to oppose foreign political and economic interests.
By the early 1940s, militant unionism was in full swing. "Equal pay
for equal work." became a popular slogan. Three hundred railway workers
were led by Mr. Imoudu in the "Great trek" of 30/9/41.
1 
Such protests
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were publicly approved and endorsed by nationalists, for example
H. Macaulay and Dr. N. Azikiwe who accorded a heroes' welcome to
the Union's leader after his release from prison in June 1945. In
the early 1960s, it was the Action Group (A.G.), the opposition party
which encouraged workers, among other groups, to adopt a stance
against the pooitfon of foreigners in the economy. It was to be the
naive acceptance of the orthodox assumption that the workers ! lot
could be improved, that resulted in the disappointment of workers
in the 1970s as they came to see their exclusion from the fruits of
indigenisation.
Privileges enjoyed by European officers were demanded for
Nigerians of a similar calibre. Workers t Unions in different
establishments expressed concern for the Nigerianisation of the key
posts, and called for the reduction of ' ,White Staff” in private and
public enterprises in favour of 7igerians. Unions demanded the
Nigerianisation of management personnel of private and government
establishments. They showed far less interest in the subject of
nationalisation.
Minor Xenophobia and working class economism has always characterised
the Nigerian Trade Unions. By and large they have never been
ideologically motivated, apart from the 1950s and 1960s when a few
ideological overtones were noticeable in some circles, most notably
the Nigerian Trade Union Congress (Mile).
The expatriate community of about 57,000 (excluding Lebanese,
Syrianis and Indians) which was resident in Nigeria in the second half
of the 1960s was extremely privileged. An industrial survey carried
out in 1968 showed that of the total labour force of (37,714 in 625
firms, only 2,040 were expatriates, and they accounted for £6.6 million
out of a total of just over f;24 million in wages and salaries.
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Expatriates earned about ten times more than their junior Nigerian
managerial counterparts. The contacts of expatriate with the
indigenous population were based largely on either master-servant or
executive-subordinate relationships. This situation was sufficient
to warrant not only the working class, but also the educated Nigerians
who served in a junior capacity to Europeans, demanding change. Any
general theoretical analysis of the supposed burdens of foreign
capital, or what is commonly referred to as "neo-colonialist
exploitation", quite understandably took second place to sensitivity
towards the particular situation in which individual Nigerians found
themselves on a day-to-day working and social basis. However, national
economic problems were, also, identified in terms of foreign business
operations, as is shown by the Minority Report of the Commission on
Review of Wages, Salary and Conditions of Service of the Junior
Employees of the Government of the Federation and in Private Establishments,
of 1964:
"In the course of taking evidence from workers, the
view was expressed to the Commission that some of the
economic difficulties of Government lay in a failure
to tax the profits of com panies adequately, and that
there is too much freedom in exporting capital and
profits from the country • • • But it appeared to
be clear that Government places no ceiling on the
amount of profits which . . . may be exported.
Moreover, no industry to which a pioneer status has
been granted pays any tax, for a period of up
five years no matter how much profit it makes."
Once indigenisation had been inaugurated in the 1970s, in close
alliance with indigenous businessmen and nationalists, there was for
many labour leaders a feeling of betrayal. When confronting foreign
employers in jointly owned enterprises, the strategy has remained as
before - to Nigerianise personnel and ownership, regardless of who
the indigenous owners turn out to be. A typical example of labour
protest against a partially indigenous firm occurred on 21st November
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1977. The employees of Bhojsons Industries Ltd. at Ikeja demanded
not just a wage increase but the Nigerianisation of top management
positions throughout Nigeria. The workers demonstrated on the streets
and demanded the removal of an individual expatriate engineer who
was accused of obstructing efforts to Nigerianise the technical and
managerial positions. Bhojson employed a labour force of 4,000
Nigerians, yet only four Nigerians were at senior technical level.
Blaming foreign businesses for obstructing the Nigerianisation
of personnel and for aggravating unemployment is not new in labour
circles. There have been instances of industrial vandalism by workers,
and of Unions calling on the government to take over directly some of
the foreign owned companies. An example was the resolution adopted
by the Nigerian postal and telecommunications workers in 1959, calling
on the Federal government to take over the British owned Cable and
Wireless operations. It went on to demand faster Nigerianisation of
the senior posts in the company}
Whatever malaise the economy suffers, the labour unions in
Nigeria always tend to see at least part Of the problem in terms
of the pressure of foreign business, even as recently as 1983,
after all of the indigenisation which had by then occurred. Mr. Akamoh,
a trade Unionist, called for amendments to the NEPD, a further halving
of foreign share ownership in the distributive trade, and reductions
in the employment of foreign personnel, ostensibly so as to conserve
foreign exchange.
(ii) The Labour Force 
In 1980 there were about 3 to 31 million organised waged workers
in Nigeria. The steady increase in the size of the workforce in
the modern sector of the econozly in the rast three decades has actually
made it more difficult for labour to combat domestic capital, due to a
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series of divisions amongst the various unions. Furthermore, the
organised workforce is still only a small minority; a conservative
estimate of the Nigerian labour force in 1981 was 32.74 million; and
of these 75' are illiterate and barely educated to school certificate
standard.
The National Economic Council put the Nigerian male labour force
at a million in 1952/53. However, three quarters of the labour force
were in the subsistence, rural agricultural sector, forestry and
husbandry, while 60% in commerce and 3% in various professions and
government employment. 4 Small scale industries of non-modern type
in the traditional crafts such as brass work, blacksmith, leather
tanning and weaving employed half a million of the male working
population in the same year. 5 An upward trend in wage labour employment
has been maintained since independence in 1960. The private commercial
sector alone employed around 212,000 persons in the second half of
1960, 14,200 higher than a year earlier. In the early sixties between
800,000 and one nillion persons were engaged in wage employment in
Nigeria. 6
The manufacturing sector, an area of crucial importance for the
participation of wor%ers,euployed 62,855 representing 11.0% of the
reported employment, according to a manpower survey of 1963. This
was based on a survey response rate of 82.4% in the manufacturing
industry. ?
In the mid-1960s, about two million, representing 5% of the
population, were in wage employment, with 60 of the total number of
emplolrees in the public sector.
The 1975/^0 plan estivates put the size of Nigerian labour force
at around 29.22 million as at 1975, and anticipated a growth in
absolute terms by about 704,000 per annum between 1975 and 1980.
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Table I	 Size of Labour Force
Year
	
Labour force	 Increase in Labour
Estimates (Millions) force (Millions) 
1975	 29.22	 Oa
1930	 32.74
	 3.52
Source: The structure and nature of Nigerian Manpower Resources -
National Manpower Board.
If educational level is taken as one determining factor in the
likely participation of employees in the indigenisation, the picture
has got to be discouraging, as the Manpower Board Statistics reveal:
Table II	 Education level of the Labour force 
Educational level	 Percentage distribution
Illiterate	 73.27
Literate but without formal schooling
	
13.70
Literate with formal schooling .	 13.03
Below primary or standard VI
	 7.89
Primary but below school certificate or
	 4.26
equivalent
School certificate (or equivalent) but below
	 .83
graduate
Graduate and above
	
.05
TOTAL	 100.00
Source: V. Diejomaoh - "The structure and nature of Nigeria's
manpower resources" - Manaement in 7igeria,June/JulY 1977 p. 25.
The l975/P0 National rlan estimated that onlj 65 of the employed
Labour force (those employed in large and medium-size establishments)
belong to high-level (senior) category of manpower, ln of the manpower
are in intermediate category, 3Z in the sil1ed group while around
of them were in the residual category. - post large and medium
Occupational Group
Estimated	 Additional
employment
	 employment
1;75 1980 1975-80
(i) Senior category
(ii) Intermediate
category
91,500
252,000
126,750
339,300
35 ,250
87,300
(iii) Skilled and
semi-skilled
category
(iv) Unskilled and
others
436,500
720,000
559,650
954,300
123,150
234 , 300
TOTAL 1,500,000 1,980,000 480,000
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industries employ far higher numbers of non-senior category, manual
employees than senior managerial staff and intermediate staff.
Table III 
anrower Structure in large-scale Establishments 
Source: V. Diejomaoh - The structure and nature of Nigeria's manpower
resources" - "lanaf7ement in Nigeria, June/July 1977 ID. 27.
Workers in both public and private sectors are classified as
"senior btaff", the "junior staff" i.e. clerical lower professional
and technical groups, and the manual labourers who operate machines,
gate keepers, cleaners, sweepers, drivers and messengers. Of all the
categories mentioned above, only the senior staff appear to have
played a very limited part in share acquisition. Out of four publicly
quoted Schedule II companies visited by the author in 1982, none
reported indigenous employee participation below the rank of "senior
staff". An interview conducted in 1982 with five intermediate group
employees of the ran' of Accountant, 01er 1-_, Typist and Sales
Representative revealed that they neither bought shares nor attempted
to do so. They were of course aware of the indigenisation exorcise
affecting their enpatriate emDloyers. When asked why they did not
take advantage of -no provision of the 1977 Decree, which was
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specifically designed to assist employees, the most common answer
referred to finance. Furthermore, the result of the interviews in
1935 among 145 employees in five companies (tro public and three
private) in Kano and Lagos which are discussed below, show very
similar results. Many had hoped that the Commission set up by the
g overnment to review and recommend salary and wage increases (the
Udoji Commission, set up in 1974) would facilitate worker participation
in the indigenisation exercise.
(iii)The Udoli Awards
In 1971, a public service review Commission, headed by Chief
Adebo, was established by Government Decree. A year later, the 1972
Indigenisation Decree was launched and, two years after the Decree was
passed, another public review Commission Decree was passed, this time
headed by Chief J.O. Udoji,in fulfilment of the Adebo Commission
recommendation of 1971. The Udoji Commission was given the task of
harmonising salaries and wages in the various parts of the government
sector. Although initially it intended to address itself only to the
public service salary structure, active trade u nion demands forced
the inclusion of a silAlar review of the private sector. This heightened
the workers' expectations in the private sector and raised issues
about the relations between the employers in the private sector and
their employees.
The increases awarded by the Udoji Commission in the public
sector in 1974 led employees in the private sector to demand corresponding
increqses, and labour pressure including strikes was eventually
effective in forcing the authorities to extend the principle of the
Udoji awards to the Private sector. The reluctance, and then in
certain instances a refusal to honour the Udoji recommendations in
the private sector led to further strikes. These forced the Employers
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Consultative Association to declare a statement of intent on negotiating
with employees. In the end, like the indigenisation scheme, the Udoji
recommendation effectively left out over 94% of the working population
from the benefits. In effect a total of 5.5% of the workers in the
public and private sectors were provided with a small portion of the
growing oil revenues of the country while the rest of the active
working population remained on less than a third of the minimum wage
of N720 paid to workers in government. 9
The payment of arrears and wage increases failed to establish
any positive connection with indigenisation. There is no evidence to
suggest that the government intended to link the Udoji award to the
indigenisation programme with the workers in mind. Needless to say,
rather than utilising the financial benefits of Udoji to buy shares,
the wage increases which were awarded induced a spending pattern
based on imported consumer goods. Even if the government had
appreciated that it would have gained in popularity by linking the
UdoJi awards with the indigenisation exercise, the government
nevertheless put no effort into advising workers on how best to
employ their financial gains for the purpose of share acquisition.
Had the awards been utilised in share acquisitions, the inflation
of consumer good prices which followed Udoji would have been
considerably less, as the government later came to publicly admit.
The Udoji award was not much help to intermediate and lower
category employees in acquiring shares in their own firms, let alone
in other enterprises. Most of the larger foreign firms who made
huge profits during the oil boom of 1973/74 did make substantial
increases in the pay of their employees of all categories. However,
indigenous employers refused to pay arrears because it was felt that
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paying arrears to employees would wipe out the accumulated profits.
As two leading businessmen, Chief Henry Fajemirokun (President of
Nigerian Association of Chambers of Commerce) and Chief T. Odutola
(President of Manufacturing Association of Nigeria) stated, indigenous
companies were still servicing the loans they had taken out in order
to purchase foreign businesses, and so could not pay the Udoji
arrears. As a consequence of this, employees were to become more
resolute in their negotiations with indigenous firms. But more than
the fact of having to pay foreign creditors, the major fear expressed
by the Nigerian owners of newly—indigenised businesses was that since
such businesses were only marginally profitable anyway, the
implementation of the Udoji recommendation would lead to a permanently
higher cost labour force which could ruin those enterprises. Accordingly,
low wages were argued by the indigenous private sector to be vital to
the success of newly acquired enterprises, although the Udoji award
had seemed to contradict any need to ensure low wages for the success
of indigenisation.
There was barely any intention by the government in 1974 to link
its wages policy with a wish, subsequently declared in the 1977 Decree,
to involve the majority of employees in the indigenisation programme.
However, since the Indigenisation Decree (1977) and the final Udoji
awards were in fact launched within twelve months of each other, the
effect of the one on the other cannot be ignored. The failure of the
government's attempt to harmonise its salaries and wages policy with
indigenisation can partly be explained in terms of the administrative
difficulties posed by indigenisation, against the background of
confidence generated by huge government oil revenues. Many workers
left their jobs in the search for higher benefits where Udoji awards
had been implemented. This damaging migration of labour could have
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been prevented at the time by an increased participation by workers
in all categories, in the indigenisation scheme. Moreover, dividends
could have been sanctioned as a deliberate supplement to wages, thus
avoiding the necessity to grant large wage increases; and a greater
involvement of private sector workers in the indigenisation could
also have matched the attractive pensions and other benefits which
were enjoyed by government employees. Hence worker participation
in indigenisation and dividend reinvestment might in theory have
provided a solution to the government's need of a wages policy, even
though in practice the sort of commitment which it would have required
from government is probably not one that could realistically be
expected from the sort of elite-dominated governments which Nigeria
has experienced in the past.
The Udoji awards were not, then, a vehicle for the workers to
participate in share ownership, and nor were there any government
plans at the time to link its wages policy to workers' participation
in its Enterprises Promotion Decree. However, by 1977, a new
military leadership had come to power, with something of a reforming
zeal. The 1977 Decree in its mandatory ten percent participation for
employees marked the first formal attempt by the government to
involve the workforce in the process of share acquisition.
(iv) Mandatory Ten Percent Participation for Employees
The 1977 NEPD, as already stated, made some attempt to "contend
with the requirements of egalitarianism." 10 Although the Decree was
careful to avoid making an express commitment to absolute equality,
its ten percent provision was widely presented among government
officials as egalitarian. The provision in Section II (1)(d) of
the 1977 Decree addressed itself to the issue of 10% workers
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participation. This section made it mandatory for all affected
enterprises to allocate 10% of part or all of the businesses that
were designated for sale, at least half of which should go to
non-managerial staff. This was seen at the time in some quarters
to constitute a significant improvement on the 1972 NEPD.
The provision originated in the industrial panel, which under
the Chairmanship of Chief Adeosun investigated the implementation
of the 1972 NEPD. The panel recommended in 1976 that: "All
enterprises affected by the NEPD should provide for sale part
of their shares to their employees, a suggested minimum being
10% (of the saleable shares). Only in cases of sole purchasers
should this requirement be waived." 11 By accepting this
recommendation the government showed its commitment to the
principle of shareholding by employees, but as can readily be
appreciated, by no stretch of the imagination could a very sig-
nificant commitment to radical egalitarianism be said to have been
on the cards.
The Adeosun report suggested the following six alternative
methods of enabling workers to purchase shares in the enterprises
in which they worked. (a) The alien proprietors could transfer
12the shares as "gifts" through a legal deed to the Nigerian employees
(b) the alien proprietors could lend money to the employees to
enable them to pay for the shares (c) the company could lend money
to the employees to enable them to pay for the shares (d) the
acquisition could be financed from past savings of the employees
(e) the purchase of the shares could be financed through the
Nigerian Bank for Commerce and Industry, the Nigerian Industrial
Development Bank, or other similar institution, either directly by
lending to the workers or indirectly through the enterprises which
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will be responsible for administering and supervising the loan.13
All these recommendations of the Board were accepted by the
government, according to the NEPB's second progress report. 14
However, none of the six alternatives listed above was wholly
realistic with regard to the Schedule II and III enterprises
affected by the NEPD. If workers had been able to save out of
their wages, and were blessed with a sound knowledge of how to
apply for shares, then there is no reason why they could not have
participated in acquiring shares in the first place. The possibility
of workers acquiring loans from the commercial banks was remote.
However, many of the larger firms were reported by the NEPB
in its progress report (1979/80) to have set up workers' trust funds
and pensions to enable them to buy shares and hold in trust for
the employees. Again, in 1983, the NEPB's 8th progress report
expressed satisfaction with the implementation of the 10% equity
participation for workers: "All the affected enterprises are made
to comply with the provisions of Section ii(d) of the Decree by
allotting 10% of the saleable shares to the staff
	 . Most of
the publicly quoted companies complied by selling the shares
directly to the individual staff, while unquoted public and private
companies established Trust funds for that purpose." 15
However, there are good reasons for viewing these impressions
of the Board with scepticism. All the evidence gathered in the
course of this study indicates that a majority of those firms
recommended for compliance certificates in the sample selected
are in fact not complying with the ten percent provision. The
discrepancy need not reflect badly on the inspectors. It owes
instead to unreliable information from company managers and owners
anxious to protect their private interests. The 8th progress report
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of the Board has already drawn attention to the non-cooperative
attitude of many companies. Although it is mandatory for the
companies to avail their records, account books, financial files
and other related documents to the inspectors for examination,
inspectors do not have the authority to interview employees directly.
Officials of the Borno State NEPC and zonal officers at Kano
revealed that on many occasions the zonal office at Kano had tried
to persuade the Board to seek from the executive council increased
powers for the inspectors, in particular the authority to interview
employees. On past and present experience, the officers explain,
employers object to NEPC officials talking to employees because
they (employers) fear that employees.may.be ,"incited" to strike.
The reluctance of employers to allow outsiders to speak to employees
on such matters as workers equity ownership was encountered by the
author on at least four occasions. Moreover, in cases where the
NEPB confirms the non-fulfilment of the 10% equity provision,
company proprietors are not strictly liable to any official sanctions.
The government's attitude to this problem has remained one of
indifference up till now.
The other part of the problem that encourages non-compliance
with the 10% requirement is the official concern to avoid the
redundancies which would be created by shutting down firms. This
is one of the dilemmas in which the Board quite often finds itself
when attempting to enforce compliance with one or other of the
requirements of the indigenisation Decrees (see chapter 4 above).
The Board's concern is sometimes exploited by companies. For example
in persuading the NEPB to unseal Sokoto Furniture Factory, the
Lebanese proprietor of the company who held 76% of the ownership at
the time, skilfully manipulated official fears in his letter (25/7/81)
to the Secretary of Sokoto State Governor:
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"that the government of Sokoto State does
everything	 to alleviate this current
situation thereby allowing the management of
the company to maintain production, keep up
present level of employment and so avoid the .
distasteful resort to redundancy which will
cause innocent workers to lose their jobs.
It may also cause untold hardship and suffering
to their families . ."
Other official records also highlight the same problem. A
letter written by the NEPC, Kano to NEPB, Lagos over the Sokoto
furniture affair expressed concern and urged the Board to allow the
firm to reopen to "alleviate the suffering of the workers". Again
in another letter (20/9/81) the Kano zonal office expressed the fear
that "workers of the Factory wanted to make trouble before they were
paid their last month's wages	 it is advisable to reopen the
factory under co-management". The Board subsequently gave a directive
to unseal the factory on 29/9/81, and placed it under co-management.
The official confirmations of satisfactory results in respect
of the fulfilment of 10% equity share allocation for workers are,
then, not always to be believed. The author was successful in
interviewing 145 employees of five companies (3 in Kano and 2 in Lagos)
on the basis of questionnaire II (Appendix D) to seek verification of
the company reports which state that those companies (inspected in
Kano) have complied, and also to determine the real extent of the 10%
implementation. Initially eight private intermediate Schedule II
manufacturing firms had been selected from Kano out of 48 firms with
16
1,034 managerial staff and 18,470 permanent manual employees.	 Since
these companies had already undergone post-compliance inspections,
they were in a position to give a clear picture of the extent of
implementation of the 10% equity provision. The general reports of
the NEPC give an overall impression that the companies have allotted
the 10% equity shares to employees. However, the individual reports
on the 145 companies show that 67 companies have in fact failed to
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comply; and the results of the interviews conducted by the author
in the case of five companies provide a detailed elaboration of this
situation.
In the inspection reports examined in 1985 only eight companies
are said to have complied with the 10% equity requirement. In one
instance here, a representative of one company's employees wrote a
letter to the management indicating the unwillingness of some workers
to take shares. Another company is shown to have partially fulfilled
the 10% equity requirement by allocating shares only to the managerial
staff, and excluded the non-managerial employees. Yet the employees
of a third company 'turned down' the offer of shares. The remaining
five companies have fully complied. One company allocated N2,160
worth of shares to three senior employees and another N2,160 to six
manual employees, with one holding N160 shares and the rest divided
equally. Another company allocated 3,000 shares to both manual and
non-manual workers. The other three are merely confirmed to have
complied by allotting 10% of their shares. Five other companies have
also claimed to have complied with 10% by setting up trust deeds for
their workers, but this has not been confirmed in the inspection reports.
The management of two Kano enterprises declined to allow workers
to be interviewed, on the grounds that the questions are "too
political". One insisted that it had complied but only managerial
staff would be allowed to answer questions, on behalf of the manual
employees. The employees of one enterprise simply declined to answer
questions. Similarly, in Lagos, out of the three public companies,
the employees of one company declined and the managerial staff of
another company refused to answer the questions. But some manual
employees were contacted: out of the total of 11 companies selected
initially, six are eliminated and a total of 143 employees were
interviewed in the five remaining companies in 1985.
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A total of 70 employees in three companies in Kano answered
Questionnaire II (Appendix D). Twelve of the employees are in junior
managerial ranks, while 58 are non-managerial, manual workers, for
example security guards, drivers, porters, shopfloor machine operators
and mechanics. In the latter case, questions were read and explained
and answers recorded by the author because the majority of respondents
were not literate in English.
All the managerial ataff admitted to knowledge of the indigenisation
Decree (see question 1 of questionnaire II, Appendix D) but 54 in
the non-managerial category were ignorant. With regard to whether
they had taken advantage of the opportunity under indigenisation
(see question 2, Appendix D) 68 of the employees (both managerial
and non-managerial) had not acquired shares.
The answers to question 4 about who were the chief beneficiaries
of indigenisation, were uniform - 67 agreed that indigenisation is
biased against workers, but the responsibility for this was not
uniformly placed. Two managerial employees blamed the government for
the bias, three blamed both the government and the employers, and
seven blamed the employers. However, 66 manual employees blamed the
employers and only two blamed the government, in particular for not
checking and verifying the participation of workers, and for passing
anti-strike legislation which impedes their ability to defend their
interests. The majority of manual employees showed ignorance and
apathy about indigenisation and the 10% equity provision, whereas all
the managerial staff questioned expressed views about the objectives
of indigenisation and related issues.
The results of the interviews among the employees of a further two
companies in Kano were similar. In the first of these, a].1 the manual
employees interviewed, with the exception of two who were aware of
the NEPD, had no knowledge as to who benefited from the indigenisation
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exercise. The failure to benefit from the indigenisation was
largely blamed on the companies, and seven blamed the government.
Even though none of the workers had any idea of how to improve the
policy, all agreed that the purpose of the policy should have been
to cater for the interests of the workers. A majority of the employees
wished to acquire shares on an individual basis, and they rejected
government participation as an alternative to individual acquisition.
17
The majority of the workers are unionised,- and the company's
employees have gone on strike more than once, in 1981 and 1984.
As all the interviewees had joined the company between 1979 and 1984,
they have taken part in these strikes. However, the reported causes
of these strikes were, again, simply poor conditions of work and low
wages rather than dissatisfaction with the failure to implement the
10% equity scheme.
In the second company, where 42 manual and eight non-manual
employees were interviewed, the response to the questions were very
similar. The managerial staff included personnel officers, clerks,
secretaries, receptionists, telephone operators and typists. In the
manual category are motor mechanics, machine operators, security
guards, drivers and messengers were similarly interviewed.
All the senior staff were aware of the NEPD, but none has reported
buying shares in the company nor in any other company. The benefits
of the indigenisation are widely believed by the staff to have gone
to businessmen. According to a majority of the senior staff the source
of the bias in the indigenisation lay in the government's handling
of the implementation of the 1977 Decree. They felt that the NEPDs
were intended "to give room (ownership) to Nigerian entrepreneurs in
foreign companies", and wished to see more indigenisation instituted.
A majority of the managerial staff belong to the Nigerian Union
of Construction and Civil Engineering Workers (NUCCEW)18 . As in the
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other cases, both managerial and non-managerial employees prefer the
acquisition of shares to be on an individual basis, although two
managerial staff did wish to see nationalisation tried.
All managerial staff had joined the company since 1978 and so
were unable to state whether majority indigenous ownership introduced
better terms of employment than foreign ownership. Furthermore, they
had undertaken no strike action since joining the company. By
contrast, manual employees of the company reported going on strike
over "poor condition of service". Along the 42 manual employees
of the company, only seven were aware of the NEPD. None of the
manual employees reported acquiring shares. Most employees blamed
the company for not allocating shares to workers. The answer to
question 7 ("What do you think should have been the main objectives
of indigenisation?") is mainly "don't know". With the exception of
two workers, all the rest are union members. With the exception of
one, all expressed a desire to acquire shares on an individual basis.
As to union assistance, twelve workers agreed that the union occasionally
helps in taking up matters on their behalf, but the rest were not
happy with the performance of the union.
Seven workers joined the company before the 1977 Decree, and
the rest joined after the implementation of the 1977 Decree. Neither
those who joined the company before the 1977 Decree nor those who
joined after, noticed any marked change in industrial relations.
Finally, as in the case of all other employees, a majority of the
employees in the company (except two who wish more foreign ownership)
preferred to acquire shares individually rather than collectively
through the unions or the NPF.
In summary of the general impressions gained so far from the
interviews of employees it could be said that the benefit to employees
in terms of equity ownership, in particular among manual workers,
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has been at best patchy and, more usually, either slight or non-existent.
However, because most workers have not been made aware of, or been
involved in, the exercise of indigenisation to any degree, insufficient
resentment has been provoked to cause a mobilisation of labour into
political action over indigenisation. As will be argued in the next
section, although indigenisation could have been used to help improve
industrial relations, by taking advantage of the individual acquisitive-
ness which runs throughout all levels of Nigerian society, instances
of poor industrial relations instead .reoccur and continue to owe to
traditional concerns about wages and related conditions of work.
(v) Industrial Relations
Much of what was said in section 3 above relates to the ways
in which Nigerian employees could have been (but were not) assisted,
directly or indirectly, intentionally or unintentionally, by the
Udoji recommendation. A further detailed consideration raised in
the course of the interviews is whether indigenisation has done anything
to improve industrial relations in Nigeria, an issue that has to be
examined specifically in the light of industrial disputes since the
launching of the Decrees. The failure of indigenisation to promote
worker shares in ownership has hardly helped to head off problems of
industrial unrest. The contention advanced here is that if the 10%
equity for workers had been properly implemented, workers would perhaps
not have resorted to strikes as often as they have done after the
1977 Decree. This judgment can be illustrated by relating the 10%
Mandatory Clause of the 1977 Decree to the government's attitudes towards
organised labour and to the levels of industrial strikes since the
launching of the Decree.
With the increase in State participation in the economy due to
indigenisation, the government started to turn its attention to problems
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of industrial relations and labour unrest. In order to contain
union militancy and to ensure the success of its wages policy,
between 1973 and 1979, the government legislated a series of measures
against employees in all sectors of the economy. Such measures have
often taken the form of carrot and stick. The carrot is largely
reflected in the financial assistance provided to the unions by the
State, and the nominal provision which entitles workers to participate
in indigenised firms. The Trade Union (Amendment) Decrees 21 and 22
were promulgated by the government in 1978, with provisions for
automatic recognition of industrial unions and the Nigerian Labour
Congress (established in 1978) by employers. Past experience had
shown that many employers refused to grant recognition to the unions
and refused to facilitate the process of collecting union dues.
The stick took the form of a series of Decrees and other measures
which curtailed the freedom of activity of radical labour leaders.
Left-wing labour leaders have even been jailed, noticeably after 1972.
For example, in 1978 three union leaders of the Kaduna Peugeot Assembly
Plant (which 'enjoys substantial government financial participation)
were sent to jail on grounds of inciting workers to strike.19
This intimidation of union activities was not a new phenomenon -
it has a history that predates indigenisation. In October 1971, 5,000.
workers at the Kaduna textile mills went on strike and as a result
riot police were deployed in a show of strength. Such heavy-handed
treatment was sometimes opposed by certain sections within the government.
For example, the Commissioner for Labour, Chief A. Enahoro is on
record as having argued in 1971 that such measures adopted to control
industrial relations allowed companies to "ignore workers' demands,
whether unjustified or justified." 20
Measures were designed through the reorganisation of labour unions
in the mid-1970s to prevent union leaders from diversifying their
financial interests in such a way as to become involved in corrupt
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practices. But the code of conduct also seemed to contradict the
spirit of employee participation at a wider level. Another tool of
control was the Trade Dispute Decree no. 23 of 1976, designed for
essential services, which is to say public service, and forbidding
the workers to embark on industrial strikes.. This Decree also affected
joint ventures between government, foreign capital and indigenous
private interests; and it provides a clear example of foreign companies
benefiting by participating in joint ownership with government.
To understand the reasons behind the promulgation of such Decrees
as the aforementioned it is important to examine the series of industrial
strikes which began in the mid-1970s.
A report carried by the Guardian (Nigeria) of 16th December 1983
noted that the country lost around 23- million man-hours through trade
disputes in 1983. In the two previous years, 1981 and 1982, the
recorded number of disputes was 163,214 resulting in the loss of
2,434,841 man-hours. It went on to report that lithe proportion of
disputes settled yearly • has shown a steady rise from 2% in
21
1980 to 17.1% in 1983.0 These figures were given by the Chairman
of the House of Representatives Committee on Labour, Mr. Ejike Nwankwo.
Compare this to the International Labour Organisation (ILO) report
(1977) which showed 400,000 working days lost in 1975 through strikes,
stoppages, lock-outs and other industrial actions. Compare also with
Table IV below, which was compiled by the Federal Ministry of Labour
at the time of the 1972 NEPD implementation.
Table IV
Industrial Relations Statistics
January - April
Item 2212 1-22,4 ,1975
Trade disputes 53 81 601
Work stoppages 18 35 NA
Workers involved 5,901 16,103 NA
Man-days lost 25,982 47,248 NA
NA - Not available
Sources: Federal Ministry of Labour, Lagos
Strikes were more intensive between January and June 1975.
If absenteeism, casual leave, and sick leave are taken into account,
the figure would be even higher. Hence if the first indigenisation
Decree was supposed to prevent labour unrest, then the results were
far from encouraging.
The Federal Ministry of Labour recorded about 883 trade disputes
between August 1975 and July 1977. About 87 were resolved by the
Ministry while 642 were solved by informal compromise. In the same
period, 51 trade disputes were referred to the Industrial Arbitration
Panel which made 65 awards. 453 of the reported disputes (883)
resulted in strikes and a loss of 569,918 man-days. "There were also
25 inter-union and intra-union disputes within the period. Thirty
of such disputes were settled by officials of the Ministry - some
22
of them through plebiscites."
	
Irrespective of which sets of figures
are thought to be the most accurate, there clearly has been much
unrest, and this unrest has often been sparked by union leaders
expressing their dissatisfaction over wages and closely related issues.
Many private-owned firms are, then, still faced with the problem
of how to foster in the junior employees a strong sense of belonging
and a willingness to be a cooperative and compliant workforce,
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inspite of — indeed o in part because of — their inability to acquire
shares. The problem is not shared to an equal extent across all sectors.
Unlike the manual workforce of the manufacturing establishments, the
employees of banks, insurance companies and other non—labour intensive
service sectors who have some education and training do admit the
benefits they have obtained. For example it was reported in Punch
newspaper (2/8/83) by the Chairman of United Bank for Africa (UBA)
that, "in accordance with the wishes of many shareholders, a special
shares offer was made to employees of the Bank • •" The manager
went on to reveal that "2,869 employees • • took advantage of the
special shares issues. As a result, the total number of shareholders
increased to 5,687. This equity participation of staff has
• • • improved the generally harmonious industrial relations in the
Bank." 23
In contrast, in 1982, a Special Report (Spotlight on Leyland
Nigeria) carried by New Africa showed "that 2% of the equity shares
reserved for Leyland personnel is distributed among the junior staff
of 20K per share:" Leyland, a British public company " has its subsidiary
in Ibadan, employing 1,200 personnel with 34 expatriate positions
which had yet to be Nigerianised at the time. Clearly, long after
the deadline had expired the company had only been able to sell one
fifth of the 10% allocation to its employees. Despite the claim by
the Leyland company that it had achieved success in its relations
with its personnel , it is unlikely that an assembly line man who
earns 14130.00 per month will ever be able to buy shares in Leyland.
The subsidies that the workers enjoys by way of cheap food and housing
allowance would not make much difference to this.
Both expatriate and indigenous employers often fear that the
unions may "erode" their ability to reinvest, through ever—increasing
wages demands, and so they seek government protection from trade union
- 246 -
pressures. The union leaders see the situation differently. In
the words of 0. Eshiett for example "The trade unions on their part
invite government intervention only in so far as it will enable them
to 'gain the lost fruits of their labour s during the colonial era
25
and what they imagine is the era of huge profits and oil boom."
The government itself however must be concerned about wage-cost
inflation and hope that wages bills will not rise so rapidly that
the fruits of improved productivity cannot be utilised to produce an
increase in capital investment.
Some Nigerian managers and proprietors believe that employees
cooperate more with alien-owned and -run enterprises than with Nigerian
employers. It is true that managerial and highly paid indigenous
staff have tended to be more tolerant of foreign management due largely
to the higher wages which they pay. However, at the same time, the
emerging indigenous aspiring capitalists are perhaps more arrogant
and inflexible in their attitudes towards workers than are foreign
investors. The latter are conscious of their foreign status and in
consequence often try to handle industrial relations with considerable
care. Industrial relations in many indigenous enterprises do become
more strained. Indigenisation has not brought about industrial peace
there: with indigenisation, the opportunity was missed not only to
share the benefits beyond a relatively tiny socio-economic and political
elite, but also to foster an improved climate of industrial relations.
(vi) The National Provident Fund
When consideration was given to the idea of worker participation
in 1976, very little thought was given to alternative methods of
participation by workers. The industrial panel under Chief Adeosun
failed to give sufficient attention to the ways in which such accumulated
labour funds as the National Provident Fund could be made use of
in indigenisation. An imaginative use of the fund might have helped
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to avett at least some of the country's industrial strife.
The National Provident Fund (NPF) was established by the Provident
Fund Act of 1961. This was a compulsory saving scheme, and it was
introduced by the first civilian government of independent Nigeria.
By 1962, cumulative NW investment was N3,449,940. After investment
in industrial properties the amount rose to N481,529,516 in July 1981.26
It was a scheme for junior workers in the private sector of the
economy. Initially the scheme affected large enterprises and excluded
small firms. The idea of the NW was to provide a measure of social
security to employees at retirement. To this end, the law required
that employers who had more than fifty workers on their pay roll,
register them with the NPF Scheme, and deduct 6% of the worker's pay
before wages were paid. The employer then doubled the amount and
remitted it directly to the NPF reserve. The scheme was later extended
to cover companies employing ten or more workers; and currently
there is a demand for the inclusion of companies with up to five
employees, and for the contribution of workers to be increased from
6% to 8% i.e. from a minimum of N4 to N8.
Since past practices have revealed that many workers were effectively
excluded from the NW Scheme, it can be argued that to subject both
partial and fully indigenised firms to a new NW programme now could
compensate for the deficiencies of the present six options which were
suggested by the Board (see page233 above). The part of the worker's
wage which was supposed to be remitted could be retained by the
companies, who in turn could regularly issue shares. Such a scheme
would rbe akin to an insurance bonus. Alternatively, the cumulated
Fund of the NW could be used to buy shares in most of the profitable
companies still unable to sell their shares. For example, the 145
company reports already referred to show that 58 enterprises have not
yet sold 559, 971 shares (not valued) held by 12 companies and N10,083,264
worth of shares held by 46 companies. These methods are far more
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desirable than any of the company charity methods so far considered
by the authorities. Such a scheme would also be likely to avoid
antagonism and resistance from indigenous owners. However, to prevent
this system being abused by Nigerian or foreign proprietors or managers,
the employees should be given full information, and the decision-making
process of the company would have to include representatives of the
employees of the firm.
It is not being suggested here that by involving workers through
the NPF, benefits from indigenisation would percolate through to
anything like a majority of working citizens, let alone all Nigerians,
but merely that such a measure would be a step in the right direction
from the point of view of the rather modest gesture towards egalitarianism
which the government seemed to want to commit itself in the 1977 Decree.
The Fund has had a substantial amount of money at its disposal
(see the figures for 1973-5 in Appendix F). Nevertheless, a brief
27
survey of NPF conducted by S. Odebe in 1983 showed that although
employers deducted workers' wages, they failed to make payments to
the NPF office. Since its inception, the NPF has experienced various
problems such as the ubiquitous postal delays in remitting dividends 28
to workers, illiteracy among the investors, and statutory difficulties
arising from government restrictions (regulation). In addition,
Mr. Obua, a representative of the Nigerian Labour Congress (NLC)
on the NPF Board has revealed that the NPF is reluctant to give
information about the number of companies which default on the
obligation to send workers' subscriptions to the Fund, the number of
people who succeeded in claiming, and the types of action taken
against defaulting companies. A greater amount of workers participation
in their enterprises would help to guarantee against such company
defaults, postal delays, and some of the other problems which have
been experienced since the introduction of the scheme.
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Since 1966, all monthly issues of NPF information and statements
have been discontinued, and no official mention of the fund is now
made. It is up to the government, given the purported intention of
the 1977 Decree to involve workers in indigenisation, to explore
the possibility of finding and reviving the resources of the NPF.
If part or all of the NW money were reinvested by buying shares,
then dividends on a regular basis could be provided to supplement
wages and other incomes. The NW could still provide the institutional
means through which all grades of workers could be involved in
indigenisation as direct beneficiaries, although the administrative
burdens involved would probably be considerable and quite costly.
In comparison the appeal to private firms to voluntarily
provide their employees with financial provisions and other forms of
loans to purchase shares, as was suggested in an NEPB report, is futile.
Government should require the firms to provide shares to employees
in the future, instead of the six percent deductions from the workers'
wages, which usually fail to reach NPF. One body which could press
for such a reform is the Nigerian Labour Congress.
(vii) The View from The Nigerian Labour Congress
The Nigerian Labour Congress was created in 1978. By 1983 it
had 143 affiliated trade union bodies with a membership of 2,464,000
registered workers. It is the officially recognised representative
of the industrial, commercial and service sector workers of Nigeria.
Its views and information about the 1977 NEPD can only be collated
by reference to NLC publications after 1978 and discussion with
present officials of the NLC. When the implementation of the 1977
NEPD began, there were reports of meetings between the NEPB, the
Ministry of Labour and representatives of trade unions on the implementation
of the 10% equity proposed,29
 It is not clear what purpose such meetings
served. Most Of the representatives of trade unions who took part
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in discussions with the government, MAN and NECA prior to the promulgation
of the 1977 NEPD are no longer with the NLC. Moreover, inspite of
the potential importance of the 1977 NEPD to employees, the NLC has
published very little literature on it since 1978. There is no
expressed NLC position on those companies that refuse to allocate
shares to their workers, except general references to the need for
a
better treatment of employees. The apparent lack of interest by the
NLC is due largely to the failure of individual workers or their
affiliated unions to report matters concerning the implementation
of indigenisation in their companies. For, according to the NLCIs
General Secretary, feedback to the NLC from members is the basis upon
which the NLC formulates policies and acts accordingly. The inability
to obtain information from members leaves it unable to make specific
demands on employers and the government.
In conversation with the author NLC officials were quite prepared
to be critical of the implementation of the indigenisation Decrees,
and in particular mismanagement by "unqualified, inexperienced
indigenes who took over through extraneous influences." The changes
in ownership structure have given rise to new indigenous employers
who are reluctant to recognise trade unions, believing that collective
bargaining is unsuitable to pioneer enterprises with limited resources
of capital and personnel.
Some officials advocated an increase in the 10% equity shares
to 30% in respect of new companies, and complained about the continuous
occupation by foreigners of sensitive positions in private and public
companies, describing indigenes in those enterprises as "fronting"
and "figure heads".
It is interesting to note that although a majority of the
employees who were interviewed expressed a wish to acquire shares on
an individual basis, some NLC officials, in contrast, believe quite
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strongly that collective participation should have been the central
theme in the involvement of labour in the indigenisation exercise.
This runs against the NLC's general policy statement (1983/4), called
a Charter of Demands, which calls for 10% equity shares to be distributed
to rank and file of workers, so accurately reflecting the majority
opinion of the 145 workers who were interviewed.
The Nigerian Labour Congress has remained opposed to the
privatisation of State owned companies and parastatals. Like the
government bureaucracy, the Nigerian Labour Congress has tended to
develop a vested interest on behalf of employees in State owned
companies, such as the Nigerian Ports Authority, Nigerian National
Shipping Line and Nigerian Railway Corporation. In its press release
_30
in 1983 the NLC strongly objected to the Shagari government's announced
nI•
policy on privatising State parastatals. The NLC's objections were
couched in terms of the need to preserve national security, but
underlying them was a more fundamental concern about security of
the jobs which could be put in jeopardy by privatisation. In any
case, the anti-foreign business feeling of NLC dictated that privatisation
be opposed, out of a fear that foreign capital be brought back into
partnership with private indigenous capital.
The Labour Congress believed that unwarranted political interference
was largely to blame for the poor performance of parastatals.
Inefficiency, cited by the government as a reason for privatisation,
was not sufficient to warrant de-nationalisation. "Members of the
boards of these companies and corporations, are political appointees.
Most Of these political appointees are compensations for the loss of
31
elective political offices • • •ll The NLC threatened that attempts
by any regime "to undermine the struggle for the economic independence
of Nigeria, will be effectively resisted by Nigerian Labour Congress." 32
Thus the idea of economic independence, viewed in the context of
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indigenisation, has come to be seen by NLC in the 1980s to be embodied
in continuity of State ownership.
Nevertheless neither the individual trade unions nor the NLC
have, throughout the period since indigenisation, canvassed openly
for the further expropriation by indigenous businessmen and the State
of remaining parts of foreign capital. Rather they have continued
to be pre-occupied with wage increases and improvements to working
conditions. The issue of who should own and control the resources
acquired from foreign investors has not been a major item for discussion
between Nigerian employers and their employees, in either the public
or private sector, although this issue is more likely to come up in
the future, given the increasing level of unionisation among workers.
Whether indigenised industries will come to serve as an effective _
political "talking drum" remains to be seen.
Paradoxically the fear has also been expressed that multinational
corporations could infiltrate the trade union organisations, so as to
undermine further efforts for "economic independence". The editorial
of the New Nigerian (15/4/77) said:
"Trade unions, if neglected or emasculated, could become
willing tools in the hands of . 	 past masters in
the politics of crisis. Should the multinational
corporations and the giant monopolies get hold of
our trade union functionaries, trade unionism could
hamper the national drive to economic independence
and rapid development. The converse is also triae.
If the authorities relate positively to a
democratically elected trade union leadership, then
our trade union movement could become responsible
and respectable, and thus serve as a powerful
supporting force in the nation's march to economic
independence, progress and the egalitarian society."'
Many union leaders were invited to serve under various governments
during the 1970s. This was, perhaps, motivated by a desire to be
better able to control union affairs.
Some trade union leaders, such as Lawrence Borha and A.Y. Kaltungo,
joined the services of their State governments. In 1979, the involvement
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of Nigerian labour leaders in national politics became even more pronounced.
In 1979 the Kaduna State government drafted Alhaji A. Dangiwa, the
current General Secretary of the NLC, into its service. There was
also an ideological affinity between the NLC and the party in power
(PRP) in that State. However it is not clear whether the union's
presence in State governments influenced central government thinking
on the second phase of indigenisation. It certainly cannot be assumed
that union leaders were crucially involved in the formulation of any
of the Federal government's economic policies, including the indigenisation
Decrees.
In summary of this chapter, it can be concluded that, historically,
labour has been spurred by both political and economic considerations
to agitate for the Nigerianisation of personnel and indigenisation
of foreign owned enterprises. After the implementation of the
indigenisation Decrees in the 1970s, union leaders realised that the
economy had been indigenised largely for the benefit of the private
businessmen, who have not proven to be accommodative towards labour's
demands. In turn labour has tended to regard the indigenous businessmen
as new domestic "exploiters", and, if anything, has stiffened its
latent antagonism in the conduct of industrial relations.
The increased participation of the State in the economy which
indigenisation inevitably produced, increased the concern of the
government to control labour unrest in various ways. In an attempt
to create industrial peace, the Industrial Panel of 1976 introduced
a very modest egalitarian provision into the 1977 NEPD, requiring
10% equity shares of any affected enterprise to be sold to the employees.
However, the 10% equity scheme has not been implemented, inspite of
the Udoji salary and wages increases.
The NPF could be turned into a viable vehicle for future worker
participation in indigenisation. The NLC which so far has been a
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rather inactive and ineffectual body, could be recommended to campaign
for this proposal concerning the NPF and cause it to be taken into
account by the government, especially in regard to any future
indigenisation exercise.
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CHAPTER 7
Industrial Performance Since NEPD Implementation
Now that the NEPDs have been largely implemented, two important
questions need to be asked. To what extent has the Nigerian economy
been indigenised? Secondly, at what cost in terms of industrial
performance has indigenisation taken place? After all, in 1976 the
Secretary to the Federal Military government, Mr. Ayida claimed that
the standard of services rendered by businesses such as banks and
departmental stores in the private sector had fallen. 1 He did not,
however, say whether this was solely due to indigenisation. The
first question will be treated very briefly and the second at greater
length.
It should be recalled from chapter 3 that in 1966, less than 70%
of all large industrial firms alone were owned and controlled by
foreign investors. Only 3.24% of the Schedule II enterprises were
indigenous while Schedule III were dominated by foreign investors
before 1977 (see chapter 3). Between 1966 and 1985 considerable
ownership indigenisation took place (particularly between 1972 and
1983). Prior to the 1977 NEPD, according to the Daily Times: "the
objective of achieving economic independence has only been scratched
on the surface. About 60% of the economy still remains in expatriate
hands. But they should not remain longer."2
Evidence based on our national sample of firms shows that as of
1985 total Nigerian ownership in 1,701 companies is N947,189,000.
Other unspecified nationalities hold N143,977,000. The table below
I
shows the breakdown of the total volume of capital invested by
nationalities in 1,447 companies, in 1985 outside of banking and oil. •
Those exclusions under-represented capital of US origin and Federal
government ownership.
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Table I 
Breakdown of Capital Invested (1985) 
COUNTRY	 NO. OF COMPANIES
	 CAPITAL (N) 
Nigeria	 1,701	 947,189,000
British	 494	 297,988,000
US
	 99	 87,293,0001
French	 59	 48,490,000
w. German	 79	 46,495,000
Italian	 79	 26,784,000
Lebanese	 128	 23,086,000
Indian	 144	 33,156,000
Syrian	 26	 9,229,000
Egyptian	 6	 377,000
Sudanese	 7	 2,572,000
Ethipian	 3	 1,110,000
ChaVian	 - 1	 20,000
Kenyan	 1	 9,000
Niger
	 1	 205,000
Others	 325	 143,977.000
TOTAL	 1,447
	
720,791,000
6
Source: Compiled from data provided by NEPB.
Progress towards indigenous ownership in the North of Nigeria
has been made, but there are still 189 enterprises with dominant
foreign proprietory interest under the Kano zone, according to
official reports. One hundred and thirty of these are in Kano, 33
in Kaduna, 12 in Maiduguri and 14 in Jos. Fifty two of the 189
enterprises are under Schedule III and the rest are under Schedule II.
In considering the second question about industrial performance,
it must be emphasised that there have been no government reports or
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other detailed official studies of the impact of indigenisation on
the performance of the economy and on consumers in particular.
Nevertheless, suggestions can still be made about how to register
improvement in the performance of indigenised firms, for they have
frequently been publicly criticised. The government should appoint
its own commission to undertake a comprehensive study of the indigenised
a
firms, and make recommendations where necessary. If need be it must
create a permanent division within the NEPB to monitor the efficiency
levels of indigenised firms and to identify problems on a regular basis.
(i) Method of Assessing Performance 
Given the poor quality of official information available, it
is difficult to make a comparison between pre- and post-indigenisation
levels of performance, and between partly foreign and wholly indigenised
concerns. The criteria of good performance is itself somewhat difficult
to define although it must take into account levels of output and
quality of output as well as unit costs of production. Expressed
consumer satisfaction and dissatisfaction can be a useful surrogate
indicator, especially given the absence of reliable data on the
companies' financial returns. The performance of indigenised firms
must not be judged merely in terms of profitability to the owner.
In the context of indigenisation these firms were supposed to facilitate
the wider aim of attaining "economic independence" for the country.
That may be defined as the economy's ability to produce sufficient
goods and services efficiently, and in a manner that requires a
reducqd dependence on foreign capital.
In what ways could these national policy objectives be incorporated
into the immediate goals of the indigenised firms? Has the
indigenisation exercise been able to prove that lack of indigenous
ownership in the past was the major constraint on achieving economic
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independence? These are important questions which should be answered.
Undoubtedly, the indigenisation of ownership in Nigeria was not only
intended to achieve the broader aims of national "economic independence",
but was conceived by many to be a valuable private end in itself.
Moreover the push for economic independence through taking over
ownership in a developing country like Nigeria might well entail a
#
trade-off, at least in the short-term, with economic efficiency and
industrial performance. The excessive emphasis in the Decrees on
simply ownership, did in fact make the other broad policy objectives
of indigenisation less attainable for the immediate future. Additional
measures designed to keep up the efficiency and the performance of
the indigenised firms, as well as the issuing of strong guidelines
to foreign capital with a view to securing control, are going to be
necessary if the Decree's broader aims are to stand any chance of
being achieved.
Most of the indigenised enterprises have failed to progress either
in terms of the volume of goods and services produced and export
performance or in terms of apparent domestic consumer satisfaction.
Moreover the production of consumer items is still sustained by the
continued importation of raw material, although this is a fairly
common pattern in the early stages of import-substituting industrialisation
in any developing country.
The acceptable performance differential between indigenous and
expatriate firms, and the period that is to be given to indigenous
firms to catch up to the levels of the expatriate firms, need to be
considered in any assessment of the indigenisation that has occurred
in Nigeria to date. If within a period of five to ten years from
indigenisation a firm still shows signs of gross inefficiency, then
the continued existence of the firm under private indigenous ownership
might have to be re-examined and new conditions laid down so as to,
- 262 -
for instance, improve the quality of products and/or services within
the framework of a new ownership structure. However, regardless of the
amount of finance which may then be made available to improve
indigenous entrepreneurship and efficiency, if the levels of commitment,
initiative and willingness for learning and honesty and integrity
remain as low as they have seemed to be in the past, then economic
independence and self-reliance for the nation will remain a very long
way away.
The limited information available points to the fact that, since
the indigenisation Decree, the standard and quality of services and
products have deteriorated considerably. The rate of decline in
efficiency varies from enterprise to enterprise. Occasionally the
government has taken measures to improve standards in its own holdings.
For example, catering hotel business is classified under Schedule I
and during early 1983 the government reintroduced management personnel
from British Caledonian Hotels to run the Federal government-owned
Federal Palace in Lagos, at an annual fee of N400,000. This is merely
one instance of a failure by government to manage indigenised firms
properly and provide a reasonable level of performance. 3
Downward trends in efficiency are partly responsible for the
rampant smuggling into the country of goods such as textile materials
and footwear which are supposed to be produced in Nigeria. The
apparent explosion in smuggling in recent years has been precipitated
partly because made-in-Nigeria products have become very poor in quality,
or are produced in insufficient quantities. Inadequate production and
poor quality are in themselves manifestations of inefficiency in
indigenised firms. It was a recognition of downward trends in efficiency
that 'partly led to amendments being made to the 1977 NEPD in 1981. The
civilian administration of President Shehu Shagari moved some enterprises
from Schedule I to Schedule II and some from Schedule II to III.
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The officially stated reason was to improve efficiency. This
acknowledgement has led commentators in Nigeria to speculate how far
the government would be prepared to see performance deteriorate
before it reversed the indigenisation Decrees completely. Of course
the general economic climate in Nigeria has changed since the heady
days of the oil boom in the 1970s. The government now can no longer
afford to maintain the position of the Obasanjo administration, which
stated, in the budget speech of 1979, that "the main springboard of
the indigenisation was political", implying that the acceptable
economic price could be high. That administration of Obasanjo was
at least aware of the likely negative consequences of indigenisation
for the immediate performance of expatriate-owned firms, but seemed
prepared by and large to discount them in the light of the political
and supposed long-term economic advantages.
The idea of a continuing partnership between indigenes and
foreigners becomes increasingly attractive with a growth in the belief
that the lower is the allowable extent of expatriate participation,
the less will' be the efficiency of indigenised firms. Indeed, the
government in recent years has already started to take steps to
relax the indigenisation Decree, by permitting increased foreign capital
participation in certain restricted areas (see Section iv below).
Whether or not these steps will be sufficient remains to be seen.
All that can be done here is to assess the degree of attainment of
the goals stated by the government so far in a few selected cases,
and this requires an examination of some of the enterprises now operated
by indigenes wholly or in majority Nigerian partnership. Many factors,
such as knowledge of the enterprises, experience, and the stage in
which the enterprise has been passed on to new owners will have to be
taken into account in any comparison with foreign ownership and
expatriate-owned firms.
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(ii) The Service Sector 
Under the 1972 Decree there are eleven types of service sector
enterprises in Schedule I and ten in Schedule II. With the exception
of construction industries and poultry farming, which have their own
classification, all the rest are classified under manufacturing
industries.
Schedule I service enterprises under 1972 Decree are: Advertising
agencies and public relations business, all aspects of pool betting
business and lotteries, casinos and gaming centres, cinemas and other
places of entertainment, clearing and forwarding agencies, manufacturing
of jewellery, hairdressing, haulage of goods by road, laundry and dry
cleaning, municipal bus services and taxis, radio and television
broadcasting, retail trade (except by or within the departmental
stores and supermarkets).
The service sector enterprises listed under Schedule II of the
above Decree (1972) are: Coastal and inland waterways shipping,
departmental stores and supermarkets, distribution agencies for machines
and technical equipment, distribution servicing of motor vehicles,
tractors and spare parts thereof or other similar objects, estate
agencies, internal air transport (Schedule and Chartered services),
passenger bus services (inter-State), shipping, travel agencies and
wholesale distribution.
Before the 1972 Decree there was a significant amount of foreign
capital in the service sector of the economy. Such enterprises as
Leventis Stores and Challarams had a very high profile in the market
place: Because of the 1972 Decree most service sector businesses
were officially restricted to Nigerians only. In doing so some
Schedule I enterprises went into voluntary liquidation, others were
transferred to Nigerian firms. Yet others were sold to state governments,
and some continued to operate without complying with the Decree. The
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amount of capital involved in individual service businesses is small
compared to the manufacturing.
In the service sector, the Nigerian Ports Authority (NPA) supplies
some interesting evidence of the inadequacy of the indigenous public
capacity to run enterprises there were affected by the Decree.
RORO (Roll on Roll off operation) Terminal Company (RTC) was
awarded a contract by NPA in May 1979 to handle cargo and carriers
at the ports. The contract was due to expire in April 1984. The five
year contract was intended to enable Nigerians to learn from RTC's
specialised skills in modern cargo handling and be in a position to
take over at the end of the contract. However, the evidence to date
indicates that the Nigerian employees have neither the equipment nor
the skills to warrant termination of contract with RTC, and officials
of NPA argued accordingly for the renewal of the contract with RTC.
The contract with RTC stipulated that RTC was obliged to use
NPA's stevedoring contractors for any manual labour performed either
on board the vessels or on the quayside of the port. Furthermore,
RTC is obliged to undertake the training of Nigerian officers on
contract bases if required by NPA.
However, there is another vested interest in this industry other
than NPA and RTC. The unionised labour force of the ports argue that
the renewal of the contract is not in the interest of the unions. The
NPA workers union campaigned to prevent the renewal of the contract
with RTC. In the classic pattern of struggle against foreign capital,
it urged the NPA to end the contract in order to "create jobs for
Nigerians and also give meaning to the national policy on self-reliance".4
However the situation was even more complex. For within the ports
labour unions, some unions that work under RTC objected to the
terminating of the contract because, they claimed, most of the RTC
workers are Nigerians, and RTC should be allowed to operate owing to
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its superior equipment. Hence indigenisation in this case opened up,
rather than terminated disagreements over the involvement of foreign
enterprise.
The indigenes in the clearing and forwarding business, which is
another service sector industry, feel that the indigenisation provisions
did not protect domestic private interest in this area because they
continue to provide opportunities for foreign participation. Although
initially the clearing and forwarding business was 100% reserved for
Nigerians under the 1972 Decree, this sector was shifted to Schedule
II in the 1977 Decree, thereby allowing 40% foreign participation.
Even with the 40% restriction, foreign clearing and forwarding agencies
remain dominant. Such agencies like Umarco, Palmline and Panalpina
undertake most of the clearing and forwarding jobs, for the large
foreign multi-national firms are themselves recipients of major government
contracts. Each foreign-owned clearing and forwarding agency mainly
receives the contract from companies of the same country of origin.
For example Panalpina clears imports of German firms, Umarco, those
of French firms and Palmline for British firms. The conflict between
the requirements of efficiency and the chief aim of indigenisation
is particularly salient in this case, especially since shipping lines
remained in Schedule III under the 1977 Decree, whereas forwarding
and clearing were put into Schedule II. The business of the two
activities is clearly interdependent - forwarding and clearing is an
appendage of the shipping lines. Where there are indigenous forwarding
and clearing firms, it is unlikely that foreign shipping lines would
sub-contract with them if there are companies of the same country
of origin to go to.
The country's high imports in the past few years have been
lucrative to forwarding and clearing firms. Nevertheless it is necessary
to maintain the sector under Schedule II because there is no comparable
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indigenous capacity. If forwarding and clearing enterprise were moved
back to Schedule I, shipping operations could be severely disrupted.
Needless to say, some indigenous businessmen have called on the
government to re-classify clearing and forwarding agency under Schedule
I of the 1977 Decree, the call being motivated by their own exclusion
from the full benefits of the sector. Mr. Emeka Johnson, the Managing
Director of an indigenous clearing and forwarding firm, Emekls
International Agencies Ltd. requested the Federal government to
reclassify the industry so as to conserve foreign exchanges in 1982.
With respect to further activity associated with the crucial
ability to physically handle trade, the A. Ayida report on the reorganisation
of dock labour industry in Nigerian ports (1969) set out the criteria
for selecting contractors by the authorities in the dock industry. 5
These criteria were stated to be: experience in the cargo handling
industry and satisfactory past performance, a good labour relations
record, including proof that all payments due to the workers in respect
of wages, National Provident Fund (NPF) contributions have been
regularly paid; evidence of competent management, technical and
supervisory staff; and proof of adequate financial resources.
Indigenous and indigenised firms have not yet attained these
qualities in the 1980s and hence foreign ship owners have preferred
to contract with the experienced and well-equipped foreign firms in
the dock industry. In any case, the shipping companies were given the
discretion to select alternative contractors who would be acceptable
to them as stevedores. Since most indigenous firms have failed to
meet the laid-down criteria, the shipping companies are impelled to
select from among foreign firms.
The Ayida report acknowledged that Nigerian businessmen were not
equipped to provide berthing facilities for ships in some of the ports.
This has been borne out since indigenisation, and, moreover, the
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private indigenous sector has not shown an inclination to enter this
sector on its own. 6
Shipping line business comes under Schedule II of the 1972 NEPD
and had in the past been predominantly foreign. The Nigerian Far East
Line was one of the first privately owned indigenous shipping companies,
launched in the early 1970s by Henry Stephen Fajemirokun to carry
agricultural commodities to the Far East, in particular Japan, and
bring back in return manufactured goods. There are other private
Nigerians who have entered the business more recently. It seems
however unlikely that the ownership of ships by indigenes can improve
the position of indigenous forwarding and clearing firms, without loss
of cargo handling efficiency at the ports.
The international shipping business is representative of one sector
that is closely related to enterprises of a lower classification. That
is to say, the shipping line business, like many others, has a
"parasite" industry which is dependent on it and upon which it is
itself dependent for its own successful functioning. In this case the
parasite is the clearing and forwarding firms, which are classified
under a different Schedule (II). The function of the one is necessary
for the survival of the other — adequate performance by clearing and
forwarding is essential to the health of the shipping industry.
Between 1978 and 1983 the Nigerian government incurred about
N7.11 billion payments in foreign exchange to foreign owned shipping
companies. This is largely due to low indigenous participation in
the shipping sector. This amount represented 86% of the total freight
bills'and shipment charges paid by Nigeria to facilitate international
and domestic sea borne trade in that period. Out of the freight bills
and related charges of N1,662 million annually paid by Nigeria for
shipping services its national carriers earned only N240 million.
Foreign interests therefore remained easily dominant in the marine
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and related businesses. To encourage private indigenous participation,
the Federal minister of Transport, Althaji U. Dikko set a new shipping
policy in 1982, making it "mandatory" for Nigerian flag bearing ships
to carry a minimum of 40% of the volume of import and export into and
out of Nigeria in accordance with the UNCTAD Shipping Code. 7
In 1983, both the public owned Nigerian National Shipping Lines
(NNSL) and other indigenous private shipping lines owned only 26
vessels as against 6,080 foreign vessels which called at Nigeilan.
Ports annually. These facts were presented by the NFA in 1983. The
overall earnings of the National Carriers are minimal compared to
earnings of foreign vessels. Only about 11% of the total volume of
traffic are carried by the domestic carriers, who earned about 9% of
the total revenues paid between 1977/78 and 1979/80. The situation
continues to this day in spite of indigenous ownership of about 68%
of the total trade traffic of ECOWAS ports and central African sub-
regions.
The Ayida Report in 1969 had argued that since shipping companies
are inclined to deal directly on a commercial basis with other private
companies, it was "impossible" and "unwise" to consider a government
cargo handling monopoly. The report therefore urged the nationalisation
of the shipping industry first, rather than tackle its "parasite industry"
head on. 9 The indigenisation Decree of 1977 ultimately provided a
favourable legal environment for mandatory indigenous participation,
not only in the shipping industry but in its appendages too. However,
the lesson to be learnt is that previous public policies have made it
more difficult to make rapid and effective indigenous in-roads in
these other sectors now.
(iii) The Manufacturing Sector
In manufacturing it is quite possible that a Nigerian who buys
his way into a firm will have to go through a learning period of
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familiarisation with the technicalities of the firm's operations.
In the short term at least, problems relating to lack of mastery of
the production process can be expected, particularly in the case of
the owner-manager-technician who excludes alien participation in
the business. On the other hand, an inflow of expatriate expertise -
the "synchronisation of government immigration policy with the manpower
requirements of indigenous firms", suggested by O. Diatchavbe10 , would
place a greater strain on the country's foreign exchange reserves.
Hence it is better to leave the expatriates who are already present
to operate in partnership with Nigerians, while the latter are
apprenticed to the business. New expatriates would very likely be
more expensive to employ and they may lack the local experience of
the expatriates who are already present.
Setting aside ideological questions about the desirability (or
not) of encouraging specifically private enterprise, a rational approach
would be to select individual Nigerian businessmen on the basis of
experience and line of business, and attach them to alien firms in a
similar area. The government should have been far more careful and
helpful in adopting this sort of approach, to ensure a smooth transfer
without later loss of efficiency. For in the case of manufacturing,
the performance of the indigenised industries has in practice been
very poor. Both the Minister of Industries, Alhaji Akanbi and the
Governor of the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN), Alhaji A. Ahmed,
have publicly admitted "that given the scale of government patronage
and the country's sacrifices, too little benefit was being derived
from the manufacturing sector." 11 For the 5% contribution it makes
to the GDP, the manufacturing sector accounts for a quarter of all
12foreign exchange outflow.
In 1980, 2,588.4 million Naira worth of foreign exchange was
transferred abroad for industrial raw material. In the same year,
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• total return in finished goods amounted to only N2,244.8 million.
In the following year, 1981 the manufacturers' share of foreign
exchange was N2,931 million approved for purchase of raw material
and the total output for the year amounted to N2,508.4 million.
Although manufacturers argue that local raw materials are more
expensive than imported ones, there are further discrepancies in the
allocation of foreign exchange to indigenous firms. Often the value
of the total output of an indigenised firm is less than the total amount
of foreign exchange it receives, thus contributing to the foreign
exchange outflow without any equivalent net value added in return. 13
The inefficient utilisation of foreign exchange led to the establishment
of new criteria of allocation in 1984, to become effective in 1985.
The Ministry of Commerce and Industry set as a condition, "the proof
of payment of excise duty and the amount of value added by manufacturers"
before approving import licence applications.
Industrialisation which is confined to assembly plants and processing
is bound to lead to a situation where only the importation of raw
materials, spare parts and capital goods can sustain continuous industrial
activity. This lesson has become increasingly obvious in Nigeria, and
a fresh look at the industrialisation policy began in official circles
in the 1980s. Indeed, the government's Stabilization Act (1982), widely
received at the time as an "austerity measure", was intended to cut
down on the imports of some consumer and industrial essentials and
increase the domestic value added to industrial products. For at
the end of 1970 few indigenous industries relied on domestic sources
%
for their imports. In the author's survey of the Kano zone in 1985
about two thirds of the 145 companies still indicated foreign countries
as the source of their industrial raw materials.
The government first started to pay some attention to "resource
based', domestic inputs after 1975, with a view to reducing foreign
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exchange requirements, and by 1980 it also began to realise that
domestic industries must relate to each other. The Federal Minister
• of Industries, Alhaji Adamu Ciroma in 1980, suggested that groups of
enterprises producing raw materials and those needing such raw materials
be linked by a system of "purchase/supply agreement". For our purpose
here the sugar and alcohol brewing industries are chosen to illustrate
a
the lack of inter-industry linkages and its consequences. Other
problems in the manufacturing sector since the indigenisation Decrees
are illustrated by a survey of the furniture industry.
The underlying assumption in the choice is that if indigenisation
affects the sugar industry, then industries such as brewing, bakeries
and dairy products which depend on sugar as an input would be similarly
affected.
In the case of sugar, the Federal government has undertaken to
develop the industry itself ever since 1970, owing to the failure of
the private sector to invest in sugar production. Neither the private
indigenous nor foreign investors have been keen to invest, even though
it was they who needed sugar the most, for their perishable consumer
goods. Examples are brewing and soft drinks, dairy products and
bakeries, these three being classified as Schedule I industries in
the 1972 indigenisation Decree. Sugar plantation processing was classified
as Schedule II under the 1977 NEPD.
The reluctance on the part of the private sector to invest in
the sugar industry may be attributed partly to the capital intensity
of the industry, particularly the processing part, and partly to
problems with the weather conditions required for the growth of sugar.
Investment in sugar also requires a long gestation period before the
returns start to flow. The other part of the problem is to do with
the relative cheapness of the price of sugar in the world market,
which encourages importation, especially when there is a world surplus
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of sugar, as occurred in for example I 983/84. 14 Moreover, many of
the foreign investorsin sugar-related industries prefer to purchase
the material from the parent company overseas, rather than develop
alternative domestic sources.
In an attempt to reduce importation and meet consumer demands,
the Federal government has invested in at least three integrated
sugar projects. Savannah Sugar project, with a total equity capital
of N65 million, was developed by the Federal government with 70% of
the equity shares. This project has a production capacity of 100,000
metric tonnes of sugar per annum, By the time Savannah started
operations in 1981, its total equity capital was about N280 million.
The second project is the Sunti Sugar with equity capital of
N164 million, and in this project the Federal government has 85%
ownership. The production capacity is also 100,000 metric tonnes
of sugar per annum. The commissioning of production is not yet underway.
The third project is at Lafiagi*in Kwara State. The total equity
capital is N55 million, and the Federal government holds 90% of the
equity shares, Production capacity has been estimated at 70,000
metric tonnes of sugar per annum. In addition to those projects,
the Federal government has also invested abroad in partnership with
foreign interests, in Swaziland and Benin Republic.
Nigeria's requirement for sugar in 1983 was estimated at about
750,000 metric tonnes per year. But the recorded local production
amounted to only 40,000 metric tonnes per annum. 15
 To improve the
supply of sugar, the Federal government further acquired 19,7% of
the Nigerian Sugar Company Limited, at Bacita, Kwara State which has
a total investment of N10 million. The capacity of the company was
323,000 tonnes in 1979/80. This company operated at a loss due to
poor yield per hectarer)of crops and to having to compete with imports
of cheap sugar.
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Even at maximum production capacity, the three sugar projects
(excluding Bacita) can only cater : for 40% of current Nigerian demand.
This is the state of the sugar industry in Nigeria since indigenisation.
What can the government do to increase private sector participation
which remains so noticeably absent? Relaxing the NEPD is one option.
An alternative option - restriction of sugar imports so as to stimulate
private interest in domestic sugar production - could have severe
consequences for those industries that depend on sugar as a raw material.
It is in order to avoid a total collapse of sugar-related industries
that sugar has continued to be imported. By allowing increased foreign
investment in the domestic production of sugar, private Nigerian
partners might in time be induced to undertake domestic production of
sugar.
The Schedule II classification of the 1977 NEPD failed to take
account of the complex relationship between the two activities of
growing and processing sugar let alone the connections between these
two activities and the sugar using industries. Processing is relatively
capital intensive, while growing sugar is labour intensive and could
. quite appropriately be classified under Schedule I or Schedule II,
depending on the amount to be invested. In 1981, the sugar plantation
and processing industry was reclassified from Schedule II to Schedule
III. The shift might not have been motivated by difficulties peculiar
to sugar, but was instead part of a general attempt to boost food
and cash crop production, under the Shagari government's "green revolution"
programme. Nevertheless the change may improve the foreign exchange
”
position of those industries that use sugar, if caution is taken to
prevent the foreign exchange cost of the new agricultural partnership
exceeding the cost of imported sugar.
We now turn to the brewing industry as one of the major users
of sugar.
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In 1980 there were about 14 major brewery companies spread across
Nigeria with a total capacity of 6,000,000 hecto litres. In 1982
four additional breweries were established, with French capital being
dominant among the foreign partners. These included the Africana
Brewery at Ibadan, 40% owned by the French (Freres and Castel) and
40% by Oyo state investment and credit corporations, and the International
Beer and Beverage Industries at Kaduna, 60% owned by various French
firms. The French also invested in the Golden Guineas Brewery
Limited (GGBL), through breweries of Ijebu Ode, which is 60% owned by
the Leventis Group, 16
In 1983 there were 27 breweries operating with some public
capital investment. Although the Federal government participates in
the brewery industry, the extent of its involvement is not as high as
' in the sugar industry, and is chiefly restricted to two firms: The
Nigeria Yeast and Alcohol Manufacturing Company at Bacita, Kwara State,
and North Brewery Ltd., Kano. In addition there is also the West
African distillers (Spirits and Wine) Ltd., Ikeja which is wholly
owned by Federal government with a total capital of N2 million.
Under the 1972 Decree, beer brewing was classified a Schedule II
enterprise, and it remained so under the 1977 Decree along with canning
and preserving fruits and vegetables. The brewery industry is a net
user of imported raw materials and equipments. Prior to the Decree
foreign capital was dominant in the brewery industries. "The . . .
correlation between foreign private ownership and net foreign exchange
use in the manufacturing sector implied that foreign ownership
encouraged input purchases from parent companies abroad . . . "17 Ten
years after the 1972 NEPD, the bulk of raw materials for the brewery
industries were still imported. Nigerian Breweries Ltd. (NBL) and
Guinness Nigeria Ltd. have however invested around N700,000 in the
farming of barley, in partnership with Dutch agronomists. 18
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It is apparent from an examination of the problems of the sugar
and sugar-related industries that the close interdependence of the
different types of industry is important for the successful
implementation of the main objectives of indigenisation, and that
lack of interest among Nigerian businessmen in creating domestic
sources of raw materials is a major obstacle. The manufacturing
sector displays additional problems, as can be revealed by examining
the furniture industry. Two cases in this instance suffice, namely
the "Abdu Dutse Furniture works" 19 and the El-Darado furniture factory.
The 1972 NEPD classified furniture manufacture under Schedule I
unless the foreign equity capital was gN)200,000 or more. At the
time of the Decree the industry was dominated by expatriates. After
the Decree, the domestic capacity was clearly inadequate to satisfy
the consumer demand, and this led to the persistent covert importation
of furniture by aliens. One suggestion made at the time to transcend
this problem was the imposition of heavy duties on furniture imports20 ,
but this would have benefited the foreign owned manufacturers who
were still in the country. A further drawback of such protection is
that foreign owned firms are reluctant to develop domestic sources of
raw material.
A major weakness with the local small-scale furniture manufacturing
firms is lack of capital and inadequate expertise to repair and
maintain equipments. The case of Abdu Dutse furniture shows that one
way to solve the problem was for the Federal government to provide
financial assistance to the private furniture industries and to
finance some training schemes. Abdu Dutse Cabinet Company was established
eight years before the 1972 Decree and yet continued to lack capital
and skilled manpower. The Kano state government provided a loan of
£3,600 before the Decree, which enabled the firm to buy new equipments.
The firm was convinced that the success of furniture stores after 1974
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was dependent on government financial assistance.
The author's interview with the manager of El-Darado furniture
factory, Maiduguri (100% indigenous owned) in 1983 forms the second
case. The company was set up in 1972 by a professional carpenter
from Anambra State. Two of its factories were established at
Maiduguri (headquarters) and Yola. Prior to 1983, the company had
employed 25 people, but owing to the state of the national economy
it had retrenched to 15 employees by early 1983.
The interview provided the following information concerning the
difficulties of the firm. The manager disclosed that due to financial
problems the firm applied to the NBCI for a loan of N300,000 as far
back as 1978. Up to the time of the interview, the loan request had
not been granted, largely because the total investment of the firm
in capital goods and cash was below the required minimum amount, at
N100,000. The company had not attempted to obtain loans from
alternative sources such as the commercial banks.
The second problem revealed, concerns inadequate spare parts
and skill. It is worth noting first of all, that the manager was
not aware of the indigenisation programmes When the purpose of it
was made known to him, he acknowledged that the idea of it was good
but specifically insisted on the necessity of a partnership between
foreign and domestic capital, so as to ensure adequate know-how and
equipment.
There already was an agreement between El-Darado and a Lebanese
company, Daltrade, based in Kano to help overcome the El-Darado's
limited access to spare parts and skills. Daltrade supplies El-Darado
with machines and parts, and accordingly any machine failure is referred
to Daltrade. The important points to note here are first, there is no
training scheme in El-Darado to substitute Daltrade Engineers, and,
secondly, the status of a connection such as that between El-Darado
and Daltrade, owned by Lebanese, is not made at all clear by the general
provisions of the NEPD. Such an arrangement calls for clarification
under the NEPD.
(iv) Recent Trends in Indigenisation
By 1980 enthusiasm for indigenisation was on the wane, and the
initial momentum had subsided somewhat, although the commitment
remained strong in some circles, particularly professional bodies.
In 1980/83, a civilian regime embarked on a pragmatic approach which
coincided with its party political manifesto.
Soon after the expiry of the 1977 NEPD deadline in December 1978,
dissatisfaction over the state of the economy had begun to be voiced
in many quarters. Politicians and large indigenous enterprises argued
that the NEPD should be relaxed, while others proposed that there be
no further indigenisation measures, at least for the time being. In
1983, Senator 0. Saraki of the ruling party, National Party of Nigeria,
(NPN) actually contemplated tabling a bill to amend the Nigerian
Enterprises Promotion Act in order to encourage free enterprise in
Nigeria. According to Senator Barak', contrary to expectations, free
enterprise had been stifled rather than encouraged since the launching
of the Decree in 1972.21
The verdict pronounced by a long-term supporter of the indigenisation
Decree, Chief 0. AwOlowo, leader of the Unity Party of Nigeria (UPN),
was also gloomy:
"Manufacturing activities have declined to the point
of near-paralysis. We proclaim, with our lips,
indigenisation of industries and the promotion of
import-substituting ventures. Yet, we have banned
raw materials and spare parts. These are either
not produced, or are insufficiently produced,
locally and are, at the same time, indispensable
to the growth and survival of our infant industries.
Besides, our industries are seriously debilitated22
because of lack or inadequacy of intrastructure."
Although the speech should be understood as a piece of electioneering
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in the presidential electoral campaign of 1983, it was also a highly
plausible admission that things have not gone well since the indigenisation
Decree. Members of the private business sector are equally well
aware of the shortcomings of Nigeria's indigenisation programme. For
instance Mr. A.C.I. Mbanefo, a management consultant noted: "that in
spite of the indigenisation Act 	 we have never been in any
position as a nation to dictate the direction we wished to move in
establishing our economic base." 23
Individuals and some organised business groups such as MAN have
for a long time lobbied various government committees on the economy
to make it legally possible for affected foreign capital to be invested
in other foreign firms. Although legislation to this effect did not
emerge until 1985, the National Party of Nigeria's manifesto on
foreign investment, which was drawn up for the return to civilian
rule in 1979, was implemented in 1982 and allowed 49% foreign participation
in Schedule II enterprises of the 1977 NEPD which had previously
restricted foreign capital to 40%.
Further measure was taken to re—foreignise the economy in 1985.
The 1985 Federal government budget also decided to permit reinvestment
of remittable dividends, provided such investments are in entirely a
new company. Thus the older companies wishing to invest further, are
permitted to do so provided they import half of the new investment
capital. In the light of general economic difficulties experienced
since indigenisation and the decline of oil revenues, the NEPB in
1984 recommended to the government the creation of Schedule IV under
the 1977 NEPD.24 Schedule IV would require a minimum of 20% indigenous
equity participation, and nominated sugar plantation and processing,
fish and shrimps trawling and processing, integrated agriculture
production and processing including establishment of feed mills,
large breeding production and distribution of improved seeds of crops,
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fish, livestock and poultry products, agricultural land clearing
and land development companies, agro-aviation companies for control
of animal and crop pests and diseases, hiring and/or servicing of
farm equipment and machineries, manufacture of dairy products, butter,
cheese, milk products. Also included were the manufacture of tyres
and tubes for bicycles, motor-cycles and motor vehicles and pulp and
paper mills, to be reallocated from their original classification
under Schedule II. The report pointed out that in spite of the attempts
since 1978 to increase foreign investment in integrated agricultural
production and processing, total investment in this area remained low.
It was the indigenous business sector's lack of interest in agricultural
investment that led the Shagari government to shift agro-industries
from Schedule II of the 1977 NEPD to Schedule III in 1981. The large
and expanding population of the country (probable annual rate of
growth around 2.5%) requires a substantial growth in large-mechanised
farms. But since Nigeria has been slow to adopt new methods of
farming, it has become necessary to make special provision for
attracting foreign capital to agriculture in the hope that Nigerians
would participate in joint ownership. However, the indications are
that private Nigerian business interest in new agro-related enterprises
remains low.
Both the government and foreign investors appreciate the importance
of joint ventures in maintaining and improving levels of efficiency
and transferring entrepreneurial know-how and technology. Foreign
investors play upon this by warning the government against subjecting
them to too much control and restriction. "What tends to frighten
off investment", Count Lambsdorff, the West German Economic Minister,
was reported as having said to an African audience in 1982,
"is the effort by developing countries to extract
the maximum advantage for their own countries
from the activities of foreign companies, leading
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in some countries to a system whereby foreign
investment is regulated and subjected to
control. Long drawn out bureaucratic processes,
a lack of clarity and frequent changes in the
law and in administrative practice, excessive
restrictions and performance requirements are
not the correct basis for ensurlu the best
possible economic cooperation."
In the case of Nigeria, all the indications now are that Lambsdorffts
message is being taken to heart, and that further changes will be
made in the law to the advantage of foreign capital, as the economy
continues to be depressed and the level of oil revenues disappoints.
The Schedule IV recommendation of the Board in 1984 has not yet
been acted on, but as evidence of a weakening of the official
commitment to indigenisation we can refer to the re-classification
of enterprises in 1981. Mallam Adamu Ciroma, the Minister of Finance,
announced in 1981 some rescheduling of the enterprises under NEPD
1977. This re-classification could be interpreted as a first step
towards de-indigenisation. 26 Certain enterprises hitherto designated
exclusively for Nigerians were to become 419% open to foreign
participation, while some in Schedule II were in the future to allow
60% foreign participation. The policy of "vesting the commanding
heights of our economy in the hands of Nigerians officially remained
unchanged." 27 The companies in Schedule II that were affected by the
changes are: companies producing metal containers, fertilizers and
cement, and, not surprising given our previous account, sugar
plantations and processing, and agricultural plantations for cash
crops. The Minister of Industry also relaxed the total restriction
of alien participation in the manufacture of jewellery and clothes,
clock repairing and rice milling.
The reasons behind the reclassifications of enterprises were
explained by the Shagari administration, in terms of a need to
rejuvenate such industries which had "stagnated" since the Decree.
The failure of the industries had exacerbated smuggling. They
282
required new investment and expertise which could only be drawn
from abroad. The Nigerian Enterprises Promotion (alteration of
lists of Scheduled Enterprises) order 1981 explained the purpose
of the alteration: The shift of enterprises from Schedule I to II
was necessitated by lack of indigenous interest, while the shift
of enterprises from Schedule II to III was largely due to capital
4
shortage. The downturn in government oil revenues from 23,105
million in 1980 to a mere p609 million in August 198128 has, more
than anything else, made the government appreciate once again the
vital contribution made by foreign capital investment. The response
to the relaxation of the Decree, by foreign capital, was immediate.
In 1981 there were well over 300 potential investors who contacted
the Ministry of Information, and, in contrast to their earlier attitude,
American investors showed keen interest.29
The government also set out to encourage more foreign investment
by allowing indigenous firms which had foreign shares to venture into
new enterprises. Prior to the 1981 amendment of the 1977 Decree, a
company with only majority indigenous participation was considered
foreign, for the purpose of new investment. In this regard, even a
60% indigenous owned firm would be entitled to only a minority ownership
in any new company it wished to form. The civilian government decided
to change all that. As from 1981, it was made permissible for such
firms to control new enterprises which they set up. An amendment of
the Decree (Act) in 1981 takes into consideration the indigenous
holding in the main firm "on a pro-rata basis when the equity is
settled for a new company."30
Not only have the original Decrees been modified by the government
reclassifying certain enterprises, but also the manner of Nigeria's
drive for indigenisation is departing from the previous pattern in
other significant ways. The previous unqualified demand for
— 283 —
indigenisation more or less across—the—board, chiefly inspired by
governmental initiative, has been changing towards a more selective
and discriminating demand issued at the level that is of immediate
concern to the particular group of agitators involved. Indigenous
professional bodies campaign to get their individual field within the
economy indigenised for their own benefit, and trade unions also express
demands for indigenisation .of the particular enterprise or sector
that are of greatest concern to them. This new trend began soon
after the 1977 Decree came into effect. The tendency within the
organised professions and unions to campaign in one's own sectional
interest is evidenced by the many calls to reduce the shareholdings
of foreigners in companies in the distributive trade and other
service indubtries.
The Association of Advertising Practitioners in Nigeria (AAPN)
is one of many organised bodies which have put pressure on the government
for the reclassification of the Advertising business from Schedule
II to Schedule I. The Association submitted a separate memorandum
to the Federal Commissioner of Trade and Industry, Dr. J.E. Adetoro,
earlier in the 1970s putting the case for a classification of the
advertising enterprises under Schedule I. In the case of Advertising
business, as also in the case of the Engineering Society of Nigeria,
the lobbying was successful (1980-1).
The government has its own general criteria upon which decisions
can be taken to classify and reclassify enterprises, but the government
probably does not always follow those criteria because of private
pressure, from the Associations that cater for the interests of the
various sectors.
One successful form of sectional lobbying came from the Nigerian
Society of Engineers. In 1982, the Nigerian Society of Engineers
encouraged the formation of a bill for deliberation by the National
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Assembly. The idea of the bill was to ensure that certain types of
construction contracts be reserved "strictly for Nigerians." 31
However the relatively poor performance of wholly indigenous firms
has been so obvious that even the President of the Nigerian Society
of Engineers (NSE) went so far as to acknowledge the reluctance of
indigenous contract-awarding establishments to use the indigenous
engineering companies. The determination of the NSE was expressed
by the outgoing President, Mr. Philip Bolude:
"We will continue to educate and lobby so that
we can have a law in the Nigerian Enterprises
Promotion Act which will stipulate that
certain industries, certain businesses must
be' sold hundred percent to Nigerians 4,
The engineers now say certain jobs miA2t be
reserved exclusively for Nigerians."
The main objectives of the NSE's campaign has been to prohibit
the exclusive award of even the most complex jobs to expatriate
firms. It has couched the presentation of the argument in terms of
"national security", as was also the case in the demand for
participation by the private sector in the oil industry and in
the nationalisation of Nigerian External Telecommunication in October
1972.
The Council of Registered Engineers of Nigeria (COREN) proposed
the restriction of the period that expatriate engineers should be
allowed to operate in Nigeria to three years. To widen the scope
of opportunities to its own members, the Council requested that all
contract-awarding government agencies and private firms refer to
them for screening and recommendation all expatriate engineers which
2
they wished to employ.33
Thus, the government-inspired indigenisation of ownership in
manufacturing and some service industries, which was introduced by
the 1972 and 1977 Decrees, has now been succeeded by group lobbying
for further indigenisation in the professions. Such bodies as the
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Council, of Registered Engineers of Nigeria have not only demanded
the restriction of the operation time of expatriate professionals,
but also advocated the banning of further foreign personnel. Moreover,
the Council emphasised that the Federal Ministry of Works should not
register any contracting firm in certain categories ( I C , and 'DI)
unless it has at least two COREN engineers, technicians or craftsmen
in its senior management payroll.
Like the Advertising Association and the Nigerian Society of
Engineers, another professional association, The Association of
National Accountants of Nigeria (ANAN), has also been active in
lobbying, and is now urging the Federal Military government to amend
the Companies Act of 1968 so as to make it "Mandatory for any company
with an annual turnover of more than N1 million to employ an internal
Auditor." The Association called for legislation to ensure that at
least 20% of the members of the Board of any company were its workers.34
The Institute of Management Consultants (IMC) has also been
attempting to get the government to regulate, either by means of a
new Decree or by an amendment to the existing Decree, activities of
management consultants and users of their service. The Institute is
aware of an official predisposition to use indigenous consultants,
but has noted that the government has so far failed to "establish a
clearing house to scrutinise requests for use of foreign consultants."
The Institute hopes to create a government-supported institution . The
Council of Registered Management Consultants of Nigeria (CORMACON)
authorised to control access by outsiders, specifically foreigners,
to the consultancy business. 35
The new trend which, then, is clearly in evidence in recent years,
is for agitation for the selective restriction of foreign capital to
be mounted by group interests for the benefit of the members of
relevant Nigerian professional bodies. The earlier more general
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agitation for restricting all kinds of foreign capital has come to
be re-focused on limited areas involving individual types of foreign
firms. This type of agitation appears to be achieving some success,
as has been reported particularly in the field of engineering.
Although NEPD allows unqualified investment by foreign investors
in Schedules II and III once the indigenous equity ownership requirement
4
is fulfilled, there is now a special provision for engineering consultancy
(which comes under Schedule II). The Council of Registered Engineers
of Nigeria (COREN) requires that sponsors and six directors of
engineering consultancy firms must have engineering qualifications
registerable with COREN.. This provision is designed to restrict
expatriates with outside qualifications, and thus open the way for
promotion of Nigerians. This was revealed by the Permanent Secretary,
Ministry of Internal Affairs, Mr. G.A. Nwanze in an address given to
0the Manufacturing Association of Nigeria (MAN) on the 27/8/01.36
Indigenisation policy has in practice become a convenient tool
for the explicit promotion of sectional interests. This recent
development should be taken into account when assessing the significance
of the government's re-classification of enterprises to less restrictive
schedules, which has owed a great deal to national economic and
external financial difficulties. Alhaji U. Abdul Mutallab, Managing
Director and Chief Executive of United Bank of Africa Ltd. prescribes:
"Within the constraint stipulated by the Nigerian Enterprises
Promotion Act, we must aggressively seek foreign direct equity
investments as a comparatively cheap source of finance • • ." 37 At
the same time he implied that Nigeria should be "suspicious" of dependence
on foreign investment, because of "past exploitation"!
The choice, then, seems to be between two perceived evils -
foreign corporate ownership of the economy on the one side, and on
the other, financial indebtedness to foreign commercial banks and,
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•	 ultimately in times of weakness in the oil market, bondage to the IMF.
Having partially indigenised the economy, Nigeria increased its
external borrowing between 1978 and 1983 to fill the capital gap
created by indigenisation. By 1983 the government was having to
negotiate with the IMP, and its experience of these negotiations
has inevitably raised in the minds of Nigerians the question of
a
whether a reduction of indigenous ownership requirements in some
specific manufacturing and agricultural enterprises would not be
more acceptable than agreeing in full to the IMF's "humiliating"
conditions.
However, history cannot be rewritten. Foreign investors have
experienced indigenisation in the 1970s, and any new invitation to
foreign enterprise now is bound to be weighed up by potential investors
in the light of that past experience. Capital-owners who might come
to Nigeria, and those which are already there, will require a guarantee
that no further restrictions would be placed on their operations.
Furthermore, although some de-indigenisation may induce more foreign
capital to come to Nigeria, and improve efficiency in areas where
that has fallen since the launching of the NEPDs, could such a trend
be allowed to continue indefinitely? Where should the government
draw the line? These questions can only be answered by considering
the nature and configuration of the national leadership, the performance
of the indigenised firms, the terms of the alliance between indigenous
and foreign partners, and above all, the state of the oil economy
and the likelihood of a return to oil boom prosperity.
0
Whatever the nature of the political and bureaucratic leadership,
and no matter how weak is the performance of the nation's economy,
it is unlikely that any parts of the indigenous private sector which
have a substantial interest at stake will be prepared to make major
concessions to de-indigenisation. ' According to F.T. Moore, writing
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for the World Bank's International Finance Corporation in 1983, when
a suggestion was made to the government for "abolishing the 1977
NEPD or fundamentally relaxing its requirements so as to attract more
investment, the idea proved to be unacceptable to the major business
organisations such as the Chambers of Commerce. 38
 Commercial
organisations are likely to resist more strongly than indigenous
manufacturing organisations. This is because they could be more
easily pushed out of business entirely, unlike indigenous investors
in other industries which are in a more secure position by virtue of
being in partnership with strong foreign companies. Nevertheless,
by and large the fear remains among both commercial businessmen and
indigenous manufacturers that to scrap the NEPD entirely would
seriously threaten their already weak position. Also from a
nationalistic point of view to completely abolish measures which
had evolved after a fairly lengthy period of agitation would be
politically unacceptable to most of those who had initially helped
to bring in the indigenisation Decrees, irrespective of whether they
now have a private material interest of their own at stake.
Although it could be argued that reopening the doors of all
classified enterprises to foreign investors would lead to improvements
in levels of efficiency, there is no guarantee that foreign capital
would not come to dominate the economy once again. F.T. Moore
maintains that:
"opening some of the reserved product and service
activities to all types of investment would very
likely improve the efficiency of the whole
industrial structure and would not necessarily
lead to any significant displacement of small
scale Nigerian businessmen and commercial
ventures by large scale foreign investments.
It is very unlikely that foreign investment would
be interested in penetrating the small scale
manufacturing and repair facilities distribution
services or commercial and retl business that
are now held by local people."
— 289 —
Two points need to be made here in connection with Moore l s view.
First, Nigeria now seems to be witnessing. an increasing involvement
of capital from non-Western sources, specifically Asians domiciled
abroad, although reliable statistical information is not yet available
to back up this widely held belief. In a private conversation with
the author, a member of the Federal House of Representatives claimed
that 90% of the industrial establishments in and around Lagos are
owned by Indians. This obviously cannot be true. But although it
was an exaggeration, the fact that the representative saw fit to
say it, and might even have believed it, suggests that the profile
of Asian entrepreneurs has increased in recent years. To lift all
restrictions on foreign capital would increase the operations of
Asian entrepreneurs. Furthermore, those foreign businessmen in
the country who, like the Lebanese, have gone underground because
of indigenisation, would come out into the open once again. Both
the Asian and Lebanese businesses might eventually push Nigerians
out of sectors they have only recently moved into under the aegis
of indigenisation.
Secondly, as has been demonstrated in the case of the shipping
industry and clearing and forwarding at least, indigenous capital
could come to be dominated once again by European and American
investors if those investors felt they had been given sufficient
guarantees of security against any future revival of compulsory
indigenisation.
At this point the status of certain unique forms of enterprises
must be queried, along with the effects of indigenisation on public
decision-makers and their relationship to the private sector. The
status of joint ventures between the Nigerian government, foreign
multinationals and other foreign governments was never clearly
spelled out in the Decrees. One instance is the Save Sugar Company,
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a joint venture between the Nigerian government, the Republic of
Benin and Lonrho Ltd., formed in 1976. Forty six percent of the
shares rest with the Nigerian government, 49% are owned by Benin
Republic and 5% by Lonrho. It is not known whether the Federal government
has entered into agreement with its partners to accept the introduction
of private Nigerian capital in the future, or whether the operations
are permanently reserved for the public sector. This is an area where
the NEPB should seek clarification. For if private indigenous partners
were encouraged to replace public capital, then contact between
investors from different African countries could be increased, leading,
possibly, to a convergence of private African capital and a strengthened
position vis-a-vis non-African transnational capital.
A second area where the NEPDs are silent, and where that silence
became embarrassing, is the status of a Nigerian-owned firm whose
base is outside Nigeria. The silence has led to a very serious
misinterpretation of the intentions of the indigenisation exercise.
The misunderstanding of the purpose of the NEPD was clearly revealed
by the report of the tribunal of inquiry into the importation of
cement 1976.40 Government officials construed the indigenisation
policy as meaning unqualified support for Nigerian owned enterprises,
whether resident in Nigeria or abroad.
Mr. Lakin-Smith, an official of the Ministry of Defence, gave
evidence to the tribunal on the need for local representatives,
saying: "At that time the indigenisation Decree has either been
enacted or just about to be enacted and I believe it being put to
me that a large number of suppliers were expected from Nigerian
firm or firms, owned by Nigerians domiciled in the US. It was
therefore desirable to associate Nigerians in Nigeria with the convention
41in the capacity of local representatives • • •-”-	 To the tribunal
(panel) this interpretation of the NEPD 1972 was a "travesty".
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majority of those suppliers who were in fact awarded the cement
contract in this case appeared to be Nigerians domiciled in Nigeria.
This is what should have happened, for Nigerians who operate business
outside the country cannot be seen as forming indigenous enterprise.
They would not necessarily make any greater contribution to the
Nigerian economy than would other foreign firms. The NEPD should not
4
have left open a loophole which allowed Nigerians abroad to qualify
for the full benefits of indigenisation.
When the panel asked Mr. Lakin-Smith about the origin of the
policy of awarding contracts to "local representatives", he revealed
that it was a policy that originated from the top. It was the
Deputy Permanent-Secretary of the Ministry of Defence who, according
to Mr. Lakin-Smith, suggested that there should be local representatives
so that Nigerians could be associated with these contracts which
would otherwise be wholly in the hands of expatriate firms.
The panel acknowledged that the practice of awarding contracts
to Nigerian representatives rather than directly to expatriates was
noble, but had turned out to be "a device for getting cheap money
and probable source of kick-back". Nevertheless this is what is
allowed by the vagueness of the NEPD; and in 1983 the government
proceeded to make contract awards to ten Nigerian firms either based
abroad or foreign affiliated. Between January and November 1983,
55 major contracts were signed between the government and 60
construction firms, of which only ten were based in Nigeria.
Thirty eight of the 55 awards alone cost N3,600 million. 43 If the
essenee of the indigenisation Decree is to involve more Nigerians
in the country's economic activities, partly in order to sae foreign
exchange, then the practice by which Nigerians who base themselves
abroad and operate just like foreign firms are awarded contracts is
simply not in accord with the objectives of the Decree. Indigenisation
- 292 -
has proliferated the establishment of local commission representatives,
induced shady foreign partners into partnership with Nigerians and,
above all, led to official dispensation of contracts in ways that
overlook the level of appropriate qualifications of the contractors.
Citizenship has become the sole criterion, and officials have failed
to discriminate between genuine business interests and mere commission
agents who only seek to take advantage of government contracts for
themselves.
This chapter has brought to light some of the problems associated
with the implementation of the indigenisation Decrees, and identified
some weaknesses in the legislation and some emerging trends. There is
still considerable scope for further indigenisation; but whether
indigenisation or, conversely, de-indigenisation will become the norm,
depends on the financial strength of the State and the influence of
the private indigenous sector and its perceptions of the consequences
of further action.
In the next chapter, we shall discuss the State's attempts to
create and encourage the development of industrial capitalism with
greater indigenous participation in owning and controlling the
manufacturing sector of the economy. This effort brings the State
itself as one of the major participants in the ownership of the
Nigerian economy into a system of partnership , between indigenous and
foreign capital.
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CHAPTER 8
The State and the Development of Indigenous Industrial Capitalism
There have been two stages in the development of relations
between foreign and indigenous capital in Nigeria. The initial
stage from precolonial times up until independence could be typified
as more or less conflictual. The second stage from the mid-1970s
onwards has been characterised by a more harmonious relationship
nurtured by the Statet with an emphasis on partnership. The crucial
function of the policy of indigenisation was to abridge the earlier
conflicting interests of some sections of the business community,
foreign and national, and to tie in the ex-military/bureaucratic
elite. Indigenisation came to be accepted by most of the affected
foreign enterprises quite quickly, for they fully appreciated that
' the arrangements would still leave them with many opportunities.
The aim of this chapter is therefore to put the wh0le of the
preceding account of indigenisation into theoretical perspective,
and to draw some conclusions ab6ut the nature and role of the State,
in relation to-the factions of indigenous private and foreign
capital, in the development of industrial capitalism in Nigeria.
First of all it must be noted that indigenisation policy was
predicated upon the assumption that increased indigenous participation
in commercial and industrial sectors would lead to an independent
and domestically sustained development of industrial production and
capacity. The indigenisation exercise was not conceived simply as
an "express lift" to passive equity participation in foreign
enterprises. Hence the capability of indigenous entrepreneurs
I
to become an independent industrial class, capable of independent
industrial production, needs to be assessed. However, central to
this assessment must be an understanding of the role of the State.
We shall look at the State's assistance to private indigenous
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industrial capital (Section i), the State's direct investment in
industries (Section ii) and the State's encouragement of partnership
between foreign and domestic capital (Section iii). Section iv
draws attention to the significance of fractional distinctions
within capital and emphasises the way in which State actors in
particular have come to provide a major constituent of the private
beneficiaries of the indigenisation exercise in Nigeria. Section v
demonstrates the effectiveness of M A N., the premier organisation
which serves the interest of foreign and indigenous industrial
capital in particularsand points to areas of conflict between
different organised business interests.
The final Section (vi) notes the significance of flaws in
Nigeria's distributive system, and draws attention to the exclusion
to date of some indigenous businessmen from the benefits of indigenisation.
(i) Private Indigenous Industrial Capital and State Assistance 
The colonial State assisted in the penetration of foreign capital
and functioned to provide the law and order which guaranteed the
operations of that capital. Soon after independence, the post-colonial
StateI adopted a mediatory role between indigenous capital and foreign
capital, and hoped that an industrial economy would develop and
eventually be controlled by indigenes. Notwithstanding this aspiration,
the shift of political power into indigenous hands at independence in
1960 did not relegate foreign capital to a marginal position in the
country's economy.
Between 1967 and 1970, indigenous ownership in foreign owned/
controlled companies was marginal. Trading and commerce were the areas
for which indigenous entrepreneurs were best fitted, either by themselves
or in partnership, but on the whole private foreign capital remained
dominant. There was in fact a steady rise in foreign private investment.
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In 1967, cumulative foreign private investment was LWk million of
which 20.9% (N99.3 million) was in manufacturing and processing and
20.0% (N102 million) in trading and business services. In 1968
cumulative foreign private capital rose to £N510.7 million and 23.3%
(N110.6 million) of the total (N510.7 million) was in manufacturing
and processing and 24.2% (N123 million) in trading and services
respectively.2
 The upward trend was maintained in 1969 and 1970 with
recorded cumulative foreign private investment of N881.6 million and
N1,003.2 million respectively. Similarly for the period 1969,
manufacturing and processing accounted for 22.2% (N195.7 million) of
4.14,4„
the total (N881.6 million) and trOding and service sector accounted
for 22.4% (N197.5). In 1970, 26.2% (N262.8 million) and 20.6%
(N206.7 million) of the total (N1,003.2 million) investment were in
manufacturing and processing, and trading and service sector respectively. 3 •
Nigerian participation in the equity ownership of foreign owned
manufacturing and processing sector firms in 1971 was 34.2%, and on
the aggregate indigenous ownership in foreign owned/controlled companies
was 18.8% in 1970 and 16.6% in 1971. 4
The present influence of transnational capital and medium-sized
Lebanese and Indian businesses and their historically sustained edge
over indigenous capital, plus the relative weakness of domestic private
capital, combined to spur Nigeria's post-colonial State to commence
indigenisation in 1972. The termination of imperial rule, domestic
resentment of foreign capital, and the aspirations of the domestic
private sector came together to provide the impetus to attempt to
break Pthe nearly total control which foreign companies had held over
substantial parts of Nigeria's economy.
The historical tendency in Nigeria has been for economic as well
as political elites to promote their interests through State policies,
or at least to so influence the State as to create economic opportunities
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for themselves and further their political and social status. In
Nigeria, political leaders during the First Republic and military
officers of the late 1960s and in the early 1970s, and top bureaucrats,
promoted a few commercial business clients who depended on government
patronage to obtain loans, contracts, import licences and other benefits.
However, for a decade or so, the relatively feeble indigenous entrepreneurs
S
were not able to penetrate the industrial sector, 'inspite of the various
legislative measures which were taken prior to 
.1972.
There is no "doubt", as Kaplinsky has observed with respect to
Kenya, that "any discussion with aspirant indigenous industrialists
will rapidly show, that there exists a very strong desire to supplant
foreign capital". 5 But no matter how strong is the historical tendency
and the aspiration of indigenous entrepreneurs to attempt to achieve
at least parity with foreign capital, the realisation of such aspirations
could only be attempted seriously in Nigeria with the prosperity which
was placed at the disposal of the post-colonial State. The emergence
of a modern industrial and commercial bourgeoisie was only potential
within a framework of support and advancement by the post-colonial
State; but the movement of indigenous capital into manufacturing was
to be made possible only with the cooperation of foreign capital. 6
Two sources account for the development of private industrial
capitalists in Nigeria in the 1970s. First, as a result of the
availability of commercial capital being increased due to oil, some
indigenous commercial capitalists did move into manufacturing and
processing. However they do not predominate. The second category of
industrialists tend to have a good formal educational background, and
have either worked for foreign firms or had a career in public service.
They include experienced top African employees in large European firms
and ex-State officials, particularly the latter who gained access to
directorships with shares in some of the large public companies, and
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even greater blocks of shares in private intermediate enterprises, as
a result of indigenisation.
Swainson has also shown in the case of Kenya, that the accumulation
of capital was proceeding and "an indigenous bourgeoisie" was emerging
as early as the 1920s. Hence the post-colonial State was not responsible
for giving rise to the indigenous bourgeoisie. However, the mere fact
of the prior existence of a nascent bourgeoisie is unimportant, given
the very restricted capability of traditional African businessmen in
particular to transcend educational, capital, technological and other
limitations which cannot be overcome by State assistance alone. Some
peripheral societies may have harboured capitalist inclinations even
before colonial rule. But what needs to be stressed is the character
of this business group in its totality, the source and method of
operation adopted by it, and its ability to use State policies
effectively (without the State bureaucracy pre-empting opportunities)
to replace, or at least to compete with, foreign capital.
A common observation on peripheral societies is that there is
usually a movement of indigenous capital from commerce into the
manufacturing sector, either on the basis of private indigenous
initiative or in consequence of a progressive "squeeze" on foreign
capital by the State. In recent years many third world States have
confronted foreign capital with some success, by increasing indigenous
ownership. In Nigeria, the movement of foreign capital out of commerce
into import-substitution industries was not directed solely by the
post-colonial State, but was also undertaken voluntarily due to the
2
offer of State subsidies and the tariff escalation introduced as a
result of balance of payment difficulties in the 1950s and 1960s.
State assistance to the private sector is an historical necessity
that the countries of the periphery have to go through, in a selective
and exaggerated imitation of some features of the experience of
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countries which are now industrialised, for example Japan. Such
at any rate is a generally accepted view. 7 However, this seems to
make a virtue of the situation without paying sufficient regard to
the limitations of the indigenous entrepreneurs of the periphery
and both the historical and contemporary factors which tend to
perpetuate those limitations.
The recruits for private enterprise industrialisation were
originally supposed to come from indigenous merchants in the commercial
sector, given sufficient nurture by the State, but the Second
National Development Plan (1970/74) introduced a Small-Scale
Industrial Credit (SSIC) Scheme 8 with the objective of encouraging
a new class of educated and technically qualified entrepreneurs to
set up modern small-scale enterprises. "Certain categories of person,
notably civil servants, statutory corporation and local authority
employees and members of the Armed forces were not supposed to be
entitled to receive any loans under the credit scheme • • •" 9 However,
given the absence of a large pool of educated indigenous businessmen,
the policy inherently led to increasing participation by ex-State
officials. The 1977 NEPD further encouraged partnership between the
ex-State officials who are the most acceptable as partners to foreign
capital,
Every State of the Federation set up the SSIC scheme in 1970 to
provide financial assistance to private individuals with industrial
projects on "liberal terms". The State governments' budgetary
allocations for SSIC were also supplemented by the Federal government.
The promotion of private indigenous small-scale industries was carried
on.by . the Third National Development plan 1975/80. "The pro-indigenous
business role of the State continued by ensuring that the pattern and
direction of development of the industrial sector conforms to guidelines
set to protect those interests of the national economy and private
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entrepreneurs." 10 These policies have not always been implemented
smoothly, partly because of administrative difficulties. The problem
can easily be illustrated by citing some examples which can only
disappoint hopes of a successful development of a large number of
State-assisted private industrialists. The SSIC scheme in Niger and
Bomb States fell far short of expectations. In the case of Niger
State, the Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Commerce and Industry
revealed that industrial loans were misused in the State. Of the 237
people who shared N1.5 million loans granted in the State between 1979
and 1983 none used the loan for the purpose for which it was intended.
According to the Permanent Secretary, only brick-making industries
and bakeries were set up through the loans. The equipment is
rudimentary and could have been acquired even without the loans.
As at 1983 there was still about N816,640 yet to be repaid by 174
beneficiaries. Political considerations were a major factor in the
selection of the loan beneficiaries, and this inevitably militated
against the successful execution of the policy.
In an interview with officials of the Borno State Ministry of
Trade, Industry .and Cooperatives, a similar picture was disclosed
about the failure of the Small-Scale Loan Scheme in the State. Like
Niger State, most of the beneficiaries of the Scheme in Borno State
failed to use the loan for the industrial projects for which they were
provided. There were 300 beneficiaries of the Scheme between 1970
and 1976. From 1976 to 1979, 281 people obtained loans. The total
disbursement was over N3 million. Loans were given from N5,000 to
N100,000 per application. Many borrowers gave fake addresses, and it
became impossible to trace and secure recovery of the loans. Subsequently
the government embargoed a further issue of loans, in 1979.
In place of the Scheme, the State government began to promote
industrialisation directly, becoming the major shareholder in a total
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of 17 manufacturing firms in the State. 11 The purported intention
of State government participation was to help establish the industries
and then hand them over to valid businessmen.
A few private indigenous entrepreneurs in Bomb State have made
in-roads into soft-drink bottling and furniture (e.g. Dalaram and
Monguno bottling firms and Hassan Modern Furniture and Stephen Floor
4
Tiles). The amount of private indigenous capital that has found its
way into processing, bottling and manufacturing is however extremely
small compared to the representation of indigenous private capital
in commerce and service sectors. Out of 164 registered members of
the State's Chamber of Commerce and Industry, 155 are in distributive
trade, commission agency, general retail, import/export and construction
businesses. About 9 are in small-scale manufacturing business. 12 By
and large, the private sector's response to the government's policy
of small-scale industrial promotion has been very weak.
Prior to 1977 it was the Federal government's policy to allocate
funds to the States for the development of small-scale industries, thus
providing support to the State governments' efforts. The Federal
government scrapped the policy of allocating funds to the States for
industrial development in 1977, but the NBCL re-established the Scheme
in 1981. The latter started to provide finance capital to private
indigenes directly, without mediating through the State governments.
In summary of this section it can be said that since the launching
of the development plan in 1962, government policies have mainly served
to prop up commercial interests rather than promote indigenous industrial
A
initiatives. For instance, private indigenous investment in engineering
industries, which must surely be a significant indicator of any serious
industrialisation, was only 4% of private investment at the height of
the indigenisation exercise between 1975 and 1978. In terms of
employment, the engineering sector still accounts for only 5% (16,000
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persons) of total employment in manufacturing. 13
The discouraging features of the private indigenous sector's
performance are by no means new. The poor record up to the 1970s is,
after all, what led to the greater, more direct efforts by the State
at industrial development in the mid-1970s.
(ii) Direct State Investment in Industrialisation
The limited shift of the State within the 1970s, from the role of
a mediator between foreign and private indigenous capital, to direct
involvement in industrial investment and promoter of private indigenous
capital, was necessitated by the private sector's overall weakness.
In short, the State became an industrial capitalist in the drive towards
industrialisation.
The reasons behind the State's acquisition of shares in foreign
firms in the 1970s are more pragmatic than ideological. The State now
shows tenacity in retaining its acquired interests but this can be
explained in terms of the State's own financial and bureaucratic
interests, notably the inadequacy of alternative revenue sources. An
official of the Borno State Ministry of Trade and Industry made it
quite clear to the author that financial reasons dictated the retention
of enterprises acquired by the State.
The activities of the State Chambers of Commerce in persuading
the State governments to relinquish their shares to the members of the
Chambers, were raised in discussion with members of the Borno State and
Kaduna State Chambers of Commerce. There seemed to be neither official
initiatives nor many serious efforts made by the members to press the
State g overnments to sell their shares to the private sector.
Documentary evidence clearly establishes Borno State g overnmentls
reluctance to sell shares acquired under the NEPD. Official comments
poured cold water on a suggestion made by Mr. H.I. Alile, Director of
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the Nigerian Stock Exchange, that: "Governments should release to
the people in an orderly manner the shares they acquired during the
indigenisation exercise on their behalf through the Stock Exchange."
An official of NEPC commented that at the moment no State could
willingly release such shares to their public as these shares are
yielding reasonable dividends and are prized as one of the main
4
revenue sources to States. This view was shared by all the officials
who were interviewed in the Ministry. The Commissioner of the Ministry
contended that share release to the general public has always been
attempted but there has been no serious response. However, there are
no official records to support such a claim.
Most of the joint ventures between the State and private sector
are run on a profit-making basis, and a section of the bureaucracy,
particularly those involved in managing State and quasi-State corporations,
are keen to promote this pattern of development as an alternative to
purely private enterprise.
The involvement of the State is reflected in financial investments
both from public banking institutions and direct government investment.
The Federal government held in 1979, N98,854 804 of the NIDB I s total
authorised capital of N100,000,000. Out of this amount, N39,181,000
was committed to manufacturing in partnership with foreign and private
domestic capital. Investments have been made in food and beverages,
textiles, footwear and leather products, wood products and furniture,
paper products, chemical products and cement, rubber, metal products,
electrical appliances and non-metallic products. 15 NIDB investment
also extends to vehicle assembly, clay products and breweries.
The preponderance of State capital in the manufacturing and
processing sectors can be illustrated further. State and Federal
governments combined have invested approximately N53,719,38017
 in
16
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48 mainly private companies with authorised and paid up capital of
N74,310,221, in the North in partnership with foreign and indigenous
private capital. The table below shows the extent of State participation
in 13 out of 48 publicly quoted companies.
TABLE 1
.4 O
	
of corn..
	 %
TOTAL AUTHORISED W659,422,154 100 48 100
CAPITAL
SHARE CAPITAL N 40,603,173 6.2 13 27
OWNED BY STATE
DIRECTORS' SHARES N 14,674,882 2.2 33 69
However, the national economic difficulties which have been
exposed by the drop in demand for oil in the 1980s have served to
keep in view and underline the true nature of the problem. The
financial prosperity of the State will not only critically affect the
prospects for development of an indigenous industrial capitalist class,
but also determine the ability of the State itself to undertake direct
investment in industries. The condition of the country's balance of
paymenteremains a crucial factor. This is amply illustrated by the
industrial downturn which has taken place during the external financial
crisis of the early 1980s, the effect of which has been the retrenchment
of workforces, 18
 closures, economic "threats" by foreign partners to
private indigenous and government firms alike, and general economic
chaos.
The triadic role of the Nigerian State— its promotion of private
s
domestic capital, direct public capital investment in industrialisation,
and the general harmonisation by the State of private domestic and
foreign capital, helps to determine the main types of private indigenous
economic actors which will flourish in Nigeria. The next section
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examines the types of indigenous capital that have ventured into
industry and those that have consolidated their position in the system
of alliances with foreign capital.
(iii) The Alliance between Foreign and Private Indigenous Capital 
In Nigeria, many of the processing, manufacturing and mining firms
and other modern industries have links with foreign capital. All of
the 114 companies in our survey in the North are in partnership.
Also in the national sample of 1705 companies, although only 4 companies
are wholly foreign and 118 are wholly indigenous, only 10 of the
indigenous companies are in manufacturing 'and 61 in service and
construction sector, with the rest unclassified.
The extent of external capital penetration of Nigeria both during
the colonial period and since, has shown that the country's economy
continues to rely on foreign capital for effective production. Admittedly
the indigenous private sector has been given more room to advance into
manufacturing by the indigenisation Decrees, but only within the
parameters defined by international capital. The post-colonial State
in Nigeria has become pivotal both to the development of indigenous
private capital and to the maintenance of a balance between domestic
and foreign capital, given the dependence of indigenous capitalism on
external partners for industrial development. The State actually
brings domestic and foreign capital together, often by providing
opportunities to foreign capital. The 60/40 equity ownership ratio
between foreign and indigenous investors which was stipulated under
Schedules II and III of the 1972 and 1977 NEPDs respectively, is only
one, very explicit official manifestation of the desire to retain
foreign capital in partnership with domestic capital.
Given the reliance of the indigenous industrial sector on external
sources of raw material (of the 20 companies which indicated to the
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author their source of raw material, 8 claimed to rely on internal
sources), equipment, managerial expertise and technical know-how,
State policies must facilitate the interest of both domestic and foreign
capital. Indeed, as the State gave an appearance of becoming increasingly
pro-indigenous business in the 1970s foreign capital actually
consolidated its overall position in the country's economy. The
t
support shown by M A N and its lobbyists in the legislature for the
maintenance of capital (discussed in chapter 6 above), suggests that
the forecast made by, for instance, Paul Collins, 19 that indigenous
interest in partnership is now on the wane, is somewhat premature.
Indigenous private capital pressure on the State led to a relaxation
of the NEPD in 1981. Lobbying of the Shagarigovernment (1979-83) to
make the economy more open to foreign investors came from the Manufacturers
Association of Nigeria (M A N ) and from those representatives of
indigenous businessmen who are already in partnership with foreign
capital, including some senators and members of the House of
Representatives and the Cabinet, and some non-Cabinet Ministers.
The reason for the desire of such people to retain foreign capital
is not difficult to see.
Unlike such other relatively advanced industrialising countries
as Brazil, India and Mexico, Nigeria has a very weak industrial base,
and accordingly desperately needs foreign capital in order to maintain
modern methods of production. This is clearly understood by Nigeria's
industrialists and the State. The falling trend in the price and
output of the country's oil in the 1980s has simply re-emphasised
Nigeria's continuing dependence on foreign capital. The ever-increasing
integration of indigenous capital with foreign firms, and the strong
support given by the State to this trend serves to strengthen mutual
cooperation between the bureaucratic and business elites on the one
hand, and foreign capital on the other.
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Indigenous capital as a whole would not and could not threaten
foreign capital in a manner likely to endanger its own survival.
_-
However, this is not to say that a renewal of indigenisation will
never again be threatened against parts of foreign capital which
undermine stability and impede the progress of indigenous capital.
Some further indigenisation measures may still be deployed from time
..
to time. As recent as 1984 the NEPB has recommended further
indigenisation in areas of petroleum haulage, tobacco manufacture,
departmental stores, supermarkets, distribution of imported goods. 20
The fact that these areas are currently infiltrated by Indians and
Lebanese is significant.
Thus the relationship between internal class forces and the
external class represented by foreign investors in Nigeria cannot
simply be reduced to a relation of "exploitation and coercion", as
Kirkpatrick and Nixson21 and others have claimed. Nor is it adequately
summarised by that rather oversimplified notion of instrumentalism
which Beckman has advanced, and which portrays not only the domestic
bourgeoisie but also the Nigerian State as merely "agents" of foreign
capital. According to Beckman, "the contemporary Nigerian State can
therefore be described as a comprador State. State institutions and
State officials operate as agents of imperialism. The real ruling
class is the bourgeoisie of the metropolitan countries. It is not
the indigenous businessmen and bureaucrats, who merely masquerade as
a 'national bourgeoisiel." 22
Neither the State nor the indigenous bourgeoisie can be construed
as merely subordinate factors or facilitators of domination and
exploitation by metropolitan capital. Oversimplification of this
sort owes to a failure to recognise the high level of political
representation of Nigerian entrepreneurs and the highly responsive
nature of Nigeria's post-colonial State. Although indigenous
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industrialists certainly rely on transnational capital for many
factors of production, or rely on foreign manufactured goods for
distribution and services, their domestic political, economic and
organisational advantages should not be overlooked.
Despite limited technological capabilities, domestic capital in
developing countries can be strong in some senses. In Brazil for
a
instance, where a "triple alliance" between foreign capital, State
capital and local private capital has been identified by Evans (1979),
analysis revealed the significance of local capital, even though, in
the final analysis, it remained the weakest element of the alliance. 23
Basically, the strength of local capitalists identified by Evans is
founded on their claim to privileges of citizenship and in their
ability to integrate with the local social structure, in their influence
over access to the local market for transnational firms. 24 The local
political power of foreign capital is weak relative to indigenous
private capital. Hence an indigenous partner can be essential to the
success of foreign capital, particularly at times when the State is
attempting to control foreign investment by imposing restrictions on
its activities.
The long-term viability of a structural alliance between sections
of private indigenous capital and foreign capital, which has been
fostered over the years by the State, has come to be disputed. Paul
Collins, for instance, in 1984 claimed that:
"there is at times a growing personal antagonism.
Even amongst the bureaucratic and managerial
elements in Nigeria who bought substantial shares
(under the indigenisation Decrees) .
	 .
enthusiasm has considerably waned • • • in favour
of making direct investments in enterprises of
their own. This was particularly the case with those
who invested in foreign companies manufacturing
low-technology • . they were impressed by the
relatively simple and 'imitable/ process involved." 2.5
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This observation led Collins to suggest that "the extent of such a
development is crucial to the emergence of an embryonic industrial
class, in particular the degree to which the petty bourgeoisie have
been able to transcend the normal limits of their class to expand the
forces of production directly and by themselves." 26 However, a rather
abstract statement such as this is not yet fully born out by the facts;
and the ability of the indigenous sector even to take full advantage
of those areas reserved to them by the indigenisation, is weak. In
spite of the removal of foreign competition, and the "low technology"
nature of the enterprises exclusively reserved for Nigerians, the
NEPB reports paint a discouraging picture. Even in an area such as
the repair of watches, which used to be in Schedule I (now reclassified
under Schedule II), "no single indigenous company was set up to
undertake the activity since it was placed in Schedule I and Nigerians
had to go abroad to have their watches repaired." 27 Similarly, clearing
and f orwarding and petroleum haulage had to be reclassified in order to
mitigate the difficulties created by the exclusion of foreign capital. 28
The preservation of some sectors to indigenous participation proved
to be disastrous to the industries as was discussed in chapter 6 above.
If many service sector activities have proven to be too demanding for
indigenous businessmen, it is difficult to see them making much of a
success of manufacturing industry without a substantial continuing
element of foreign participation.
Thus, although in the long term a total indigenous takeover of
ownership of joint ventures may be pressed for in some areas, the
problem of how to create a domestic managerial and technological
capacity that will reduce reliance on critical external supports has,
as already pointed out, yet to be solved. All the officials of M A N
who were interviewed by the author confirmed that even wholly indigenous
companies still suffer from "dependence-orientation" and admit that
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foreign participation is essential to their success. The aspiration
to take)over at the ownership level is one thing, which in time may
come to be fully consummated; however the capacity to survive and
prosper independently is clearly another thing entirely.
In the next section we shall identify and discuss the different
fractions of local capital. For the economic and political strengths
of the several fractions differ, and the differences go beyond the
distinction of public and private indigenous ownership.
(iv) Fractions of Capital
Local capital in Nigeria should not be visualised as a single
entity; rather, it should be seen as comprising several fractions
which do not share identical interests. There are two broad distinct
groups in the private indigenous sector,-the traditional African
commercial businessmen, and the ex-State officials who, as was shown
in chapter 5, foreign capital tends to welcome as partners, especially
in comparison with not only serving members of the taiiitary/bureaucracy
politicians (in private capacity) but also the traditional commercial
businessmen. The preference owes in part to the administrative and
professional competence of ex-State officials and their mastery of
State policies. But on some occasions bureaucrats still in active
service as well as those outside, in pursuit of private goals collude
with foreign capitalists against . . . indigenous businessmen. 29
As was observed by Adejugbe: "What makes the Nigerian situation
perhaps exceptional is the enormous divergence between expressed
government goals and the pursuit of private goals that are thrust
upon the system by individuals and sub-coalitions with the bureaucracy.
This socio-political situation has adversely affected the attainment
of the goals of the indigenisation policy." 30
In the private companies examined by the author in the North,
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shares have been bought by 73 retired senior military officers and
top bureaucrats including ex-military governors, secretaries to
military governments, Federal permanent secretaries, diplomats,
senior police officers, State Commissioners and other top Federal
officials. They possess a total holding of N5,023,928 worth of shares
and unvalued shares of 72,36031 out of 201,000 saleable shares in
about 38 Schedule II enterprises. In addition 11 Northern aristocrats,
emirs, prominent traditional title holders and their families hold
a token N91,100 worth of shares and 50,000 unvalued shares out of
917,000 saleable shares in 7 companies and 40% of one company whose
authorised share capital is not given. Northern aristocrats seem to
be allocated small shareholdings and given directorships in order to
patronise the companies that operate under their area of influence
and improve their public image. Southern traditional rulers also
seemed to be given directorships among the 48 public companies examined.
Though they are small in number and in terms of equity share ownership,
the traditional African Emirs and Chiefs are a significant group of
shareholders because of their political position and influence.
In most cases ex-State officials operate in partnership with
proprietors of medium sized private firms originally owned solely by
Lebanese, Indians, Syrians and large public companies or subsidiaries
of transnational firms. As is shown in table 1 above (page 307 )
almost all of the indigenous directors of the 33 out of the 48 companies
are top members of previous governments, with a total share ownership
of N14,674,882. About one quarter of the 48 companies with a total
authorised capital of N659,422,154 are Schedule III enterprises
and just under three quarters are Schedule II. Ownership of shares
by ex-State officials might represent a small fraction relative
to foreign, State and the aggregate of individuals as a whole,
but their ownership is nonetheless highly significant because they
— 33.5 —
furnish the major private indigenous blocks of shareholding, and therefore
have the greatest chance of exercising a significant voice. A high
concentration of directors32
 equity shares relative to the aggregate
of shareholders was also observed in other studies. For example,
Teriba et al. in their study of ownership and control structure . of
some manufacturing firmsin Nigeria showed that in a total paid-up
capital of 688 firms, 53.5% were owned by the companies' board members.
The high ownership percentage among the directors of small-scale
Lebanese and Indian businesses contrasts with public companies with
a large capital base, where Nigerian directors are only nominal
shareholders relative to foreign investors and the State.
The practice whereby civil servants move into the private sector
has a long tradition in Nigeria. But never before has there been
such a mass absorption of public officers by private indigenous and
foreign firms as was induced by indigenisation in the 1970s. Indeed,
the private sector attracted such a large number of "high-level
administrative personnel that in 1979 the Nigerian Government
temporarily prohibited permanent secretaries from moving into the
private sector." 34
 Before the 1972 Decree, the interests of the
military officers at least, and the business class seemed to be kept
reasonably separate. However with the launching of the indigenisation
policy, in particular the Second Decree (1977), the economic interests
of the business class and the military/bureaucracy began to coalesce.
Most military officers and bureaucrats of the 1960s and early 1970s
have ended up as directors and shareholders in private or public
9
companies, after making their exit from office. The integration of
this group into the Nigerian business community has therefore expanded
and strengthened the pursuit of indigenous capitalism in Nigeria.
In contrast, the traditional African commercial group who were
33
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originally intended to be the beneficiaries of the 1972 Decree have
been impeded by the participation of ex-State officials and also by
aliens who have been able to retain their businesses by the acquisition
of Nigerian or OAU citizenships, and the merger of alien companies.
N1,984,707 worth of shares of companies in Kano had been retained
by the original alien owners of about 20 enterprises, by obtaining
Nigerian citizenship. Nine Lebanese retained N1,210,000 worth of
shares by acquiring citizenship of neighbouring countries - chiefly
Niger, Chad, Sierra Leone, Benin Republic and Ivory Coast. Out of
19 companies 17 were involved in merger. Two have only been renamed
so as to give the impression of a change of ownership. In 8 companies,
the Lebanese proprietors had their applications for citizenship turned
down by the Ministry of Internal Affairs. But since these proprietors
belong to families, some members of which have been successful in
acquiring Nigerian citizenship, those who do not obtain Nigerian
citizenship simply transfer their shares. In this way the owners of
four companies successfully transferred N909,500 worth of shares to
naturalised relatives, so avoiding having to sell at an artificially
low valuation. For example Shour Transport Company with a value of
N200,000 under the 1972/74 Decree valuation was directed by the
Security Exchange Commission (SEC) to be sold to Nigerian(s) for
N100,000 in 1979. The proprietor of the company had already failed
to comply with the 1972 Decree which placed the company under Schedule
I. The business was sealed in 1976, but then reopened because the
proprietor applied for citizenship. The company thus escaped the
requirements of the 1972 and 1977 Decrees until the proprietor's
application for citizenship was rejected in 1979. The company was
finally transferred to another member of the Shour family who is
involved in manufacturing.
Thirty-five citizens of OAU held N16,437,800 worth of shares.
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Even more substantial has been the participation by the Northern
States and the Federal governments. Combined State participation
amounts to N53,719,380 in 48 companies with an authorised capital
of N74,310,221. However, in spite of the extent of private and
public indigenous participation which has already occurred, and the
successfUl efforts made by alien proprietors to retain their shares,
in 1985 N10,083,264 worth of shares and 559,951 shares (not valued)
held by 58 enterprises had still not been sold to comply with the
1977 NEPD. In addition 3.11. Schedule II and III enterprises raised
their equity capital base by N8,141,166 so as to escape indigenisation,
in compliance with the requirement of the NEPD. These companies had
not paid dividends during the previous years, and so the cumulative
dividends and profits may have accounted for a large part of the new
capital.
There is, then, still some scope left for traditional businessmen
to purchase shares, but no evidence of a concerted attempt to take
advantage of this situation has been forthcoming. The inability of
indigenous businessmen in commerce and the service sector to enter
partnership with foreign capital reflects their low levels of education
and an absence of support from the State and/or alien owners in
obtaining access to the system of partnership, or simply a very weak
financial base. In early studies some of them demonstrated mistrust
of partnership in general. 35 Teriba et al. suggest that the
psychological sense of mastery of one l s own business has been too
strong among many traditional Nigerian businessmen. Another explanation
they give is the cumbersome bureaucratic procedures which discourage
oone-manbusinesses from entering partnership. 36 All of these factors
revolve around an inability to organise effectively. Further,
traditional businessmen cannot hope to match the monopoly of relevant
information effectively wielded by ex-State officials who come into
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contact with foreign investors. The ex-State officials are endowed
with modern administrative and organisational skills, and above all
are familiar with the modern international business language - English,
unlike the traditional Nigerian entrepreneurs, particularly those in
the North. Many of the latter operate within the limits of a local
market and do not travel widely enough to absorb new techniques and
a
values so as to expand the scope of their business activities.
The traditional Nigerian businessmen are able neither to coherently
and rationally articulate their case for State assistance nor to
appreciate the most effective methods of exerting pressure on the
alliance of foreign capital, State capital, and a section of private
indigenous capital. It should be recalled that there were no appreciable
efforts by some of the State Chambers of Commerce to persuade the
government to relinquish shares to their members, and this has allowed
the States to continue to hold shares. State ownership - granted also
the support of the NLC, interested in job security for its members - is
indeed likely to remain one pillar of the alliance system for some time
to come.
By way of contrast with the failings and weakness of traditional
commercial businessmen, the organised strength of the educated elite
with a public service background, and those involved in the manufacturing
sector, in particular MAN, will be looked at in the next section.
(v) The Manufacturers' Association of Nigeria
The importance of differentiation of local capital is reflected
in the policies of the State which favour different fractions of capital
(including foreign capital) at different times. 37 For Collins, the
role of the Nigerian State, "expressed in public policy", is complex,
and involves the interplay of sectional group and class interest . • •
The role of the State in practice is at the very least a variable one." 38
The actions of State are by implication determined by the relative
strengths of the several interests involved, and the
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time and circumstanoes in which the State conceives and then tries
to implement its several policies.
Most important of the private business organisations is the
Manufacturers' Association of Nigeria (M.A N ), which represents the
interest of foreign as well as indigenous manufacturers in Nigeria, and
takes part in periodic (i.e. bi-monthly) consultations with officials
of State. It is important to examine the activities of M A N. to
show what an organised business group can, unlike the traditional
African businessmen who are weakly represented by State Chambers,
achieve in Nigeria.
The Manufacturers' Association of Nigeria was established in
May 1971. 39
 Its membership rose from 110 in 1971 to 780 industrial
firms, which are mainly found in Schedules II and III. The membership
remains open to established firms with ten or more persons in its
employment and engaged in manufacturing activity. With an annual
membership subscription of between N500 and N5000 (depending on the
members' capital size and annual turnover), 40% of its revenue is spent
on publicity, advertisement and lobbying, including the entertainment
of selected government officials. The central objective of the
Association is to provide manufacturers with means of influencing
government policy and to operate in conjunction with such organisations
as Nigerian Association of Chambers of Commerce, Mines and Agriculture
(NACCIMA) and Nigerian Employers' Consultative Association (NECA) on
matters of common interest.
M A N. has contributed memoranda in the clarification of the
NEPD (1972). It is a member of various policy formulating bodies
related to the economy strongly represented on inter-ministerial
committee, the Industrial Development Coordination Committee (IDCC),
which comprises representatives of the Federal Ministries of Commerce
and Industry, Finance, Internal Affairs, National Planning, Agriculture,
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Health, External Affairs, Mines and Power, Science and Technology,
Housing and Environment and the Cabinet Office. The IDCC functions
to coordinate and develop the industrial sector of the economy, and
facilitates the granting of approvals and administers incentives.
Virtually every major government ministry is represented in the IDCC,
which gives to M A.N. an opportunity to communicate the needs of its
members to all relevant government officers.
The participation of LA N. is not restricted to IDCC, it also
sits on productivity, price and incomes board, Nigerian Shippers
Cbuncil, Nigerian Standard Organisation, Nigerian Export Promotion
Council, Industrial Training Fund, and Boards of Federal polytechnics
and the NEFC (Lagos). It participates in State government industrial
committees and submits memorandum on issues related to industry. These
are but a few of the more formal channels through which manufacturers
are able to attempt to influence government policy.
MAN, functions specifically to serve the interest of manufacturers,
but its members also belong to other closely related organisations,
chiefly NACCIMA and NECA. NACCIMA in particular represents Schedule
I and II enterprises such as in construction, and distribution which
includes some members of large Schedule II and III enterprises. These
Associations have "interlocking membership 40" with M A N. because
many of the large public companies such as UAC, UTC, SCOA and John ftolt
which have branches in most States of the Federation are allowed to
operate at both commercial and manufacturing levels.
The president of M A N , Chief Odutoba of Odutokia Tyresole Co. Ltd.,
said in answer to a question about his views on the NEPD 1972:
"As far back as July 1971 the Manufacturers'
Association of Nigeria in a memorandum addressed
• to the Federal Ministry of Industries, four other
Federal Ministers and the Central Bank expressed
our support of the then proposed Decree on
indigenisation. This position remains unchanged
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after the publication of the Decree especially
as we note from an initial study of the Decree
that many of the suggestions and recommendations
in our 1971 memorandum have been incorporated in
the Decree. It is in the best interest of the
private sector and the economy as a whole that tle
Decree should be efficiently implemented .
The memoranda
 in question were correspondence between M AN and
NEPB in June, July and September of 1972, which dealt with questions
about vagueness in the 1972 Decree.
For instance, M A N asked the Board to clarify the position of
a company that grows, processes and cans agricultural products.
Where a company manufactures metal containers for its own use, (which
is Schedule II activity), the Board was asked to clarify whether the
company should sever this aspect of its activity. Similarly, shipping,
stevedoring, clearing and forwarding are parts of the same industry,
but the parts are classified differently. Advertising and public
relations, road haulage or the distribution of a manufacturer's products
or imported allied products are all areas which M AN wanted the NEPB
to clarify. M A N, wanted a clearer definition of wholesale distribution -
whether it be restricted to buying and selling, or alternatively
include processing prior to sale. Further areas found to be vague by
M A IT are Schedule I item (3) "component", Schedule I item (a) "other
places of entertainment", Schedule I item (14) "related articles of
jewellery" and Schedule II item (33) "whole distribution". As can be
seen, M A U I s concern is not only restricted to manufacturers' interests
alone. In its efforts to protect the manufacturers' interest, it
also indirectly protects the interest of the distributive and
processing sectors, where most of the major manufacturers are in any
case engaged.
M A N also raised questions about companies which were not
covered by the classifications of the 1972 NEPD, and how they were to
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conform with the 1970/74 National Development Plan. The plan states:
"the government will encourage nationwide equity participation in
all manufacturing industries." Already the prospect of a Schedule
III (which was to be introduced in the 1977 NEPD) was embedded in
MAN's memorandum of 1972 to the NEPB.
The queries raised by MAN led to a meeting with NEPB officials
which gave MAN the opportunity to both clarify its questions and
provide some recommendations, which were later accepted by the NEPB.
Two such recommendations were to take steps to develop manpower and
create credit facilities for effective implementation, and a strong
machinery to ensure 40% indigenous participation in Schedule II
enterprises on a continual basis. Both the management training board
and the NBCI were set up in 1973. Statements from representatives
of business firms, Associations, and documentary evidence confirm
that many of the suggestions which they offered to the Federal
government were accepted and incorporated in the indigenisation Decree.
The interest of NACCIMA, representative of the commercial and
service sectors of the economy, and MAN often overlap because of the
dual activities of some of the large manufacturing firms. Therefore
the distinction between the manufacturers and the commercial sector
should not be over—emphasised, as far as the large national organised
groups are concerned. An interview with officials of MAN in 1985
revealed that though there are some latent sources of conflict among
members who represent technical, commercial and other aspects of
manufacturing interests, open conflict surfaces only occasionally.
Most pronounced are conflicts between, on the one side, the
commercial and manufacturing sectors, and on the other side those
business organisations that represent, for example, services industries
such as transporters. Indigenous business groups compete amongst themselves
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for State benefits and for partnership with foreign capital. This
was typified by the conflict which occurred in 1972 between the Nigerian
Chamber of Commerce and Industries (NCCI) and the Nigerian Chamber of
Indigenous Contractors (NCIC), over the government's policy on
expatriate quota allocations. 42 In the construction boom of the 1970s,
when large contracts were awarded to indigenous and foreign companies,
government attempts to restrict expatriate allocations were hardly
welcome to indigenous contractors who depended on expatriates for the
execution of the contracts.
Perhaps nowhere is the relationship between the manufacturing
sector and other sectors of the economy more controversial than in the
case of distributors of manufactured goods. Distribution is
	 an
area reserved exclusively for Nigerians, with the exception of a few
Schedule II and III companies that have operational bases in almost
every State of the Federation.
(vi)
	
Manufacturers and Distributors
Attention has already been given in other studies to the relationship
between the manufacturing sector and the distributive network in other
countries. Peter Evans (in "Dependent Development") portrayed the
distributive system in Brazil as a source of strength for local capital.
In Nigeria, however, the reservation of distributive agencies to
indigenous businessmen could prove to be a source of potential weakness
for the alliance between foreign and indigenous capital, and pose a
threat to efficient production and distribution. In recent years, both
public disquiet and official discontent has been directed even against
manufacturers because of their acquiescence in the behaviour of
distributors, accusing both parties of "greed". The image of the
former is tarnished by the reputation of the latter. The NLC also
expressed concern about the role of middlemen in the Nigerian economy,
most notably in December 1983.
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The flaws in the Nigerian distributive system are acknowledged
in official circles. In 1983, the Governor of CBN, A. Ahmed, said:
"I would . . • like to touch • • • the fate of the
consumers of Nigerian manufacturers, who are made to
pay exorbitant • • • prices, even where there are no
shortages. This practice is a product of our peculiar
distributive system. A distributive system that
guarantees higher profit margins to the middlemen
than to the producers needs to be re-examined. It
is also paradoxical that producers either covertly
or overtly nurture and protect such a system. Even
where producers of branded products advertise retail
prices, distributors and retailers insist on a
different set of prices far above the advertised ones.
This type of situation is sustainable only because,
very often buyers are not allowed direct access to
producers • • ." 43
The 8th progress report of the NEPB (1983) throws more light on
the defects of Nigeria's system of distributing manufactured products.
The report identifies a very limited and geographically restricted
concentration of distributive agents who serve well beyond their State
of origin. In turn, sub-distributors are appointed who in turn make-up
the price. The extra profit made in this extended system of distributor-
ship is an additional revenue for the sole distributor companies who
are also paid commission by the manufacturers. Both manufacturers and
distributors benefit from the extended system of distribution, &nd'it is the
finalconsumer who pays the inflated price.
The Board has observed that most of the large companies which
complied with "Section 7 (1) of the 1977 Indigenisation Decree (e.g.
SCOA, CFAO, UAC) are engaged in distribution of locally produced goods
and are . . . guilty when it comes to the question of greed to remain
44
as sole distributors of some manufacturing companies." The tendency
of sole distributors to monopolise other companies' products is also
noted. The report further observed that even when manufacturing firms
appoint Nigerian individuals and associations as distributors, usually
they are allocated only a token number of products. The bulk goes to
expatriate distributors at a lesser price, and in most cases with credits
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on soft terms. Accordingly, the Board urged that the NEPCs take over
distributorships, although the Federal government is unlikely to
countenance such a move given its general ideological commitment to
capitalism and the opposition of organised business pressures.
If the industrial capitalists tried to remove the middlemen so
as to improve their own reputation, then they would be attacking a
significant group which, by ensuring that distribution agencies
remain in private hands, adds some ideological legitimacy to the
indigenous capitalist system. In this sense, the distributors embrace
the interests of private manufacturers. Transnational firms which have
less than N25 million annual turnover and operate in less than 10
States of the Federation are not allowed by the 1977 NEPD to become
involved in distribution. Thus, in the absence of other alternative
distributors, manufacturing firms are unlikely to welcome any proposals
for a State monopoly of distributive services. 45
 Defective though it
is, the private distribution system is likely to remain.
In conclusion to this chapter, the evidence from Kano, at least,
suggests that there is a latent frustration among some of the leadership
of the private indigenous business community because of their inability
to acquire shares in manufacturing and commercial firms which come
under the Decrees. How long can the partnership introduced by the
indigenisation exercise remain the exclusive preserve of the existing
members of the alliance? Increasing demands from sections of the
business sectors and elsewhere for a renewed squeeze on foreign capital,
owing to their exclusion from the direct benefits of indigenisation up
uktil . now, are bound to run into objections from those other sections of
the business community which wish to retain the consolidated partnership
with aliens and foreign capital l and who have even called for the relaxation
of existing indigenisation measures. The balance of political influence
among these different socio—economic groups cannot be evaluated
in isolation from the nation's
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financial environment. For an extension of indigenisation will only
become possible if the financial position of the State becomes again
as strong as it was in the 1970s, and if a regime with a strong
commitment to "economic independence" occupies p&litical power. For
the time being, indigenisation may have resolved the conflict of
interest between foreign capital and one important section of domestic
capital, but other sections remain still to be satisfied. In so far
as new measures to promote further indigenisation exist as a future
possibility, foreign investors will have to continue to seek security
by associating with private domestic capital and with the State.
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Conclusion
Indigenisation and the Enterprises Promotion Decrees in Nigeria
have sought to bring about a change in the ownership of commercial
and industrial establishments in the country. The State has attempted
to redirect foreign investment and to increase indigenous participation
generally in the economy. Thus in seeking these objectives the State
has not only attempted to bar whole and partial foreign ownership
and activity in certain types of enterprise, but also has actually
encouraged foreign and domestic capital partnership where necessary
for the long term acquisition of technological and managerial skills.
Indigenisation policy came, under the banner of "economic
independence", to promote public and private domestic capital. This
benefitted not only private indigenous businessmen but also the country's
military/bureaucratic personnel and, later, its civilian politicians.
To a large extent, indigenisation policy can be seen as a method of
redistributing extensive parts of already existing foreign investment
to certain sections of the Nigerian population.
In studying Nigeria's indigenisation and the policy of promoting
private indigenous enterprise, a variety of inter-related themes have
been developed and discussed. What broadly emerges is the clear message
that Nigeria's indigenisation policy has transferred large portions of
the economy into the hands of the public and private indigenous sectors.
But indigenisation policy is totally inadequate as a strategy for
economic independence and national development. Large foreign shares
remain well consolidated by virtue of opportunities for new management
contraCts, trade, and the security offered in the new system of alliances
which has included politically influential domestic partners.
From a historical standpoint indigenisation in Nigeria was a
reaction to the dominating presence of foreign business and political
interests in the territories of what was to become modern Nigeria.
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The reaction first came from traditional rulers, indigenous merchants,
traders, workers and nationalist leaders and their parties. But in
spite of a general agitation for greater equality of opportunity in
the economic and administrative spheres, during the colonial period,
little was achieved until after the gaining of political independence
in 1960. That led to administrative and economic opportunities being
4
made available on a much greater scale to educated Africans.
In the first six years after independence, Nigeria was to be
ruled by a party political leadership that clearly identified its
interests and the interests of the country with private enterprise.
To this end, it encouraged foreign investment under generous incentives,
in the pursuit of industrialisation. Although the leadership intended
both foreign and private domestic capital to thrive, the balance in
the economy was heavily biased against indigenes. However, occasional
official statements and parliamentary debates reflected a strong
desire to push foreign capital out of the commercial and service
sectors in favour of indigenous entrepreneurs. The parliamentary
debates also showed the opposition party's willingness to consider
nationalisation.
However, the tension created by the politics of inter-personal,
inter-regional and intra-regional distribution of power and resources
was to lead to the collapse of parliamentary democracy in Nigeria, at
the beginning of 1966. On the 15th of January 1966, the Nigerian
Military swept the politicians out of office and assumed direct rule.
By 1967, Nigeria was plunged into a civil war which lasted for thirty
month. The country emerged from the war with new perspectives on its
economic relations with the outside world and a growing aspiration
for continental leadership. The changes in official thinking coincided
with a foreseeable rise in the financial fortunes of the State, based
on sales of crude oil abroad. The launching pad for indigenisation
- 335 -
was laid by the traumatic experience of the Civil War, which provided
the psychological predisposition of the officials. But the increase
in State oil revenues was to play the most vital part.
The method chosen by the military authorities immediately after
the war in their search for "economic independence" could equally well
have been chosen by their predecessors. Occasional measures of
nationalisation; in such sectors as the oil industry were not part
of a well thought-out long-term plan. The same arguments of national
security were deployed by the government to indigenise the commercial
and industrial sectors of the economy in the 1972 NEPD. By 1974, the
country had witnessed the start of a significant move towards
indigenous ownership and joint ventures between domestic and foreign
capital.
Despite the failures and shortcomings in the implementation of
the 1972 and 1977 NEPDs a substantial part of foreign businesses had
been acquired by indigenous businessmen and their military/bureaucratic
patrons by the end of the 1970s.
Politically, the NEPDs have demonstrated that indigenous businessmen
can successfully lobby the Nigerian State to take a purportedly
"nationalist" stance against foreign businesses. Furthermore, the
inside information, and the knowledge both about government policy
and the methods of acquiring shares which were made available to
officials of the State, has led to a significant participation by
ex-public servants in the fruits of indigenisation. This was
particularly made possible by foreign firms who have preferred
partnel2ship with politically influential citizens. The prominence
of the public officials and the opportunities which they seized from
the indigenisation exercise were resented by many of the businessmen
we have spoken to. Interestingly, resentment is also expressed by
some NEPB officials and a few members of the intelligentsia. No less
- 336 ...
than two-thirds of the 35 people interviewed in questionnaire I
category were critical of the role played by active civil servants.
Socially, the polarisation of society, class formation and growing
inequality of income has become even deeper than before. Labour
unions were not appeased by a partial and unrealistic attempt to
involve them in the indigenisation. Industrial disputes have continued,
with private employers becoming ever more dependent on the State to
control labour. The State itself has become an employer in the private
sector, because of its partnership with private domestic and foreign
capital, and so can directly exercise control.
The economic consequences of indigenisation are also self-evident.
Nigeria has shown the weakness of its indigenisation, which is based
on financial wealth from oil. In the 1980s oil has proven to be an
unreliable source of government revenue and national income and foreign
exchange.
Declines in industrial production, inefficiency, a lack of
private indigenous interest in certain indigenised sectors, and a
continuing dependence by indigenous industrialists on external sources
-
of raw material, spare parts and other essentials, all raise serious
doubts about the ability of the economy at the current stage of its
indigenisation to perform adequately. Those to whom ownership has been
transferred have amply demonstrated their inability to deliver
potential benefits of indigenisation in the form of greater employment
opportunities, foreign exchange conservation, or the production of
cheaply priced consumer goods. In the wake of declining oil revenues,
$1
the tendency of the government between 1980 and 1984 has been to
reinvite foreign capital once again to some of the - areas from which it
had been totally or partially excluded in 1972/74 and 1977/79.
The burden of poor economic performance imposed by private
indigenous ownership is likely to persist until substantial foreign
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investment is made, in partnership with the State, in those areas
already designated to the indigenous private sector.
Many of the officially stated primary objectives of indigenisation
have not yet been achieved. Neither have some of the more secondary
implied aims, such as the aspiration to continental economic (and
political) leadership. Such a lead could perhaps be achieved by a
shift from a mere import substitution industrialisation to State-
foreign ventures with a greater emphasis on export-promotion. However,
a viable export-based economy cannot be one that depends entirely on
external factors of production. At least a major percentage of such
factors must be domestically sourced. If the government can succeed
in encouraging both the private and public sector industries in this
direction, Nigeria will develop a strong market within Africa and
particularly among ECOWAS members. This could be a useful step towards
a strong political role for Nigeria in the affairs of black Africa as
a whole.
Export promotion, a restraint on imports and an overall concern
for the country's balance of payment position might also encourage
foreign capital investors to concentrate in areas of the Nigerian
economy that are most beneficial to Nigeria. Once this pattern of
investment begins to take place, the continuing costs of random
foreign capital investment would be reduced.
The illusion of indigenisation in Nigeria, which professed to
bring economic independence, self-sufficiency, and the eventual
betterment of the standard of living of Nigerians has turned out to
be not a transformation but an economic rearrangement in which the
military/bureaucrats and their business clients, who together designed
and executed the Decrees, have come to be placed in a more privileged
position than ever before. The lesson is that economic independence
and self-sufficiency cannot come by reallocating resources to the
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hands of aspiring indigenous capitalists who have neither the ability
nor the outlook required to involve the mass of the people of Nigeria
in the ownership and management of the economy. To seek genuine
independence is to go against the interests of such a privileged group.
Hence any initiative to transform the economy in a manner that is
sincerely aimed at economic independence must come from somewhere else.
Indigenisation has left out of the immediate direct benefits
workers, peasants and of course petty traders, retailers and the
mass of government employees. In these circumstances, it is likely
that increasing pressure will come first from some of the more articulate
and well organised among the excluded groups, not for greater equity
as such, but instead for greater access to the opportunities for
private individual and group gain. Some professional bodies have
already demonstrated an ability to press their interests sufficiently
well to secure legislation that meets their demands, restricting
foreign competitors in their fields. However, the same cannot be
said of the aggregate mass of the population.
The implementation of the indigenisation Decrees contains its
own seeds of potential -future conflict. First, the concentration of
benefits in the southern region - particularly Lagos and to some
extent Kano, is already responsible for discontent in other parts
of the country. In the absence of further indigenisable foreign
firms which could cushion sectional pressures, those shares which have
already been acquired by the State and Federal governments may have to
be relinquished to the private sector. Publicly owned parastatals
already perceive themselves to be under threat of privatisation. Such
a threatened move is seen in some circles, particularly the southern
States, as an attempt by the present politically dominant northern
elite to restore the economic imbalance between the North and the
South which was created in the early stages of indigenisation.
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If significant denationalisation does take place under the
present or a future government, then sectional manoeuvring by the
inheritors of Nigeria's ethnic and regional politics may come to be
increasingly interpreted by observers in terms of a class-based
framework of analysis. After all, political leaders such as
Dr. N. Azikiwe and Chief 0. Awolowo have already portrayed central
issues of Nigeria's past political economy in a class light. An
example is the Eniigu Mine workers' strike in 1948.
The main weakness of indigenisation policy will lie in the
growing awareness of workers and other groups of their own relative
deprivation, which has been heightened by indigenisation. Their
protest is already manifest in strikes, and some support is given in
columns of the national newspapers which complain of injustice and
inequality in Nigerig‘,society. Indigenisation has tended to sharpen
the consciousness of this large section of the excluded majority,
and has generated widespread resentment against the military/bureaucratic
group which up till now has shown indifference and tolerance of radical
socio-economic and political demands.
The Nigerian military regimes have been fairly liberal and
non-repressive compared to their counterparts in many of the Latin
American countries, but the contrast can be easily explained. The
absence of a well organised and serious challenge to the policies
pursued by successive Nigerian regimes has allowed Nigerian regimes
to tread the softer path. However, in the current stage of Nigeria's
development it is difficult to envisage the early consolidation of a
radical popular social and economic force which can pose a serious
alternative to the government's typically capitalist policies, despite
the occasional agitations for better pay by the tiny industrial working
class. Hence reformist and incremental recommendations are at present
the most realistic improvements to suggest.
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Some suggestions have already been made to improve the NEPD -
particularly in Chapters six and seven above. For example, it has
been argued that the utilisation of the National Provident Fund in
the buying of shares would allow workers to participate in the benefits
of indigenisation. It has also been suggested that, where indigenised
firms continue to remain inefficient, the . .:State should step in to
reorganise the ownership structure and increase greater public
participation. Those private indigenous firms which perform badly
should not qualify for government promotion and assistance, although
private domestic firms which are complementary to other domestic
industries should be given encouragement. A limited public participation
in the intermediate industrial establishments is desirable; and it is
imperative that the State play a greater role in developing capital-
intensive and large industrial establishments.
Nigeria's industrialisation has intensified dependence on
external factors, and as a result foreign borrowing for the importation
of both capital and consumption goods has led to the sort of large
public sector deficits which Nigeria is curremtly uxperiencIng.
The technological base of the Nigerian economy has been shown to be
totally inadequate in relation to the extent to which the economy has
been indigenised in the pursuit of "economic independence". The
private indigenous sector has proven itself ineffectual as a pioneer
of technological innovation.
An alternative to this emphasis on private indigenous capital
which so far has failed Nigeria so badly would be to allow greater
foreign industrial capital investment in partnership with the State.
The cultivation of such a link as this would, of course, have to be
matched by a strong commitment to containing corruption and enforcing
public accountability. In time to come, when joint public ventures
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have developed a capacity to operate independently of external
assistance, and when a greater mastery of modern technology has
been achieved, the government could then choose to pursue a selective
measure of further nationalisation of the foreign shares.
However, the alternative is merely hypothetical, for both
external and internal political opposition to such a strategy in
Nigeria could be expected. There is every possibility that Nigerian
government and politics will continue to be elite-dominated; and
whether military or civilian, the elites have in the past shown no
inclination to seriously entertain socialist policies. Furthermore
it would be unrealistic to expect strong pressures from below for
such policies. Voting behaviour in general elections in the past
has been heavily influenced by regional and ethnic and religious
affiliations, not by principles of an ideological sort. In the 1979
elections for the Senate and the House of Representatives the Unity
Party of Nigeria (UPN) was explicitly in favour of more indigenisation,
and became the second largest party in terms of seats won. The Peoples'
Redemption Party was the only party to canvas on a left-wing ticket,
and it won only 7 seats (out of 95) in the Senate and 49 seats (out
of 449) in the House of Representatives.
Thus the suggestion that private sector participation be reversed
or restricted in those firms which have already been partially
indigenised, is unlikely to be adopted by any government which
conforms to the types of capitalist-oriented political regime which
have ruled Nigeria since independence. The inequity throughout
sociei'y which has been fostered by the main economic decisions of
pro-business and self-centred civilian and military/bureaucratic
governments has come to be rationalised and legitimated. It is
accepted in far too many areas as a necessary feature of any path
to development which complies with the parameters of indigenous
capitalism. Each successive regime has either strengthened
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the private indigenous hand in the economy, or partially lapsed into
the previous forms of reliance on foreign capital investment, usually
under pressure or by default rather than by design. Nigeria appears
for the time being anyway, to be locked into a self-defeating cycle of
indigenisation, de-indigenisation and re-indigenisation.
0
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, Decree No. 4
[23rd February 1972]
THE FEDERAL MILITARY GOVERNMENT hereby decrees as
follows :—
General
1.--(1) There is hereby established a body to be knon a. the Nigerian
Enterpiises Promotion Board (in this Decree hereafter referred to as "the
BoArd"). uhich shall have and may exercise such functic.ns as may he
cm:erred on it by ur under this Decree.
(2) The Board shall have general power to advance arid develop the
Fomotion of enterprises in which citizens of N i geria shall r,rticipate ful:y
and play a dominant role and in particular, witheut prtjudice to the generality
of the foregoin c_!, t::e I3oard shall have power—
(a) to advise the C..mmiss i ner on c'early defined policy guide-lines
ior the promoticn uf Nizerian enterprises
(b) to determine an y  :natter relating to bm.iness enterpri 4es in Nii.lcria
generr, 1:y in reset ci commerce am: industry th.,t may be referred
Commence-
ment.
••
Establish-
ment of
Enterprises
Promotion
Board, etc.
cl••••• ••n•
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Establish-
ment of
Enterprises
Promotion
Committees,
etc.
to it in accordance with any directive of the Commissioner, and to make
such recommendations as may be necessar; on those matters in such
manner as may be directed by the Col . -nissioner ; and
(c) to perform such other functions as the Commissioner may determine,
or as may be conferred on it by this Decree or any other enactment,
so however, that in the exercise of any power or the performance of any
function by or under this Decree the Board shall not act, in relation to any
of the enterprises specified in Schedule 1 or 2 to this Decree which is purely
a commercial undertaking, except on the advice of the Permanent Secretary,
Federal Ministry of Trade.
(3) The members of the Board shall be appointed by the Commissioner
and shall comprise—	 •
(a) the Permanent Secretary, Federal Ministry of industries, who shall
be the Chairman ;
(b) one representative each of the following Federal Ministries, that is-
'	 (i) Trade ;
(ii) Finance ;
	 —
(iii) Economic Development and Reconstruction ; and
(iv) Internal Affairs ; and
(c) three representatives of development or investment agencies incor-
porated in Nigeria.
(4) There shall be a Secretary to the Board who shall be an officer in
the Federal Ministry of Industries.
(5) The Board shall have power to co-opt any pima to attend its
meetings.
(6) A member of the Board shall hold office for such period as may be
specified in the instrument of appointment.
2.—(1) There is hereby established for each State a Nigerian Enterprises
Promotion Committee (hereafter in this Decree referred to as"the committee").
(2) The committee in each State shall consist of—
(a) the Permanent Secretary responsible for industries in the State
who shall be the chairman of the committee ;
(b) an officer in the Ministry of Trade ;
. (r) the Registrar of Co-operative Societies ;
(d) three other persons to be appointed by the State Commissioner or
State Commissioners, as the case may be, for trade and indu.: tries,
and members of such corntrktee shall hold office for such period as may be
directed by the Military Governor of the State.
(3) The committee shrll have, power to co-opt any person to attend
its meetings.
(4) The secretary of the committee shall be an officer in the Ministry of
Trade or Industry of the State or any other fit and competent person in the
public service of the State appointed by the Military Governor of that State.
(5) The principal function of the committee shall be—
(a) to assist and advise the Board on the implementation of this Decree ;
(b) to ensure that the provisions of this Decree shall be complied with
by any alien resident or carrying on business in the State ;
(c) to recommend to the Board such othe: measures as may be necessary
in the opinion of the committee to enable full effect to be given to the
provisions of this Decree ; and
;.-
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(II) to perform such other functions as may be assigned to it by the Board.
(6) If in any State any office mentioned in this section does not exist
or is combined with another office the reference in any paragraph to the
office mentioned therein shall be construe4 as a reference to that office
or the offices so combined in the St. c which in the opinion of the Military
Governor most nearly corresponds to the office so mentioued, and the
decision of the Military Governor in this regard and as to the number of
members of the committee shall be nal.	
•
(7) In this section, the reference to the Military Governor of the State
includes a reference to the Administrator of East-Central State.
	 F-
t
the Board or any committee established by this Decree may determine its 
Supple-3.--(1) Subject to such directions as may he given by the Commissioner,
own quorum, and may, subject as aforesaid, otherwise regulate its own
nietntary
as 0 
pr 
o-	 i
proceedings.	
provisions
(2) There may be paid to the members of the Board remuneration and 
ccedings,
allowances payable in accordance with the current regulations of the Govern- 
etc.
 Board andd o
(3) The validity of any proceedings 3f the Board or of any committee 
a State
mcnt of the Federation.	 committee.
i
i
shall not be affected by—	 1
i-(a) any vacancy in its membership,
(b) any defect in the appointment of any member, and
.(c) the fact that a person not entitled to do so takes part in the pro-
	
'C
ceedings of the Board or, as the case may 'el, of the committee.
	
i
(4) The expenses of the Board in the exercise of its functions shall be
paid out of funds provided by the Government of the Federation.
	
l
F
Promotion of Nigerian Enterprises 
t
4.—(1) All enterprisea specified in Schedule 1 of this Decree are hereby, Enterprises /
subject to the provisions of this Dccree, exclusively reserved for Nigerian !
citizens or associations, and accordingly— 	 ,	
exclusively
reserved for	 .
(a) as from the appointed day, no person, other than a Nigerian citizen 
Nigerians.
or association, shall be the owner or part owner of any such enterprise 
Schedule 1.
iin Nigeria: and
i(b) no alien enterprise on or after the date of commencement of this 1Decree shall be established in Nigeria.	 t
(2) For the purposes of subsection 1 (b) above, an enterprise shall be
	
e
tdeemed to be an "alien enterprise", unless the entire capital or proprietary
	 I
interest, whether financial or otherwise, in the enterprise ; ii so far as it	 I
citizens o.. v! ...,ociations.
1
concerns any
by Nigerian
 the enterprises in Schedule 1 below, is also owned and
controlled 
(3) Nothing in this section shalt, r.,-. from the date of ccmmencement
of this Decree and before the apv'med day, preclude the sale or transfer
by any person of any cf the enterprises affected hy this section. 	 1
n
I
enterries specified in Schedule 2 of this Decree are hereby, Enterprises
subject to the provisions of this Dec! ee, barred to aliens, and accordingly, 1
5.—(l) Al l	 v 	
no alien shall, as from the appointeu day. ne the owner or part owner of any 
p
aliens.
zally
ed to
such enterprise—
	
barr
	
i
a) where—
Schedule 2.
( i
(i) the paid-up shart! ..apital o c the ente;prize does not exceed 	 1-
L200,000, or	 1
-
— • —.ma- • -	 " "
ram-
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Inspectors of
enterprines.
(ii) the turnover of the enterprise does net exceed £500,000,
whichever the Board considers to be appropriat n
 and applicable in relation
to such enterprise ; and
(b) if the paid-up share capital exceeds £200,000 or the said turnover
exe,eds £500,000 (whichever is appropriate and applicable), where the
equity participation of Nigerian citizens or associations in the enterprise
is less than 40 per cent, and
no alien enterprise shall be established, on and aaer the date of commence-
ment of this Decree, as respects any of the said enterprises, or continue to-be
operated otherwise than as permitted under this Decree.
(2) For the purposes of subsection (1) above—
(a) the references to the "paid-up share capital" and the "turnover"
of any enterprise relate to the paid-up share capital or the turnover of
the enterprise, as reflected in the accounts submitted to the Federal Board
of Inland Revenue for the purpose of income tax returns during the year
of assessment 196869, 1969/70 and 1970/71 (whichever is the highest)
or in the case of an enterprise established after 1st April 1971, subject as
in subsection (1) above, from the year of assessment next following the
year when such enterprise was established;
(b) "equity participation" means equity shares or other capital contri-
butions; and
(c) an enterprise shall be deemed to be an alien enterprise-
(i) as respects the operation of subsection (1) (a) of this section,
	
•
unless the paid-up share capital or proprietary interest, whether financial
	
or otherwise, in the enterprise is also owned and controlled by Nigerian
	
,	 4
citizens or associations, and
(ii) as respects the operation of subsection (1) /b) of this section,
unless the conditions therein stated regarding the equity participation
of Nigerian citizens or associations in the enterprise are, as from the
commencement of this Decree, complied with.
(3) Notwithstanding the foregoing provisions, an exemption may
with the approval of the Federal Executive Council be granted in respect of
any enterprise to which this section relates by the Commissioner—
(a) with a view to enabling any alien to comply with any of the conditions
set out in subsection (1) (a) and (b) of this section ; and
(b) on any application made to him within such period not being
earlier than 4 months before the appointed day,
and the exemption may with such approval be granted, subject to such
conditions as the Commissioner mav on the recommendation of the Board
specify, for an initial period of 6 months after the appointed day.
(4) Any exemption granted pursuant to the foregoing provisions may
be renewed by the Commissioner on the recommendation of the Board
and with the approval of the Federal Executive Council for a further period
of not more than 6 months at a time on any subsequent application therefor.
6.—(1) Without prejudice to the operation of any other enactment,
there shall be for the purposes of this Decree a number of inspectors of
enterprises (in this Decree hereafter referred to as "inspectors") who shall
be members of the public service of the Federation.
(2) The inspectors shall, subject to this section, have such powers and
carry out such functions as the Commissioner may confer on them.
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(3) Notwithstanding the foregoing subsection (2), for the purpobc of
carrying out any of their functions, such inspectors—
(a) shall have a right of access at all times a: may be necessary to any
building or premises where any enterprise is being carried on or which
they reasonably suspect is being used for any purpose to which this Decree
relates ;
(b) may inspect such building or premises, or business, in order to
determine whether or not the building or premises is being, used, or as
the case may be the business is being carried on ,
 for the purposes authorised
by this Decree, and may require the production of all books of account or
other documents and inspect them for ensuring that the provisions of this
Decree arc being complied with ; and
(r) shall be entitled to require from the directors or other officers of the
enterprise such information and explanation as may be deemed necessary.
(4) Any person, who-
• (a) without lawful excuse the proof of which shall lie on him—
(1) refuses to admit into his building or premises any inspector
appointed under this section ; or
(ii) denies such inspector the right to inspect the building or premises
or the business for the determination of the matter specified in sub-
section 3 (b) above ; or
(iii) refuses or neglects to give any information which any inspector
may require from him ; or
(b) in respect of any request for information from any inspector, makes
any statement which he knows to be false or which he has no reason to
believe to be true ; or
(c) in any way obstructs any inspector in the dischargf of such functions
as may be conferred on him by this section ;
shall be guilty of an offence under this Decree.
7. The Board may by instrument in writing, notwithsianding section
6 (I) above, request any person to furnish such estimates, returns, or other
information as may be specified, and he may by that instrument specify
the time, manner and form in which such estimates, returns or information
are to be furnished, and it shall be the duty of any such person to comply
with the request.
8, The Commissioner may as from the commencement of this Decree
and before the a- pointed day or such other day as may be specified for the
purposes of any particular order (or in respect of any enterprise), by an order
published in the Federal Gazette with the prior approval of the Federal
Executive Council—
(a) alter the list of enterprises specified, respectively, in Schedules 1
mod 2 of this Decree by way of addition, substitution or deletion ;
(6) as specified in sectior. 5 above, vary the amount of the paid-up share
capital of the enterprise, the turnover of the enterprise, the extern of the
equity participation of Nigerian citizens or associations in the enterprise,
and the years of assessment which shall be applicable cr any of those
matters ; and
(c) make such different provisions in relation to different enterprises
or as re_spects different areas of the Federation, and impose such terms
and conditions as he may deem necessary.
Supply of
information.
Alteration e4
the lists of
enterprises
, 
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9. The Commi,siJner may, without prejudice to the powers exercisable
under section 5 above and subject thereto, with the prior ap p roval of the
Federal Executive Council, by an order published in the Federal Ga7ette
exempt any existing enterprise from all Cr any of the provisions of this
Decree and may (subject as aforesaid and with such approval) impose in
relation to any exemption such conditions as he may think fit.
Offences and Penalties
1.0.—(l) Any person, who—
(a) acts as a front or purports, for the purposes of defeating or in a
manner likely to defeat the object of this Decree, to be the owner or part
owner of any enterprise ; or
(5) operates any enterprise for or on behalf of any alien who is under this
Decree--
•	 (i) not permitted to operate the enterprise ; or
(ii) disqualified from operating the enterprise ; or
(iii) not permitted to own or be part owner of such enterprise,
shall be guilty of an offence under this section, and shall be liable on conviction
to a fine of £7,500 or to imprisonment for a term of 5 years or to both such
fine and imprisonment.
(2) It shall not be lawful for any Nigerian citizen or association to
employ, whether on full time or part time basis, any alien for the operation
of any enterprise previously owned wholly or partl y by that alien which the
alien has disposed of pursuant to the provisions of this Decree, except with
' the written prior approval of the Federal Commissioner for Internal Affairs.
11.—(1) Any person found guilty of any offence under this Decree for
which no penalty is provided shall upon conviction be liable to a fine of
L5,0r.x3 or be sentenced to imprisonment for 5 years or to both such fine and
imprisonment.
(2) Any person who contravenes an y of the provisions of this Decree
shall, except as otherwise prescribed, be guilty of an offence and shall be
sentenced upon conviction to a fine of £500 or to imprisonment for 3 years
or to both such fine and imprisonment.
Additional
penalty for
contraven-
tion of
sections
4 and 5
above.
(3) Where any offence under this Decree is committed by a body of 	 .
persons then—	 -
(a) in the. case of a body corporate, other than a partnership or other	 .
association, every director or officer of that body shall be deemed to be
guilty of the offence
(1)) in the case of a partnership or other association, every partner or
officer of that body shall be deemed to be guilty of the offence.
(4) No person shall, however, he deemed to he guilty of an offence under
subsection (3) above, if he proves to the satisfaction of the court that
the offence was committed without his consent, and that he exercised all
due diligence to prevent the commission of the offence having regard to
all the circumstances.
12.--(l) Where, on or after the appointed day, any alien continucs to be
the owner o: part rmner of any enterprise in contravention of section 4 or 5
above, unless exempted under the provisions of this Decree, it shall be
lawful for the Board--
(a) to take over, sell or otherwi.,e dispose of the enterprise, and
1'
Reeulations
and reports.
!tight PI
pt
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(b) to distribute the proceeds of such sale or disnusal (if any)- •
(i) in the case of partnersLips, to the pronrietors of the entermi F e duly
registered as such under the Registra:iop of Business Names Act 1961
(ii) in the case of companies registered under the Companies Decree
1968, to the shareholders of the company ; and
(iii) in any other case, in such manlier as may be directed by the
Board, and
any expenses incurred by the Board in relation to the exercise of an y of thc
powers conferred by this subsection shall be a charge upon and be defrayed
.	 ,
by the Board from the proceeds ef such sale or disposal.
(2) It shall be sufficient for the purposes of taking over any enterprise
under subsection (1) (a) of this section —
(a) in the case of partnership 4 , if the certificate of registration or business
permit of the enterprise is cancelled
(b) in the ease of a compan y, if the certificate of registration or business
permit of the company is cancelled ; and
(c) in either case, if the assets of the association are registered by the
Registrar of Business Names, or as the case may be, the Registrar of
Companies or any person duly authorised to do so, in the name of
the Federal Military Government.
(3) In this section, "business permit" means any business permit issued 1963 No. 6.
pursuant to section 8 of the Immigration Act 1963.
Supplementary Provisions
13.—(1) The Commissioner may make regulations generally for the
purpose of giving effect to the provisions of this Decree, and ma y
 in
particular, without prejudice to the generality of thct foregoiag ca-orisioas
make regulations—
(a) prescribing the forms for returns and other information required
under this Decree ;
(b) prescribing the detailed powers and functions of inspectors apoointed
for the purposes of this Decree ;
(c) for the procedure for the obtaining of any information required
under this Decree ;
(d) requiring returns to be made, within the period specified therein,
by any enterprise to which this Decree appiies ;
(e) prescribing any fees payable under this Decree ; and
(f) prescribing such other matters as may be referred to hint by the
Federal Executive Council.
(2) Any tegulations made pursuant to subsection (1) above shall be
presented to the Federal Execome Council for the approval of that Council
together with anv report and recommendations of the Board including any
measures which the Commissioner proposes in relation thereto.
14. An y pc-son aczrieved by an) decio of the Board or by the
exercise b y the Band of an y po..1/4er under this Decree shall lin e the right
to forward a pc:ition on such ^rie yance to the Commissioner w ho may,
notwithstandini , anythin: to the contrary in this Decree and subject to the
approval oi the Federal Executive Council, confirm or reverse the decision
ui the Board or take such forther measures in relation to the petition as he
nuy think just and reasonable.
1961 No. 17.
196S No. St
Exclusion
of
Intcrpreta-
lion.
1963 No. 20
1960 No. 43.
•
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' 1.5. Except as otherwise prescribed by this Decree, there shall be no
right of appeal against any act, matter or thing done or purported to be done
by or under this Decree ; and, without prejudice to the operation of any
other enactment excluding the jurisdiction of a court of law in respect of
certain proceedings, and for the av ., idance of doubt, no proceedings by way '-
of orig,inating summons, certiorari, mandamus, prohibition, injunction
or any other prerogative writ shall lie or be instituted on account of or in
respect of any such act, matter or thing done or purported to be done.
16.—(1) In this Decree, unless thc context otherwise requires, the
following expressions have the meanings respectively assigned to them— .
"alien" means a person or association whether corporate or unincorporatc,
other than a Nigerian citizen or association ;
"appointed day" means 31st March 1974;
"Commissioner" means the Federal Cpmmissioner for Indust; ies
"enterprise" includes any industrial or commercial undertaking ;
"Nigerian citizen or association" means—
(a) a person who is a citizen of Ni geria by virtue of the Constitution
of the Federation and the Nigerian Citizenship Act 1960;
(b) any person of African descent not being a citizen of Nigeria, who
is a national of an y country in Africa which is a member countr y of the
Organization of African Unity, and who continues to reside and carry
on business in Nigeria, if the country of which he is a national also
permits citizens of Nigeria to establish and operate businesses or enter-
prises in that country on the basis of reeprocity ; and
1963 No. 51. (c) any company registered under the Companies Decree 1968
partnership, association or body (whether corporate or unincorporate),
and except as otherwise prescribed by or under this Decree, the entire
capital or other financial interest of which is ownechwholly and exclusively
by citizens of Nigeri?
"ownership" in relation to any enterprise includes any proprietary
interest in the enterprise beneficially, and any derivative of that word
shall be construed accordingly ;
"prescribe" means prescribe by this Decree or by regulations ; and
"supermarket" means supermarket as may be defined from time to time
by the Federal Executive Council
1961 No. 22.	 "year of assessment" has the same meaning as in the Companies •
Income Tax Act 1961.
. (2) The reference in this Decree to "the equity participation of Nigerian
citizens or associations" is a reference to the stocks and shares which Nigerian
citizens or assoc;ations have in such industry which do not bear fixed interest
or dividend.
(3) The references in Schedule 1 and Schedule 2 to "Retail trade"
and "Wholesale distribution" shall be construed, respectively, as including
references to such retail trade and wholesale distribution as may be specified
for thc purposes of this Decree, with the approval of the Federal Executive
Council, by an order made b y the Commissioner.
(4) Section 15 above shall not be so construed as to exclude the right
to appeal against any decision of a court in connection 1% ith any criminal
offence created under this Decree.
Citation and
	 17. This Decree may be cited a .; the Nigerian Enterprises Promotion
extern.
	 Decree 1972 and shall apply throughout the Federation.
I
;
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SCHEDULES
Sections 4 and 16
SCHEDULE 1
ENTERPRISES EXCLUSI . ELY RESERVED
Item
1. Advertising agtncies and public relations business.
2. All aspects of pool betting:business and lotte-ies.
3. Assembly of radios, radiograms, record changers, television sets,
tape recorders and other elcctric domestic appliances not com-
bined with manufacture of components.
4. Blending and bottling of alcoholic drinks.
5. Blocks, bricks and ordinary tiles manufacture for building ..nd
construction works.
6. Bread and cake making.
7. Candle manufacture.
E. Casinos and gaming centres.
9. Cinemas and other places of entertainment.
10. Clearing and forwarding agencies.
11. Hairdressing.
12. Haulage of goods by road.
13. Laundry and dry-cleaning.
14. Manufacture of jewellery and related articles.
15. Newspaper publishing and printing. 1
16. Ordinary garment manufacture not combined with production of
textile materials.
17. Municipal bus services and taxis.
18. Radio and television -broadcasting.
19. Retail Tiade (except by or within the departmental stores and
supermarkets).
20. Rice milling.
21. Singlet manufacture.
22. Tyre retreading.
SCHEDULE 2	 Sections 5 and 16
ENTERPRISES BARRED TO ALIENS UNDER CERTAIN
CONDITIONS
Item	 List of Enterprises
I. Beer brewing.
2. Boat building.
3. BicYcle and motorcycle t y re manufacture.
4. Bottling soft drinks.
5. Coastal and inland waterways shipping.
6. Conrtruction industries.
...••••••••••••••......-•••••• •
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Scittnum: 2—continued	 Sections 5 and 16
7. Cosmetics and perfumery manufacture.
8. Departmental stores and supermarkets.
9. Distribution agencies for machines and technical equipment.
10. Distribution and servicing of motor vehicles, tractors and sparc
parts thereof or other similar objects.
11. Estate agency.
12. Fish and shrimp trawling and processing.
13. Furniture making.
14. Insecticides, pesticides and fungicides.
15. Internal air transport (scheduled and charter services).
16: Manufacture of bicycles.
17. Manufacture of cement.
18. Manufacture of matches.
19. Manufacture of metal containers.
20. Manufacture of paints, varnishes or other similar articles.
21. Manufacture of soaps and detergents.
22. Manufacture of suitcases, briefcases, handbags, purses, wallets,
portfolios and shopping bags.
1
23. Manufacture of wire, nails, washers, bolts, nuts, rivets and other
similar arLicles.
24. Paper conversion industries.
25. Passenger bus services (inter state).
26. Poultry farming.
27. Printing of books.
28. Production of sawn timber, plywood, veneers and other wood
conversion industries.
29. Screen printing on cloth, dyeing.
30. Slaughtering, storage, distribution and processing of meat..
31. Shipping.
32. 'Crave' agencies.
Wholesale distribution.
MADE this 23rd day of February 1972.
GENERAL Y. GOWON,
Head of the Federal Militaty Government,
Contmander-in-Chicf of the Armed Forces,
Federal Republic of Nigeria
1
- 353 -
Nigerian Enterprises Promotion 1972 No. 4	 A 21
EX ?LAN ATOM.
 NO a
(This note does not form part of the above Decree, but is
intended to explain its purpose)
•
Tis Decree establishes the Nigerian Enterorises Promotion Board,
which has the power to ad ...ince the promotion of Nigerian enterprises. 'rhe
Decree also establishes the Enterprises Promotion Contmittee in each State
of the Federation with certain pow ers to assist and advise the Board on the
implementation of the Decree, and to ensure that the provisions of the
Decree are complied with by aliens resident in every State. 	 •
2. Under section 4 of the Decree, the establishment and operation of
certain enterprises (listed in Schedule I of the Decree) are now exclusively
reserved for Nigerian citizens, companies and associations, and certain other
enterprises (listed in Schedule 2 ot the Decree) cannot be operated or carried
on by aliens in Nigeria unless they fulfil certain conditions specified in section
5 of the Decree. The Decree also provides that exemptions may be granted
in certain circumstances, and subject to such conditions as may he deemed
necessary in respect of enterprises affected by the Decree.
3. Any person who acts as a front for the purpose of defeating the
object of the Decree is liable to be prosecuted, and any contravention of any
of the provisions of the Decree is an offence punishable with a fine or
imprisonment or both. The Board also has power, under the Decree, to take
over, sell or otherwise dispose of an y enterprises where there has been a
contravention, and may distribute the proceeds in the manner provided
under the Decree. An aggrieved person may, however, petition the Commis-
sioner for a review of his case.
PGIILISHIL, DT AUTHORITY OF TIIE FEDERAL MILI sARY GOVERNMPNT OF NIGERIA
AND PioN.ir.o bY TIIE MINISTRY OF INFORMATION, PRINTING DIVIPON, LAGOS
-••n••••••n•=.	 •n• ••••• •••••••
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APPENDIX B
NriGER1ATZ	 PROMOTIOI.: DI:CI-a:P. 1977
ARRANGEMENT OF SECTIONS
A 17
Sections
1. Establishment of Nigerian Enter-
prises Promotion Board, etc.
2. Establishment of Enterprises Pro-
:	 motion Committees for the
States, etc.
3. Supplementary provisions with
respect to proceedings of the
Board or of State Conunittees.
4. Enterprises exclusively reserved
for Nigerians. Schedule 1.
5. Enterprises in respect of which 60
per cent of equity must be
owned by Nigerians. Schedule 2.
6. Enterprises in respect of which 40
per cent of the equity must be
owned by Nigerians. Schedule 3.
7. Special provisions in respect of
certain enterprises holding com-
panies.
8. Definition of expressions used in
sections 4 to 6.
9. Sale or transfer of enterprises to
be subject to approval by the
Board and the Capital Issues
Commission.
10. Provisions supplementary to sec-
tion 9.
11. General gArlelines regarding
approval of sales or transfer by
the Board or Commission.
12. Inspectcrs of enterprises.
13. Power to seal up premises.
14. Additional penalty for contra-
vention of the Decree.
15. Supply of information..
16. Alteration of lists of enterprises.
17. Penalty for acting as a front.
18. Offences and penalties.
19. Power of inspector to conduct
prosecutions, etc.
20. Regulations &id reports.
21. Right to petition.
22. Exclusion of rights.
23. Interpretation.
24. Repeal and saving.
25. Citation and commencement.
Sc-rtEDuLEs
Schedule 1.
Scnedule 2.
Schedule 3.
-•-•	 _
• .	 .4	 '	
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(2) There may he paid to the members of the Board or any Committee
remunet ation and allowances payable in accordance with the current regula-
tion.; of the Government of the Federation.
(3) The validity of any proceedings of the Board or of any Committee
shall not be afiected by—
(a) any vacancy in its membership
(h) any defect in the appointment of any member ; or
(c) the fact that any person not entitled to do so took part in the
proceedings.
(4) The experses of the Board in the exercise of its functions shall be
paid out of funds provided by the Government of the Federation.
Promotion of Nigerian Enterprises
4.—(1) All enterprises specified in Schedule 1 to this Decree arc hereby, Enterprises
subject to this Decree, exclusively reserved for Nigerian citizens or associations excluzively
and accordingly—	 reserved forNigerians.
(a) as from the appointed day no person, other than a Nigerian citizen Schedule 1.
or association, shall he the owner or part owner of any such enterprise in
Nigeria ; and
(b) no such enterprise shall be established in Nigeria by an alien on or
after the commencement of this Decree.
(2) Nothing in this section shall as from the commencement of this
Decree and before the appointed day preclude the sale or transfer in accord-
ance with the provisions of this Decree by any person of any of the enterprises
affected by this section.
5. Subject to this Decree, as from the appointed datp no alien shall be
the owner or part-owner of any of the enterprises specified in Schedule 2
to this Decree unless the equity participation of Nigerian citizens or associa-
tions in the enterprise is not less than sixty per cent.
6. Subject as aforesaid, as from the appointed date no alien shall be the Enterprises
owner or part-owner of any of the enterprises specified in Schedule 3 to this in respect	 L
of which	 tDecree unless the equity participation of Nigerian citizens or associations 40 per cent	 t.in the enterprise is not less than forty per cent.	 a the equity	 i
must be	 .-
owned by	 s
Nigerians.
Schedule 3. l
1
	
7.—(1) Notwithstanding sections 4, 5, and 6 above any alien who Special	 I;
immediately before the commencement of this Decree was the owner or provisionf
 in	 i.
respect	 rpart-owner of any body corporate carrying on an enterprise the business of 	 ocertain
which comprised enterprises specified in Schedules 1, 2 and 3 to this Decree enterprises;	 71"
or in any two of those Schedules may after the appointed date continue to be holding
owner or part-owner of any such body corporate if— 	 companies. n
t(a) the annual turn-over of the body corporate was not less than
t-N25,000,000 ;	 t
•
t
f
• i
t
i
Enterprises
in respect of
which 60
per cent of
the equity
must be
owned by
Nigerians.
Schedule 2.
•
•
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(b) the business of the body corporate was king carried on in not less
than 10 States in the Federation
(c) the equity participation of Nigerian citizens or associations is by the
30th June 1977 not less than sixty per mt.
(2) Sections 4, 5 and 6 above shall not apply in the case of any non-
trading holding company the subsidiary companies of which have in respect
of the applicable enterprises by the appointed date, complied with the provi-
sions of this Decree.
(3) For the purposes of subsection (2) above, the expressions "holding
company" and "subsidiary company" have the meanings respectively
196S No. 53. assigned thereto in section 147 of the Companies Decree 1968.
Definition of
expressions
used in sec-
tion '1.
Sale or
transfer of
enterprises
to be subject
to approval
by the Board
and the
Capital
Issues
Commission.
8. For the purposes of section 4 above, an enterprise shall be deemed to
be an alien enterprise unless the entire capital or proprietary interest,
whether financial or otherwise, in the enterprise in so far as it concerns any
of the enterprises in Schedule 1 to this Decree is also owned and controlled
by Nigerian citizens or associations.
9.—(1) As from the commencement of this Decree no enterprise to
which section 4 of this Decree applies (whether or not operated by or as a
company) and no enterprise to which section 5, 6 or 7 of this Decree applies
which is being operated otherwise than by or as a public company shall be
sold or in any manner transferred to Nigerian citizens or associations unless
the terms and other conditions of and pertaining to the sale or transfer have
been approved by the Board.
(2) As from the commencement of this Decree as aforesaid no shares in
or in respect of any enterprise to which section 5, 6 or 7 of this Decree applies
which is an enterprise operated by or as a public company shall with a view to
securing compliance (to any extent whatsoever) with the provisions of section
5, 6 or 7 of this Decree be sold or in any manner transferred to Nigerian
citizens unless the approval of the Capital Issues Commission (hereafter
referred to as "the Commission") has been obtained with respect to—
(a) the price at which the shares are to be sold or transferred and the
timing of the sale ; and
(b) the terms and other conditions pertaining to the sale or transfer,
including the manner of the selection of the buyers or transferees or,
where applicable, the manner of the allotment of the shares among the
buyers or transferees.
(3) This section shall have effect notwithstanding any other requirement
in any law (including, where applicable, the Companies Decree 1968) and
such other law shall he construed subject to this Decree.
(4) Without prejudice to subsection (3) above, the powers conferred on
1973 No. 14. the Commission under the Capital Issues Decree 1973 shall be construed as
including power to grant approvals for the purposes of this Decree and
any rules made by the Commission may be adapted or otherwise modified
by the Commission for the purposes of this Decree.
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(5) Notwithstanding anything to the c.ntrerv in this section the
Commission shall be charged with the function of determining the pr tees of
shares in enterpri.:e. to which the Decree rela:c.: and in tile case of public
companies there shall be an Allotment Committee of that Commission
which shall consist of she following persons that is---
(1) a representative of the Board,
(ii) a representatice of the Lagos Stock Exchange, and
(iii) a representative of the appropriate issuing house.
10.—(1) Where approval of the Board or, as the case may be, of the
Allotment Committee of the Commission has not ben obtained as required
under section 9 of this Decree or if any application in relation thereto has
been refused—
(a) any sale or transfer of any enterprise conccrned or of any shares or
other proprietary interest in or in respect of any affected enterprise shall
be void and shall be of no effect ; and
(h) any moneys received in relation to or connecter: with any of the
trmsactions referred to in the section shall forthwith be repaid without
interest by the vendor or transfetor, and if any such money is not repaid
within 14 days after the date of the notification of the refusal to give the
approval the directors of any company concerned shall be jointly and
severally liable to repay that money with interest at the rate of five per
cent per annum from the expiration of the 14th day : Provided that a
director shall not be liable if he proves that the default in the repayment
of the money is not due to misconduct or negligence on his part, and
that all the moneys involved had been kept in a separate bank account to
facilitate repayment.
(2) The reference in paragraph (b) of subsection (1) tbove to "directors
of a company" shall—
(a) in the case of a partnership, be construed as a reference to the partners
of the body concerned ; and
(b) in the case of any other unincorporated body, be construed as a
reference to the person in whom is vested the beneficial ownership of the
enterprise concerned.
11.—(1) In considering applications for approval pursuant to section 9 of
this Decree the Board or, as the case may be, the Allotment Committee of
the Commission shall have regard to the following general guidelines, that is
to say :—
(a) Beneficial ownership of the enterprises affected should be as wide-
spread as the circumstances of each case would justify and deliberate
efforts must be made to prevent the concentration of ownership in a few
hands.
(b) Except in the case of owner-managers, no enterprise should be sold
or transferred to a single individual and in no ease is a single individual to
be allowed to have control of more than one enterprise.
(c) Where appropriate, allotment rules made or approved by the Board
or the Allotment Committee of the Commission as appropriate shall be
such that would ensure that-
(i) no individual holding more than 5 per cent of the equit y
 of an
enterprise or holding a portion of the equity valued at more than N50,000,
whichever is the higher, is alloted any further portion of the equity in
that enterprise
Provisions
supplement-
ar y to
section 9.
General
guidelines
regarding
approval of
sales Of trans-
fet by the
Board or
Commission
(2) The inspectors shall, subject to this section, have such powers and
carry out such functions as the Board may confer on them.,
	
(3) Notwithstanding subsection (2) above, for the purpose of carrying	 !
out any of their functions, such inspectors—	 t
i(a) shall have a right of access at all times as may be necessary to any
building or premises where any enterprise is being carried on or which
	
they reasonably suspect is being used for any purpose to which this Decree 	 i
relates ; ..
l'(b) may inspect such building or premises, or business in order to deter-
mine whether or not the building or premises is being used, or as the case
may be, the business is being carried on, for the purposes authorised by
this Decree, and may require the production of all books of account or
other documents and inspect them for ensuring that the provisions of this
Decree arc being complied with ; and
(c) shall be entitled to require from the directors or other officers of the
enterprise such information and explanation as may be deemed necessary.
(4) Any person, who—
(a) without lawful excuse the proof of which shall lie on him-
(i) refuses to admit into his building or premises any inspector
appointed under this section ; or
II
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(ii) no individual shall be allot ecl more than 5 per cent of the equity of
an enterprise or any portion of the enterprise valued at more than
N50,000, whichever is higher
(iii) no individual shall be alluted any portion of the equity of an
enterprise that would make any holding of that individual of the equity 	 •
of the enterprise concerned to exceed 5 per cent of the total equity of
thaL enterprise or to attain a value exceeding N50,000, whichever is
higher.
(d) Not less than 10 per cent total ecuity shares of any Schedule 2 or 3
enterprise or where only a fraction is being sold not less than 10 per cent of
the amount of sale is reserved for the employees of the enterprise con-
cerned and of the 10 per cent not less than one half shall be reserved
for the non-managerial staff.
(e) Consideration in a form acceptable to the Board or the Commission
should pass from the transferee to the seller or transferor and, where
appropriate, all rights including agency rights, sole representation and all
other ancillary rights should pass to the buyer or transferee.
• (2) For the purposes of subsection (1) above, the Allotment Committee
shall have regard to information as to the existing shareholdings of indivi-
duals seeking to acquire further interests in enterprises to which this Decree
relates.
Inspectors of
enterprises.
12.—(1) Without prejudice to the operation of any enactment, there
shall continue to be for the purposes of this Decree a number of inspectors of
enterprises (in this Decree hereafter referred to as "inspectors") who shall be
designated as such by an order published in the Federal Gazette by the
Commissioner from among members of the public services of the Federation
and of the States, and when so designated the inspectors shall, as respects
any exercise of the functions conferred upon them by firtue of this Decree
be responsible to the Board and no other person or authority.
Additional
penalty for
contraven-
tion of the
Decree.
i•
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(ii) denies such inspector the right to in 3p,.e; the hoi/diag or premises
or the busine; for the detcrmination or the matter specifit rt in subsection
(3) (b) above ; 07
(iii) refuses or neglects to give any information which any inspector
may 'quire from him ; or
(b) in respect of any request for information from any inspector, makes
any statment which he knows to be false or which he has no reason to
believe to be true ; or
(c) in any way obstructs any inspector in the d;scharge of such functions
as may be conferred on him by this section,
shall be guilty of an offence under this Decree.
13.—(1) If the Board is satisfied that—
(a) an alien has been engaging in any of the enterprises specified in
Schedule 1 to this Decree ; or
(b) that an alien enterprise is being carried on in contravention of section
5, 6 or 7 or any other provision of this Decree,
the Chairman of the Board may direct an inspector to seal up any premises in
which the offending enterprise is being carried On.
;
Power to
seal up
premises.
(2) Whenever an inspector has sealed up any premises he shall be
deemed to have been duly directed to do so by the Chairman.
(3) Every police officer shall if called upon by an inspector give all
reasonable assistance to the inspector necessary to effect the sealing up of any
affected premises and to prevent unauthorised persons from having access
to or interfering with the premises or any goods contained therein.
14.—(1) Where, on or after the appointed day, any alien continues to
be the owner or part owner of any enterprise in contravention of section 4 of
this Decree, it shall be lawful for the Board—
(a) to take over, sell or otherwise dispose of the enarprise, and
(b) to distribute the proceeds of such sale or disposal (if any)—
(i) in the case of partnerships, to the proprietors of rthe enterprise
duly registered under the Registration of Business Names Act 1961 or
any other applicable law
(ii) in the case of companies, to the share-holders of the company
and
(iii) in any other case, in such manoer as may be directed by the
Board ; and
any expenses incurred by the Board in relation to the exercise of any of the
powers conferred by this subsection shall be a charge upon and be defrayed
by the 13oatd from the proceeds of such sale on disposal.
(2) It shall be sufficient for the purposes of taking over any enterprise
under subsection (1) (a) of this section—
(a) in the case of partnerships, if the ce rtificate of registration or
business permit of the enterprise is cancelled
(b) in the case of a company, if the certificate of registration or business
permit of thc company is cancelled ; and
(c) in other case, if the assets of the association arc registered by the
Registrar of Business Names, or as the case may be, the Registrar of
Companies or any person duly authorised to do so, in the name of the
Federal l ilitary Government.
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1963 No. 6.
Sup; ly of
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Alteration of
lists of enter-
prises.
Penalty for
acting as a
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Offences and
penalties.
(3) In this section "business permit" means an' business permit issued
puisuant to section 8 of the Immigration Act 1963.
15.—(1) The Board may by instrument in writing, request any person
carrying on any enterprise to which this Decree relates to furnish such
estimate3, returns or other information as may be specified and he may by
that instrimcnt specify the time, manner and form in which such estimites,
returns or information are to be furnished, and it shall be the duty of any
such person to comply with the request.
(2) Any person, who--
(a) 'refuses or neglects to give any information which the Board may
require pursuant to subsection (1) above ; or
(b) in tespect of the information so required make any statement which
he knows to be fa lse or which he has no reason to believe to be true,
shall oc guilty of an offence and shall on conviction be liable to a fine of
N1,000 or to imprisonment for three years.
16. The Commissioner may with the prior approval of the Federal
Executive Council as from the commencement of this Decree and before
the appointed day or such other day as may be specified for the purposes of
any particular order (or in respect of any enterprise) by an order published
in the Gazette—
(a) alter the list of enterprises specified, respectively in Schedules 1, 2 or
3 to this Decree by way of addition, substitution or deletion
(b) as respects section 6 or 7 above, vary the extent of the equity
participation of Nigerian citizens or associations in the enterprise
(c) make such diflerent provisions in relation to different enterprises
or as respects different areas of the Federations, and impose such tern-is
as hc may deem necessary.
•
Offences and Penalties
17.—(1) Any person who—	 -
(a) acts as a front or purports for the purpose of defeating or in manner
likely to defeat the object of this Decree, to be the owner or part owner of
any enterprise ; or
(b) operates any enterprise for or on behalf of any alien who is under
this Decree—
(1) not permitted to operate the enterprise ; or
(ii) disqualified from operating the enterprise ; or
(iii) not permitted to own or be part owner of such enterprise,
shall be guilty of an offence under this section, and shall be liable on convic-
tion to a fine of N15,000 or to imprisonment for a term of 5 years or to both
such fine and imprisonment.
(2) It- shall not be lawful for any Nigerian citizen or association to
employ, whether on full time or part time basis, any alien for the operation of
any enterprise previously owned wholly or partly by that alien which the
alien has disposed of pursuant to the provisions of this Decree, except with
the prior approval of the Federal Commissioner for Internal Affairs after
con.ultation with the Board.
18.—(1) Any person found guilty of an offence under this Decree for
which no penalty is provided shall upon conviction be liable to a fine of
N10,000 or to imprisonment for 5 years or to both such fine and imprisonment.
•
•-•.1	 •••••• • • •
	 n.••••nn•••n•••...
[i.
Right to
petition.
f
Exclusion of
•	 ^
361 ".
Nigrrian 1,Vrrprises l'romol;on 	 1'3. 77 No. 3	 A 27
(2) Where aiji offence under this Decrce is committed hy a body of
persons, therein—
(a) . in the czme of a body corporate, e vet y director or officer of that
body shall be deemed to be goilty of the oIt,lice
(b) in the case of a partnership or other aLbociation, every partner or
ofncee of that body shall lie &tined to be guilty of the offence.
(3) No person shall, however, be deemed to be guilty of an offence
under subsection (2) above, if he proves to the satisfaction of the court that
flu: offence was committed without his cons...zit and that he exercised all
due diligence to prevent the commission of the offence having regard to all
he circumstances.
19.—(1) Subject to section 104 of the Constitution of the Federation
(which relates to the power of the Attorney-General of the Federation to
institute, continue or discontinue criminal proceedings) any inspector or
officer of the Board may in a court of competent jurisdiction prosecute
an offender for an offence under this Decree.
(2) It shall not be an objection to the competency of an inspector to
give evidence as a witness in any prosecution for an offence under this Decree
that the action is prosecuted or conducted by that inspector.
Miscellaneous Provisions
20.—(1) The Commissioner may make regulations generally for the
purpose of giving effect to the provisions of this Decree, and may in.particular,
without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing provision, make regula-
tions—
(a) prescribing the forms for returns and other information required
under this Decree ;
(b) prescribing the detailed powers and functions of inspectors
(c) prescribing the procedure for obtaining any information required
under this Decree
(d) requiring returns to be made, within the period specified therein,
by any enterprise to which this Decree applies
(e) prescribing any fees payable under this Decree ; and
(f) prescribing such other matters as may be referred to him by the
Federal Executive Council.
(2) Any regulations made pursuant to subsection (1) above shall be
presented to the Federal Executive Council for the approval of that Council
together with any report and recommendations of the Board including any
measures which the Commissioner proposes in relation thereto.
21. Any person aggrieved by any decision of the Board or by the
exercise of any power under this Decree shall have the right to forward a
pet ; :ioil on such grievance to the Commissioner who may, notwithstanding
anything to the contrary in this Decree and subject to the approval of the
Federal Executive Council, confirm or reverse the decision of the Board or
take such further measures in relation to the petition as he may think just
and reasonable.
22. Except 23 OtherWice prescribed by this Decree, there shall be no
right of appeal against any act, matter or thing dune or purported to be done
by or under this Decree ; and without prejudice to the operation of any
other enactment excluding the jurisdiction of a court of law in respect of
Power of
inspector
to conduct
prosecutions,
etc.
1963 No. 20.
Regulations
and reports.
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eel tam procerdings, aud for the avoidance of doubt, no proceedings by way
of 061,1:mi1Ig Fl./II1111011S, eta rtimari, mandamus, prollibitiJn, injtmetion or
any othet prerogative WI it shall lie or be instituted on account of or in respect
of such aet, matter or thing done or purported to be done.
Interpreta- 	23.— (1) In this Decree, unless the context otherwise requires, the
tion.	 following expressions have the meanings respectively assigned to them :—
"alien" means a person or association whether corporate or unincorporate
other than a Nigclian citizen or association
1973 No. 14.
	
	
"appointed date" (a) in the case of any enterprise to which section 7
applies, means Nth June 1977 ; and
(b) in every other case, means 31st December, 1978.
"Commission" means the Capital Issues Commission established by
section 1 of the Capital Issues Decree 1973
"Commissioner" means the Federal Commissioner charged with
responsibility for industries
1963 No. 51.
	
	
"company" means any company registered under the Companies
• Decree 1968 or under any enactment replaced by that Decree
"enterprise" includes any industrial or commercial undertaking
"Nigerian citizen or association" means—
1963 No. 20.
	
	 (a) a person who is a citizen of Nigeria by virtue of the Constitution
of the Federation
(b) any person of African descent, not being a citizen of Nigeria,
who is a national of any country in Africa which is a member country
of the Organisation of African Unity, and who continues to reside and
carry on business in Nigeria, if the country of which he is a national
also permits citizens of Nigeria to establish and op4rate businesses or
enterprises in that country on the basis of reciprocity ; and
(c) any company registered under the Companies •Decree 1968,
partnership, association or body (whether corporate or unincorporate),
and except as otherwise prescribed under this Decree, the entire capital
or other financial interest of which is owned wholly and exclusively by
citizens of Nigeria
"ownership" in relation to any enterprise includes any proprietary
interest in the enterprise beneficially, and any derivative of that word
shall be construed accordingly
"prescribed" means prescribed by this Decree or by regulations
"shares" includes stocks.	
- -
(2) The reference in this Decree to "equity participation of Nigerian
citizens or associations" is a reference to stocks an ,1 shares which Nigerian
citizens or associations have in such industry which do not bear fixed interest
or dividend.
(3) Section 22 of this Decree shall not be so construed as to exclude
the right to appeal against any decision of a court in connection with any
criminal offence created under this Decree.
Repeals and	 24.—(1) The Nigerian Enterprises Promotion Decree 1972 is hereby
saving,
	 repealed and the following enactments, that is to say-
1973 No. 28.	 (a) the Nigerian Enterprises Promotion (Amendment) Decree 1973
1974 No. 7.	 (b) the Nigerian Enterprises Promotion (Amendment) Decree 1974
-
-*
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(e) Ow Nigerian EnterprisLs Pt omotion (Amendment) (No. 2) Decree
1974 7 and
(d) Nigel Lin . Entet prises Promotion Decree 1976,
ale hereby, consequentially, rep...did.
(2) Without prejudice to section 6 of the I merpretation Act 196; the
repeal Of the enactrunIts specified in subsection (1) el this section shall not
Om anything done under or pursuant to those enactments.
25.—(1) This Decree may he cited as the Nigerian Enterprises Pi 0-
notant Decree 1977.
(?) This DLcree shall be deemed to have come into force cat 29th June
1976.
SCHEDULES
SCHEDULE i	 Section 4
EN1 UPRISES EXCLUtIVEL RESERVED FOR NIGERIANS
I. Advertising and public relations business.
2. All aspects of pool betting business and lotteries.
3. Assembl y of radius, radiograms, record changers, television sets, tape
recorders and other electric domestic appliances not combined with
manufacture of components.
4. Blending and bottling of alcoholic drinks.
5. Blozks and ordinary tile manufacture for building and construction works.
Bread and cake making.
7. Candle manufacture.
S. Casinos and gaming centres.
9. Cinemas and other places of entertainment.
10. Commercial transportation (wet and dry cargo and fuel).
11. Commission agents.
11 Departmental stores and supermarkets having an annual turnover of
less than N2,000,000.
13. Distribution agencies excluding motor vehicles, machinery and equipment
and spare parts.
Electrical repair shops other than repair shops associated with distribution
of electrical goods.
15. Establishments specialising in the repair of watches, clocks and jewellery,
including imitation jewellery for the general public.
16. Estate agency.
17. Film distribution (including cinema films).
18. Garment manufacture.
14":
A 29
1974 No. 13
1976 No. 27.
1964 No. 1
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r Ante, prises Amotiun
19. 1 laird rt ssing.
20. Ice-ellm making "s% lien not asscciated with the manufacture of other
dairy products.
21. Indenting and confii ming.
2 7 . Laundry and dry-cleaning.
23. Manufacturers' representatives.
2-1. Manufacture of jeweller) , and related articles, including imitation
jewellery.
25. 'A lanufacture of suitcases, brief cases, hand-bags, purses, wallets, portfolios
and shopping bags.
26. Municipal bus services and taxis.
27. Newspaper publishing and printing.
28. Oflicc cleaning.
29. Passenger bus servic,s of any kind.
• 30. Poultry farming.
31. Printing of stationery (when not associated with printing of books).
32. Protective agencies.
33. Radio and television broadcasting.
34. 1( ‘-tail trade (except by or within departmental stores and supermarkets).
35. Rice milling
36. Singlet manufacture.
37. Stevedoring and shorehandling.
38. Tyre retreading.
39. Travel agencies.	 1
40. Wholesale distribution of local manufactures and other locally produced
goods.
SCHEDULE 2	 Section 5
ENTERPRISES IN RESPECT.OF WHICH NIGERIANS MUST HAVE MAJORITY
INTEREST
I. Banking-commercial, merchant and development banking.
2. Basic iron and steel manufacture.
3. Beer brewing.
.4. Boat building.
5. Bottling of soft drinks.
6. Business services (other than machinery and equipment rental and leas-
ing) such as business management and conwlting services ; fashion
designing.
7. Clearing and forwarding agencies.
8. Canning and preserving of fi u its and vegetables.
9. Coastal and inland waterways shipping.
10. Cuistruction industry.
• ••	 •	 r,Noc••.- .• •	 -••••••,-	 •••	 • •n•-• •
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11. Della; tmental stip i es and sup:inla y]; ets having annual tut foyer of not
les.; than N2,000,1)0J.
12. Dist' ibution agencies for machines and technical equipment.
13. Distribution and servicing of motor vehicles, tractors and spare parts
thereof m similar objects.
14. Fish and shrimp ti awling and processing.
15. Fertilizer production.
16. Grain mill products except rice milling.
17. Industrial cleaning.
18. Ins.Tticides, pesticides and fungicides.
19. Internal air transport (scheduled and charter services).
20. Insurance-all class..
21. Lighterage.
22. Manufactute of bicycles.
23. Manufacture of biscuits and similar dry bakery products
24. Manufacture of cement.
25. 1\ Ianufacture of cosmetics and perfumery.
26. Manufacture of cocoa, chocolate and sugar confectionery.
27. Manufacture of dairy products, butter, cheese, milk and other milk
products.
28. Manufacture of food products like yeast, starch, baking powder, coffee
roasting ; processing of tea leaves into black tea.
29. Manufacture of furniture and interior decoration. Maifufacture of metal
fixtures for household, office and public building.
30. Manufacture of leather feotwcar.
31. Manufacture of matches.
32. Manufacture of metal containers.
33. Manufacture of paints, varnishes or other similar articles.
34. Manufacture of plastic products such as plastic dinnerware, tableware,
kitchenware, plastic mats, plastic machinery parts, bottles, tubes and
cabinets.
35. Manufacture of rubber products, rubber footwear, industrial and
mechanical rubber specialities such as gloves, mats, sponges and foam.
36. Manufacture of tyres and tubes for bicycles and motorycles ; of tyres and
tubes for motor vehicles.
37. I\ Ianu facture of soap and detergents.
0 38. Manufacture of wire, nails, washers, bolts, nuts, rives and other similar
articles.
39. Other manufacturing industries such as non-rubber and non-plastic toys,
pens, pencils, umbrellas, canes, buttons, brooms and brushes, lamp-
shades, tobacco pipes and cigarette holders.
40. Mining and quarrying.
41. Oil milling, cotton ginning and crushing industlies.
42. Paper conversion industries.
43. Plantation sugar and processing.
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Plant,tion acricultut e for tree crops, grains and other cash crops.
45. Printing of books.
46. l';,.dus-tion of snxvn timher, plywood, veneers and other wood conversion
indu,tries.
47. Petro-chemical feed-tack industries.
Pil l nli-hing of hooks, periodicals and such like.
49. Pulp and paper mills.
50. Restaurants, cafes and other eating and drinking places.
Si. Salt refinery and packaging.
5 9 . Screen printing on cloth, dyeing.
53. Inlend and coastal shipping.
S. Slaur,htering, storage associated with industrial processing and dis-
tribution o c meat.
55. Tanneries and leather finishing.
56. Whole:ale distribution of imported goods.
57. Photographic studios, including commercial and aerial photography.
SCHEDULE 3
	
Scciion 6
ENTERPRISES TO WHICH SECTION 6 APPLIES
1. Distilling, rectifvinr: and blending of spirits such as ethyl alcohol, whisky,
brandy, gin and the. like.
2. Tobacco manufacture.
3. Manufacture of basic industrial chemicals (organic ant inorganic) except
fertilizers.
4. Manufacture of s)nthetic resin, plastic materials and man-made fibres
except glass.
5. :11anufacture of drugs and medicines.
6. Manufacture of pottery, china and earthenware.
7. 'Manufacture of glass and glass products.
•	 •8. A1anufacture of burnt bricks and structural clay products.
9. Manufacture of miscellaneous non-metal:c mineral products such as
concrete, gypsum and plastering products, including ready-mixed
concrete ; mineral wool, abrasive ; asbestos products ; graphite products.
10. Manufacture of primary non-ferrous metal products such as ingots, bars
and billets ; sheets, strips, cirales, cecrous, mods, tubes, pipes and wire
rods ; casting and extrusions.
11. Ma1facture of (fabricated metal) cutlery, hand tools and general hard-
ware.
12. Manufacture of structural metal products-components of bridges, tanks,
metal doors and screens, window frames.
13. Manufacture of mi.lcellaneous fabr'cated metal products, except machi-
nery and equipnwnt, such as safes and vaults ; steel springs furnazea
stoves, and the like.
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11. Manufacture of enghies and no bincs.
15. Manufacture of apis ultural machinery and equipment.
16. 'Ala)	 (' of met.d am l wood Wo: king machittery.
17. 'Manufacture . of special industrial machinery and equipmem, such as
te:-.tile and food machinery, paper industry machinery, oil it:lining
machinery an .1 equipment, and the like.
18. Manufactmv cif office, computing and accounting machinery.
19. ganufacture of other machinery and equipment except clic:irk-al equip-
ment, pumps. air and can compressors ; blow nir-conditioning and
ventilating machinery ; refrigerators, and the like.
20. Manufacture of electrical industrial machinerv and apparatus.
21. Manufactute of radio, television and communication equipment and
apparatus.
22. Manufactm •e cif electrical appliances and houseware.
23. Manufacture: of electrical apparatus and suppFes not elsewhere classified,
such as insulated wires and cables, batteries, electric lamps and tubes,
fixtures and lamp switchec, sockets, switches, insulators, and the like.
24. Ship building and repairing (excluding boat building).
25. Manufacture of railway equipment.
26. Manufacture of mo:nr vehicles and motorcycles.
27. Manufacture of aircraft.
28. Manufacture of professional and scientific and measurin g and controlling
equipment, such as laboratory and scientific instruments, surgical, me-
dical and dental equipment, instruments and suppligs and orthopaedic
and prosthetic appliances.
29. Manufacture of photographic and optical goods. •
30. Manufacture of watches and clocks.
31. Ocean transport/shipping.
32. Oil servicing companies.
33. Storage and warehousing—the operation of storage facilities and ware-
houses (including bonded and refrigerated warehouses) for hire by
the general public.
31. Textile manufacturing industries.
35. Hotels, rooming, houses, camps and lodging places.
36. Data processing and tabulating services (on a fee or contract basis).
37. Production of cinema and television films (or motion picture production).
, 38. Machinery and equipment rental and leasing.
39. All other enterprises not included in Schedule 1 or 2 not being public
sector enterprises.
MADI at Lagos this 12th day of January 1977.
LT.-61:NtitA s. 0. OBANANjo,
Head of the Ft di ral Military Government,
Commander-in-rhicf of the ,lrmid Forces,
Federal Republic of Nigeria
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ExPLANAToitY Non,
(This note dor y not frrin part of the a;.(rve Dore( Ina is inter:feu'
to explain its (fleet)
The Decree re-enacts the Ni,-crian F.nterprises Promotion 'Decree 1972
to introduec provisions L.:cesscry for tha implementation 01 the next stage
of OK. inch7enisation programme. The effective date of the Dectee is 29th
June 1976 while the appointed date, that is, the dot,. on wl.;ch all affected
enterpi;:“,.s.ire exp. seted to have complied 'n ith th piovisions of
the Deere'c is 30th June /977 inthe case of enterrn ise:, to which section 7
applie.s, and 31st 1)i:ember 1978 in every other case.
1
I'VALIC111:1) !re ArTilORITY or TIM FEPF‘lAl. Mil 11- ARY GOVr.RNMENT OF DZIGI:RIA
AND PRINILD DY Tin g MINISTRY OF 1 NI ORNIATION,	 1)1V1.310N, LAC:04
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Questionnaire I 
(Administered to officials and ex-officials from the public
sector and to officials of the Manufacturers Association of
Nigeria, and some private businessmen).
1. Who conceived the 1972 Decree?
2. Where did the impulse for the Second Decree come from?
3. What is the difference between the 1972 and the 1977 Decrees?
4. Why was the Second Decree promulgated?
5. Has any particular section of society benefited most from
the indigenisation exercise of 1972?
6. Who benefited most from the 1977 Decree? How significant
do you think was the mandatory 10% clause?
7. Do you think ex-State officials are the major beneficiaries
of indigenisation between 1972 and 1979?
8. Has indigenisation policy helped you in any way to 'join'
your company? How do you think you benefited from indigenisation?
9. When did you come to know about the company? Under what
condition did you join'' the company?
10. What are the main contributions you would say you made to your
firm and to-the national economy by joining the company?
11. Has the Nigerian economy improved or declined since the
implementation of the two Decrees between 1972 and 1979?
12. Have industrial relations improved in your company by virtue
of changes in ownership and management in favour of Nigerian
-370-
citizens?
13. What do you think has been the role of MAN in the agitation
for indigenisation?
14. Who are the main indigenous owners and managers of industrial
capital in Nigeria? Ex-State officials? Traditional
African businessmen?
15. Who or what section of society do you think was most
politically active in bringing about indigenisation?
16. What is the relationship between MAN and the State?
17. Did the Nigerian Press play any role in the indigenisation
exercise between 1972 and 1979?
18. Why do ex-State officials join private business after they
leave office?
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APPENDIX D
Questionnaire II 
(Administered to manual and non-manual employees of indigenised firms)
1. Are you aware of the 1977 Indigenisation Decree which provides
opportunities to employees to own shares in their firm?
2. If you are aware, have you taken advantage of the opportunity?
3. If yes to question two, how? If not, why not?
4. Who has benefited from indigenisation? Do you consider
indigenisation to have been biased against manual employees?
Hoe/Why?
5. Who is to blame for this bias?
6. Do you feel strongly about this? If so, how have your views
of indigenisation affected your behaviour? (e.g. more
politically radical; more willing to strike, etc.).
7. What do you think should have been the main objective of
indigenisation?
8. How can the indigenisation policy be improved to take account
of your interests?
9. Are you a member of a union?
10. If yes, which union?
11. Do you wish to acquire shares as an individual or do you
prefer your union to acquire shares on your behalf?
12. Does the union help you in any way in your dealings with
the management of your firm? i.e. How valuable is
membership of a union?
- 372 -
13. How long have you worked for the firm?
14. If you have been with the company for more than 13 years,
how do you compare your experience with the company under
expatriate ownership and management, and under Nigerian
ownership and management?
15. Are you better paid under indigenous ownership and management?
16. Have you ever gone on strike due to poor pay/working conditions/
or poor relations with Nigerian managers?
17. Do you think that much greater nationalisation and other
'socialist' policies by government would benefit Nigeria?
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515. 	 4.3
National Provident FundEnd of Month
1973 July
August
September
October
November
December
1974 January
February
March
April
May
June
July
August
September
October
November
December
1975 January
February
March
April
May
June
July
August)
September
October
November
December
102,759
104,228
105,666
106,971
108,569
109,725
112,030
114,929
115,669
116,945
118,881
120,267
121,635
123,498
125,143
126,792
128,411
129,746
131,826
133,286
134,861
138,081
140,780
143,304
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The National Provident Fund: Savings Statistics 1973-5
N' 000
Source: Extracted from- (NPF) Econ. Indicators, Fed. Office of Statistics,
Lagos, December 1975.
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APPENDIX G
Nigeria 1960-1985: Brief Chronology of Events
1960, October 1st
	 Nigeria became Independent under
Prime Minister A.A. Tafawa Balewa
1961	 Provident Fund Act establishes the
National Provident Fund.
1962, April 1st
	 First National Development plan
inaugurated.
1963, October 1st
	
-	
Nigeria becomes a Federal Republic.
1966, January 15th
	
First rilitary coup and the end of the
First Republic, General J.A. Ironsi
took over power.
1966, May 24th
1966, July 29th
1966, August 8th
1967, May 27th
Unitary system of government was
established.
Second military coup, General Y. Gowon
took over power.
▪ Federal system of government re-established.
- 12 States were created out of the 4
Regions of the Federation.
1967, May 30th
	
Ojukwu secedes and proclaims the former
Eastern Region as "Biafra".
1967, July 6th	 Beginning of the Nigerian Civil War.
1970, January 12th
-	
End of Civil War and the surrender of
”Biafrall,
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1970, April 1st
	 Second National Development Plan
inaugurated.
1971, May	
•	
Government-owned Nigerian National Oil
Corporation was established.
1971, July	 Nigeria joins OPEC.
1971, August 6th
	
▪ 	
Publication of the final report of the
Adebo Wages and Salaries Review Commission.
1972, February 23rd -
	
NEPD promulgated.
1973, January 1st	
-	
Naira (N) currency introduced
(Ni = 100K (Kobo)
1973, October	
	
OPEC oil prices increase approximately
fourfold inside twelve months (due to
mid-East war).
1974, September 25th -
	
Publication of the first report of the
Udoji Public Service Review Commission.
1975, April let	
-	
Third National Development Plan
inaugurated.
1975, July 29th	
	
Third military coup, General M. Mohammed
took over power.
1975, November 17th -
	
Appointment of Adeosun Panel to report
on the workings of the 1972 NEPD.
1976, February 13th -
	
Attempted military coup failed, head
of State assassinated and General Obasanjo
took over leadership.
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1976, April	 The 12 States of the Federation were
replaced by 19 States.
1976, September	
•	
Universal free primary education launched.
1977, January	 Second NEPD promulgated
1977, April 1st
	
▪ 	
Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation
replaces Nigerian National Oil Company.
April let	 Marketing Boards became National Boards.
1978, January	
	
Nigeria's first heavy borrowing from
Eurocurrency Market.
1978, February	 Nigerian Labour Congress established.
1978, September 21st -	 Civilian constitution promulgated and
ban on politics lifted.
1979, January	
-	
Oil revenue increased (following the
revolution in Iran).
1979, July
1979, August 11th
1979, , October 1st
▪ Elections to the Senate, National House
of Representatives, State Houses of
Assembly, and of State Governors, under
the new Constitution.
- Presidential election.
▪ Military return to barracks and Second
Republic established. Shagari became
the elected President.
1980	
-	
Fourth National Development Plan (1981-85)
was launched.
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1980, April 14th
1981
1982
a
1982
1983, January
Green Revolution (the boosting of
agricultural production) was launched.
Nigerian Enterprises Promotion (alteration
of list of scheduled enterprises) Order.
Government revenue from oil falls to
under half the figure for 1979.
Reclassification of agro-industries
from Schedule II to Schedule III of
the 1977 Decree.
Mass expulsion of West African "aliens"
from Nigeria.
1983, December 31st .- 	 Fifth military coup, General M. Buhari
took over as head of military government.
Civilian constitution suspended.
1985, August 27th	 Sixth military coup. I. Babangida
took over.
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